医务社会工作者:医学人文关怀的使者

医务社会工作的内涵决定了其社会作用的重要性,医务社会工作的历史进程显示了其迅速发展的必然性,我国医疗卫生体制改革凸现出发展医务社会工作的紧迫性.目前国内医务社会工作还有许多问题亟待解决,应进一步提高认识水平,加强专业人才队伍建设,健全各项政策法规,积极进行实践探索,构建中国特色的医务社会工作模式,促进医务社会工作的发展.     

Taking Degrees of Truth Seriously

This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works studying these in the particular cases of Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics and of logics associated with varieties of residuated lattices are also presented. Finally the extension of this paradigm to other, more general situations is discussed, highlighting the need for philosophical or applied motivations in the selection of the truth degrees, due both to the interpretation of the idea of truth degree and to some mathematical difficulties.     

Weak and Strong Theories of Truth

A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.     

Truth and Generalized Quantification*

Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All(?, ψ)—that is, All ?s are ψ—or Most(?, ψ). Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene's strong scheme, and Kripke's theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers.     

科技道德的两种精神

本文致力于挖掘各种科技道德规范背后的伦理精神 ,提出科学精神和人本精神是科技道德规范的灵魂 ;阐释两大精神的丰富内涵 ;辨析二者间的学理关系和实践关系。     

想象的真理--论想象与真理的关系

无论再现论还是表现论的文艺观念,都肯定文艺活动的想象性质,并试图在此基础上理解文艺活动的区别特征。而这也同时产生了论证想象活动的真理性的要求,只不过在西方形而上学思想传统和符合论真理观念的限制下,对想象理解还包含着许多内在的困难。本文试图说明这些困难,并指出由西方现当代人文主义哲学所提供的解决问题的可能方向。     

Saving the Truth Schema from Paradox

The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr(A)A (understood as the conjunction of Tr(A)A and ATr(A)). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(A)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an . Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with as an additional connective, and where the effect of classical logic is preserved in the arithmetic or formal syntax itself. Section 1 is an introduction to the problem and some of the difficulties that must be faced, in particular as to the logic of the ; Section 2 gives a construction of an arithmetically standard model of a truth theory; Section 3 investigates the logical laws that result from this; and Section 4 provides some philosophical commentary.     

The Logic of Pragmatic Truth

The mathematical concept of pragmatic truth, first introduced in Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui (1986), has received in the last few years several applications in logic and the philosophy of science. In this paper, we study the logic of pragmatic truth, and show that there are important connections between this logic, modal logic and, in particular, Jaskowski's discussive logic. In order to do so, two systems are put forward so that the notions of pragmatic validity and pragmatic truth can be accommodated. One of the main results of this paper is that the logic of pragmatic truth is paraconsistent. The philosophical import of this result, which justifies the application of pragmatic truth to inconsistent settings, is also discussed.     

真实性及其伦理边界——对新闻真实性原则的伦理反思

真实是新闻的生命 ,追求并维护新闻的真实性是新闻工作者的伦理准则。然而和任何准则都不可能是绝对的一样 ,真实性同样不是一条绝对性原则。在具体的新闻传播活动中 ,由真实性引发的伦理冲突是经常存在的。新闻从业人员的职责之一 ,就是如何运用自己的道德智慧来解决这些伦理冲突。     

Conservative Theories of Classical Truth

Some axiomatic theories of truth and related subsystems of second-order arithmetic are surveyed and shown to be conservative over their respective base theory. In particular, it is shown by purely finitistically means that the theory PA ÷ "there is a satisfaction class" and the theory FS of [2] are conservative over PA.     

刍议恽代英精神

恽代英精神有着丰富的内涵,它集中体现在以下几个方面：爱国主义精神、为人民服务的精神、为崇高理想而奋斗的精神和追求真理、发展真理的精神。这种精神是对中华传统民族精神的升华,是毛泽东精神的组成部分,是21世纪中国人民继续奋发图强实现民族伟大复兴的精神动力。     

和谐伦理精神探析

和谐社会是一种和而不同的动态的理性社会,它需要一种全新的和谐伦理精神来支撑。这种和谐伦理精神主要体现在公平正义、诚信友爱、尊重自然等三个方面。公平正义是构建社会主义和谐社会制度的首要美德;诚信友爱是协调和谐人际关系的道德基石;尊重自然是实现人与自然和谐相处的生态伦理精神。这三种伦理精神的统一体现了社会、人和自然的统一。     

