A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism

Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally better to use a neversentient human than a sentient animal, butthese cases are few and would not fulfill thecurrent need for research subjects. The use ofnonautonomous animals instead of humans inrisky research can be based on solid moralground. It is not necessarily speciesism.     

Confronting ethical permissibility in animal research: rejecting a common assumption and extending a principle of justice

A common assumption in the selection of nonhuman animal subjects for research and the approval of research is that, if the risks of a procedure are too great for humans, and if there is a so-called scientific necessity, then it is permissible to use nonhuman animal subjects. I reject the common assumption as neglecting the central ethical issue of the permissibility of using nonhuman animal subjects and as being inconsistent with the principle of justice used in human subjects research ethics. This principle requires that certain classes of individuals not be subjected to a disproportionate share of the burdens or risks of research. I argue for an extension of this principle to nonhuman animal research and show that a prima facie violation of the principle occurs because nonhuman animals bear an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of the risks of research without sufficient justification or reciprocal benefit.     

Biodefense research and the U.S. regulatory structure whither nonhuman primate moral standing?

Biodefense and emerging infectious disease animal research aims to avoid or ameliorate human disease and suffering arising from the natural outbreak or intentional deployment of some of the world's most dreaded pathogens. Research to develop medical countermeasures to these diseases faces a difficult challenge since the products usually cannot be tested for efficacy in human beings. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's Animal Rule may be increasingly used to overcome this challenge by allowing researchers to translate animal data into medical countermeasures without human subject efficacy testing. Yet the Animal Rule also has significant implications for increased intensive nonhuman primate research. We argue that despite the common belief that nonhuman primates have a fairly high level of moral standing and the protections for animals that are crucial to the U.S. regulations guiding animal research, the Animal Rule specifically and the regulations generally raise serious problems for the attribution of moral standing to nonhuman primates. We argue, however, that the burden of proof is on a position denying all moral standing to nonhuman primates and compare the implications of the U.S. regulatory structure in this regard with some recent developments in the European Union.     

The institutional review board is an impediment to human research: the result is more animal-based research

Biomedical research today can be generally classified as human-based or nonhuman animal-based, each with separate and distinct review boards that must approve research protocols. Researchers wishing to work with humans or human tissues have become frustrated by the required burdensome approval panel, the Institutional Review Board. However, scientists have found it is much easier to work with the animal-based research review board, the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Consequently, animals are used for investigations even when scientists believe these studies should be performed with humans or human tissue. This situation deserves attention from society and more specifically the animal protection and patient advocate communities, as neither patients nor animals are well served by the present situation.     

The analysis of human behavior in context

Does the name of the special interest group, “The Experimental Analysis of Human Behavior,” imply that those who analyze the behavior of human animals must organize themselves apart from those who analyze the behavior of nonhuman animals? Is the use of nonhumans in experiments really not relevant to the analysis of the behavior of humans? If so, then something must have changed. Many differences exist, of course, between the behavior of humans and nonhumans—humans, for example, cannot fly under their own power—but have we really isolated differences in principle, differences that require separate organizations for the study of each? I will try to indicate why I believe this is a serious concern, where the concern comes from, and what, perhaps, might be done to maintain what was once a flourishing bidirectional relation between research with humans and nonhumans, in both basic and applied research.     

Should protections for research with humans who cannot consent apply to research with nonhuman primates?

Research studies and interventions sometimes offer potential benefits to subjects that compensate for the risks they face. Other studies and interventions, which I refer to as “nonbeneficial” research, do not offer subjects a compensating potential for benefit. These studies and interventions have the potential to exploit subjects for the benefit of others, a concern that is especially acute when investigators enroll individuals who are unable to give informed consent. US regulations for research with human subjects attempt to address this concern by mandating strict protections for nonbeneficial research with subjects who cannot consent. Typically, humans who cannot consent, such as children, may be enrolled in nonbeneficial research only when it poses low risks and has the potential to gather information of sufficient value to justify the risks, an appropriate surrogate gives permission on the individual’s behalf and the individual agrees (assents). In contrast, US regulations for nonbeneficial research with nonhuman primates do not include these protections, even though it too involves subjects who cannot consent and who face risks for the benefit of others. Is this difference in regulatory protections justified? Or does the principle of fairness—treat like cases alike—imply that regulations for nonbeneficial research with nonhuman primates should include protections similar to those that apply to nonbeneficial research with humans who cannot consent?     

