共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
2.
James BehuniakJr. 《Dao》2010,9(2):249-252
Certain discussions about “relativism” in the philosophy of Zhuangzi turn on the question of the morality of his dao 道. Some commentators, most notably Robert Eno, maintain that there is no ethical value whatsoever to Zhuangzi’s dao as presented in the Cook Ding episode and other “knack passages.” In this essay, it is argued that there is indeed a moral
dimension to Cook Ding’s dao. One way to recognize it is to explore the similarity between that dao and John Dewey’s notion of educational method. There are moral traits that Dewey can appeal to in recommending his method.
It is argued here that these traits represent the moral features of Cook Ding’s dao as well. 相似文献
3.
Qiyong Guo 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(3):345-362
Mou Zongsan uses the highest moral principle “autonomy” to interpret Confucius’ benevolence and Mencius’ “inherent benevolence
and righteousness”, focuses on the self-rule of the will. It does not do any harm to Mencius’ learning, on the contrary, it
is conducive to the communication between Chinese and Western philosophies. If we stick to Kant’s moral self autonomy and
apply it to interpreting Zhu Xi’s moral theory, similarly we will discover the implications of Zhu Xi’s “autonomy” in his
moral learning. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Mou Zongsan to say that Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the autonomous one.
__________
Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2005, (6): 33–39 相似文献
4.
The idea of the “nation” has played only a small role in modern political philosophy because of its apparent irrationalism
and amoralism. David Miller, however, sets out to show that these charges can be overcome: nationality is a rational element
of one’s cultural identity, and nations are genuinely ethical communities. In this paper I argue that his project fails. The
defence against the charge of irrationalism fails because Miller works within a framework of ethical particularism which leads
to a position of metaethical relativism. A consequence of this relativism is that a community’s moral principles and boundaries
of exclusion cannot be rationally justified to those constructed as “outsiders”. The defence against the charge of amoralism
fails because Miller does not so much provide an argument to show that nations are ethical communities as assume they are;
we are therefore left without resources to discriminate between ethical and unethical nations. I apply these problems to Miller’s
treatment of the question of immigration, arguing that it shows that his version of “liberal” nationalism has a tendency to
collapse towards a conservative position on such issues. This should not give us any great confidence that the nation, as
Miller presents it, should be embraced by modern political philosophy.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
5.
Sirkku Ikonen 《Synthese》2011,179(1):187-202
My purpose in this paper is to look at Cassirer’s relation to critical philosophy from a new perspective. Most discussions
concerning Cassirer’s Kantianism have so far centered on his relation to neo-Kantianism and the Marburg school. My focus will
not be on neo-Kantianism but on Cassirer’s notion of a “critique of culture.” In an often cited paragraph from the introduction
to The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer says that his aim is to broaden Kant’s critical approach to all various forms of culture, to language as well as
myth and art, and thus to transform the “critique of reason” into the “critique of culture.” I will explore Cassirer’s concept
of the “critique of culture” and suggest that it can best be understood by placing it in the context of early twentieth century
German philosophy. More precisely, I will aim to show that Cassirer’s critique can be seen as an effort to find a middle path
between Lebensphilosophie and the positivism of the Vienna Circle. 相似文献
6.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
7.
William Edward Morris 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):441-454
Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,”
which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an
analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism”
reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his
naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program
for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses
the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or
positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas. 相似文献
8.
Anders John 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(2):137-143
In his “Third Way” Aquinas appears to argue in a way that relies upon shifting quantifiers in a fallacious way. Some have
tried to save this and other parts of the “Third Way” by introducing sophisticated logical and metaphysical machinery. Alternatively,
Aquinas’ apparently fallacious quantifier shift can be seen to be part of a valid argument if we supply a simple premise which
an Aristotelian natural philosopher would surely hold. In this short paper, I consider candidates for this premise, defend
a specific premise, and from that discussion draw a moral about quantifier predicate logic. I conclude that Aristotelian natural
philosophy is more than an historical backdrop to Aquinas’ arguments. 相似文献
9.
Yulie Lou 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):66-78
Hu Shi frequently gave lectures on the history of Chinese philosophy, especially the history of ancient Chinese philosophy,
from the year 1919 to 1937. A large number of papers and dissertations published during this period are related to his research
on this topic. In his opinion, there are three characteristics of the history of ancient Chinese philosophy: “ religionalization
of thought,” “Indianization of philosophy,” and “conflict between Chinese thought and Indian thought.” In this paper, I explore
Hu Shi’s deep insight into the religionalization of Confucianism in Han dynasty and into the thought of Taoism in the medieval
times.
