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1.
Kenneth Knies 《Husserl Studies》2011,27(2):83-104
I argue that the teleological-historical reflections of the Crisis are an effort to clarify what Husserl calls the “ultimate presuppositions” of phenomenology. I begin by describing the kind
of presuppositions revealed in natural-attitude and phenomenological reflection. I then consider how the ultimate presuppositions
become problematic for Husserl. After clarifying the distinction between these presuppositions and those already handled by
the reduction, I consider the appropriateness of the new reflections Husserl undertakes in order to address them. 相似文献
2.
Mikkel Gerken 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(3):373-394
I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer.
Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential
presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific
reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’
operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain
inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I outline a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal
but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential
presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes that function as premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise
inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from other kinds of presuppositions. In conclusion, I note some features
of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference. 相似文献
3.
Ronald N. Giere 《Erkenntnis》2005,63(2):149-165
Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion several times during the twentieth century. I begin by
noting three presuppositions of a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic
in the latter part of the century, Bas van Fraassen. The first presupposition is that there is a fundamental distinction to
be made between what is “empirical” and what is “theoretical”. The second presupposition is that a genuine scientific realism
is committed to their being “a literally true story of what the world is like”. The third presupposition is that there are
methods for justifying a belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory which do not also suffice to justify beliefs in its
literal truth. Each of these presuppositions raises a number of problems, some of which are quite old and others rather newer.
In each case, I briefly review some of the old problems and then elaborate the newer problems. 相似文献
4.
Corey Anton 《Human Studies》2006,29(2):181-202
This paper explores the meaning of dreamless sleep. First, I consider four reasons why we commonly pass over sleep’s ontological significance. Second, I compare and contrast death and sleep to show how each is oriented to questions regarding the possibilities of “being-a-whole.” In the third and final part, I explore the meaning and implications of “being-toward-sleep,” arguing that human existence emerges atop naturally anonymous corporeality (i.e. living being). In sum, I try to show that we can recover an authentic – if somewhat ambiguous – sense of “being-a-whole” only by recognizing the ontological significance of dreamless sleep. 相似文献
5.
Enactive appraisal 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Giovanna Colombetti 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(4):527-546
Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion
known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and
personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.”
I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective
notion of personhood.
相似文献
Giovanna ColombettiEmail: |
6.
Sami Pihlström 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,62(1):3-32
This paper examines the possibility of setting a boundary between religion and “pseudo-religion” (or superstition). Philosophers
of religion inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas, in particular, insist that religious language-use can be neither legitimated
nor criticized from the perspective of non-religious language-games. Thus, for example, the “theodicist” requirement that
the existence of evil should be theoretically reconciled with theism can be argued to be pseudo-religious (superstitious).
Another example discussed in the paper is the relation between religion and morality. The paper concludes by reflecting on
the issue of relativism arising from the Wittgensteinian contention that the religion vs. pseudo-religion division can only
be drawn within a religious framework, and on Wittgenstein’s own suggestion that the religious person “uses a picture”. 相似文献
7.
Ruth Manor 《Synthese》2006,153(2):171-186
The present offers a pragmatic solution of the Heap Paradox, based on the idea that vague predicates are “indexical” in the
sense that their denotation does not only depend on the context of their use, but it is a function of the context. The analysis
is based on the following three claims. The borderlines of vague terms are undetermined in the sense that though they may
be determined in some contexts, they may differ from one context to the next. Vagueness serves the important communicative
function, enabling speakers to identify entities as objects (as things we can talk about) in terms of some quantitative differences
between the “object” and its background in the context. Thus, in some contexts we can naturally partition the group of men
uniquely so as to distinguish the bald from the not-bald. Whether a man with a given hair number is among the bald in a given
context depends not only on his own hair number but also on the hair number of others in that context. This provides the background
for the claim that when we assert that John is bald, we presuppose that there is a unique demarcation to the bald in that
context. I consider the truth of the Paradox’s statements in contexts where the presupposition is true and in contexts where
it is false. The analysis yields that the contradiction is avoided because though each of the statements is often true, never
are all the sentences in the Paradox true together. 相似文献
8.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(1):59-71
“Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight” is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an
imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative
inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions
of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, “since surrender” or “it follows that surrender or fight”, and
(3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (“surrender or fight” permits you to fight without surrendering,
but “surrender” does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one’s mind and thus cannot be construed as
making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of ‘inference’, some everyday-life
inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions
does not amount to changing one’s mind. 相似文献
9.
Carl Baker 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(1):107-123
In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses
of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism—individualized indexical contextualism—I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider
are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic
blindness; and claiming that attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available
strategies gives a response which both (a) satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement-data and (b) is plausible independent
of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic
is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic. 相似文献
10.
