Levels of processing in disruptive effects of prior information

Under certain conditions, advance information about possible letter alternatives may depress recognition of single tachistoscopically presented letters followed by a pattern mask. Neill and Walling (1981) found that this “before-disruption effect” occurred specifically when alternatives were featurally similar. In contrast, Experiment 1 of the present study found that precuing facilitated identification of unfamiliar stimuli composed of letterlike features, particularly when alternatives differed in only one critical feature. Contrary to Smith, Haviland, Reder, Brownell, and Adams (1976), composition of letterlike features is therefore not sufficient to produce the before-disruption effect. The before-disruption effect appears to occur when there is opportunity to represent the stimulus at a deeper (i.e., name) level, but foreknowledge of a critical distinguishing feature biases processing instead toward the level of physical features. Congruent with this analysis, Experiment 2 found the before-disruption effect for letters to be attenuated when targets were unpredictably upper- and lowercase, necessitating name-level matching to the alternatives. Experiment 3 found the superior identification of unprecued letters to be paradoxically associated with inferior target detection, as indicated by concurrent presence/absence judgments. In addition, identification of unprecued letters, but not precued letters, was significantly above chance on trials in which overt target detection failed to occur. The results are consistent with recent suggestions that pattern masking does not terminate perceptual processing, but rather interferes with conscious awareness of completed visual analysis.     

Disruptive effects of prior information on tachistoscopic recognition

Smith, Haviland, Reder, Brownell, and Adams (1976) found tachistoscopic letter recognition to be disrupted by advance information about possible letter alternatives. An association of “before-disruption” with a bias to respond “same” in same-different judgment led Smith et al. to conclude that incidental mask features corresponding to a precued letter were erroneously incorporated into the target letter decision. Experiments 1 and 2 in the present study failed to replicate the before-disruption effect under conditions similar to those of Smith et al., although precuing produced a strong bias to respond “same.” Similarity between “same” and “different” alternatives was manipulated in Experiment 3 by selecting letter pairs differing in one critical feature (P-R, O-Q, C-G, F-E) for one group of subjects, and re-pairing the same letters (P-G, O-E, C-R, F-Q) for another group. Contrary to Smith et el., precuing interacted significantly with pair similarity, such that before-disruption occurred only with similar alternatives. In contrast, precuing produced equivalent “same-bias” in both groups. The dependence of before-disruption on pair similarity was extended to two-alternative forced-choice recognition in Experiment 4. Together with inconsistencies in the Smith et al. data and more detailed analysis of present recognition errors, the results suggest (1) the before-disruption and same-bias effects of precuing are mediated by separate mechanisms, and (2) before-disruption reflects loss of target letter information rather than direct incorporation of extraneous mask features.     

When phonology fails: orthographic neighbourhood effects in dyslexia

Both cerebral hemispheres contain phonological, orthographic and semantic representations of words, however there are between-hemisphere differences in the relative engagement and specialization of the different representations. Taking orthographic processing for example, previous studies suggest that orthographic neighbourhood size (N) has facilitatory effects in the right but not the left hemispheres. To pursue the nature of this asymmetric N effect, in particular whether there are individual differences in such specialisation, we examined N in a case of developmental dyslexia, FM. We first describe the nature of his difficulties, which are mainly severe phonological deficits. Employing the divided visual field paradigm with FM revealed a greater sensitivity in the right than in the left hemisphere to orthographic variables, with a significant inhibitory N effect in the left, but not right hemisphere. Such inhibition, to a lesser degree, was found among a group of adults with dyslexia but not among age-matched normal readers. We argue that enhanced sensitivity to orthographic cues is developed in some cases of dyslexia when a normal, phonology-based left hemisphere word recognition processing is not achieved. The interpretation presented here is cast in terms of differences between people with dyslexia and typical readers that originate in the atypical way in which orthographic representations are initially set up.     

Long-term perceptual specificity effects in recognition memory: the transformed pictures paradigm.

