Libertarianism,Climate Change,and Individual Responsibility

Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been written about it from a libertarian point of view in particular. In this paper, I apply the libertarian moral theory to the problem of climate change. I focus on libertarianism’s implications for our individual emissions. I argue that (i) even if our individual emissions cause no harm to others, these emissions cross other people’s boundaries, (ii) although the boundary-crossings that are due to our ‘subsistence emissions’ are implicitly consented to by others, there is no such consent to our ‘non-subsistence emissions’, and (iii) there is no independent justification for these emissions. Although offsetting would provide such a justification, most emitters do not offset their non-subsistence emissions. Therefore, these emissions violate people’s rights, which means that they are impermissible according to libertarianism’s non-aggression principle.

     

What is ‘mental action’?

There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.     

Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle

John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.     

Conscious inhibitions: Freud,anti-Semitism,and Hobbesian imagination

This work aims to portray the effects of Freud’s anxiety about anti-Semitic violence on his political theory and metapsychology. Taking as its entry point Freud’s reorientation of anti-Semitism as aggressive action, I argue that Freud’s fear of the violent mob can be located in three interconnected dimensions of his work, all deeply informed by Hobbesian imagination. First, Freud accepted a Hobbesian vision of social antagonism into his political theory; second, he formulated a deeper, more efficient defence mechanism against mob violence with his notion of psychical guilt; third, Freud’s fears penetrated his metapsychology. Suffering from anti-Semitism, Freud was not only quick to accept a Hobbesian perspective – he also reconstructed it to a degree that radically changed its meaning. Freud’s third and most pervasive manoeuvre destabilized one of Hobbes’s fundamental theoretical tenets by suggesting that the Hobbesian State of Nature is inherently a non-human reality.     

The Baby Boomers Meet Menopause: Fertility, Attractiveness, and Affective Response to the Menopausal Transition

The purpose of this study was to identify social factors that affect women’s concerns about menopause. Data from a sample of 1,037 baby-boomer women who took part in two waves of the Midlife in the United States survey (MIDUS) were utilized. Two waves of survey data were collected in 1996 and 2005 from a nationally representative sample of women born between 1946 and 1964 residing in the United States. Women’s concerns about the effects of menopause on attractiveness, fertility, and the cessation of menstruation were examined. Analyses were replicated in Wave I and II of the study. Women who occupied multiple roles had fewer concerns about the loss of fertility. Women who had more symptoms were significantly more concerned about the effects of menopause on attractiveness. Concerns about the effects of menopause were also related significantly to women’s age, education, and financial security.     

Hilbert,logicism, and mathematical existence

David Hilbert’s early foundational views, especially those corresponding to the 1890s, are analysed here. I consider strong evidence for the fact that Hilbert was a logicist at that time, following upon Dedekind’s footsteps in his understanding of pure mathematics. This insight makes it possible to throw new light on the evolution of Hilbert’s foundational ideas, including his early contributions to the foundations of geometry and the real number system. The context of Dedekind-style logicism makes it possible to offer a new analysis of the emergence of Hilbert’s famous ideas on mathematical existence, now seen as a revision of basic principles of the “naive logic” of sets. At the same time, careful scrutiny of his published and unpublished work around the turn of the century uncovers deep differences between his ideas about consistency proofs before and after 1904. Along the way, we cover topics such as the role of sets and of the dichotomic conception of set theory in Hilbert’s early axiomatics, and offer detailed analyses of Hilbert’s paradox and of his completeness axiom (Vollständigkeitsaxiom).     

The Ethics of Reflexivity: Pride,Self-Sufficiency,and Modesty

This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: (1) the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, (2) the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, (3) the degree to which one interprets one’s personal ideals in an individualistic or collective manner, (4) the degree to which one’s commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals is rigid or flexible, and (5) the worthiness of one’s personal ideals. This framework, I argue, illuminates the nature and moral significance of virtuous and vicious forms of the character trait of pride.     

Logic,Rules and Intention: The Principal Aim Argument

Stephen Mumford develops his view of sport spectatorship partly through a rejection of an argument he attributes to Best, which distinguishes between two categories of sports, the ‘purposive’ and the ‘aesthetic’, on the basis of the claim that they have different principal aims. This paper considers the principal aim argument and one feature of Mumford’s rejection of that argument, namely, Best’s observation that the distinctions to which he draws attention are based on logical differences. The paper argues that Mumford misconstrues Best’s argument by taking it to be about the intentions of players and athletes, while it is actually about a specific feature of the rules of each sport.     

