道与创世说的对话——浅论道与西方创世说的相似之处

“道”作为中国古代哲学的重要范畴,是无形的、隐秘的、不可言说的,它又被称作“太一”,是最初的泉源,万物的本原,由它生成天地万物。所有这些方面都与基督教创世观有相通、相似之处,那种认为中国古代哲学缺乏本体论传统的观点是值得商榷的,道与创世说完全可以平等对话。     

Kierkegaard’s Regulative Sacrifice: A Post-Kantian Reading of Fear and Trembling

Abstract

The present paper suggests to consider Kierkegaard’s use of Abraham’s story in Fear and Trembling in regulative terms, that is, to consider it as a model – not for our moral behaviour but rather for our religious behaviour. To do so, I first rely on recent literature to argue that Kierkegaard should be regarded as a distinctively post-Kantian philosopher: namely, a philosopher who goes beyond Kant in a way that is nevertheless true to the spirit of Kant’s original critical philosophy. Then, I present a post-Kantian reading of Fear and Trembling, focusing on the problematic implications that result from comparing this text with Hegel’s theory of recognition. Finally, I submit that sacrifice in Fear and Trembling is a regulative notion in a Kantian sense. This interpretation addresses some of the most problematic aspects of the text. I conclude that the regulativity of sacrifice may be regarded as an important and perhaps an essential component of Kierkegaard’s overall philosophical strategy.     

Book Review

I support Rattansi and Phoenix's (1997) general thesis that historical and contextual issues play a vital role in the adolescent identity formation process. I find 3 general, problematic issues in the Rattansi and Phoenix analysis, however: (a) there are many dubious assumptions and deductions about identity and its formation, (b) many "newer" theorizations of identity that the authors highlighted and recommended have existed for at least 30 years, and (c) there is a confusion between identity structure and content in proposing identity as a multiple rather than unitary construct. Finally, I do support the authors' call for identity research to draw on tools from a variety of disciplines.     

Form and formless: A discussion with the authors of Anticipating China

Chinese culture is neither the first problematic thinking (analogy) claimed by the authors of Anticipating China, nor the second one (logical inference). On the one hand, analogies are one of the most remarkable aspects of Chinese thinking, while on the other hand, Yin-Yang, Dao and Fo are all universal codes that could neither be reached by analogy nor by logical inference. In fact, both the first and second problematic thinking share the same world view, taking the world as a composite, and the difference lies merely in whether the components are irreplaceable particulars or substitutable elements. Both build their knowledge on the components and how they combine. In the terms of this paper, both systems are constructed with spatially definable forms, real or nominal. The highest codes in Chinese culture are not built upon the physical properties of an object, and could never be found by analysing the object, physically or logically. Yin-Yang, Dao and Fo are names without form, and thus are thinking modes that cannot be described by a spatial concept. They are non-structural systems and a way of formless thinking.     

"一阴一阳之谓道"析议

一阴一阳之谓道,包含着三个问题:一是一阴一阳的关系;二是一阴一阳与道的关系;三是道究 竟是二元的或是一元的。本文结合中西哲学史对此展开分析,并得出结论认为,“一阴一阳之谓道”,已将 易之三义(即易简、变易、不易)全部涵括在其中了。     

Hysterical Again: The Gastrointestinal Woman in Medical Discourse

This article suggests increased attention to how medical discourses of gastrointestinal (GI) disorder and distress are fraught with social assumptions and consequences by examining nineteenth-century and contemporary medical texts focused on chronic constipation and Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS). I suggest that these medical discourses present what I call the “gastrointestinal woman,” who is characterized as having unjustified anxiety and is to blame for her condition. My approach to understanding, and ultimately revising, the representation of the gastrointestinal woman is shaped by disability studies scholarship, which encourages intervention in problematic medical discourses and more active shaping of discourses of chronic pain and illness by those who have these conditions.     

试论陈致虚的道教易学思想

本文主要分析了陈致虚道教易学的内丹学思想的理论特色。陈致虚以《周易》之理来建构其内丹学的思想体系,提出了“易只阴阳两件物事”、“易之道道数也”、“易之道统乎天心”等三条道教内丹学的原则。认为道教内丹修炼是法天地阴阳造化生生之理而进行的,天地造化就是太极或道的展开过程,修道即是要回复到道本身。而天地造化之功不离阴阳两件物事,所以,内丹修炼不离阴阳。“阴阳”为道之纲纪,向道复归的路径为“逆”,“天心”即天地造化生生的节度和有序性,内丹修炼通过调和“阴阳”,以“逆”的方式法“天心”而施功,便能参赞天地之化育,以论还丹。陈致虚通过“援易入道”,在对本体之道的理解、修持的原理、证道的方法等内丹学的重要理论问题上作出了具有特色的阐述,为宋元时期成熟的道教内丹学的理论体系的建立作出了贡献。     

