Mangabeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cercocebus torquatus lunulatus</Emphasis>) solve the reverse contingency task without a modified procedure

Problem solving often relies on generating new responses while inhibiting others, particularly prepotent ones. A paradigm to study inhibitory abilities is the reverse contingency task (Boysen and Berntson in J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process 21:82–86, 1995), in which two different quantities of food are offered to an individual who receives the array he did not choose. Therefore, mastery of the task demands selecting the smaller quantity to obtain the larger one. Several non-human primates have been tested in the reverse contingency task. To date, only great apes and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have succeeded in the original task, with no need of procedural modifications as the large-or-none contingency, correction trials or symbolic stimuli substituting for actual food quantities. Here, four mangabeys were presented with two stimulus arrays of one and four raisins in the context of the reverse contingency task. Three of them learned to perform the task well above chance without a modified procedure. They also reached above-chance performance when presented with two stimulus arrays of zero and four raisins, despite the initial difficulty of choosing a null quantity. After a period of 7–10 months, in which the animals were not tested on any task, all three subjects continued to perform well, even when presented with novel quantity pairs.     

Cognitive imitation in 2-year-old children (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Homo sapiens</Emphasis>): a comparison with rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>)

Here we compare the performance of 2-year-old human children with that of adult rhesus macaques on a cognitive imitation task. The task was to respond, in a particular order, to arbitrary sets of photographs that were presented simultaneously on a touch sensitive video monitor. Because the spatial position of list items was varied from trial to trial, subjects could not learn this task as a series of specific motor responses. On some lists, subjects with no knowledge of the ordinal position of the items were given the opportunity to learn the order of those items by observing an expert model. Children, like monkeys, learned new lists more rapidly in a social condition where they had the opportunity to observe an experienced model perform the list in question, than under a baseline condition in which they had to learn new lists entirely by trial and error. No differences were observed between the accuracy of each species' responses to individual items or in the frequencies with which they made different types of errors. These results provide clear evidence that monkeys and humans share the ability to imitate novel cognitive rules (cognitive imitation).     

Inhibitory control and response selection in problem solving: how cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) overcome a bias for selecting the larger quantity of food

When presented with a choice between 1 and 3 pieces of food in a type of reversed contingency task, 4 cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) consistently chose the 3 pieces of food and received nothing, even though the choice of 1 piece would have yielded 3. However, in a task in which the tamarins received the 1 piece of food when they chose it, all subjects learned to select 1 over 3. Thus, the tamarins' prior failure on the reversed contingency task did not result entirely from an inherent inability to suppress the prepotent response of reaching to the larger of 2 quantities of food. After the experience of selecting the smaller quantity and receiving it, all of the tamarins solved the version of the reversed contingency task that they failed initially. These results suggest that the tamarins' initial failure may have reflected a difficulty with selecting an alternative response option.     

Metacognition in monkeys during an oculomotor task

This study investigated whether rhesus monkeys show evidence of metacognition in a reduced, visual oculomotor task that is particularly suitable for use in fMRI and electrophysiology. The 2-stage task involved punctate visual stimulation and saccadic eye movement responses. In each trial, monkeys made a decision and then made a bet. To earn maximum reward, they had to monitor their decision and use that information to bet advantageously. Two monkeys learned to base their bets on their decisions within a few weeks. We implemented an operational definition of metacognitive behavior that relied on trial-by-trial analyses and signal detection theory. Both monkeys exhibited metacognition according to these quantitative criteria. Neither external visual cues nor potential reaction time cues explained the betting behavior; the animals seemed to rely exclusively on internal traces of their decisions. We documented the learning process of one monkey. During a 10-session transition phase, betting switched from random to a decision-based strategy. The results reinforce previous findings of metacognitive ability in monkeys and may facilitate the neurophysiological investigation of metacognitive functions.     

Concept learning by monkeys with video picture images and a touch screen.

