Do lateral eye movements increase susceptibility to misinformation? A registered replication

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review -     

Is awareness necessary for true inference?

In transitive inference, participants learn a set of context-dependent discriminations that can be organized into a hierarchy that supports inference. Several studies show that inference occurs with or without task awareness. However, some studies assert that without awareness, performance is attributable to pseudoinference. By this account, inference-like performance is achieved by differential stimulus weighting according to the stimuli's proximity to the end items of the hierarchy. We implement an inference task that cannot be based on differential stimulus weighting. The design itself rules out pseudoinference strategies. Success on the task without evidence of deliberative strategies would therefore suggest that true inference can be achieved implicitly. We found that accurate performance on the inference task was not dependent on explicit awareness. The finding is consistent with a growing body of evidence that indicates that forms of learning and memory supporting inference and flexibility do not necessarily depend on task awareness.     

Is neutralization necessary for criminal behavior?

Criminological theories currently place much emphasis on neutralization of norms, i.e., extension or distortion of norms to allow guilt‐free infraction, as a key element in criminal behavior. This paper examines the major assumptions underlying the neutralization thesis and a critical alternative thesis, which argues that criminal beliefs rather than neutralizations permit criminal actions. Analysis of data from a sample of college students calls into question the neutralization theory assumption of homogeneity of moral values in this society. The alternative thesis is supported by the finding of variation in moral values and its link to differential criminal involvement. It is argued that this evidence precludes the need for a concept such as neutralization to account for criminal behavior.     

Is exposure a necessary condition for fear-reduction?

In most of the effective techniques for reducing fear, exposure to the fear-provoking stimulus is a prominent feature. It is argued that in many circumstances, engaged exposure to the fear stimuli is a sufficient condition for fear-reduction, but there is no good reason for supposing that such exposure is a necessary condition for fear-reduction. Seven examples of fear-reduction apparently taking place in the absence of exposure are used to illustrate the argument. Some theoretical and practical consequences of the argument are introduced.     

Is a new version of philosophical pragmatism necessary? A reply to Barnes-Holmes

Barnes-Holmes (2000) discussed certain issues regarding philosophy, pragmatism, and behavior analysis, and offered a "behavioral pragmatism" based on or derived from behavior-analytic perspectives. In a comparison of certain philosophical views, Quine's concept of observation sentences was employed for representing pragmatism, but this concept is not sufficiently representative of the literature of philosophical pragmatism to warrant the broad conclusions drawn by Barnes-Holmes. Further, although the extensive and diverse literature of philosophical pragmatism has been shown by a number of writers to have various themes and perspectives in common with Skinner's radical behaviorism, it is unnecessary to extract a limited, generic version of pragmatism because (a) the latter cannot match the range and depth of the various extant versions and (b) the problems raised by Barnes-Holmes in justification for the new version yield readily to the current versions in philosophy. A set of philosophical views may provide additional verbal support for a given system of science, and the science of behavior analysis may eventually contribute to philosophical discourse. The latter, however, will not be achieved by proposing new versions of old philosophy, but rather by approaching established philosophical issues in new ways.     

Is there a future for investigative hypnosis?

Since its heyday in the 1970s and 1980s, hypnosis as an investigative procedure has declined in popularity such that many experts now consider it to be more a liability than a useful forensic tool. Indeed, in the US, a majority of the states follow a per se exclusion rule, prohibiting any memories retrieved during or after hypnosis from being introduced into evidence. In this paper, factors contributing to the demise of investigative hypnosis are re-examined. It is concluded that a per se exclusion rule is overly inclusive, but it is advisable for investigators to avoid using hypnosis when other, less contentious alternatives, such as the cognitive interview, are available. Nevertheless, it often goes unrecognised that a more positive legacy of investigative hypnosis is very present in modern investigative interviewing best practice; moreover, there may still be procedures employed in hypnotic interviewing that have yet to be exploited. For example, recent research indicates that, when divorced from the context of hypnosis, brief techniques such as focused breathing, and eye closure, can enhance memory. As memory enhancement with these techniques is achieved without the increase in false positive errors familiar to more traditional hypnosis techniques, evidence from such procedures should be acceptable to the courts. The potential role of hypnosis as a tool to reverse the effects of misinformation is also considered. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is retrieval success a necessary condition for retrieval-induced forgetting?

When information is retrieved from memory, it becomes more recallable than it would have been otherwise. Other information associated with the same cue or configuration of cues, however, becomes less recallable. Such retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, &; Bjork, 1994) appears to reflect the suppression of competing nontarget information, with this suppression facilitating the selection of target information. But is success at such selection a necessary condition for retrieval-induced forgetting? Using a procedure in which some cues posed an impossible retrieval task for participants, we report evidence that the attempt to retrieve, even if unsuccessful, can produce retrieval-induced forgetting. This finding, we believe, supports and refines a suppression/inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting.     