父母元情绪理念、情绪表达与儿童社会能力的关系

对341名学前儿童及其父母进行问卷调查, 考察父母元情绪理念、情绪表达与儿童社会能力的直接与间接关系。结果表明：(1) 父亲情绪教导对儿童社会能力有促进作用, 而情绪紊乱对儿童社会能力有阻碍作用; 父亲的积极情绪表达对儿童社会能力有促进作用, 消极情绪表达则有负向作用; 此外, 父亲情绪教导、情绪紊乱除了对儿童社会能力具有直接作用外, 还通过其情绪表达对儿童社会能力具有间接影响。(2) 母亲情绪教导对儿童社会能力具有积极作用, 而情绪紊乱则具有消极影响; 母亲积极情绪表达对儿童社会能力有促进作用, 而消极情绪表达对儿童社会能力无显著预测关系; 母亲情绪教导通过其积极情绪表达对儿童社会能力具有间接促进作用。     

Rule Following,Error Theory and Eliminativism

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to the contrary, non-eliminativist error theory does not provide a plausible vehicle for understanding the ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical paradox about rule-following developed in Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.     

Reading minds: Mentalization,irony and literary engagement

The concept of ‘mentalization’ has recently provided a fertile resource for thinking about various issues in psychoanalysis, including attachment, children’s play, personality disorders and the work of interpretation within the analytic setting. Mentalization also provides fruitful ways of thinking about how we read. This paper will suggest that book reading is akin to mind reading: engaging with certain literary texts is akin to understanding the minds of others from the subjective perspective required by mentalization. This way of thinking about literature provides a useful way of understanding its value. The paper will focus specifically on the uses of irony and free indirect speech in Jane Austen’s novel Persuasion. Austen’s use of literary techniques provides a way of understanding the inner lives of her characters via the ironic voice of the implied author, and requires the reader to engage in the kinds of understanding and insight required for mentalization.     

Time,space, and process in Anne Conway

ABSTRACT

Many scholars have drawn attention to the way that elements of Anne Conway’s system anticipate ideas found in Leibniz. This paper explores the relationship between Conway and Leibniz’s work with regard to time, space, and process. It argues – against existing scholarship – that Conway is not a proto-Leibnizian relationist about time or space, and in fact her views lie much closer to those of Henry More; yet Conway and Leibniz agree on the primacy of process. This exploration advances our understanding of Conway’s system, and the intellectual relationships between Conway, More, and Leibniz.     

Consistency, Models, and Soundness

This essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I focus my attention on the remarks that Frege makes on consistency when he sets about criticizing the method of creating new numbers through definition or abstraction. This gives me the opportunity to comment also a little on H. Hankel, J. Thomae—Frege’s main targets when he comes to criticize “formal theories of arithmetic” in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903)—G. Cantor, L. E. J. Brouwer and D. Hilbert (1899). Part 2 is mainly devoted to Hilbert’s proof theory of the 1920s (1922–1931). I begin with an account of his early attempt to prove directly, and thus not by reduction or by constructing a model, the consistency of (a fragment of) arithmetic. In subsequent sections, I give a kind of overview of Hilbert’s metamathematics of the 1920s and try to shed light on a number of difficulties to which it gives rise. One serious difficulty that I discuss is the fact, widely ignored in the pertinent literature on Hilbert’s programme, that his language of finitist metamathematics fails to supply the conceptual resources for formulating a consistency statement qua unbounded quantification. Along the way, I shall comment on W. W. Tait’s objection to an interpretation of Hilbert’s finitism by Niebergall and Schirn, on G. Gentzen’s allegedly finitist consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic as well as his ideas on the provability and unprovability of initial cases of transfinite induction in pure number theory. Another topic I deal with is what has come to be known as partial realizations of Hilbert’s programme, chiefly advocated by S. G. Simpson. Towards the end of this essay, I take a critical look at Wittgenstein’s views about (in)consistency and consistency proofs in the period 1929–1933. I argue that both his insouciant attitude towards the emergence of a contradiction in a calculus and his outright repudiation of metamathematical consistency proofs are unwarranted. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein falls short of making a convincing case against Hilbert’s programme. I conclude with some philosophical remarks on consistency proofs and soundness and raise a question concerning the consistency of analysis.     