Human factors with nonhumans: factors that affect computer-task performance

There are two general strategies that may be employed for "doing human factors research with nonhuman animals." First, one may use the methods of traditional human factors investigations to examine the nonhuman animal-to-machine interface. Alternatively, one might use performance by nonhuman animals as a surrogate for or model of performance by a human operator. Each of these approaches is illustrated with data in the present review. Chronic ambient noise was found to have a significant but inconsequential effect on computer-task performance by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Additional data supported the generality of findings such as these to humans, showing that rhesus monkeys are appropriate models human psychomotor performance. It is argued that ultimately the interface between comparative psychology and technology will depend on the coordinated use of both strategies of investigation.     

Util-izing animals

ABSTRACT Biomedical experimentation on animals is justified, researchers say, because of its enormous benefits to human beings. Sure, animals suffer and die, but that is morally insignificant since the benefits of research incalculably outweigh the evils. Although this utilitarian claim appears straightforward and relatively uncontroversial, it is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. This defence of animal experimentation is likely to succeed only by rejecting three widely held moral presumptions. We identify these assumptions and explain their relevance to the justification of animal experimentation. We argue that, even if non-human animals have considerably less moral worth than humans, experimentation is justified only if the benefits are overwhelming. By building on and expanding on arguments offered in earlier papers, we show that researchers cannot substantiate their claims on behalf of animal research. We conclude that there is currently no acceptable utilitarian defence of animal experimentation. Moreover, it is unlikely that there could be one. Since most apologists of animal experimentation rely on utilitarian justifications of their practice, it appears that biomedical experimentation on animals is not morally justified .     

The role of executive control in tool use

Comparing cognitive functions between humans and nonhuman primates is helpful for understanding human tool use. We comment on the latest insights from comparative research on executive control functions. Based on our own work, we discuss how even a mental function in which non-human primates outperform humans might have played a key role in the development of tool use.     

Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?

If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism—the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in which knowledge has to be robust . Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology's supposed conceptual core is not as epistemically unchallengeable as we might have assumed to be the case.     

Evolutionary developmental psychology: Contributions from comparative research with nonhuman primates

Evolutionary developmental psychology is a discipline that has the potential to integrate conceptual approaches to the study of behavioral development derived from psychology and biology as well as empirical data from humans and animals. Comparative research with animals, and especially with nonhuman primates, can provide evidence of adaptation in human psychological and behavioral traits by highlighting possible analogies (i.e., similar function, but independent evolution) or homologies (i.e., inheritance from a common ancestor) between human traits and similar traits present in animals. Data from nonhuman primates have played a crucial role in our understanding of infant attachment to the caregiver as a developmental adaptation for survival. Primate and human data are also consistent in suggesting that female interest in infants during the juvenile years may be a developmental adaptation for reproduction that facilitates the acquisition of maternal skills prior to the onset of reproduction.     

Precocious quantitative cognition in monkeys

Basic quantitative abilities are thought to have an innate basis in humans partly because the ability to discriminate quantities emerges early in child development. If humans and nonhuman primates share this developmentally primitive foundation of quantitative reasoning, then this ability should be present early in development across species and should emerge earlier in monkeys than in humans because monkeys mature faster than humans. We report that monkeys spontaneously make accurate quantity choices by 1 year of age in a task that human children begin to perform only at 2.5 to 3 years of age. Additionally, we report that the quantitative sensitivity of infant monkeys is equal to that of the adult animals in their group and that rates of learning do not differ between infant and adult animals. This novel evidence of precocious quantitative reasoning in infant monkeys suggests that human quantitative reasoning shares its early developing foundation with other primates. The data further suggest that early developing components of primate quantitative reasoning are constrained by maturational factors related to genetic development as opposed to learning experience alone.     