Is comprehension necessary for error detection? A conflict-based account of monitoring in speech production

Despite the existence of speech errors, verbal communication is successful because speakers can detect (and correct) their errors. The standard theory of speech-error detection, the perceptual-loop account, posits that the comprehension system monitors production output for errors. Such a comprehension-based monitor, however, cannot explain the double dissociation between comprehension and error-detection ability observed in the aphasic patients. We propose a new theory of speech-error detection which is instead based on the production process itself. The theory borrows from studies of forced-choice-response tasks the notion that error detection is accomplished by monitoring response conflict via a frontal brain structure, such as the anterior cingulate cortex. We adapt this idea to the two-step model of word production, and test the model-derived predictions on a sample of aphasic patients. Our results show a strong correlation between patients’ error-detection ability and the model’s characterization of their production skills, and no significant correlation between error detection and comprehension measures, thus supporting a production-based monitor, generally, and the implemented conflict-based monitor in particular. The successful application of the conflict-based theory to error-detection in linguistic, as well as non-linguistic domains points to a domain-general monitoring system.     

Are monkeys able to plan for future exchange?

Whether or not non-human animals can plan for the future is a hotly debated issue. We investigate this question further and use a planning-to-exchange task to study future planning in the cooperative domain in two species of monkeys: the brown capuchin (Cebus apella) and the Tonkean macaque (Macaca tonkeana). The rationale required subjects to plan for a future opportunity to exchange tokens for food by collecting tokens several minutes in advance. Subjects who successfully planned for the exchange task were expected to select suitable tokens during a collection period (5/10?min), save them for a fixed period of time (20/30?min), then take them into an adjacent compartment and exchange them for food with an experimenter. Monkeys mostly failed to transport tokens when entering the testing compartment; hence, they do not seem able to plan for a future exchange with a human partner. Three subjects did however manage to solve the task several times, albeit at very low rates. They brought the correct version of three possible token types, but rarely transported more than one suitable token at a time. Given that the frequency of token manipulation predicted transport, success might have occurred by chance. This was not the case, however, since in most cases subjects were not already holding the token in their hands before they entered the testing compartment. Instead, these results may reflect subjects' strengths and weaknesses in their time-related comprehension of the task.     

Is community necessary? Quasi-philosophical ruminations

In responding to and examining Mary Anne Raywid's (1989) adoption of community building as an aim for schools, I survey a number of types of communities, including recreational, intentional and language communities. In considering all these communities, I try to show both the power of communities in our personal lives and some idea of why we might be of two minds about promoting community as an ideal in the modern world and in schools in particular.     

Is the conflict model of decision making applicable to the decision to be screened for cervical cancer? A field study

The present study examined aspects of the conflict model of decision making (Janis and Mann, 1977) in the context of attending for a screening test for cervical cancer. In addition, the ability of decision coping styles as measured by Mann's (1982) Decision Making Questionnaire II (DMQ II) to predict screening status was examined. Three hundred and two women answered a questionnaire operationalizing the constructs in the conflict model about their beliefs and knowledge of cervical cancer and the Pap smear test. Four screening categories were identified: never screened, not screened in the last two years (overdue), screened in last two years and initiated the test, and screened in last two years and recruited to have the test. Differences in the decision processes of these groups were examined. Women who were overdue for their Pap test showed greater decisional conflict and were more likely to adopt a defensive avoidance coping pattern than those who had been screened in the last two years. Regression analyses exploring predictors of decisional stress and defensive avoidance for each group, except the never screen, showed that the model's suggested pathways were evidenced among the Overdue Group. Results failed to find any association between coping styles as measured by the DMQ II and screening status. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Is amodal completion necessary for the formation of illusory figures?

Kanizsa's hypothesis suggests that the creation of an anomalous surface is due to the amodal completion of the inducers. In the present paper a new pattern that is able to disconfirm this explanation is presented. According to the Helmholtz-Ratoosh law amodal completion only occurs when the borders of two adjacent surfaces meet forming T-shaped junctions. When the borders of the two adjacent surfaces have Y-shaped junctions, amodal completion is absent. However, when a pattern inducing an anomalous figure has the latter figural characteristics, in spite of the absence of amodal completion, an illusory figure is still visible. In this paper a set of experimental results (carried out by means of a magnitude estimation procedure as well as the method of constant stimuli) supporting the aforementioned observations is presented.     

Is early identification of children of alcoholics necessary for preventive intervention? Reaction to Havey and Dodd

Havey and Dodd (1995, this issue) address the question of how to best identify early adolescents who are at risk for later substance abuse, with a particular focus on children of alcoholics (COAs). They conclude that stressful family events are preferable to COA status as an at-risk indicator. In addition, they question the well-substantiated at-risk status of COAs, claiming support for the null hypothesis regarding individual and family differences between COAs and non-COAs. This article addresses both conceptual and methodological concerns about identification and intervention for COAs in general, and about the Havey and Dodd study in particular. I first discuss a theoretically-empirically based approach to identification and risk prevention that supports a more complex, less parsimonious, model than that suggested by Havey and Dodd. Second, I present research to support the at-risk status of COAs. Third, I discuss issues related to identification of COAs and question the validity of Havey and Dodd's identification techniques. On the basis of conceptual and methodological arguments, I contend that Havey and Dodd's conclusions are not well-founded in their own or others' research and that the at-risk status of COAs cannot be dismissed on the basis of their research. I also contend that early identification may not be necessary for intervention with COAs or other at-risk groups. Alternatively, primary prevention programs provide the context for both service delivery and identification of individuals who might not otherwise be easily identified, particularly those at risk for developing mental health problems because of family environment factors (e.g., family alcoholism or conflict), or those currently experiencing mild or internalized (e.g., depression) adjustment difficulties.