What's Wrong with the Experience Machine?

Nozick's thought experiment is less effective than is often believed. Certainly, there could be reasons to enter the machine. Possibly, life there might be among the best of all those available. Yet we need to distinguish between two versions. On the first, I retain my beliefs, memories, dispositions, some knowledge. On the second, all these too are determined by the scientists. Nozick alludes to both versions. But only on the first will machine life have appeal.     

What's Wrong with Prepunishment?

Punishing someone for a crime before they have committed it is widely considered morally abhorrent. But there is little agreement on what exactly is supposed to be wrong with it. In this paper, I critically evaluate several objections to the permissibility of prepunishment, making points along the way about the connections between time, knowledge, desert, deterrence and duty. I conclude that, although the conditions under which it could permissibly be administered are unlikely ever to arise in practice, nevertheless in principle, nothing is wrong with prepunishment after all.     

What's Wrong with Creativity Testing?

Creativity testing as it is now done is often based on a defective assumption that different kinds of creativity can be compressed into a single unidimensional scale. There is no reason to believe that the different kinds of creativity represent, simply, different amounts of a single unidimensional construct. The article shows how three different ways of viewing creativity lead to different ways of measuring creativity, all at variance with current unidimensional models. The point of view presented here does not suggest that current creativity tests are invalid, but rather, that care must be taken in the nature of claims made for them. Moreover, many of the same arguments could be applied to the measurement of intelligence and even wisdom as well.     

What's Really Wrong with the Limited Quantity View?

In Part Four of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit seeks Theory X – the Utilitarian account of the morality of choices where the number of people who will ever exist depends upon our actions. Parfit argues that X has yet to be found. The two simplest versions of Theory X are Total Utilitarianism and Average Utilitarianism. Unfortunately, Parfit argues, each of these leads to unacceptable results. Parfit explores various alternatives and finds them all unsatisfactory. This paper deals with one of those alternatives: the Limited Quantity View. I argue that ParfitÕs argument against this view fails. However, I then present a new and more general objection which defeats a broad range of utilitarian views, including the Limited Quantity View.     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.     

On the need for real dialogue: What's wrong with monological contractualism?

According to T.M. Scanlon, the core idea of contractualism consists in the claim that what we are morally required to do is conceptually grounded in the value of living in “relations of mutual recognition” with others. Specifically, Scanlon's contractualist idea of “living in relations of mutual recognition with others” requires that one act only in ways that cannot be reasonably rejected by all of those affected, according to the results of a hypothetical reflection conducted within one's own mind. I claim, however, that Scanlon is mistaken to rely on a single individual's hypothetical reflection (monological reflection) to determine what no one affected could reasonably reject. Instead, following Jürgen Habermas, I claim that we must engage in actual dialogue with all who stand to be affected, in order to live in relations of mutual recognition with others.     

Probing The Politics of Difference: What's Wrong with an All-Male Priesthood?

Though it is often taken for granted that feminists necessarily must condemn the exclusion of women from the Roman Catholic priesthood, the author demonstrates that the politics of difference, if pursued consistently, reopens this question. International feminist arguments for honoring gender differences, the teachings of John Paul II concerning women, and Catholic social justice teachings, taken jointly, suggest that the current Catholic exclusion of women from the priesthood is unjust not because the reservation of a social role to a single sex is inherently unacceptable, but because of the asymmetry in power between the roles accorded men and women in the governance of the Catholic Church. To be just, sex-specific reservation of roles must meet the criteria of balance, proportion, power, and particularity.     

The American Girl: Playing with the Wrong Dollie?

This essay explores the American Girl Just Like You doll through a variety of feminist lenses. It was inspired by my experiences chaperoning my friend Grace (aged eleven) to the American Girl Store in New York City, and returning to the store to shop for my own doll. I returned to the store because I was not sure why I was so extremely disturbed by this doll. The doll is not emaciated, not overtly sexy, and marketed along with outfits that supposedly send girls the message that they can achieve their goals. She comes in a variety of skin, eye, and hair colors, and the line is therefore marketed as racially and ethnically sensitive. I argue that although the Just Like You line appears to be empowering and racially sensitive on a superficial level, an in‐depth feminist analysis indicates that it is not. In fact, the Just Like You line is highly problematic from a feminist perspective.     

