《易传》与道家哲学的可通约性

<易传>和道家是先秦哲学中最具形上学思维能力的哲学流派.尽管<易传>的"尚刚"和道家的"贵柔"代表了中国传统哲学的两大方向,体现了儒道二家各自的价值取向和人生态度,然而,当<易传>和道家哲学在寻求终极性的形上学根源时,却不约而同地运用了类似的思想方法,即在形而上的"道"论中走到了一起.本文从传统形上学的本原论、本体论和体用论等方面,试图阐释这两家哲学的可通约性.<易传>和道家的形上学之所以能够相互贯通,是因为<易传>和道家的哲学处在同一个层次上以阐释其价值观念和政治理想,也就是说,"性与天道"是道家的形上学,也是儒家的形上学,不是那一家的"专利".正因为这样,儒道二家才有可能在魏晋玄学和宋代理学中走向新的沟通和融合.     

现代新儒家的易学思想论纲

现代新儒家代表人物特重<易传>,他们借助于诠释<易传>来阐发自己的哲学思想.熊十力的易学是以"乾元"为中心的本体-宇宙论;马一浮的易学是以"性理"为中心的本体-工夫论;方东美的易学是以"生生"为中心的形上学;牟宗三的易学是以"穷神知化"为中心的道德形上学;唐君毅的易学是以"神明之知"为中心的天人内外相生相涵的圆教.他们以现代哲学的观念与问题意识重点阐发了<周易>哲学的宇宙论、本体论、生命论、人性论、境界论、价值论及其间的联系,肯定了中国哲学之不同于西方哲学的特性是生机的自然观,整体和谐观,自然宇宙和事实世界涵有价值的观念,至美至善的追求,生命的学问和内在性的体验.他们重建了本体论和宇宙论,证成了超越性与内在性的贯通及天与人合德的意义.     

Why Talk about Chinese Metaphysics?

Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The tension is particularly manifest in notions such as “Chinese philosophy,” “Daoist cosmology,” “Neo-Confucian idealism,” or “Chinese metaphysics.” For some, “Chinese metaphysics” may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which talk about “metaphysics” is frequent and popular and to which talk of “Chinese metaphysics” may wish to contribute: the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting “Chinese metaphysics” on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy—of which talk about “Chinese metaphysics” may but need not be an example.     

哲学的困境和黑格尔的幽灵——关于"中国无哲学的反思"

When Western science was introduced to modern China, more translated words were used to express fundamental concepts and terms than borrowed words. The process of academic translation, commensuration, and communication between Western and Chinese philosophy is a process of comparative philosophical research. Nowadays, however, it seems that Chinese philosophy is evaluated by a Western Hegelian criterion. This leads to the debate over whether or not China has philosophy. But it is meaningless to argue about whether or not China has the name of philosophy. The key issue is whether or not China has the actuality of philosophy. Looking at the history of Western philosophy, it seems that the Hegelian definition of philosophy was the only one that existed in Europe. However, during the last 200 years after Hegel that the two main philosophical trends of positivism (scientism) and irrationalism developed from anti-Hegelianism or “Spurning Metaphysics.” As metaphysics is being reconstructed, the ghost of Hegel has reappeared. It is clear that in the future, philosophy will evolve from the development of human metaphysics or cultural philosophy. It is a process of the “negation of negation”: from traditional metaphysics to the spurning of metaphysics, and then to human metaphysics. Translated by Wu Bo from Wenshizhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2005, (3): 18–25     

《易传》的宇宙本体论哲学——宋明理学本体论的滥觞

为了弥补先秦儒家思想体系在哲学形上学方面的缺失,健全与完善儒家的哲学结构,《易传》立足于儒家学术立场,通过对诸子百家哲学理论成果的承继与开新,创辟了先秦时期最为博大精深的宇宙本体论哲学。这既完成了先秦儒家道德形上学的建构,同时为后世儒家哲学尤其是宋明理学本体论的进一步发展与完善,提供了基本的理论架构与思想源泉,对整个中国哲学及中国文化的演进也产生了广泛而深远的影响。论文从本根论、元气论、易道论、道器论四个方面,阐述了《易传》的宇宙本体论哲学体系。     

