Chomsky On The ‘Ordinary Language’ View Of Language

There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins, and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ordinary language’ view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, and his rejection of it is a major motivation for the development of his own theory. In this paper I shall review Chomsky’s long-standing criticisms. I shall show that (1)Chomsky’s argument does not constitute a dismissal of the ‘ordinarylanguage’ view of language, (2) Chomsky’s conclusions about language do not follow from his argument, and (3) the ‘ordinary language’ view actually points to a promising way for us to understand the true nature of language and mind. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Anthropology Of ‘Sinhala Buddhism’

Part of the general problem in the anthropology of Buddhism as I demonstrate in this article is that the theoretical significance of the fact that the category 'Buddhism' is a recent and Western invention has not been sufficiently appreciated. Therefore, the anthropology of ‘Sinhala Buddhism’ continues to address the ahistorical and essentialist questions of who are Buddhists and who are not. In my view, such questions can only serve to further establish the essentialist assumptions about ‘authentic Buddhism’. Contrary to that, I explain how recent scholarship has challenged such established academic assumptions as what Buddhism is and who Buddhists are, and proposes questions of a different kind.     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

The scientific use of ‘representation’ and ‘function’: avoiding explanatory vacuity

Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity. Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory. My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function. However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.     

Unconfirmed Sightings Of An ‘Ordinary Language’ Theory Of Language

It is unfortunate that Francis Y. Lin, in ‘Chomsky on the “ordinary language” view of language’ pays little attention to his own remark, ‘Chomsky’s criticisms make us realize that we should not be content with general and vague formulations of convention, ability, and so on. We must make such notions precise and provide details’ Lin speaks so imprecisely and provides so few details of notions on which he relies heavily, such as ‘general learning mechanism’ and ‘sentence frame’, that readers must employ large amounts of guesswork to place even a halfway specific interpretation on his proposals and claims. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in self-referential awareness: a neurocognitive hypothesis

The nature of the ‘self’ and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the neurocognitive bases of self-related representation and processing is also crucial to research on the neural correlates of consciousness. The distinction between an ‘I’, corresponding to a subjective sense of the self as a thinker and causal agent, and a ‘Me’, as the objective sense of the self with the unique and identifiable features constituting one’s self-image or self-concept, suggested by William James, has been re-elaborated by authors from different theoretical perspectives. In this article, empirical studies and theories about the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in cognition and self-related awareness are reviewed, including the relationships between self and perception, self and memory, the development of the self, self-referential stimulus processing, as well as related neuroimaging studies. Subsequently, the relations between self and different aspects of consciousness are considered. On the basis of the reviewed literature and with reference to Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, a neurocognitive hypothesis is formulated about ‘I’-related and ‘Me’-related self-referential awareness. This hypothesis is extended to metacognitive awareness and a form of non-transitive consciousness, characteristic of meditation experiences and studies, with particular reference to the notion of mindfulness and other Buddhist constructs.     

The logic of obligation, ‘better’ and ‘worse’

Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, FT-33794. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for remarks on an earlier version of this paper.     

Reiteration: The ‘Imperative of the Word’ and Echoing the ‘Significative Terms’

Abstract

The act of reiteration is viewed as a therapeutic reply that is especially responsive in the face of what Lacan (1977) and Heidegger (1927/1962) respectively refer to as “empty speech” and “idle talk.” By hearing and selecting those key signifiers and phrasings that bear the client's story of distress, the act of reiteration allows us to focus and address the “subject who speaks” rather than the commonsense storyline itself. As an active and continuing punctuation of the client's direct discourse at the level of the word, the act of reiteration is only the first moment of a more complete narrative reply. But in keeping the therapist ever grounded in the client's direct expressions, it is this first moment of reiteration that leaves the therapist positioned to be responsive to the client's discourse of “rhetorical displacements,” of intimation and allusion, as these “echo” from “elsewhere.”     