The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth

Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken together, are paradoxical. Yablo’s paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k > i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k > i is s(k) true). We generalize Yablo’s results along two dimensions. First, we study the behavior of generalized Yablo-series in which each sentence s(i) has the form: For Q k > i, s(k) is true, where Q is a generalized quantifier (e.g., no, every, infinitely many, etc). We show that under broad conditions all the sentences in the series must have the same truth value, and we derive a characterization of those values of Q for which the series is paradoxical. Second, we show that in the Strong Kleene trivalent logic Yablo’s results are a special case of a more general fact: under certain conditions, any semantic phenomenon that involves self-reference can be emulated without self-reference. Various translation procedures that eliminate self-reference from a non-quantificational language are defined and characterized. An Appendix sketches an extension to quantificational languages, as well as a new argument that Yablo’s paradox and the translations we offer do not involve self-reference.     

Henkin Quantifiers and the Definability of Truth

Henkin quantifiers have been introduced in Henkin (1961). Walkoe (1970) studied basic model-theoretical properties of an extension L _* ¹(H) of ordinary first-order languages in which every sentence is a first-order sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. In this paper we consider a generalization of Walkoe's languages: we close L _* ¹(H) with respect to Boolean operations, and obtain the language L ¹(H). At the next level, we consider an extension L _* ²(H) of L ¹(H) in which every sentence is an L ¹(H)-sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. We repeat this construction to infinity. Using the (un)-definability of truth – in – N for these languages, we show that this hierarchy does not collapse. In addition, we compare some of the present results to the ones obtained by Kripke (1975), McGee (1991), and Hintikka (1996).     

Criteria Based Content Analysis: The Less Scientific Road to Truth

Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA) is a forensic tool that aims atdistinguishing true from false statements made by crime victims. As such,CBCA and similar techniques are regularly employed by psychologicalexpert-witnesses in court. However, it could be argued that the diagnosticaccuracy of CBCA is moderate, and too low for application in the forensiccontext. The current article discusses problems that arise if conclusionsabout credibility of testimonies based on CBCA are presented in court. Afundamental, yet so far hardly addressed flaw is that CBCA suffers from aninherent truth bias. That is, the underlying notion that credibility isexamined by means of searching for signs supporting truthfulness isscientifically less valid than the approach in which credibility isestablished by focusing on alternative explanations and signs of deceit.     

Modal Logic,Truth, and the Master Modality

In the paper (Braüner, 2001) we gave a minimal condition for the existence of a homophonic theory of truth for a modal or tense logic. In the present paper we generalise this result to arbitrary modal logics and we also show that a modal logic permits the existence of a homophonic theory of truth if and only if it permits the definition of a so-called master modality. Moreover, we explore a connection between the master modality and hybrid logic: We show that if attention is restricted to bidirectional frames, then the expressive power of the master modality is exactly what is needed to translate the bounded fragment of first-order logic into hybrid logic in a truth preserving way. We believe that this throws new light on Arthur Prior's fourth grade tense logic.     

What Truth Depends on

What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both φ and the members of Φ are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs.     

Truth and democratic education

The connection of education to democracy is an issue of central importance to communities committed to liberty and justice. In her influential book Democratic Education Amy Gutmann addresses this connection. In doing so she takes up a position regarding democracies and the teaching of truth which is indefensible, and which removes any ban on manipulating citizens. Also indefensible is Gutmann's position concerning publicly-funded community colleges and universities. These she deems nonselective institutions; a mistake that obscures the unequal distribution of opportunities for democratically-required education. The outcome is to reveal Gutmann's analysis of democratic education and democratic participation to be, in important respects, inadequate.     

On Meaningfulness and Truth

We show how to construct certain L _{M, T} -type interpreted languages, with each such language containing meaningfulness and truth predicates which apply to itself. These languages are comparable in expressive power to the L _T -type, truth-theoretic languages first considered by Kripke, yet each of our L _{M, T} -type languages possesses the additional advantage that, within it, the meaninglessness of any given meaningless expression can itself be meaningfully expressed. One therefore has, for example, the object level truth (and meaningfulness) of the claim that the strengthened Liar is meaningless.