Audience-tuning effects on memory: the role of shared reality

After tuning to an audience, communicators' own memories for the topic often reflect the biased view expressed in their messages. Three studies examined explanations for this bias. Memories for a target person were biased when feedback signaled the audience's successful identification of the target but not after failed identification (Experiment 1). Whereas communicators tuning to an in-group audience exhibited the bias, communicators tuning to an out-group audience did not (Experiment 2). These differences did not depend on communicators' mood but were mediated by communicators' trust in their audience's judgment about other people (Experiments 2 and 3). Message and memory were more closely associated for high than for low trusters. Apparently, audience-tuning effects depend on the communicators' experience of a shared reality.     

Creating shared reality about ambiguous sexual harassment: The role of stimulus ambiguity in audience-tuning effects on memory

By tuning messages about ambiguous information to their audience's attitude, communicators can reduce uncertainty and form audience-congruent memories. This effect has been conceptualized as the creation of shared reality with the audience. We applied this approach to representations of ambiguous antecedents of sexual harassment and examined whether the effect depends on the event's perceived ambiguity. Participants read a testimony about a supervisor's ambiguous behaviors toward a female employee and described the behaviors to an audience who had previously evaluated him positively or negatively. We manipulated perceived ambiguity of the testimony by including or omitting information about eventual, clear-cut harassment (known vs. unknown outcome). As predicted, participants aligned their messages and memory with their audience's evaluation only in the unknown-outcome condition, where epistemic uncertainty was higher. The findings highlight the role of epistemic needs in the communicative creation of a shared reality about a ubiquitous social situation with potentially harmful outcomes.     

The generalization of shared reality: When communication about one target shapes evaluations of other targets

Communicators often tune their message about a target to the audience's attitude toward that target. This tuning can shape a communicator's own evaluation of the target, which reflects the creation of a shared reality with the audience. So far, evidence for shared‐reality creation has been confined to one specific target. In two experiments, we examined whether and when a shared reality would generalize to other targets. In Experiment 1, shared‐reality creation about an ambiguous sexist target generalized to the evaluation of a new ambiguous sexist target for which no audience attitude was provided. However, this happened only when there was high (vs. low) commonality with the audience regarding previous judgments. In Experiment 2, we investigated conditions for the temporal persistence of generalization. One week after message tuning to a high‐commonality audience, a shared reality generalized to a new ambiguous sexist target when participants recalled the shared‐reality creation about the initial target, but it did not generalize in conditions without such recall. Also, no generalization occurred for non‐ambiguous or non‐sexist targets. Results suggest that shared reality generalization depends on perceived commonality with the audience, recollection of shared reality at time of judgment, and similarity between new and initial targets.     

Talking about visually perceived events: Communication effects on eyewitness memory

Communicators' tuning of a message about a social target to their audience's evaluation can shape their representation of the target. This audience‐tuning effect has been demonstrated with ambiguous text passages as input material. We examined whether the effect also occurs when communicators learn about the target's behaviours from visual (nonverbal) input material. In Experiment 1, participants watched a soundless video depicting ambiguous behaviours of a target, described the video to an audience who liked (vs. disliked) the target, and subsequently recalled the video. Both message and recall were biased towards the audience's judgement. In Experiment 2, the video depicted a forensically relevant event, specifically ambiguous behaviours of two persons involved in a bar brawl. Participants tuned their event retellings to their audience's responsibility judgement and remembered the event accordingly. In both experiments, the effect of the audience's judgement on recall was statistically mediated by the extent to which the message was tuned to the audience. The more participants experienced a shared reality with their audience the stronger was the message‐recall correlation (Experiment 2). We conclude that the audience‐tuning effect for visually perceived information depends on the communicators' creation of a shared reality with their audience. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“说出即相信”效应的影响因素和理论解释

在人际沟通中, 沟通者向听众态度方向调整关于目标人物的信息, 并且随后沟通者对目标人物的记忆和评价也会出现相应的偏差, 这就是“说出即相信”效应。“说出即相信”效应的影响因素包括沟通目的、反馈、沟通者与听众的关系、求知需求、沟通者的人格特征等。研究者用基本信息过程、认知失调理论、分享现实理论等来解释这一效应。未来的研究可以将这一效应推广到群体领域, 完善理论机制并开展更多的应用研究。     

Creating shared reality in interpersonal and intergroup communication: the role of epistemic processes and their interplay

We describe research on the creation of shared reality in communication, emphasizing the epistemic processes that allow communicators to achieve confident judgements and evaluations about a communication topic. We distinguish three epistemic inputs: (1) the communicator’s own judgement about the topic (judgement of communicator); (2) the communicator’s perception of the audience’s judgement about the topic (judgement of audience); and (3) the communicator’s message to the audience about the topic (message of communicator). We argue that the influence of each input increases with the communicator’s confidence in the validity of that input. We review a variety of empirical studies in terms of this framework. We also address barriers to shared-reality creation in intergroup communication and describe interventions that work by increasing the validity strength of judgement of an outgroup audience. We discuss the relation between the present research and other approaches to social influence and social sharing.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Humble trust