Of Levinas’ ‘structure’ in address to his four ‘others’

It has long been accepted that one of Levinas’ major concerns is to establish an ethics of responsibility for the ‘other.’ Yet it has been deemed for decades, even by Levinasians, that his approach to that concern is ‘unsystematic’ and ‘not consistent.’ That situation arose because Levinas’ four terms for ‘other’ are difficult to translate, so his terms were first addressed by adopting English conventions. Such conventions have furthered Levinas scholarship, but our aim is to consider Levinas’ consistency: Hence we undertake the first English-language assessment of the rigour of Levinas’ approach in 1961 to the ‘other’ by means of all four terms. To do so, we follow a ‘formal structure’ that Levinas develops from the tradition of phenomenological logic—mostly Husserl’s. We hope the result will palliate worries about Levinas’ rigor, and allow new ways to engage with his work.     

The Eclipse of Imagination Within Educational ‘Official’ Framework and Why It Should be Returned to Educational Discourse: A Deweyan Perspective

In recent decades, the shift towards the “learnification” of educational discourse has de facto reframed educational purposes and schooling practice, thus reframing what students should know, strive for, and, in a sense, be. In this paper, given the efforts to disrupt the dominance of learning discourse, I seek to engage regarding a specific concern, namely, the progressive removal of imagination within educational official framework. Indeed, imagination has virtually disappeared from the documents, publications, web pages and recommendations of major educational agencies and institutions worldwide, with important and potentially damaging consequences for schooling, teaching and learning. Employing a Deweyan perspective, I argue that imagination plays a crucial role in the creation of pivotal educational features and phenomena, such as knowledge, inquiry, choice and deliberation, critical agency, meaning creation, and, importantly, the openness of possibilities. Therefore, the eclipse of imagination becomes, at the very same time, the eclipse of education; nurturing imagination is about nurturing education.     

The ‘workshy’

Abstract

This article is an attempt to apply the Kleinian ‘positions’ to long-term unemployment and to use them to suggest an alternative to punitive concepts such as ‘workshy’, while discussing the paradox in which a sincere attempt to find work exists alongside behaviour which seems designed to sabotage it. Such sabotaging behaviour not only offers secondary gains but affords channels for projections which mitigate unresolved aggression. While effective in coping with long-term unemployment, these mechanisms inhibit development and ‘benign cycles’ are gridlocked. Change and growth are seen as threats and aggression cannot be worked through and must be projected. Persecutory anxieties and a lack of enrichment by ‘otherness’ results and is reinforced by the reality of chronic unemployment. No opportunity for reparative work exists, so ‘concern’ and a sense of responsibility are inhibited. Narcissistic omnipotence and grandiosity is a feature. Long-term unemployment and homelessness show similar revolving door patterns connected to similar coping mechanisms.     

Autism and ‘disease’: The semantics of an ill-posed question

It often seems incorrect to say that psychiatric conditions are diseases, and equally incorrect to say that they are not. This results in what would seem to be an unsatisfactory stalemate. The present essay examines the considerations that have brought us to such a stalemate in our discussions of autism. It argues that the stalemate in this particular case is a reflection of the fact that we need to find the logical space for a position that rejects both positive and negative answers. It then suggests one way in which we might find such space, by applying Michael Dummett’s notion of semantic disharmony.     

‘There and then’, ‘here and now’, ‘when and if’: The relationship of present,past and future in the consulting room

This paper revolves around the question of the patient’s inhabiting of time. Where is the main focus of the patient’s indwelling in time – the past, the present or the future – and what are the qualitative aspects of such indwelling? Of equal significance, is the patient able to move freely between past, present and future events and preoccupations and make links between them, or is he or she caught in a ‘time warp’? These questions are explored within a context of both psychodynamic and existential theory, drawing on the one hand on the work of Winnicott, Bick, Bion and Turp and on the other of Heidegger, Van den Berg, Merleau-Ponty, Kemp and Scheffler. The themes addressed are illustrated with clinical examples.     

From Patterns To Prosperity: A Review Of Rachlin’s The Science Of Self-control.

The Science of Self‐Control (Rachlin, 2000) presents a clear overview of research and theory on self‐control, emphasizing important recent research by Rachlin and his students on temporally extended behavioral patterning as an aid to curbing impulsive decisions. We found the book well suited as a textbook in a graduate seminar on self‐control, particularly because it lucidly presents several provocative ideas about self‐control, decision making, addiction, and general theories of behavior. Of particular interest are his discussion of the “primrose path” to addiction and his behavioral research on the “prisoner's dilemma” as it relates to self‐control. Although we take some issue with teleological behaviorism, the theory of behavior advocated by Rachlin, we recommend this book to anyone interested in self‐control.