The effects of a study/test mismatch in the viewing mode of natural scenes on recognition memory performance were examined. At both encoding and retrieval, scenes were presented either by being divided into quarters that were displayed in a sequential cumulative fashion or by scrolling the images through the screen, thereby gradually revealing the content of the images. Half of the participants were tested immediately after encoding and the other half after 48 hours. For both the immediate and delayed retrieval conditions, better recognition memory was demonstrated when viewing modes matched across study and test than when they mismatched. Implications for current processing and multiple systems views of memory are discussed.     

When more is less: feedback effects in perceptual category learning

Rule-based and information-integration category learning were compared under minimal and full feedback conditions. Rule-based category structures are those for which the optimal rule is verbalizable. Information-integration category structures are those for which the optimal rule is not verbalizable. With minimal feedback subjects are told whether their response was correct or incorrect, but are not informed of the correct category assignment. With full feedback subjects are informed of the correctness of their response and are also informed of the correct category assignment. An examination of the distinct neural circuits that subserve rule-based and information-integration category learning leads to the counterintuitive prediction that full feedback should facilitate rule-based learning but should also hinder information-integration learning. This prediction was supported in the experiment reported below. The implications of these results for theories of learning are discussed.     

When discounting fails: An unexpected finding

Two studies were designed to investigate the effects of prior information about plausible causes on subsequent attributions. In the Experiment 1, prior information was given about an internal and an external cause. It was predicted and found that the stronger an expectancy for a behavior, the more the behavior would be attributed to the cause that formed the basis of the expectancy. It was also predicted that (1) for facilitative causes, the stronger the expectancy based on a given cause, the less the behavior would be attributed to other causes (discounting), and (2)for inhibitory causes, the stronger the expectancy, the more the behavior would be attributed to other causes (augmenting). These predictions were not supported. It was suggested that discounting and augmenting did not occur because subjects had been given information about both causes which "locked in" their attributions to each cause. To test this explanation, a second study was undertaken in which observers were given information about only one cause. The results of Experiment 2 indicated that discounting and augmenting may only occur for attributions to causes about which no prior information is available.     

Spacing effects in recognition memory: When meaning matters

The present study showed that using incidental learning tasks promoting structural/perceptual processing of targets it is possible to obtain a reliable spacing effect for nonwords in a yes/no recognition memory task, whereas no spacing effect is detected for words. These data are, collectively, incompatible with current theories of spacing effects. A theoretical proposal to account for these findings is outlined.     

Impact of encoding depth on awareness of perceptual effects in recognition memory

Pictorial stimuli are more likely to be recognized if they are the same size, rather than a different size, at study and at test. This size congruency effect was replicated in two experiments in which the encoding variables were respectively undivided versus divided attention and level of processing. In terms of performance, these variables influenced recognition and did not influence size congruency effects. But in terms of awareness, measured by remember and know responses, these variables did influence size congruency effects. With undivided attention and with a deep level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in remembering. With divided attention and with a shallow level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in knowing. The results show that effects that occur in remembering may also occur independently in knowing. They support theories in which remembering and knowing reflect different memory processes or systems. They do not support the theory that remembering and knowing reflect differences in trace strength.     

When culture fails: coping with cultural trauma

The research into the phenomenon of cultural trauma is growing as the effects of historical transformations are recognized and analysed. The concept of cultural trauma and the analytic concept of the cultural complex is a suitable theoretical approach for this research. The Lithuanian experience of cultural trauma after the historical shifts indicates the importance of the interplay between societal and individual factors in coping with trauma. Academic psychotraumatological studies carried out at Vilnius University indicate a stronger traumatic experience by people who are survivors of direct political repression and even intergenerational transmission of trauma, but this group also seems to demonstrate an intergenerational transmission of resilience. Paradoxically, from a long‐term perspective, the victims of direct repression seem to have suffered less than the people who accommodated to the regime, and this applies also to their offspring. Analysis in terms of overcoming cultural trauma indicates that society is gradually integrating historic traumatic experiences, although a healthy cultural identity has not yet been restored.     