Drama,intimacy, and vulnerability: the spiritual challenges of digital culture

The ever-increasing engagement of children and youth in social media and gaming activities online has created new challenges for scholars and practitioners of children’s spirituality. Bringing psychosocial and media studies research on the phenomena of adolescent ‘drama’ and morality, cyberbullying, and the vulnerable adolescent’s desire for intimacy and community into conversation with ideas about and practices for children’s spiritual nurture is essential work. Questions about the positive and negative influences of digital participation on moral imagination, levels of aggression and prosocial behaviours in social media communication, and the extent to which intimate relationships can be developed online are key concerns to be explored in this article.     

Continuing the Dialogue between Psychoanalysis and Somatic Experiencing: Reply to Bass,Leddick, Levine,Blakeslee, Sylvae,and Lombardi

I had expected that bringing together psychoanalysis and Somatic Experiencing (SE) might be controversial. That expectation was certainly not disappointed. Although Bass resonated with much of my thinking, he also challenged the whole idea of integrating these two forms of treatment. Leddick provided extensive critique, though more about how I drew upon SE, not so much the fact that I did. While Lombardi appreciated aspects of my work with the patient, he utterly rejected the whole notion of drawing upon SE, viewing it as mechanistic, simplistic, narrowly behavioral, and merely about modulation. To address these critiques, I revisit here the clinical process with Sue, highlighting how SE is about so much more than just modulation. SE can deepen our forms of analytic holding and can help patients (re)connect with their bodies in ways that are emotionally alive, intimate, and healing. In revisiting the clinical process, I draw upon Levine, Blakeslee, and Sylvae’s in-depth discussion of SE: its goals, principles, and techniques. Though I agree with Bass’s and Lombardi’s concerns about “integration” of psychoanalysis and SE, I do not propose integration of the two, but rather interweaving of one into the other. In essence, I seek here to continue to illustrate how SE can interweave into our work, enriching our psychoanalytic ways of looking, listening, and responding.     

Of words,tools, and actions

The author rejects Leon Galis's claim (Inquiry, Vol. II, No. 2) that in ‘Of Words and Tools’ (Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2) he attacks a form of the ‘use’ theory of meaning that no one has held. Galis's other claim, that the author criticizes a needlessly weak form of the theory, is found to be justified, but the author argues that his procedure was adequate, and parallel to that oi Galis's own reconstruction of the ‘use’ theory in terms of ‘goal‐directed action’. Difficulties in this reconstruction are pointed out, and some meta‐semantic issues about theories of meaning raised.     

Relativism, sceptical paradox, and semantic blindness

Relativism about knowledge attributions is the view that a single occurrence of ‘S knows [does not know] that p’ may be true as assessed in one context and false as assessed in another context. It has been argued that relativism is equipped to accommodate all the data from speakers’ use of ‘know’ without recourse to an error theory. This is supposed to be relativism’s main advantage over contextualist and invariantist views. This paper argues that relativism does require the attribution of semantic blindness to speakers, viz. to account for sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles. To that end, the notion of semantic blindness is clarified by distinguishing between content-blindness and index-blindness, and it is argued that the attribution of index-blindness required by the relativist account is implausible. Along the way, it is shown that error-theoretic objections from speakers’ inter-contextual judgments fail against relativism.     

Causal Projectivism,Agency, and Objectivity

This article examines how specific realist and projectivist versions of manipulability theories of causation deal with the problem of objectivity. Does an agent-dependent concept of manipulability (i.e. the agency theory version of causal projectivism) imply that conflicting causal claims made by agents with different capacities can come out as true? In defence of the projectivist stance taken by the agency view, I argue that if the agent’s perspective is shown to be uniform across different agents, then the truth-values of causal claims do not vary arbitrarily and, thus, reach a satisfactory level of objectivity. My argument connects Price’s considerations on the situation of deliberation, whose structure, common to all agents, is the same with respect to both decision making and causal claims on a concept inspired by Douglas’s classification of objectivity of thought processes: the perspective of the detached agent. I further argue that, despite his agent-independent concept of intervention, Woodward’s claim of a stronger objectivity standard (i.e. agent independence) cannot be achieved, as the relativity of causal concepts to a variable set brings about the issue of the agent’s choice of variables. Consequently, a more permissive objectivity standard (admitting of the agent’s perspective) applies to both views.