Substantive Equality and Equal Citizenship1

In Part 1, I argue that Watson and Hartley’s relational feminist political liberal approach – grounded in the idea of equal citizenship – produces a rather elusive liberal feminist agenda (because of its reliance on intuitions) and that it may lose track of the importance of goods whose value stems from the role they play in an individual woman’s or girl’s life rather than from the role they play in securing equal citizenship. I suggest that a distributive principle approach – like that of Susan Okin – might do better on both scores. In Part 2, I argue that Watson and Hartley may have overpromised what the state can and may do. Discussion includes focus on policy questions concerning, for example, prostitution and the gendered division of labor.     

On Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: Reply to Critics

In writing Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, we aimed to show that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism. To that end, we develop and defend a particular understanding of the commitments of political liberalism. Then, we argue that certain laws and policies are needed to protect and secure the interests of persons as free and equal citizens. We focus on the laws and policies that we think are necessary for gender justice. In particular, we apply our view to the contexts of prostitution law, family and marriage law, state support for caregivers, and religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. In this article, we consider some of the challenges made by the thoughtful critics who are part of this symposium. In particular, we address: why the collective enterprise view of liberal democracy requires shared reasons for the justification of certain laws and policies; how we understand substantive equality and why our understanding of substantive equality does not commit us to a comprehensive doctrine; how we avoid defending a particular political conception of justice in showing that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism; and how it is that, given justice pluralism, public reasons can provide stability for the right reasons.     

Mental Handicap and Citizenship

ABSTRACT Mentally handicapped people have been taken in philosophical work as an obvious exception to the canons which are applied to other, 'rational'individuals. This paper argues that mentally handicapped people should be accorded the same rights as others. If there are human rights, then mentally handicapped people are entitled to them as humans; and if there are rights which apply in general to citizens, the same rights apply equally to mentally handicapped people. The argument for the inclusion of mentally handicapped people as citizens is first, that there is a presumption of inclusion: if citizenship is accorded to all other individuals, there is no reason why citizenship should not be accorded to mentally handicapped people on the same basis as others. Second, mentally handicapped people cannot successfully be excluded without effectively challenging the presumption of inclusion applied to other groups. Third, and perhaps most important, there are positive reasons why mentally handicapped people, as a particularly vulnerable group, need to have rights to protect them against particular abuses.     

公民资格论——政府公共性视界中的公民公共感能力探究

政府公共性意义上的公民,分享着两项公共权利,承担着两项公共义务。他们不仅能够感知和理解公共权利和公共义务,而且具有把它们化为现实的公共感能力。用公共感能力确定公民的资格,为公民的概念提供了规范的标准,从而与国籍描述的公民资格区分开来,把公民定义为与市民不同的公共角色。公民作为公共的角色,应该积极地从正反两面培养自己的公共感能力,不断创造自己作为公民的价值。     

Respect,Religion, and Feminism: Comments on Lori Watson and Christie Hartley,Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism

There is significant disagreement among feminists and liberals about the compatibility between the two doctrines. Political liberalism has come under particular criticism from feminists, who argue that its restricted form of equality is insufficient. In contrast, Lori Watson and Christie Hartley argue that political liberalism can and must be feminist. This article raises three areas of disagreement with Watson and Hartley’s incisive account of feminist political liberalism. First, it argues that an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine can be compatible with respecting others, if that appeal is to the value of equality. Second, it takes issue with Watson and Hartley's defence of religious exemptions to equality law. Third, it argues that political liberalism can be compatible with feminism but that it is not itself adequately feminist. It concludes that political liberalism is not enough for feminists.     

Gratitude,Citizenship and Education

Citizenship education is a complex matter, and not least the place of civic virtues in it. This is illustrated by a consideration of the civic virtue of gratitude. Two conceptions of gratitude are explored. Gratitude seen as a debt is examined and Kants exposition of it, including his objections to a persons getting himself into the position where he has to show gratitude as a beneficiary, is explored. An alternative conception of gratitude as recognition is developed. This, it is claimed, has more relevance to the kind of gratitude it would be appropriate for citizens of a democratic state to feel. The educational implications of these views are indicated.     