Originally published in Chinese Philosophy, volume 15 (May 1992), translated by Han Jianying 相似文献
10.
Kurtis Hagen 《Dao》2003,3(1):85-107
Xunzi was chronologically the third of the three great Confucian thinkers of China’s classical period, after Confucius and
Mencius. Having produced the most comprehensive philosophical system of that period, he occupies a place in the development
of Chinese philosophy comparable to that of Aristotle in the Western philosophical tradition. This essay reveals how Xunzi’s
understanding of virtue and moral development dovetailed with his positions on ritual propriety, the attunement of names,
the relation betweenli (patterns) andlei (categories), and his view ofdao (the way) in general. I have argued for a “constructivist” understanding of each of these aspects of Xunzi’s philosophy in
some detail elsewhere (see Hagen 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), and so here I will just briefly review a few key points before addressing
their relation to moral development. 相似文献
11.
Superaddressee or Who Will Succeed a Mentor? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Lyudmila Bryzzheva 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2006,25(3):227-243
This philosophical essay is inspired by a four-year pedagogical relationship that continues in its altered form today. The
main focus of this piece is the transformation of a mentor as an immediate addressee into mentor as a superaddressee, an influential third listener who oversees observable dialogues. I explore the mutual responsibilities of a student and
a mentor in order to uncover the elements in the pedagogical chemistry responsible for the transformation of an addressee
into a superaddressee. Confirmation (a perfect form of understanding) of a student’s intellectual and moral uniqueness, incarnation
of a particular value deemed desirable by a student, and education of a student into the dialogic ways of being on his or
her own are the necessary ingredients of the process of becoming a superaddressee. Initially a mentor engages in the pedagogy
of understanding whose ideal outcome is confirmation of a student’s intellectual and moral makeup. After the dialogue is over,
a mentor often moves into the domain of inner speech from where he or she continues to offer perfect understanding, especially
in the absence of such understanding from an immediate addressee. Two types of superaddressees are identified and their relationship
with the invoking consciousness is explored. I conclude that becoming a superaddressee is the most generous pedagogical contribution
to a student’s future: a mentor thus makes his or her voice available to a student’s inner dialogue, often without receiving
anything in return.
Mikhail Bakhtin is highly influential in my writing. “Superaddressee” or “a third listener” is one of his coinages. The term
is treated in “The Problem of the Text” as part of the collection “Speech genres and other late essays” (1986), alluded to
in Voloshinov’s (1976) “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art” and expanded upon in Frank Farmer’s (2001) “Saying and Silence.” 相似文献
12.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献
13.
Changchi Hao 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(3):382-400
In this essay I argue that Mozi’s philosophy is anything but utilitarianism by way of analysing four ethical theories. Utilitarianism
is an ethics in which the moral subject is an atomic individual human being, and its concern is how to fulfill the interests
of the individual self and the social majority. Confucian ethics is centered on the notion of the family and its basic question
is that of priority in the relationship between the small self and the enlarged or collective self. Opposite to these two
moral theories is Mozi’s ethics: The interests that Mozi is primarily concerned with are not the interests of my individual
self or my collective self, but the interests of the other. The fulfillment of the material needs of the other is my moral
obligation. The arguments are centered on the three basic concepts, “the I,” “the we,” and “the other.” The significance of
Mozi’s thought in modern or postmodern context lies in its striking resemblance to the philosophy of a contemporary western
philosopher, Levinas. In both Mozi and Levinas, there is a suspension of utilitarianism.
__________
Translated from Zhongguo Zhexue Shi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2005 (1) 相似文献
14.
Daniela Steila 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):315-327
At the end of 1907 within a couple of months Lunačarskij met both Gor’kij and Brzozowski in Italy and found many important
points of contact with each. To compare Lunačarskij’s thought at that time with Brzozowski’s “philosophical program” of 1907
casts some new light on the great variety of interpretations that enlivened Easter European Marxism at the beginning of the
twentieth century. On the one hand, it explains Lunačarskij’s “economism” as distinct both from Brzozowski’s extreme anthropologism
and Gor’kij’s “cosmism”; on the other, it shows that Lunačarskij’s “philosophy of labour” promoted a violent attitude of conquest
and humankind’s domination of nature. Although he criticized Brzozowski’s sympathies with German Idealism, Lunačarskij shared
with him a deep appreciation of human creative power, which is evident in his peculiar form of collectivism as well. 相似文献
15.
