Refugee Discrimination – The Good,the Bad,and the Pragmatic

This article addresses three questions. To what extent does the current refugee regime discriminate among refugees? When is such discrimination wrong? Could discrimination ever be justified pragmatically, for the sake of admitting more refugees given political constraints? In answer to the first question, it finds discrimination is rampant. There is the kind of discrimination that gets noticed: discrimination that states choose to enact within the refugee regime. But there is also a kind of discrimination that is missed: discrimination that is a product of the regime itself. The second question proves tricky. Matters are clear at the extremes. Discrimination based on need is permissible. Discrimination based on race or religion is not. In between, we have a set of hard cases that are more difficult to judge. The article searches for relevant criteria. Finally, on the last question, the article concludes that a political leader could be justified in enacting discrimination as a pragmatic response to political constraints but that, even on such occasions, discrimination remains wrongful.     

Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?

This paper examines the efforts of contractualists to develop an alternative to aggregation to govern our duty not to harm (duty to rescue) others. I conclude that many of the moral principles articulated in the literature seem to reduce to aggregation by a different name. Those that do not are viable only as long as they are limited to a handful of oddball cases at the margins of social life. If extended to run-of-the-mill conduct that accounts for virtually all unintended (in the sense of undesired) harm to others—noncriminal activities that impose some risk of harm on others—they would rule out all action. Moreover, because such conduct poses an irreducible conflict between freedom of action and freedom from expected harm, it can be regulated only by principles that accept the necessity of making precisely the sorts of interpersonal trade-offs that contractualism is foundationally committed to reject: trade-offs in which the numbers count, such that a risk of serious harm to one person can be justified by small benefits to the many.     

Egalitarianism and Responsibility

This essay examines several possible rationales for the egalitarian judgment that justice requires better-off individuals to help those who are worse off even in the absence of social interaction. These rationales include equality (everyone should enjoy the same level of benefits), moral meritocracy (each should get benefits according to her responsibility or deservingness), the threshold of sufficiency (each should be assured a minimally decent quality of life), prioritarianism (a function of benefits to individuals should be maximized that gives priority to the worse off), and mixed views. A case is made for adopting either prioritarianism or a mixed view that gives priority both to the worse off and to the more responsible and deserving.     

The Ethics of Citizen Selection of Refugees for Admission and Resettlement

The global space is in need of creative solutions to the challenges posed by those seeking, and deserving of, asylum. In some democratic states, experiments in permitting citizens to have a greater role in selecting refugees for admission are underway; in this article, I consider the conditions that must apply to any citizen-selection scheme, in order for such a scheme to be morally acceptable. I begin with an account of the way in which citizen-selection schemes – usually called ‘sponsorship programs’ – operate presently. I then offer a justification for engaging citizens in refugee resettlement in general, as well as in selecting specific refugees for admission in particular, and then identify several conditions that must attend any permissible citizen-selection scheme. I defend this account from two objections: (1) that states should be the primary, and indeed only, agent that selects refugees for admission and (2) that citizens will inevitably use problematic criteria in selecting refugees for admission, so they should be denied the right to do so. I conclude with some proposals for how a citizen-selection scheme can be crafted to respond to this latter worry, including an outline of an exception clause that permits citizens to make the case that some refugees ought to be resettled, even if not specially selected by the UNHCR for resettlement priority, including especially family members and friends.     

Keeping Out Extremists: Refugees,Would-Be Immigrants,and Ideological Exclusion

Many people want to live in liberal democracies because they are liberal and democratic. Yet it would be mistaken, indeed naïve, to assume that this applies to all would-be residents. Just as some inhabitants of liberal democracies oppose one or more fundamental liberal-democratic values and principles (e.g. the rule of law, freedoms of conscience and speech, rights to private property and to political participation), so there are foreign would-be residents who do so, who might include individuals with e.g. Jihadist, Neo-Nazi, and radical anarchist views. Proceeding on the assumption that there exists no unconditional moral right to immigrate, this article asks whether it is ever morally permissible for liberal democracies to deny residence to nonnationals based on evidence that they personally hold extremist views. I argue that this is sometimes the case. Specifically, my contention is that even if we adopt a cosmopolitan perspective on which states are not allowed to prioritise the interests of their own citizens and residents over those of foreign nonresidents, there are two conditions under which such exclusions are justified even when refugees are being refused admission (although, as I suggest, states might be morally required in such cases to admit other refugees instead).     

