TWO KINDS OF INTENTIONALITY IN LOCKE

Ideas play at least two roles in Locke's theory of the understanding. They are constituents of ‘propositions,’ and some of them ‘represent’ the qualities and sorts of surrounding bodies. I argue that each role involves a distinct kind of intentional directedness. The same idea will in general be an ‘idea of’ two different objects, in different senses of the expression. Identifying Locke's scheme of twofold ‘ofness’ reveals a common structure to his accounts of simple ideas and complex ideas of substances. A consequence is a distinction among substance sorts parallel to one of his distinctions between primary and secondary qualities.     

论西方心理学的两大方法论

本文对实证主义和现象学对心理学发展所起的方法论作用进行了研究。文中对心理学方法论的含义及方法论对心理学流派建立的指导意义进行了详细的分析。通过追溯构造派与格式塔心理学、行为主义与人本主义心理学的对立和这一对立所体现的实证主义与现象学方法论的尖锐冲突,作者概括和总结了西方心理学的发展留给我们的经验教训。     

情绪应激体液免疫调节作用的影响因素

以给予经定时喂水训练大鼠空瓶刺激为情绪性心理直激源,研究了应激源给予的频率及抗原免疫前或后给予应激刺激等因素对此情绪应激体液免疫调节作用的影响：结果表明,特异性抗原OVA免疫前3次,每次30分钟的情绪应激刺激不影响大鼠的抗OVA抗体水平和脾脏指数;抗原免疫后,同样频率和持续时间的情绪应激能一定程度地降低体液免疫功能;而抗原免疫后14次,每次10分钟的情绪应激刺激则显著降低大鼠的抗OVA抗体水平和脾脏指数。该研究证实,抗原免疫后、反复多次的情绪应激刺激能显著抑制大鼠的原发性体液免疫功能。     

A TALE OF TWO ABRAHAMS: KAFKA,KIERKEGAARD, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FAITH IN THE MODERN WORLD

I have vigorously absorbed the negative element of the age in which I live, an age that is, of course, very close to me, which I have no right ever to fight against, but as it were a right to represent. The slight amount of the positive, and also of the extreme negative, which capsizes into the positive, are something in which I have had no hereditary share. I have not been guided into life by the hand of Christianity – admittedly now slack and failing – as Kierkegaard was, and have not caught the hem of the Jewish prayer shawl – now flying away from us – as the Zionists have. I am an end or a beginning. 1     

文化常模和目标调节模型:两种幸福感文化观

随着世界经济的发展,人们物资生活水平的提高,如何提高生活质量这一问题引起了越来越多的关注。20世纪60年代后期,主观幸福感(SWB)的研究逐步在全世界范围内形成热潮。近年来,幸福感属性中的文化差异引起了跨文化研究者的极大兴趣。文章通过比较SWB跨文化研究中新近出现的两个理论模型——文化常模模型和目标调节模型,探讨了文化在SWB产生过程中的作用,并在此基础上分析了情绪性幸福感和生活意义之间的关系。     

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: In this article, I propose one way of understanding the expression "feminist epistemology." I begin from the premise that improper philosophical attention has been paid to the implications of what I call The Fact of Preconditions for Agency: that moral and rational agents become such only through a long, deliberate, and intensive process of intervention and teaching, a process that requires commitments of time, effort and emotion on the part of other agents. I contend that this is a sufficiently important aspect of what it is to be a person that accounting for its philosophical implications may have repercussions not only for moral and political theory, but for epistemology as well. I contend further that, given the current configuration of social possibilities, a theory that acknowledges this Fact might appropriately be deemed "feminist."
My argument is presented in four segments. In Section II, I show how such a theory could be feminist by providing a discussion of categories of social identity; in Section III, I show how such a theory could be epistemology by describing a strategy of argument from parity. In Section IV, I apply this strategy to a case from political philosophy to show why its counter-intuitive implications do not provide good grounds for rejecting the suggested redistricting. And in Section V, I apply the same strategy to a case from epistemology to bring out how it might lead to a theory that might legitimately claim to be feminist epistemology.     

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INQUIRY

Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus’ response to the dogmatists’ objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus’ arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists’ inquiry, we should conclude either that it is impossible or that it does not supply the skeptics with satisfactory starting‐points for further inquiry.     

TOWARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPASSIBILIST PASTORAL CARE

Not a few scholars reject the notion of divine impassibility. Contemporary theodicists in particular often see impassibility as impotent in the face of evil and suffering. At best, it is assumed that impassibility has no contribution to make to pastoral practice. At worst, it is argued that impassibility has negative repercussions for sufferers and carers. The purpose of this article will be to argue that impassibility has the potential to positively impact pastoral practice. It will be proposed that a constructive ‘impassibilist pastoral care’ arises from a well defined understanding of impassibility and an awareness of the weaknesses of passibility. Consequently, five principles of pastoral care will be identified. Relationality engenders practice which is mutual. Particularity resists the tendency in much care towards ‘normalisation’. Equivalence challenges the passibilist by submitting that the incarnation provides an ontologically equivalent divine suffering which stands in contrast to the so‐called ‘suffering of God’ thesis. Arationality affirms that human reason is limited and therefore prevents the carer from over rationalising suffering. Otherness arises from the belief that God is ontologically distinct and therefore he alone is the source of salvation. In light of these principles, the proposed understanding of ‘impassibilist pastoral care’ is brought into dialogue with the questions sufferers ask and a positive and effective definition of impassibility is submitted. In sum, this article seeks to bring together philosophical and theological defences of impassibility in order to submit a fresh approach to the care of those who suffer.