PHILOSOPHY AND SALVATION: THE APOPHATIC IN THE THOUGHT OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

The mystical apotheosis of Schopenhauer's thought is intimately connected to his immanent definition of philosophy. An analysis of the philosophical progression to salvation via aesthetic contemplation, compassion, and asceticism, illuminates Schopenhauer's advocacy of Eckhartian‐style mysticism. Schopenhauer's mysticism, like Eckhart’s, relies on the structures of negation facilitated by a particular metaphysics. Both therein transcend the tradition of theological discourse which holds it possible to construct propositions that express the essence of the divine. That has led to both being associated with atheism. However, in tracing the mechanism by which Schopenhauer's philosophy reaches its mystical apotheosis, it becomes apparent that it would be mistaken to charge him (and Eckhart) with atheism on the basis of an alleged inability to distinguish between an “atheistic non‐existence of God” and a “hyper‐thingness of God”. Rather than attack Schopenhauer in this manner, and hence also Eckhart, it is more appropriate to target their underlying metaphysical preconceptions, which in the case of Schopenhauer, is to take issue with his Critical conception of philosophy.     

A Daoist way of being: clarity and stillness as embodied practice*

Daoism, especially classical Daoism, is often constructed as a ‘philosophy,’ ‘set of ideas,’ or ‘system of thought.’ This is particularly the case in studies of Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. The present article draws attention to the central importance of clarity and stillness (qingjing 清靜) as a Daoist form of meditative practice, contemplative experience, and way of being. Examining historical precedents in classical Daoism, the article gives particular attention to the Tang dynasty (618–907) ‘Clarity-and-Stillness Literature,’ specifically the eighth-century Qingjing jing 清靜經 (Scripture on Clarity and Stillness; DZ 620). In the process, one finds that qingjing is one of the major connective strands throughout the Daoist tradition, a connective strand that reveals the central importance of embodied, experiential, and applied dimensions of human being from a Daoist perspective.     

理论哲学与实践哲学:孰为第一哲学?

理论哲学与实践哲学涵括了哲学的全部领域。然而,一部西方哲学史实际上只是理论哲学即形而上学的历史,实践哲学则被隐于形而上学的阴影之下,为形而上学所遮蔽。其实,实践哲学作为一个重要的哲学领域,应当是贯穿于西方哲学史的、异于形而上学的一个十分重要而广阔的哲学领域。该     

BETWEEN THE OLD METAPHYSICS AND THE NEW EMPIRICISM: COLLINGWOOD'S DEFENCE OF THE AUTONOMY OF PHILOSOPHY

Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood's key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive domain of inquiry and that Collingwood's attempt to defend the autonomy of philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional notions against the kind of meaning scepticism which came to prevail from the 1920s. I defend the philosophical claim that there is a third way between the idealist metaphysics with which Collingwood is often associated and the neo‐empiricist agenda which characterised analytic philosophy in mid‐century by defending the hermeneutic thesis that Collingwood's work is a sustained attempt to articulate a conception of philosophy as an epistemologically first science. Since there is a via media between the old metaphysics and the new empiricism there is no need to choose between a certain kind of armchair metaphysics and a scientifically informed ontology.     

Doing Ontology and Doing Justice: What Feminist Philosophy Can Teach Us About Meta-Metaphysics

Abstract

Feminist philosophy has recently become recognised as a self-standing philosophical sub-discipline. Still, metaphysics has remained largely dismissive of feminist insights. Here I make the case for the value of feminist insights in metaphysics: taking them seriously makes a difference to our ontological theory choice and feminist philosophy can provide helpful methodological tools to regiment ontological theories. My examination goes as follows. Contemporary ontology is not done via conceptual analysis, but via quasi-scientific means. This takes different ontological positions to be competing hypotheses about reality’s fundamental structure that are then assessed with a loose battery of criteria for theory choice. Such criteria make up the constitutive values of ontology (e.g. providing a unified, coherent, non-circular, simple, parsimonious total theory). These values are distinguished from contextual values of a practice: the political and moral values embedded in the social context of inquiry. Although we may be frank about some meta-metaphysical value commitments, bringing in feminist contextual values is viewed as an unacceptable move when thinking about ontological theory choice. This paper then asks: is this move unacceptable? I think not and I aim to motivate this methodological insight here by examining recent work on grounding.     