Clare Carlisle 《Continental Philosophy Review》2005,38(1-2):19-39
This paper begins by reflecting on the concept of habit and discussing its significance in various philosophical and non-philosophical
contexts – for this helps to clarify the connections between habit and selfhood. I then attempt to sketch an account of the
self as ”nothing but habit,“ and to address the questions this raises about how such a self must be constituted. Finally,
I focus on the issue of freedom, or liberation, and consider the possibility of moving beyond habit. I emphasize the body
since it is through the body that the un-doing of habit must take place. Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty are distinguished from
the many philosophers who have recognized the importance of habit by their more radical claim that we not only have habits,
but are habits – and for this reason I draw on their work in the first two sections of this paper. 相似文献
11.
Kirsten Jacobson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):355-373
Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home”
is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar
notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity
that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially
an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for
our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way
of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature
of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. 相似文献
12.
Victoria S. Harrison 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2006,59(3):133-152
Few seem to have difficulty in distinguishing between religious and secular institutions, yet there is widespread disagreement
regarding what “religion” actually means. Indeed, some go so far as to question whether there is anything at all distinctive
about religions. Hence, formulating a definition of “religion” that can command wide assent has proven to be an extremely
difficult task. In this article, I consider the most prominent of the many rival definitions that have been proposed, the
majority falling within three basic types: intellectual, affective and functional definitions. I conclude that there are pragmatic
reasons for favouring the formerly popular view that essentialist definitions of “religions” are inadequate, and that religions
should be construed, instead, as possessing a number of “family resemblances.” In so arguing, I provide a response to the
view that there is nothing distinctive about religions, as well as to the recent claim that religions do not exist. 相似文献
13.
Joel W. Krueger 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(1):1-22
This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an “esthetic technology”
to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination
that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived
as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or “nested acoustic environment”
that further affords possibilities for, among other things, (1) emotion regulation and (2) social coordination. When we do
things with music, we are engaged in the work of creating and cultivating the self, as well as creating and cultivating a
shared world that we inhabit with others. I develop this thesis by first introducing the notion of a “musical affordance”.
Next, I look at how “emotional affordances” in music are exploited to construct and regulate emotions. I summon empirical
research on neonate music therapy to argue that this is something we emerge from the womb knowing how to do. I then look at
“social affordances” in music, arguing that joint attention to social affordances in music alters how music is both perceived
and appropriated by joint attenders within social listening contexts. In support, I describe the experience of listening to
and engaging with music in a live concert setting. Thinking of music as an affordance-laden structure thus reaffirms the crucial
role that music plays in constructing and regulating emotional and social experiences in everyday life. 相似文献
14.
Dan Mcarthur 《Synthese》2006,151(2):233-255
In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the
laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that
fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply
in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental
physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing
a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account
of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable.
I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such
as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the
EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether
abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses. 相似文献
15.
In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous
motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account
for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate
the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason,
and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”.
In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view.
This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in
each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. 相似文献
16.
In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge
them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will
call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue
our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we will inevitably
find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory)
or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations
that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals
or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient.
I should like to thank David Frost for brushing up my English and the Austrian Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research (FWF) for the financial support. 相似文献
17.
Patrick Stokes 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(1):23-44
Visual forms of episodic memory and anticipatory imagination involve images that, by virtue of their perspectival organization,
imply a “notional subject” of experience. But they contain no inbuilt reference to the “actual subject,” the person actually
doing the remembering or imagining. This poses the problem of what (if anything) connects these two perspectival subjects
and what differentiates cases of genuine memory and anticipation from mere “imagined seeing.” I consider two approaches to
this problem. The first, exemplified by Wollheim and Velleman, claims that genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations
are phenomenally “unselfconscious,” with the co-identity of the notional and actual subjects secured by a determinate causal
history. The second approach posits some distinctive phenomenal property that attaches to genuinely reflexive memories and
anticipations and serves to experientially conflate the notional and actual subject. I consider a version of the second approach,
derived from Kierkegaard’s discussions of phenomenal “contemporaneity,” and argue that this approach can better account for
the possibility of affective alienation from the selves we were and will be: the way in which our sense of self and awareness of our causal history can sometimes come apart. 相似文献
18.
Nick Bostrom 《Synthese》2007,157(1):59-78
The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self- locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reason
when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend
the “1/2 view” and those who advocate the “1/3 view”. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a
new “hybrid” model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model
appears to violate Bayesian conditionalization, but I argue that this is not the case. By paying close attention to the details of
conditionalization in contexts where indexical information is relevant, we discover that the hybrid model is in fact consistent
with Bayesian kinematics. If the proposed model is correct, there are important lessons for the study of self-location, observation
selection theory, and anthropic reasoning. 相似文献
19.
Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers
rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical
realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing
that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well,
perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want to say that “The Matterhorn is 4,500 m high” expresses
the same truth as “The Matterhorn is 14763.7795276 feet high” (or that it is true in the same range of utterance contexts),
even though the two are extensionally equivalent. The reason is that they express different intensions. 相似文献
20.
James Mensch 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,42(4):449-463
In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence,
assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive. In this article,
I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering
a number of examples. In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather
at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality
and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure. 相似文献