Two rhesus monkeys were trained in a same/different task to discriminate digitized computer-stored picture stimuli. The pictures were digitized from 35-mm slides and presented in pairs on a computer monitor. The monkeys were required to touch the pictures and then make a choice response to indicate whether the pictures were identical or nonidentical. The response areas and stimuli were located to the sides of the picture stimuli. Responses were defined and monitored by an infrared matrix touch screen. After learning the same/different task, both monkeys showed performance accuracy with novel picture stimuli similar to that with training picture stimuli. This accurate novel-picture transfer indicates that a same/different concept had been learned, a concept similar to the one they had previously demonstrated in a different apparatus with rear-projected slide stimuli and a response lever.     

Waiting by mistake: Symbolic representation of rewards modulates intertemporal choice in capuchin monkeys,preschool children and adult humans

In the Delay choice task subjects choose between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed option. This paradigm, also known as intertemporal choice task, is frequently used to assess delay tolerance, interpreting a preference for the larger delayed option as willingness to wait. However, in the Delay choice task subjects face a dilemma between two preferred responses: “go for more” (i.e., selecting the larger, but delayed, option) vs. “go for sooner” (i.e., selecting the immediate, but smaller, option). When the options consist of visible food amounts, at least some of the choices of the larger delayed option might be due to a failure to inhibit a prepotent response towards the larger option rather than to a sustained delay tolerance. To disentangle this issue, we tested 10 capuchin monkeys, 101 preschool children, and 88 adult humans in a Delay choice task with food, low-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-one correspondence with food items), and high-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-many correspondence with food items). This allows evaluating how different methods of representing rewards modulate the relative contribution of the “go for more” and “go for sooner” responses. Consistently with the idea that choices for the delayed option are sometimes due to a failure at inhibiting the prepotent response for the larger quantity, we expected high-symbolic tokens to decrease the salience of the larger option, thus reducing “go for more” responses. In fact, previous findings have shown that inhibiting prepotent responses for quantity is easier when the problem is framed in a symbolic context. Overall, opting for the larger delayed option in the visible-food version of the Delay choice task seems to partially result from an impulsive preference for quantity, rather than from a sustained delay tolerance. In capuchins and children high-symbolic stimuli decreased the individual’s preference for the larger reward by distancing from its appetitive features. Conversely, the sophisticated symbolic skills of adult humans prevented the distancing effect of high-symbolic stimuli in this population, although this result may be due to methodological differences between adult humans and the other two populations under study. Our data extend the knowledge concerning the influence of symbols on both human and non-human primate behavior and add a new element to the interpretation of the Delay choice task. Since high-symbolic stimuli decrease the individual’s preference for the larger reward by eliminating those choices due to prepotent responses towards the larger quantity, they allow to better discriminate responses based on genuine delay aversion. Thus, these findings invite greater caution in interpreting the results obtained with the visible-food version of the Delay choice task, which may overestimate delay tolerance.     

Capuchin monkeys’ use of human and conspecific cues to solve a hidden object-choice task

Learning by watching others can provide valuable information with adaptive consequences, such as identifying the presence of a predator or locating a food source. The extent to which nonhuman animals can gain information by reading the cues of others is often tested by evaluating responses to human gestures, such as a point, and less often evaluated by examining responses to conspecific cues. We tested whether ten brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus [Sapajus] apella) were able to use cues from monkeys and a pointing cue from a human to obtain hidden rewards. A monkey could gain access to a reward hidden in one of two locations by reading a cue from a conspecific (e.g., reaching) or a human pointing. We then tested whether they could transfer this skill from monkeys to humans, from humans to monkeys, and from one conspecific to another conspecific. One group of monkeys was trained and tested using a conspecific as the cue-giver and was then tested with a human cue-giver. The second group of monkeys was trained and tested with a human cue-giver and was then tested with a monkey cue-giver. Monkeys that were successful with a conspecific cue-giver were also tested with a novel conspecific cue-giver. Monkeys learned to use a human point and conspecific cues to obtain rewards. Monkeys that had learned to use the cues of a conspecific to obtain rewards performed significantly better than expected by chance when they were transferred to the cues of a novel conspecific. Monkeys that learned to use a human point to obtain rewards performed significantly better than expected by chance when tested while observing conspecific cues. Some evidence suggested that transferring between conspecific cue-givers occurred with more facility than transferring across species. Results may be explained by simple rules of association learning and stimulus generalization; however, spontaneous flexible use of gestures across conspecifics and between different species may indicate capuchins can generalize learned social cues within and partially across species.     