When preview information starts to matter: Development of the perceptual span in German beginning readers

How is reading development reflected in eye-movement measures? How does the perceptual span change during the initial years of reading instruction? Does parafoveal processing require competence in basic word-decoding processes? We report data from the first cross-sectional measurement of the perceptual span of German beginning readers (n = 139), collected in the context of the large longitudinal PIER (Potsdamer Intrapersonale Entwicklungsrisiken/Potsdam study of intra-personal developmental risk factors) study of intrapersonal developmental risk factors. Using the moving-window paradigm, eye movements of three groups of students (Grades 1–3) were measured with gaze-contingent presentation of a variable amount of text around fixation. Reading rate increased from Grades 1–3, with smaller increases for higher grades. Perceptual-span results showed the expected main effects of grade and window size: fixation durations and refixation probability decreased with grade and window size, whereas reading rate and saccade length increased. Critically, for reading rate, first-fixation duration, saccade length and refixation probability, there were significant interactions of grade and window size that were mainly based on the contrast between Grades 3 and 2 rather than Grades 2 and 1. Taken together, development of the perceptual span only really takes off between Grades 2 and 3, suggesting that efficient parafoveal processing presupposes that basic processes of reading have been mastered.     

Picture recognition without picture identification: a method for assessing the role of perceptual information in familiarity-based picture recognition

The present study examined the claim that unidentifiable test-pictures are processed and recognized on a perceptual, as opposed to a conceptual, level. Using an extension of the recognition without identification paradigm (e.g., Cleary, A. M. & Greene, R. L. (2000). Recognition without identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1063-1069; Peynircioglu, Z. F. (1990). A feeling-of-recognition without identification. Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 493-500), it was observed that when test-pictures were unidentifiable during a masked perceptual identification task, old-new discrimination occurred when the study-list consisted of pictures (Experiments 1-3), but not when the study-list consisted of picture names (Experiment 2) or when picture exemplars served as test-cues (Experiment 3). Results provide converging evidence that a study-test perceptual match is needed for the episodic recognition of unidentified test-pictures. Implications for the present paradigm as a tool for examining the role of perceptual information in recognition-familiarity are discussed.     

Visual-auditory events: cross-modal perceptual priming and recognition memory.

Modality specificity in priming is taken as evidence for independent perceptual systems. However, Easton, Greene, and Srinivas (1997) showed that visual and haptic cross-modal priming is comparable in magnitude to within-modal priming. Where appropriate, perceptual systems might share like information. To test this, we assessed priming and recognition for visual and auditory events, within- and across- modalities. On the visual test, auditory study resulted in no priming. On the auditory priming test, visual study resulted in priming that was only marginally less than within-modal priming. The priming results show that visual study facilitates identification on both visual and auditory tests, but auditory study only facilitates performance on the auditory test. For both recognition tests, within-modal recognition exceeded cross-modal recognition. The results have two novel implications for the understanding of perceptual priming: First, we introduce visual and auditory priming for spatio-temporal events as a new priming paradigm chosen for its ecological validity and potential for information exchange. Second, we propose that the asymmetry of the cross-modal priming observed here may reflect the capacity of these perceptual modalities to provide cross-modal constraints on ambiguity. We argue that visual perception might inform and constrain auditory processing, while auditory perception corresponds to too many potential visual events to usefully inform and constrain visual perception.     

Contribution of perceptual fluency to recognition judgments.

Following a shallow (count vowels) or deep (read) study task, old and new words were tested for both fluency of perception and recognition memory. Subjects first identified a test word as it came gradually into view and then judged it as old or new. Old words were identified faster than new words, indicating implicit, perceptual memory for old words. Independently of this effect, words judged old were identified faster than words judged new, especially after shallow study. Eight experiments examined the possible causal relationship between perceptual fluency and recognition judgements. Experiments 1 to 4 showed that fast identifications per se do not promote old judgments. Accelerating the identification of test items by semantically priming them or making them come more quickly into view did not affect recognition judgments. Experiment 5 showed that the usual association of fast identifications with old judgments is not an artifact of item selection because the association disappeared when the identifications and judgements were segregated into different phases of the test task. Experiments 6 and 7 showed tha the likelihood of old judgments increases directly with the pretested perceptibility of test words, but only after shallow study. Experiment 8 showed that the dependency of recognition judgments on perceptual fluency continues to hold when the requirement to identify the words before judging them is eliminated. We conclude that fluency of perception contributes to recognition judgments, but only when the fluency is produced naturally (e.g., through perceptual memory) and explicit memory is minimal.     