Animal welfare and individual characteristics: a conversation against speciesism

It seems impossible for a human being not to have some point of view concerning nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) welfare. Many people make decisions about how humans are permitted to treat animals using speciesist criteria, basing their decisions on an individual's species membership rather than on that animal's individual characteristics. Although speciesism provides a convenient way for making difficult decisions about who should be used in different types of research, we argue that such decisions should rely on an analysis of individual characteristics and should not be based merely on species membership. We do not argue that the concept of species is never useful or important. To make our points, we present a conversation among a skeptic, an agnostic, and a proponent of the view that our moral obligations to an animal must be based on an analysis of that individual's characteristics. In the course of the discussion, concepts such as personhood, consciousness, cognitive ability, harm, and pain are presented, because one's understanding of these concepts informs his or her ethical decisions about the use of animals by humans.     

The Gladiator Sparrow: Ethical issues in behavioral research on captive populations of wild animals

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues: whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal’s interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated.     

The Gladiator Sparrow: Ethical issues in behavioral research on captive populations of wild animals

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues: whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal’s interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated.     

The Gladiator Sparrow: ethical issues in behavioral research on captive populations of wild animals: a case study with commentaries exploring ethical issues and research on wild animal populations

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues, whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal's interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated.     

Non-Neural Extensions of haptic Sensitivity

Some animals are served perceptually by keratinous appendages without nervous supply, such as vibrissae, whereas others (principally primates) are able to perceive using inorganic tools. These capacities may be designated extended haptic percep- tion. Examples of extended haptic perception in crustaceans, whiskered animals, nonhuman primates, and humans are reviewed. It is argued that such perceptual recruitment of neurally inert components shows perception, per se, to be more fundamental than specialized perceptual organs.     

The cocktail party problem: what is it? How can it be solved? And why should animal behaviorists study it?

Animals often use acoustic signals to communicate in groups or social aggregations in which multiple individuals signal within a receiver's hearing range. Consequently, receivers face challenges related to acoustic interference and auditory masking that are not unlike the human cocktail party problem, which refers to the problem of perceiving speech in noisy social settings. Understanding the sensory solutions to the cocktail party problem has been a goal of research on human hearing and speech communication for several decades. Despite a general interest in acoustic signaling in groups, animal behaviorists have devoted comparatively less attention toward understanding how animals solve problems equivalent to the human cocktail party problem. After illustrating how humans and nonhuman animals experience and overcome similar perceptual challenges in cocktail-party-like social environments, this article reviews previous psychophysical and physiological studies of humans and nonhuman animals to describe how the cocktail party problem can be solved. This review also outlines several basic and applied benefits that could result from studies of the cocktail party problem in the context of animal acoustic communication.     

Self-aggression, stereotypy and self-injurious behaviour in man and monkeys

Self-aggression (SA) in monkeys is sometimes referred to as an animal analogue of self-injurious behaviour (SIB) in humans. However, the initiating and maintaining conditions of SA, along with other considerations, make it unlikely that SA can serve as a very useful model of human SIB. Instead, another, more widespread behaviour in nonhuman primates, namely stereotypy, appears to share more in common with human SIB and therefore seems likely to provide a more suitable model. It is concluded that SA is interesting from the point of view of the study of aggression, and that greater understanding of it should have theoretical and practical consequences.     

Harms and deprivation of benefits for nonhuman primates in research

The risks of harm to nonhuman primates, and the absence of benefits for them, are critically important to decisions about nonhuman primate research. Current guidelines for review and practice tend to be permissive for nonhuman primate research as long as minimal welfare requirements are fulfilled and human medical advances are anticipated. This situation is substantially different from human research, in which risks of harms to the individual subject are typically reduced to the extent feasible. A risk threshold is needed for the justification of research on nonhuman primates, comparable to the way risk thresholds are set for vulnerable human subjects who cannot provide informed consent. Much of the laboratory research conducted today has inadequate standards, leading to common physical, psychological, and social harms.