In Their Own Words: Mental Health and Quality of Life of West African Refugees in Nigeria

Refugees are exposed to extreme stressors and are therefore at risk of mental health and social problems. Other issues refugees have to cope with include the loss of their country, culture, language, profession, family, friends, and future plans. Much of the studies that have been done on refugee mental health have not attempted to explain what these experiences mean to these individuals. Thus, this study provides explorative data on the mental health and quality of life of West African refugees living in Nigeria in order to understand their views and perspectives. This study carried out in 2010 employed qualitative methods; a total of four focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted among adult male and female refugees purposively selected at the Oru Refugee Camp, Ogun State, Nigeria. Respondents described quality of life as a major determinant of mental health status. Most of the participants believed that women were more predisposed to mental ill health due to their sensitive emotional make-up. Factors identified by respondents as affecting mental health and quality of life among refugees included poverty, unemployment, physical health, housing and environment, discrimination, stigmatization, and insecurity. Refugees rated their mental health and quality of life as poor due to the aforementioned factors. Recommendations were made to the international community, national and local governments to invest more on education, provision of vocational and entrepreneurial skills as well as adequate housing in order to improve the mental health and quality of life of refugees.     

Cross-ethnic networks, self-reception system, and functional integration of refugees from the former Yugoslavia in Rome

The character of the immigrant policy context in Italy has caused refugees from the former Yugoslavia in Rome to organize themselves spontaneously and to create a self-reception system that facilitates their functional integration. The Italian policy context allows refugees to approach their situation in exile in an active way because it does not offer them a dependent role. Emphasizing the importance of providing refugees with a framework for an active reconstruction of life, however, should not be understood as an apologia for the absence of strategy for integration as well as legal, financial, and institutional means to facilitate this process.     

KINDS, ESSENCES, POWERS

What is the new essentialist asking us to accept? Not that there are natural kinds, nor that there are intrinsic causal powers. These things could be accepted without a commitment to essentialism. They are asking us to accept something akin to the Kripke‐Putnam position: a metaphysical theory about kind‐membership in virtue of essential properties. But Salmon has shown that there is no valid argument for the Kripke‐Putnam position: no valid inference that gets us from reference to essence. Why then should we accept essentialism? A remaining reason is Ellis's argument by display: we should buy essentialism because of the benefits it will bring. But are these benefits real? The problem is that the putative benefits of essentialism – that the laws of nature are necessary, that the problem of induction is solved, and so on – look actually to be the assumptions of Ellis's theory. If that is the case, there is no real benefit to be gained from adopting the theory. The argument for essentialism is therefore underdetermined and it remains possible to accept natural kinds into one's ontology without accepting their corresponding essences.     

Organising Somalian,Congolese and Rwandan Migrants in a Time of Xenophobia in South Africa: Empirical and Methodological Reflections

Xenophobic practices pervade civil society and the state in South Africa. But its victims are not passive. Academic scholarship has not sufficiently recognised the multiple roles of refugees and asylum seekers migrant organisations in a context where refugees are required to “self-settle”. The dominant methodological focus of existing research has been on the migrant as the individual. This paper’s main research objectives are to question this focus and examine evidence of the collective responses to struggles faced by foreign African migrants and refugee groups in Cape Town. Eleven refugee and asylum seeker associations formed by Somalians, Congolese and Rwandan asylum seekers and refugees were investigated, based on extensive interviews with 11 leaders of refugee organisations. These organisations not only strongly defend migrant interests but also project a long-term view of integration into South African society. In addition, the paper concludes by arguing for a shift in the focus of research in order to show that migrant organisations are crucial in an individual’s collective security concerns, in advocacy with government institutions and in initiatives to build relationships with South Africans.     

Attitudes,Tracing, and Control

There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections.     

Preparing Counselors to Work with Refugees: Integration of Experiential Activities

The number of globally displaced refugees has increased by record-high numbers. Refugees are forced out of their home countries and many are resettled in the United States. As the number of refugees entering the US continues to increase, there is a need to ensure that mental health counselors understand the unique needs of this population and provide culturally appropriate counseling services. The aim of this article is to present experiential activities that counselor educators can use in counselor preparation programs to better prepare counselors-in-training to work with refugees.     

Beyond the Frontstage: Trust, Access, and the Relational Context in Research with Refugee Communities

This paper examines the role of trust and the concept of access as they affect the relational context in which community research, and research with refugee communities in particular, is conducted. Sociologist Irving Goffman's metaphor of frontstage and backstage behavior is used to illustrate the complexity and importance of developing of relations of trust, and thereby gaining "backstage" access, in communities that are generally closed to outsiders. It is argued that gaining authentic ("backstage") access to refugee communities, as well as other communities that have developed a self-protective insularity, is essential if we are to gather data that accurately reflect the actual beliefs, feelings, and experiences of community members. The paper then examines the puzzling lack of discussion regarding issues of trust, access, and the relational context in the literature on refugee mental health. Explanations for this apparent inattention are sought in the influence of the prevailing scientific paradigm that guides most research with refugees, and that shapes the values of the field's "gatekeepers," the editors and reviewers of scholarly journals. Throughout the paper, key points are illustrated with examples drawn from the author's research with refugees from Guatemala, Bosnia, and Afghanistan.     

Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation

Animals often aid others without gaining any immediate benefits. Although these acts seem to reduce the donor's fitness, they are only apparently altruistic. Donors typically help because they or their kin receive future benefits or avoid costly punishment. Reciprocal altruism--alternating the roles of donor and recipient--has been a well-studied form of cooperation among non-kin because of its intuitive appeal in explaining human cooperation. Despite immense theoretical interest, little empirical evidence substantiates the biological importance of reciprocal altruism in non-human animals. We propose that this is because psychological mechanisms constrain its application in cooperative contexts. In particular, we contend that cognitive limitations such as temporal discounting, numerical discrimination and memory make reciprocity difficult for animals.     

First things first: infants make good use of the sympathetic rhythm of imitation,without reason or language

Research on communication with infants, including newborns, has demonstrated that imitations in great variety play many different parts, and with emotions of interest and pleasure. Matching another's actions may seek attention and provoke reply, accept or reject advances, express admiration or mockery. It seems best to regard imitating as one way that persons express and receive sympathetic awareness, one manifestation of the intuitive readiness to move rhythmically with others in games of sociability. Infants exhibit growing awareness of how to cooperate with others in gaining knowledge and skills. The intersubjective intuitions that are active early in life and that build trust and companionship must be significant for therapists who work with young patients for whom communication is difficult. Imitating and accepting imitations can build reciprocal confidence.     

Disability versus futility in rationing health care services: defining medical futility based on permanent unconsciousness--PVS,coma, and anencephaly

All societies must ration health care services in the face of unlimited demand. The concept of medical futility may appear to be an uncontroversial means by which to ration services. Depending upon how it is applied, however, limiting services based on alleged medical futility may violate prohibitions against disability-based discrimination. In particular, use of medical futility to require removal of life-sustaining interventions has been held to violate the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA protects both people with disabilities who are conscious and people in unconscious states, such as permanent vegetative state (PVS), coma, and anencephaly. Ultimately, as the number of people in permanently unconscious states increases, our society will have to recognize that consciousness is an essential characteristic defining human beings and determining whether a legal right to unlimited life-sustaining intervention should apply. This article proposes to define medical futility to preclude life-sustaining interventions after a stated period of permanent unconsciousness and to redefine the end of life consistently as neocortical death.     

基因专利保护的伦理审视

基因专利与普通专利不同,需要兼顾资源提供者的利益.当前,基因专利保护中出现的诸多问题背离了尊重、公正、有利的普遍伦理原则.基因专利需要接受伦理的考量,道德规范是消解基因专利冲突的理性选择.     

The Kosovar sponsoring experience in Northern Alberta

We examine the experiences of sponsors who assisted Kosovar refugees in Northern Alberta. Although the sponsors of the Kosovars did not provide basic financial support to the refugees, many found their role to be onerous, particularly in terms of emotional investment and demands on their time. They would have liked more opportunity to debrief and to have contact with other experienced sponsors. Some of the sponsors' initial expectations of the Kosovars were at odds with reality; conversely, many sponsors felt that the refugees had unrealistic expectations of them and of life in Canada. Recommendations are made for future sponsoring arrangements.     

Sport,Wholehearted Engagement and the Good Life

I present an account of the good life as one in which wholesale engagement in the social practices that human agents take up is the signature feature. I then argue that sport, because it is one of a select few human undertakings in which such full-blown action is the rule rather than the exception, is a paradigmatic example of such a good life. I close by claiming that equating the good life with wholehearted action is an especially promising way not only to appreciate the contribution sport makes to our lives but to legitimize that contribution to would-be detractors.     

Ecological Refugees,States Borders,and the Lockean Proviso

Ecological refugees are expected to make up an increasing percentage of overall refugees in the coming decades as predicted climate change related disasters will displace millions of people. In this essay, I focus on those rights ecological refugees may claim on the basis of collective self‐determination. To this end, I will focus on a few specific cases that I call cases of ‘ecological refugee states’. Tuvalu, the Maldives, and to a certain extent, Bangladesh are predicted to be ecological refugee states in the near future. These are states whose entire (or close to it) geographical territory is predicted to be lost to rising sea levels; the collective body of the people will itself become an ecological refugee. The question is: what may the people of an ecological refugee state legitimately claim on the basis of their right to self‐determination? Should we redraw state borders to accommodate a New Tuvalu? I argue that a plausible position regarding territorial rights is that when (1) a people clearly is (or recently was) self‐determining and has a legitimate claim to continue to be self‐determining, and (2) the self‐determination of a people is existentially threatened because the people lacks territorial rights, that (3) the people becomes a candidate for sovereign over a new territory. The result is that existing state borders may need to change to accommodate something like a New Tuvalu. To generate these results on behalf of ecological refugee states, I examine the principles of the system of territorial states. Because the system of territorial states is a system of exclusive rights over goods, especially land, it is possible that it is subject to the conditions of a Lockean proviso mechanism. This paper is dedicated mainly to adapting a version of the Lockean proviso for use in territorial rights theory.