An exposition of Zhou Yi studies in modern Neo-Confucianism

The representatives of modern Neo-Confucianism all greatly value Yi Zhuan and regard it as one of their spiritual resources, and give their own creative interpretations and transformations. Xiong Shili’s ontological-cosmological theory takes “qian yuan” as its center; Ma Yifu has a theory of ontology-cultivation centered on “nature-principle”; Fang Dongmei has a metaphysics of production and reproduction; Mou Zongsan takes the view of “completely knowing the fathomless and understanding transformation” as a moral metaphysics; and in Tang Junyi there is a theory of the harmony of doctrines on Heaven and man in which “the knowledge of divine understanding” is its key concept. They employ modern philosophical concepts and thinking to illustrate the cosmology, ontology, theory of life, theory of human nature, theory of spiritual worlds, axiology and their connections in Zhou Yi. They affirm that the characteristics of Chinese philosophy that are different from Western philosophy consist in a naturalist view of vital life, a harmonious view of totality, an axiological view that values exist in natural universe and the world of fact, the pursuit of Good and Beauty, and intuitive experience of inner world. __________ Translated from Zhou Yi Yanjiu 周易研究 (Zhou Yi Studies), 2004 (4) by Hao Changchi     

Herder's ‘Expressivist’ Metaphysics and the Origins of German Idealism

Charles Taylor's influential exposition of Hegel made the doctrine of expressivism of central importance and identified Herder as its exemplary historical advocate. The breadth and generality of Taylor's use of ‘expressivism’ have led the concept into some disrepute, but a more precise formulation of the doctrine as a theory of meaning can both demonstrate what is worthwhile and accurate in Taylor's account, and allow us a useful point of entry into Herder's multifaceted philosophy. A reconstruction of Herder's overall philosophical position, centred around a refined theory of what this paper labels ‘Herderean expressivism’, reveals a naturalistic, teleological metaphysics. This metaphysics fulfils the Hegelian aim of providing what Dieter Henrich has called a ‘feedback loop’ between ontology and epistemology. Exploring Herder's expressivism, therefore, helps further the case for his decisive impact on Hegel's philosophy. Herder's methodological naturalism, however, represents an obstacle to Hegel's absolute idealism.     

The Substantive Impact of Computers on Philosophy Prolegomena to a Computational and Information-Theoretic Metaphysics

I survey in this article the practical uses of computers in philosophy: except for logic, computers have not yet noticeably improved the quality of philosophizing, research, or pedagogy. They have made work easier. My main interest, however, is in the "substantive" impact that computers may have on philosophical problems, especially in metaphysics. I argue that logic, the notion of decidability, and the theory of computation all predated and did not require modern digital computers. In the philosophy of mind, there has been a persistent conflation of computationalism and physicalism. The two theses can and should be separated. Finally, I suggest that we see glimpses of a new metaphysics based on information and information transformations that goes far beyond the well-trodden mind-brain debates.     

A study on the theory of “returning to the original” and “recovering nature” in Chinese philosophy

The approach of returning to the original and recovering nature is a typical characteristic of Chinese philosophy. It was founded by the Daoist School and followed by both Daoist and Confucian schools. The precondition of returning to the original and recovering nature is the stillness and goodness within nature integrated into a whole afterwards. Its implementation includes not only returning to the original root so as to achieve the philosophical aim but also restoration to the original nature after it is injured by man’s physical nature and desire. The realization of human nature depends on the work making up for the loss of the original nature. Although there are different methods of realization concerning the return to the original nature, such as returning to the root, seeking the lost mind, extinguishing desire, being good at return, and the self-consciousness of intuitive knowledge, all of these aim at returning to the original nature of stillness and purity. The philosophical value consists in the unceasing pursuit of returning to the original nature.     

中西形而上学的异通发微

中国传统哲学属于境界形态的形而上学 ,它与西方的自亚里士多德以来的实体形态的形而上学不同。亚氏的形而上学是由对是的逻辑分析开始的 ,即由对逻辑命题的分析而寻找不变的实体存在。亚氏的思维方式对西方文化产生了深远的影响。中国传统哲学则不然 ,它是由“省身”、“尽心、知性、知天”、“思诚”、“静观”、“玄览”、觉悟而去认识世界的本体 ,这种形而上学固然是境界形态的。至于现代 ,西方哲学出现了转向 ,存在主义者海德格尔对存在 (是 )作了新的诠释 ,海氏的诠释在某种意义上与中国传统哲学有契合之处 ,这从一个侧面说明了中国传统哲学所潜含的现代意义。     

Philosophy for psychology: Reality ain't what it used to be - perhaps it's evolved!