I challenge the common view that trust is characteristically risky compared to distrust by drawing attention to the moral and epistemic risks of distrust. Distrust that is based in real fear yet fails to target ill will, lack of integrity, or incompetence, serves to marginalize and exclude individuals who have done nothing that would justify their marginalization or exclusion. I begin with a characterization of the suite of behaviors characteristic of trust and distrust. I then survey the epistemic and moral hazards of distrust, in particular, distrust’s propensity to bias interpretation, to perpetuate itself, to confirm itself, to dishonor, and to insult. Taking seriously these moral and epistemic hazards requires taking affirmative measures to respond to them. I elaborate one such response: “humble trust”. The practice of humble trust issues from skepticism about the warrant of one’s own felt attitudes of trust and distrust, curiosity about who might be unexpectedly responsive to trust and in which contexts, and commitment to abjure and to avoid distrust of the trustworthy. Humble trust enables individuals to trust that they will be trusted.

     

Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it.

     

认识性信任：学龄前儿童的选择性学习

人类个体对外界知识的获取很大程度上依赖于沟通, 即他人的证言。对儿童来说尤其如此。发展心理学家最近致力于研究学龄前儿童对他人证言的信任。一方面, 学龄前儿童往往会盲目地接受他人所告知的信息, 表现为轻信偏差; 另一方面, 儿童在知识学习上又会表现出高度的胜任力, 他们会借助一系列线索保证获取更为可靠的信息, 包括知识性线索和社会性线索。正如有关婴儿是否存在心理理论尚有争论, 儿童认识性信任的潜在机制也存在两种不同的取向, 涉及儿童是否理解信息者的心理状态。尽管对儿童知识性信息的研究取得了大量的成果和发现, 未来仍有许多问题值得探讨。     

The Building of Epistemic Trust: An Adoptive Family’s Experience of Mentalization-Based Therapy

ABSTRACT

Recently, theorists have posited the development of epistemic trust – the trust in others as reliable sources of information – as an essential aspect of the therapeutic relationship and a mechanism of therapeutic change. Epistemic trust is likely to be disrupted in adoptive children and families and Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT) aims to explicitly promote its development. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how epistemic mistrust is addressed and how epistemic trust is established within the MBT framework. This single-case, exploratory study reports data from in-depth interviews with one adoptive family, which were analyzed qualitatively using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Two superordinate themes are reported: pre-therapy factors contributing to epistemic mistrust and factors contributing to the development of epistemic trust. The findings highlight two critical elements in establishing epistemic trust: the use of certain clinical skills that help build a secure base within therapy and the possibility of trust being transferred from and to other professionals/systems beyond therapy. Hence, this study informs a deeper understanding of how epistemic trust may be built in therapeutic work with adopted children and identifies possible clinical approaches that may be used by clinicians working with this client group.     

"On my bed at night I sought him whom my heart loves"" reflections on trust, horror, G*d, and the queer body in vowed religious life

What can the multifaceted bouquet of queer love reveal about G*d? In this paper I wish to answer this question by reflecting on the queer body of the male vowed religious. I will argue that, since gendering is a key feature in our attempts to create epistemic order, the performance of gender instability in turn destabilizes our attempts to create epistemic order. In short: gender trouble leads to epistemic trouble. Far from being only a passive sign for these troubles, the male religious body, which is stylized by renouncing penetration, is also a field for the active experience of the horror and the need for trust implied in our fragile epistemic situation. Both trust and horror can be interpreted as an experience of the Dark Night, as the experiential side of Negative Theology. I will argue that the grace that we as queer men and women in general contribute to the Church is that we are pointing to and living out the fundamental reality of epistemic uncertainty and the troubling necessity of trust.     

参照性交流中的“听者设计”

“听者设计”一直是参照性交流研究领域中的热点。参照性交流过程中交流者通常会根据对交流同伴共享信息的评估来调整自己的行为,但是这些调整什么时候以及怎样发生的机制问题仍然存在争论。重点评述了“听者设计”的已有研究角度和研究进展,并归纳总结了参照惯例视角、记忆和注意视角、交流情境视角的研究观点。未来研究应扩展已有研究设计,以深入探查“听者设计”的形成、获得、发展变化过程,以及其与参照性交流其他限制因素间的相互作用;需要结合行为证据和眼动、脑成像证据等以帮助揭示“听者设计”过程的行为特点与认知机制。     

The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust

According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p. While the strong view offers a genuinely inter-personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p only if the speaker is reliable. While the weaker view offers an epistemic account of testimony, it faces a problem about redundancy: how can trust play any epistemic role when the speaker's reliability seems to pre-empt any contribution that trust may make towards such epistemic reason? This paper argues that neither horn of this dilemma is convincing once proponents of assurance views avail themselves of an epistemic distinction between reasons of rationality as a guide to reasonable belief and reasons of justification as a guide to true belief. Whereas testimonial assurance grounds rational reasons, which need not make probable the beliefs they make reasonable, testimonial reliability grounds justificatory reasons, which need not make reasonable the beliefs they make probable.     