Forms of Transformation in the Reflective Space: Clarifying “Mentalization” Theory Through a Clinical Application: Commentary on Paper by Stephen Seligman

In responding to discussions of my paper “Jonah: A Fantasy of Flight” by Fishman, Salberg, and Shulman, I focus on some of my critical assumptions in reading this or any other biblical text. Prominent among these is the need to relinquish the stance of “already knowing” the meaning of the text. This irreducibly enigmatic book demands close, informed, and literary reading. Within the context of a sustained reflection on the methodology and spirit of my enterprise, I discuss the main points of difference or disagreement that arise in the papers of my discussants, as well as celebrating the places of accord and enrichment.     

Monkey homologues of language areas: computing the ambiguities

The 'language-readiness' of human brains most probably resulted from modification of structures present in non-human primate brains, but identifying such homologues and the nature of their modifications has been highly problematic. In a recent article, Arbiband Bota suggest that these problems can be overcome using a neuroinformatics approach. But its assumptions ignore many non-local, activity-dependent, regressive, and allometric effects of neurodevelopment that violate assumptions of classic homology. What if these effects are what matter most?     

‘Analytic’ reading, ‘continental’ text: The case of Derrida’s ‘on forgiveness’

This paper seeks to apply some of the tools of analytic philosophy to a text written by a ‘continental’ philosopher, in order to evaluate the quality of its arguments. In ‘On Forgiveness’, Jacques Derrida seems to be making two different claims about forgiveness. First, he claims that an act of forgiveness is only truly meaningful as forgiveness when one is forgiving the unforgivable. Second, he is also recommending that we change our understanding of the concept of forgiveness for ethical reasons. I examine three lines of argument used in the essay to support the first claim. I find each of these lines of argument problematic. Since these arguments are unconvincing, I argue that this leaves only the second claim for Derrida to defend.     

Reductive levels and multi-scale structure

I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be revised.     

Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness

Experimental philosophers have recently conducted surveys of folk judgements about a range of phenomena of interest to philosophy including knowledge, reference, and free will. Some experimental philosophers take these results to undermine the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence. I consider several different replies to the suggestion that these results undermine philosophical appeal to intuition, both piecemeal replies which raise concerns about particular surveys, and more general replies. The general replies include the suggestions that the surveys consider the wrong sort of judgement, or the wrong kind of judge, or that the results of the surveys do not generate scepticism about philosophical appeal to intuition in particular, but rather a more problematic and general scepticism. I argue that the last of these general replies is the most promising. To assess its merits, I consider the most developed account of how the survey results are supposed to raise sceptical problems specifically for philosophical appeal to intuition, that presented in Weinberg (Midwest Stud Philos XXXI:318–343, 2007). I argue that there are significant objections to Weinberg’s account. I conclude that, so far, experimental philosophers have failed to show how their survey results raise a sceptical challenge that applies to philosophical appeal to intuition in particular, rather than having a problematic, more general scope.     

《易经》与中国文化心理学

在我们中国的文化传统中,《易经》素有“众经之首”和“大道之源”的称誉。当代心理学史家把中国看作是心理学的第一个故乡,中国传统文化中包容着丰富的心理学思想和独特的心理学体系。对此,作者以《易经》为基础,通过易经中所使用的“心”字,易传中所发挥的“心”的意义,和《易经》卦象中所表达的心理的象征性等几个方面,阐述了《易经》中所包含的“中国文化心理学”,以及这种中国文化心理学对于当代西方心理学思想的影响。     

Mixed Feelings About Mixed Solutions

The numbers problem concerns the question of what is the right thing to do in trade-off cases where one can save different non-overlapping groups of persons, but not everyone. Proponents of mixed solutions argue that both saving the many and holding a lottery to determine whom to save can each be morally right in such cases, depending on the relative sizes of the groups involved. In his book The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson presents an ingenious version of such an approach that avoids a commitment to interpersonal value aggregation, which is highly controversial and rejected by many philosophers for a number of reasons. I criticise Peterson’s proposal by first arguing that it cannot account for the idea that holding a lottery is morally wrong if differences in numbers are very large, and by second pointing out that it relies on implausible assumptions about what is good for an individual. Given the shortcomings of Peterson’s non-aggregationist version of a mixed solution, I next address the issue of how problematic a commitment to interpersonal aggregation really is. To this end, I present an aggregationist version of a mixed solution that is reason-based and bypasses most standard objections to interpersonal value aggregation. I conclude that although there is reason to be optimistic, it remains to be seen whether a mixed solution can be worked out in a fully satisfying way.     