According to Wittgenstein (<citeref rid="bib37">1980</citeref>): 'Philosophy is the discipline of thinking about thinking'. And 'the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory, but an activity. The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology' (p. 77). This paper is in the nature of a philosophical discourse analysis of the August 2001 issue of The Psychologist (which focused on evolution), illustrating with various examples the need for philosophical rigour in psychological discourse. In particular, Ryle's (<citeref rid="bib31">1966</citeref>) notion of logical category errors is exemplified and explained by samples from the psychological discourse in The Psychologist journal.     

马克思的本体论思想及其当代意义

马克思的本体论思想日益引起学界的关注。本文认为,必须从马克思的哲学革命变革的宗旨和使命出发,把本体论问题放到“解释世界”和“改变世界”的框架内,才能给马克思的本体论思想以及正确的诠释和定位,马克思终点了传统的思辨形而上学本体论,但却继承和光大了人类的形而上情结和追求,并以人和人的实践活动底蕴,深刻地回答了世界本真存在的追问,关爱生命,提高人的素质,促进人的全面发展,这就是马克思本体论思想的当代价值所在。     

The Problem of Authorship and the Project of Chinese Philosophy: Zhuang Zhou and the <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">Zhuangzi</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Bold">between Sinology and Philosophy in the Western Academy</Emphasis>

This essay looks into a particular aspect of Sinological challenge to the modern project of Chinese philosophy within the Western academy through the lens of authorship, using the Zhuangzi 莊子 as a case study. It explores philosophical implications for texts whose authorship is in doubt and develops a new heuristic model of authorship and textuality, so that a more robust intellectual space for the philosophical discourse on Chinese classics can be carved out from the dominant historicist Sinological discourse. It argues that philosophical and Sinological approaches to Chinese classics have divergent scholarly objectives and follow different disciplinary norms. To clarify such divergence, it proposes a heuristic model to distinguish two sets of scholarly objects operative in Sinology and philosophy respectively, namely original text versus inherited text, historical author versus textual author, and authorial intent versus textual intent. These two sets of scholarly objects are related, at times overlapping but often irreducibly distinct, with the former in the pairs belonging to Sinologists and the latter to philosophers.     

"中国马克思主义哲学"理论体系的实存应予肯定--兼答徐素华先生

徐素华先生文章把我提出的“中国马克思主义哲学”等同于他所说的“党的指导思想形态”,“在中国的马克思主义哲学”等同于他所说的“学术研究形态”,这不符合我的本意。“马克思主义哲学合法性问题”的讨论确实存在。“中国马克思主义哲学”是在中国实践中学习、运用,在总结实践经验、发扬中国优秀哲学文化、升华人民群众智慧的基础上发展了的马克思主义哲学。它是中国哲学的一个现代形态。它既是一个创新的哲学理论体系,又是党的指导思想的哲学基础。     

Chinese Marxist Philosophy Since Reform and Opening-Up

Since reform and opening-up began in 1978, Chinese Marxist philosophy has undertaken the double mission of enhancing the emancipation of the mind in society and of realizing its own ideological emancipation. It has gone through an evolutionary process from “extensive discussion about the criterion of truth” to “reform of philosophical textbooks”; from the proposal of the philosophical conception of “practical materialism” to reflection on “modernity”; and from the carrying-out of dialogues among Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophies to the exploration of “new forms of civilization.” Chinese Marxist philosophy has shifted its way of doing research with practical materialism as a core conception, and it changed such modes of thinking as the intuitive theory of reflection based on na?ve realism, the theory of linear causality based on mechanical determinism, and the reductionism of essence based on abstract substantialism. As a result, it has boosted changes that were already underway in Chinese philosophy, worldviews, theories of truth, conceptions of history, and views of development, and it has further endowed the discourse system of Marxist philosophy with laudable subjectivity and originality.