A negativity bias in interpersonal evaluation

Two studies were conducted to demonstrate a bias toward negativity in evaluations of persons or their work in particular social circumstances. In Study 1, subjects evaluated materials written by peers. Those working under conditions that placed them in low status relative to the audience for their evaluations, or conditions that made their intellectual position within a group insecure, showed a clear bias toward negativity in those evaluations. Only individuals who believed their audience to be of relatively low status and at the same time believed their intellectual position to be secure did not show this bias. In Study 2, subjects viewed a videotape of a stimulus person and rated him on several intellectual and social dimensions. Again, subjects believed their audience to be of either relatively high or relatively low status. As a cross dimension, they were given instructions to focus on either the intellectual or the social abilities of the stimulus person while viewing the videotape. A strong main effect of audience status was demonstrated, but only in ratings of intellectual traits; subjects who believed their audience to be of relatively high status rated the stimulus person's intellectual qualities significantly more negatively. Moreover, this effect was independent of the instructional focus subjects had been given. The negativity bias is discussed in the context of previous demonstrations of biases toward weighting negative information more heavily than positive information, as well as previous demonstrations of seemingly pervasive positivity biases in memory and judgment.     

Believing on trust

The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig’s writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the ‘system knows’, social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.     

Cognitive tuning sets: Anticipating the consequences of communication

This paper reviews the literature on cognitive tuning sets: the expectations of having to transmit or receive information. It is shown that having to transmit information leads to a unified and distorted summary being transmitted, a reluctance to receive additional information, a rejection of inconsistent information, and a shaping of the material to accommodate the anticipated audience. As well, the opinions of the transmitters become polarized. It is argued that the receiver condition is probably not the correct control group to use since the outcome depends on the uncontrolled perceived goals. It is suggested that future research should probably treat the multiple effects of cognitive tuning sets separately. An integrated explanation is given in terms of anticipating the consequences of communication. This work was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Grants Scheme.     

Inconsistency effects in source memory and compensatory schema-consistent guessing

The attention–elaboration hypothesis of memory for schematically unexpected information predicts better source memory for unexpected than expected sources. In three source-monitoring experiments, the authors tested the occurrence of an inconsistency effect in source memory. Participants were presented with items that were schematically either very expected or very unexpected for their source. Multinomial processing tree models were used to separate source memory, item memory, and guessing bias. Results show an inconsistency effect in source memory accompanied by a compensatory schema-consistent guessing bias when expectancy strength is high, that is, when items are very expected or very unexpected for their source.     

Cognitive tuning sets: Anticipating the consequences of communication

This paper reviews the literature on cognitive tuning sets: the expectations of having to transmit or receive information. It is shown that having to transmit information leads to a unified and distorted summary being transmitted, a reluctance to receive additional information, a rejection of inconsistent information, and a shaping of the material to accommodate the anticipated audience. As well, the opinions of the transmitters become polarized. It is argued that the receiver condition is probably not the correct control group to use since the outcome depends on the uncontrolled perceived goals. It is suggested that future research should probably treat the multiple effects of cognitive tuning sets separately. An integrated explanation is given in terms of anticipating the consequences of communication. This work was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Grants Scheme.     

Effects of perceived scrutiny on participant memory for social interactions

It is well known that passive audiences can impair performance on all but the simplest of tasks. The present research asked whether audience impairment effects occur as well when performers do not know, but only imagine that they are being watched, when performers are interacting with rather than merely being observed by the “audience,” and when the performance in question is one to which the audience has no access—namely, the encoding of information exchanged in a dyadic interaction. The hypothesis was that worry about being evaluated interferes with effective information processing, but only for time periods during which one of two interactants entertains distracting thoughts about the other person's possible scrutiny. To model this situation, pairs of unacquainted university students were asked to exchange opinions over a “TV phone.” On some trials one subject's image appeared on both monitors, on some trials the other subject's image appeared on both monitors, and on some trials both monitors were blank. In subsequent unanticipated recognition memory tests, participants remembered fewer of the opinions expressed during time periods when their own image was shown. This occurred even when nothing about participants' overt behavior affected the memory of observers, even when the TV images were supposedly incidental to the task, and even when the periods of scrutiny occurred at random 15-sec intervals, but the effect was limited to subjects who worry about the impression they make, and to time periods when their image was available to the other participants (not just to themselves).