What's Going On with Dora? An Interpersonal Perspective

Freud views Dora's symptoms as displacements of conflictual fantasies and affects. In this essay the focus is shifted to Dora's body in relation, a vehicle for communication. The schism between her soma and psyche—or act and word—is understood as Dora's response to the mystifying, hypocritical relatedness in her family. Freud's bifurcation of theory and clinical praxis may repeat this pattern at moments when metapsychological interpretations do not jibe with the interactive moment. A detailed inquiry regarding the often-embodied transference-countertransference matrix is therefore explored toward better understanding and integration.     

The psychology of self-esteem: Promise or peril?

The psychology of self-esteem bypasses consequential issues of everyday behavior and moral responsibility in favor of pursuing a global goal of enhanced self-esteem on the assumption that happiness, success, and responsible behavior will automatically follow. The goal is vague and ways of achieving it are confused and conflicting. Greater attention to concrete tasks and challenges and sensitivity to moral issues could help make therapy more clear, effective, and socially useful.     

What's Wrong with Speciesism? (Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2015)

Peter Singer famously argued in Animal Liberation that almost all of us are speciesists, unjustifiably favoring the interests of humans over the similar interests of other animals. Although I long found that charge compelling, I now find myself having doubts. This article starts by trying to get clear about the nature of speciesism, and then argues that Singer's attempt to show that speciesism is a mere prejudice is unsuccessful. I also argue that most of us are not actually speciesists at all, but rather accept a view I call modal personism. Although I am not confident that modal personism can be adequately defended, it is, at the very least, a philosophical view worthy of further consideration.     

What is Wrong with the Concept of Religious Experience?

After briefly mentioning the reason why the concept of religious experience has become a key to understanding Western and non-Western religious phenomena in current religious studies, this paper argues that the concept itself is insufficient to represent the religious phenomena of Islam, because to speak about 'an experience of God' in the context of Islam is misleading. This paper also argues that to consider mystical experience as well as the prophetic revelation that is wah?y within the boundaries of religious experience is confusing. Since the transmission process and contents of wah?y are extraordinary and miraculous, it should not be treated as an ordinary religious occurrence and therefore should not be considered as a personal religious experience.     

Interpersonal choice: The advantage on the left or on the right?

This study explored whether body specificity unconsciously influenced preferences for certain people. Participants were presented pictures of the heads of 2 persons who were described as having the similar personality, profession and family background. They were instructed to choose 1 in each pair as the preferred date, preferred friend, more charismatic boss or as the better national leader. The results showed body specificity had an influence on the selection preference on first impression. Participants tended to choose the character on their dominant‐hand side. This study not only provided the first social psychological evidence for the body‐specificity hypothesis, but also first demonstrated a role for body specificity in impression formation and selection preference.     

Personhood: What's in a name?

Although there are persistent metaphysical challenges to the notion of “natural kinds” of entities that are what they are essentially, all developed and useful taxonomies are based on just such notions. “Persons,” if they are to be distinguished from other kinds of things, must possess unique properties or the potential for acquiring such properties. Reductive strategies, far from locating these properties, ignore them and thus render the concept of “person” either ambiguous or unintelligible. The properties that count, it is argued here, are those associated with moral and civic forms of life.     

Motor Imitation in Young Children with Autism: What's the Object?

Two studies investigated the nature of motor imitation in young children with autism. Study 1 compared different types of motor imitation in 18 autistic children, 18 children with developmental delay, and 18 normally developing children. Results revealed weaker imitation skills for the autistic group, though all groups demonstrated a similar pattern of performance across different imitation domains. Imitation of body movements was more difficult than imitation of actions with objects, and imitation of nonmeaningful actions was more difficult than imitation of meaningful actions. Study 2 investigated concurrent and predictive relations between imitation and other developmental skills within a sample of 26 two-year-old children with autism. Results suggested that imitation of body movements and imitation of actions with objects represent independent dimensions. Imitation of body movements was concurrently and predictively associated with expressive language skills, and imitation of actions with objects was concurrently associated with play skills. Improvements in both motor imitation domains occurred over a 1-year period.     

Erratum: Comment: What's in a name?

Erratum . New Blackfriars Volume 86, Number 1004
In this article by Fergus Kerr in Volume 86, Number 1004, July 2005: - p. 360, line 5 of text: 'He reaffirms his predecessor's condemnation of "Modernism" (he is said to have found a document delating himself in the papal in-tray); but, by these "new terms"' should read: 'He reaffirms his predecessor's condemnation of "Modernism" (he is said to have found a document delating himself in the papal in-tray); but, by these "new terms", he means the categorization of Catholics as "modernists" and "integrists".'