共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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PALPH WEDGWOOD 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2002,65(2):349-369
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Kent Ingvar Hurtig 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(3):517-543
Bernard Williams has famously argued that there are only “internal” reasons for action. Although Williams has produced several,
slightly different versions of internalism over the years, one core idea has remained the same: the reasons a person has for
acting must be essentially linked to, derived from, or in some other way connected to, that person’s “subjective motivational
set”. I have two aims in this paper. First, after having cleared up some initial ambiguities, I try to show that Williams’s
internalism admits of two rather different interpretations. Second, I will argue that both these interpretations are inadequate.
The first interpretation is incompatible with certain claims that supposedly provide the reasons why we should accept internalism
in the first place. The second interpretation faces other problems: given the essential link between reasons and motivation,
this interpretation cannot adequately deal with the phenomenon of accidie. Furthermore, those who subscribe to this interpretation
of internalism are, on pain of inconsistency, forced to accept an implausible account of reasonable regret. 相似文献
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Miriam Schoenfield 《Philosophical Issues》2015,25(1):252-272
Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent's internal states that explains why only these states can play whatever role the internalist thinks these states are playing? Internalists have frequently appealed to a special kind of epistemic access that we have to these states. But such claims have been challenged on both empirical and philosophical grounds. I will argue that internalists needn't appeal to any kind of privileged access claims. Rather, internalist conditions are important because of the way in which we expect them to act as causal mediators between states of the world, on the one hand, and our beliefs and actions on the other. 相似文献
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Michael S. Brady 《The Philosophical quarterly》2000,50(198):91-97
Internalism about practical reasons claims that there is a necessary connection between what an agent has reason to do and what he would be motivated to do if he were in privileged or optimal conditions. Internalism is traditionally supported by the claim that it alone can capture two (supposed) conditions of adequacy for any theory of practical reasons, that reasons must be capable of justifying actions, and that reasons must be capable of explaining intentional acts. Robert Johnson ( The Philosophical Quarterly , 49 (1999), pp. 53–71) has argued that versions of internalism which avoid obvious problems nevertheless fail to capture both conditions. I argue that Johnson's criticisms rest upon a misinterpretation of the 'explanatory condition', and I proceed to formulate a version of internalism which will allow practical reasons to have both justificatory and explanatory force. 相似文献
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Tomoji Shogenji 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):59-72
This paper addresses the meta-epistemological dispute over the basis of epistemic evaluation from the standpoint of meliorative
epistemology. Meliorative epistemology aims at guiding our epistemic practice to better results, and it comprises two levels
of epistemic evaluation. At the social level (meliorative social epistemology) appropriate experts conduct evaluation for
the community, so that epistemic evaluation is externalist since each epistemic subject in the community need not have access
to the basis of the experts’ evaluation. While at the personal level (meliorative personal epistemology) epistemic evaluation
is internalist since each member of the community must evaluate the reliability of the (apparent) experts from the first-person
perspective. I argue that evaluation at the social level should be the primary focus of meliorative epistemology since meliorative
personal epistemology does not provide informative epistemic norms. It is then pointed out that epistemic evaluation at the
social level can be considered internalist in the extended sense (social internalism) in that every component of the evaluation
needs to be recognized by some members of the community at some points. As a result, some familiar problems of internalist
epistemology, such as regress and circularity of epistemic support, carry over to meliorative social epistemology. 相似文献
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Joshua Gert 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(1):15-34
Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s
main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as
objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox
externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have
of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism.
But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting
“hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that
Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own
version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of
Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option. 相似文献
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John Greco 《Synthese》1990,85(2):245-277
In section one the deontological (or responsibilist) conception of justification is discussed and explained. In section two, arguments are put forward in order to derive the most plausible version of perspectival internalism, or the position that epistemic justification is a function of factors internal to the believer's cognitive perspective. The two most common considerations put forward in favor of perspectival internalism are discussed. These are the responsibilist conception of justification, and the intuition that two believers with like beliefs and experiences are equally justified in their like beliefs. In section three it is argued that perspectival internalism is false, and that in fact the position is not supported by a responsibilist conception of justification. Section four explicates two other forms of internalism, which are rejected for reasons similar to those presented against perspectival internalism. In section five, an internalist theory of justification is defended which is supported by a responsibilist conception of justification. Roughly stated, the position is that justified belief is belief which arises from the use of correct rules of reasoning. The idea of correctness is explicated, and the position is distinguished from others which are similar to it. 相似文献
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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The aim of this paper is to outline the program of a hermeneutic theory of the way in which reality becomes disclosed and meaningfully... 相似文献
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Richard Feldman 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(5):603-620
Abstract: Among the important themes in Roderick Chisholm's epistemology are his commitment to internalism, his defense of the independence of epistemology from empirical science, and his assumption that we do know most of what we initially think we know. In “Roderick Chisholm and the Shaping of American Epistemology” Hilary Kornblith argues that Chisholm's views lead to a radical divorce between the factors that justify beliefs and the factors that cause beliefs, that Chisholm's views have the consequence that there is no connection between justification and truth, and that Chisholm's kind of epistemology is unable to give epistemic advice. I argue that Chisholm's views do not have these consequences. 相似文献
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Luis R.G. Oliveira 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2018,99(2):174-185
Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. 相似文献
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David Alexander 《Philosophia》2012,40(3):497-521
Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what I call the phenomenon of reflective defeat: if one is justified in not believing that E makes probable P, then this defeats whatever justification one has for believing P upon the basis of E. I argue that this modified version of externalism has the virtue of accommodating the intuitions that motivate internalism, without the cost of the vicious regress that makes internalism so unattractive. 相似文献
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Anthony Brueckner 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):47-54
This paper concerns various competing views on the nature of perceptual justification. Various thought experiments that motivate various views are discussed. Once reliabilism is rejected and some form of internalism is instead embraced, the following issue arises: must an internalist nevertheless require that perceptual justification involve the possession of evidence for the reliability of our perceptual processes? Matthias Steup answers in the affirmative, espousing what he calls internalist reliabilism. Some problems are raised for this form of internalism. 相似文献
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Robert Lockie 《Ratio》1998,11(1):14-36
Moral Internalism is the claim that it is a priori that moral beliefs are reasons for action. At least three conceptions of 'reason' may be disambiguated: psychological, epistemological, and purely ethical. The first two conceptions of Internalism are false on conceptual, and indeed empirical, grounds. On a purely ethical conception of 'reasons', the claim is true but is an Externalist claim. Positive arguments for Internalism — from phenomenology, connection and oddness — are found wanting. Three possible responses to the stock Externalist objections are uncovered and overturned. In so doing a close relation between Internalism and Behaviourism is revealed, and some stock anti-behaviouristic arguments are co-opted for Externalism. The likely dependence of Internalism on an Atomistic Associationism is uncovered and criticised. Internalism is seen as being ultimately a type of Ethical Determinism. Finally, a sketch of an Anti-Associative Externalism is given whereby the notion of self determination of action is put forward as an account of moral motivation fit to resist both the internalist and the belief-desire psychology premises of the stock non-cognitivist argument. 相似文献