Chuanhua Peng 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(2):193-216
Xunzi’s philosophy of language was mainly unfolded through the “discrimination of ming 名 (names) and shi 实 (realities)” and the “discrimination of yan 言 (words) and yi 意 (meanings).” Particularly, the “discrimination of names and realities” was centered on the propositions that “realities
are realized when their names are heard” and that “names are given to point up realities,” including the view on the essence
of language such as “names expect to indicate realities” and “conventions established by usage,” the view of development of
language such as “coming form the former usage and being newly established,” and the view of functions of language such as
“discriminating superiority and inferiority and differentiating identities and differences”; while the “discrimination of
words and meanings” mainly contained two aspects: One was that words could completely represent meanings while it could not
do so on the other hand, and the other was that the Dao should be grasped through “an unoccupied, concentrated and quiet mind.”
Xunzi’s philosophy of language stressed both language’s value attribute and its cognitive attribute, and it is the greatest
achievement of pre-Qin dynasty’s philosophy of language. 相似文献
16.
Summary This article is an investigation of parallel themes in Heinrich Hertz’s philosophy science and Kant’s theory of schemata, symbols and regulative ideas. It is argued that Hertz’s “pictures” bears close similarities to Kantian “schemata”, that is, they are rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning. Kant’s distinction between symbols and schemata is discussed and related to Hertz’s three pictures of mechanics. It is argued that Hertz considered his own picture of mechanics (the “hidden mass” picture) as symbolic in a different way than the force and energy pictures. In the final part of the article it is described how Harald H?ffding soon after the publication of Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics developed a general theory of analogical reasoning, relying on the ideas of Hertz and Kant. 相似文献
17.
John A. Schuster 《Synthese》2012,185(3):467-499
One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed “physico-mathematics”. This signalled
a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy,
non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related
to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more ’physicalised’, more closely intertwined
with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous
epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes’ physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the
mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases
one could literally “see the causes”. Optics took pride of place within Descartes’ physico-mathematics project, because he
believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes’ early physico-mathematical
program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later
work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an
achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal
knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular
motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system. 相似文献
18.
Mark E. Jonas 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(2):153-169
In this paper, I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming has been largely misinterpreted in the philosophy
of education journals. The misinterpretation partially stems from a misconstruction of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and leads
to a conception of self-overcoming that is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s educational ideals. To show this, I examine some
of the prominent features of the so-called “debate” of the 1980s surrounding Nietzsche’s conception of self-overcoming. I
then offer an alternative conception that is more consistent with Nietzsche’s thought, and provides a more nuanced understanding
of Nietzsche’s “anti-democratic” pedagogy. Ultimately, I argue that while Nietzsche’s educational philosophy is not egalitarian,
it can be effectively utilized in “democratic” classrooms, assuming his concept of self-overcoming is properly construed.
相似文献
Mark E. JonasEmail: |
19.
Jürgen Oelkers 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2000,19(1-2):3-19
In 20th century’s European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy ofdemocracy. John Dewey’sDemocracy and Education was translated in nearly every European language but did not become the center of discussion. Even “radical education” was
much more childcentered than open to radical questions of political democracy. This article discusses the problem in two respects,
first the tension between neo-liberalism’s concept of individuality and public education, and second the future problems of
a theory of “democratic education”after Dewey. The aim is to overcome traditional European dualisms like that of “citizen”or “man” i.e. to pave the way for a post-Rousseauian theory of education.
Inaugural lecture upon taking office at the University of Zurich on 22nd November 1999. 相似文献
20.
Stieb JA 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):11-18
It has been claimed that (1) computer professionals should be held responsible for an undisclosed list of “undesirable events”
associated with their work and (2) most if not all computer disasters can be avoided by truly understanding responsibility.
Commentators of “A Critique of Positive Responsibility in Computing” argue that this is not Donald Gotterbarn’s view (Gotterbarn,
JSEE 14(2):235–239, 2008) but that a critique of the view nevertheless raises significant moral issues within computing such
as the ethical goals of a computing profession, the appropriate ethical stance toward bugs, and the public good with respect
to computing (Miller, JSEE 14(2):245–249, 2008). Commentators also argue that “A Critique”’s “profitable misreading” demonstrates
the “moral ecology” of organizations “dedicated narrowly to financial success” and that other “moral ecologies” that are customer
or quality driven can be shown to be more important or preeminent (Huff, JSEE 14(2):241–244, 2008). It is argued here that
(1) the hyper-inflated reading of Gotterbarn’s and Ladd’s views on positive responsibility persists despite Gotterbarn’s explicit
rejection of it, and that (2) such a reading of positive responsibility cannot be placed within a single moral ecology, nor
can a single moral ecology be shown to be any more important or preeminent than others.
Stieb, J. A. (2008). A critique of positive responsibility in computing. Science and Engineering Ethics,
14(2), 219–233. 相似文献