Questioning Hermeneutics with Freud: How to interpret dreams and mute-speech in Sikh scripture

This paper begins to question the interpretive endeavor when it is applied to the Adi Granth. The text itself expresses a view that the ‘world is a dream’ and that there is real difficulty in communicating the truth about reality, since it is like a mute person who enjoys, but is unable to express, the taste of his sweet; that is the sweetness of the mystic experience. I raise the question: what is hermeneutics to this situation? How is one to interpret a dream and a text that is the ‘speech’ of a mute person? Traditional hermeneutic theories (conservative, moderate and critical) do not seem to cater for this problematic since they do not concern themselves with the unconscious, the sub-text, the dreams underlying waking thought. I thus turn to Freud to gain clues about the interpretation of dreams, and thus attempt a preliminary radicalization of hermeneutic theory. It is suggested that perhaps a reversal is required where dreams precede worldly reality, and interpretation is a sign of delusion, obviously locating and implicating this very text within the very problematic it attempts to illuminate. Beyond this ironic tautology I ask: could there be a self that does not dream and does not interpret?     

The Laozi Code

The term “dao” (道) has been playing the theoretically paradigmatic role in almost all East Asian philosophies, religions, and cultures. The meanings of the term “dao” in the Dao De Jing and other ancient East Asian texts have remained hermeneutically problematic up to this point in time. This article argues that one of the main causes of this hermeneutical problematic is the failure to establish a theoretically formal typology of the “dao.” It further suggests that a hermeneutically disciplined reading of the 76 uses of the term “dao” in the Dao De Jing accomplishes two important goals: (1) it demonstrates that a typological approach may enhance an understanding of the Laoian Dao, and (2) it provides some good data to begin reconstructing such a theoretically formal dao-typology.     

Zhuangzi’s Meontological Notion of Time

This article investigates the concept of time as it is laid forth in the Daoist text, the Zhuangzi 莊子. Arguing that authentic time lies with cosmogony and not reality as envisioned by humanity, the Zhuangzi casts off the ontology of the present-now in favor of the existentially creative negativity of Dao 道. As the pivot of Dao, nothingness not only allows us to side-step the issue of temporal directionality, it reflects the meontological nature of Daoist cosmology in general. Framing time in terms of the motion of nothingness, this paper concludes that the authentic time of Dao reveals itself through the principle of creation qua rest. Experiencing such temporal self-grounding, the sage becomes existentially awakened such that temporal ekstases becomes unfathomable.     

Reassessing logical hylomorphism and the demarcation of logical constants

The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on several substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations; this holds in particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the class of logical constants. I begin with a characterization of currently widespread views on form and matter in logic, which I refer to as ‘logical hylomorphism as we know it’—LHAWKI, for short—and argue that the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is mereological. Next, I sketch an overview of the historical developments leading from Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical hylomorphism (LHAWKI). I conclude with a reassessment of the prospects for the combination of hylomorphism and logic, arguing in particular that LHAWKI is not the only and certainly not the most suitable version of logical hylomorphism. In particular, this implies that the project of demarcating the class of logical constants as a means to define the scope and nature of logic rests on highly problematic assumptions.     

Formulating deflationism

I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ${\langle \text{p}\rangle}$ is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue that certain circularity charges rest on mistaken assumptions about logic that lead to Carroll’s regress. I show how the propositional quantifier can be seen as on a par with first-order quantifiers and so equally acceptable to use. While the proposed parallelism between these quantifiers is controversial in general, deflationists have special reasons to affirm it. I further argue that the main three types of approach the truth-paradoxes are open to an adherent of (Q), and that the derivation of general facts about truth can be explained on its basis.     

The ad hominem argument of Berkeley’s Analyst

This paper responds to two issues in interpreting George Berkeley’s Analyst. First, it explains why the text contains no discussion of religious mysteries or points of faith, despite the claims of the text's subtitle; I argue that the subtitle must be understood, and its success assessed, in conjunction with material external to the text. Second, it’s unclear how naturally the arguments of the Analyst sit with Berkeley’s broader views. He criticizes the methodology of calculus and conceptually problematic entities, and the extent to which they require one to bend the rules of classical mathematics. Yet, elsewhere, Berkeley’s opinion of classical mathematics and its intelligibility is low, and he defends a pragmatic approach to word meaning that should not find fault with so functionally successful a theory. The ad hominem intention of the text makes it difficult to discern to what extent Berkeley is committed to the sincerity of these criticisms. This component of the text is rarely discussed, but I argue that when trying to decide what Berkeley’s true position is in the Analyst, we should treat its ad hominem component as its primary intention.