Differentiated Citizenship and Contextualized Morality

Political theorists, increasingly, are realizing the virtues of contextuality to conceptual analysis. Just as theory may provide useful standards for the assessment of political practices, so may application of theoretical constructs within particular contexts provide a critical corrective to theory. This essay relates work undertaken within sociolegal studies applying a constitutive methodology to such efforts to contextualize political theorizing. The essay describes how the emphasis placed by constitutive theory on locality and meaning entails a contextual analysis. The essay then demonstrates how a constitutive and contextual approach can enhance our understanding of the moral issues surrounding differentiated citizenship policy. While the most obvious cost associated with differentiated citizenship policy is a loss in formal equality, a contextual assessment demonstrates the prospect of an even deeper, though ultimately contingent, moral loss in self-invention.     

Civic Friendship and Thin Citizenship

Contemporary appeals for a deepening of civic friendship in liberal democracies often draw on Aristotle. This paper warns against a certain kind of attempt to use Aristotle in our own theorising, namely accounts of civic friendship that characterise it as similar in some way to Aristotelian virtue friendship. The most prominent of these attempts have focused on disinterested mutual regard as a basic ingredient in all Aristotelian forms of friendship. The argument against this is that it inadequately accounts for the idea of a virtue friend as another self, which we find in Aristotle’s thought. When we attend closely to that, we see that civic friendship is different in a fundamental way from virtue friendship because virtue friends are keenly committed to the moral improvement of one another. It is argued that Aristotle does not see civic friendship in the same way. However, if this argument about the differences between the forms of friendship cannot be accepted, the paper argues that we should not draw on Aristotle for an understanding of civic friendship because any similarity it might have to virtue friendship would license illiberal interventions in the lives of citizens in service of some idea of moral improvement. A seeming connection between Aristotelian civic friendship and thick conceptions of citizenship is replaced with a connection between it and thinner conceptions.     

Boundaries of Citizenship Behavior: Curvilinearity and Context in the Citizenship and Task Performance Relationship

Resource allocation, attentional capacity, and role theories all suggest that the well‐documented linear relationship between citizenship behavior and task performance may be more complex than previously believed. In a study of 352 incumbents, we develop hypotheses that propose a curvilinear effect of employee citizenship on task performance. We further argue that this nonmonotonic relationship is different across the targets of citizenship performance and is moderated by several factors from the task context. Results support the curvilinear assertion, indicating that the relationship with task performance inflects when citizenship is more frequently performed. These diminishing returns are amplified when the target of citizenship is the organization compared to the individual. Findings further reveal that the task context elements of accountability and autonomy moderate the curvilinear relationship, whereas ambiguity does not. Implications for a reappraisal of the citizenship–task performance relationship are discussed.     

Citizenship and Community Mental Health Care

Citizenship is an approach to supporting the social inclusion and participation in society of people with mental illnesses. It is receiving greater attention in community mental health discourse and literature in parallel with increased awareness of social determinants of health and concern over the continued marginalization of persons with mental illness in the United States. In this article, we review the definition and principles of our citizenship framework with attention to social participation and access to resources as well as rights and responsibilities that society confers on its members. We then discuss our citizenship research at both individual and social‐environmental levels, including previous, current, and planned efforts. We also discuss the role of community psychology and psychologists in advancing citizenship and other themes relevant to a citizenship perspective on mental health care and persons with mental illness.     

Citizenship and immigration a current review

The presence of immigrants and their activities challenge traditional notions of citizenship centred on the conflation of national and state membership. Four dimensions of citizenship— defined here as membership in a socio-political community—are identified: legal status, rights, identity, and participation. Discussion centres on the constraints and determinants of naturalization, the extent to which rights are linked to personhood rather than membership in a nation-state, and the challenge to state identity and cohesion produced by multiculturalism. It is suggested that future research should consider citizenship as participation. This dimension highlights how immigrants’ transnational activities challenge traditional views of citizenship. We cannot, however, dismiss the importance of the state. The concept of participation is therefore also important since it focuses attention on dynamic interactions between the individual and the nation-state.     

Confucianism and the Idea of Citizenship

Does Confucianism have anything to contribute to the idea and practice of citizenship? Many critics would argue that it does not, on the grounds that it is inhospitable to values such as individuality, individual rights, equality and democracy. However, these grounds have to be severely qualified. Furthermore, there is no single conception of citizenship, even though the liberal conception stands out as, probably, the most influential one. Recently in the debate on citizenship, many commentators have been highly critical of the liberal conception, precisely for its uncompromising emphasis on individuality and individual rights, which tends to produce a political practice that fails to bring about equality and democratic values. Confucianism has much to contribute to the critique of the liberal conception of citizenship, as well as to the construction of a more viable conception, one that has a better chance to cope with the effects of globalisation.