When Greta Garbo is easier to remember than Stefan Edberg: influences of prior knowledge on recognition memory in Alzheimer's disease.

This study investigated the effects of prior knowledge on recognition memory in patients with a mild Alzheimer's disease. Normal older adults and mildly demented patients were presented with dated and contemporary famous faces with name tags and were asked to generate unique statements about each person. Results indicated that both groups generated more statements about the dated than about the contemporary figures. Most important, both groups performed better with the dated than with the contemporary faces in an unexpected episodic face recognition task. This pattern of results suggests that both groups (a) possess more knowledge of dated than of contemporary famous individuals and (b) are able to utilize prior knowledge to enhance episodic remembering. Viewing these results in light of other recent work, it is concluded that differences between normal old and mildly demented individuals in the ability to utilize cognitive support for remembering may be differences in degree.     

When logic fails: Implicit transitive inference in humans

Transitive inference (TI) in animals (e.g., choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C) has been interpreted by some as reflecting a declarative logical inference process. We invert this anthropomorphic interpretation by providing evidence that humans can exhibit TI-like behavior on the basis of simpler associative mechanisms that underlie many theories of animal learning. In this study, human participants were trained on a five-pair TI problem (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, E+F-) and, unlike in previous human TI studies, were prevented from becoming explicitly aware of the logical hierarchy, so they could not employ logical reasoning. They were then tested with three problems: B versus D, B versus E, and C versus E. Participants only reliably chose B over E, whereas the other test conditions yielded chance performance. This result is inconsistent with the use of logical reasoning and is instead consistent with an account developed to explain earlier TI studies with rats that found the same pattern of results. In this account, choice performance is based on differential associative strengths across the stimulus items that develop over training, despite equal overt reinforcement.     

When festinger fails: Prophecy and the watch tower

Within its history, the Watch Tower has often set dates for the coming of Christ's millennial reign. The ability of Jehovah's Witnesses to endure the failure of these interpretations of Biblical prophecy reveals the power of the Watch Tower to withstand what would seem to be fatal challenges to its system of belief. In what has become a classic study, the social psychologist Leon Festinger has argued that such disconfirmations of prophecy lead only to deepened conviction and increased proselytism to persuade others that the original belief was correct. Applying Festinger's hypothesis to the prophetic speculation of the Watch Tower, I argue that his model fails to recognize how complex organizations and systems of belief shape responses to disconfirmed prophecy. Indeed, the history of Jehovah's Witnesses demonstrates that organizational structure and ideology constitute crucial variables for any analysis of reaction to prophetic failure. It is the very power of the Watch Tower as a millenarian movement that allows not only the rationalization of disconfirmation but the retrospective denial of the prophecy itself.     

Exemplar accounts of blending and distinctiveness effects in perceptual old-new recognition

Recent findings from the perceptual old-new recognition literature indicate that observers have extremely high false-alarm rates to new items that are "blends" of old ones. In addition, evidence suggests that "distinctive" old items--that is, those located in isolated regions of the similarity space--are recognized with higher probability than are typical old items. Both types of phenomena challenge the predictions of global-familiarity exemplar models of perceptual old-new recognition, which posit that the probability that an observer judges an item as old is based on its summed similarity to previously presented exemplars. In the present research the authors pursued these blending and distinctiveness effects by testing paradigms in which similarity relations among objects are highly controlled and in which the variables of blending and distinctiveness are not confounded with other properties associated with the individual objects themselves. In contrast to previous results, the authors found effects of blending and distinctiveness that are compatible with the predictions of a pure summed-similarity exemplar model.     

Depth of processing: When the principle of congruity fails

Two factors, level of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and congruity (Schulman, 1974), known to have large effects on the recall of experimenter-provided responses to questions, were examined in a series of five incidental learning experiments using subject-generated responses. The data show that manipulation of level of processing has the same effect on recall of subjectgenerated responses as it does on experimenter-provided responses. However, the effect of congruity is reversed for subject-generated responses. The data suggest that the difficulty of generating unrelated responses (“incongruous“ items) may account, at least in part, for the failure of the “principle of congruity“ with subject-generated responses.