Ordinal representation of numeric quantities by brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Using techniques established by E. M. Brannon and H. S. Terrace (2000) with rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), the authors tested the ability of brown capuchins (Cebus apella) to order arrays of items ranging in quantity from 1 to 9. Three monkeys were trained on a touch screen to select the quantities 1-4 in ascending order. The monkeys exhibited successful transfer of this ability to novel representations of the quantities 1-4 and to pairs of the novel quantities 5-9. Patterns of responding with respect to numeric distance and magnitude were similar to those seen in human subjects, suggesting the use of similar psychological processes. The capuchins demonstrated an ordinal representation of quantity equivalent to that shown in Old World monkeys.     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) succeed in a test of quantity conservation

Nonhuman animals demonstrate a number of impressive quantitative skills such as counting sets of items, comparing sets on the basis of the number of items or amount of material, and even responding to simple arithmetic manipulations. In this experiment, capuchin monkeys were presented with a computerized task designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity. Monkeys first were trained to select from two horizontal arrays of stimuli the one with the larger number of items. On some trials, after a correct selection there was no feedback but instead an additional manipulation of one of those arrays. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array but not the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made a second selection from the two arrays of items. Previous research had shown that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeeded with this task. However, there was no condition in that study in which items were added to the smaller array without increasing its quantity to a point where it became the new larger array. This new condition was added in the present experiment. Capuchin monkeys were sensitive to all of these manipulations, changing their selections when the manipulations changed which array contained the larger number of items but not when the manipulations changed the physical arrangement of items or increased the quantity in one array without also reversing which of the two arrays had more items. Therefore, capuchin monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the arrays. The data indicate that capuchins are sensitive to simply arithmetic manipulations that involve addition of items to arrays and also that they can conserve quantity.     

Can rhesus monkeys spontaneously subtract?

Animals, including pigeons, parrots, raccoons, ferrets, rats, New and Old World monkeys, and apes are capable of numerical computations. Much of the evidence for such capacities is based on the use of techniques that require training. Recently, however, several studies conducted under both laboratory and field conditions have employed methods that tap spontaneous numerical representations in animals, including human infants. In this paper, we present the results of 11 experiments exploring the capacity of semi-free-ranging adult rhesus monkeys to spontaneously compute (i.e. single trial, no training) the outcome of subtraction events. In the basic design, we present one quantity of objects on one stage, a second quantity on a second stage, occlude both stages, and then remove one or no objects from each stage. Having watched these events, a subject is then allowed to approach one stage and eat the food objects behind the occluder. Results show that rhesus monkeys correctly compute the outcome of subtraction events involving three or less objects on each stage, even when the identity of the objects is different. Specifically, when presented with two food quantities, rhesus monkeys select the larger quantity following subtractions of one piece of food from two or three; this preference is maintained when subjects must distinguish food from non-food subtractions, and when food is subtracted from either one or both initial quantities. Furthermore, rhesus monkeys are capable of representing zero as well as equality when two identical quantities are contrasted. Results are discussed in light of recent attempts to determine how number is represented in the brains of animals lacking language.     

Ordinal judgments of numerical symbols by macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) learned that the arabic numerals 0 through 9 represented corresponding quantities of food pellets. By manipulating a joystick, the monkeys were able to make a selection of paired numerals presented on a computer screen. Although the monkeys received a corresponding number of pellets even if the lesser of the two numerals was selected, they learned generally to choose the numeral of greatest value even when pellet delivery was made arrhythmic. In subsequent tests, they chose the numerals of greater value when presented in novel combinations or in random arrays of up to five numerals. Thus, the monkeys made ordinal judgments of numerical symbols in accordance with their absolute or relative values.     

KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORDINAL POSITION OF LIST ITEMS IN RHESUS MONKEYS

Abstract —What is learned during mastery of a serial task: associations between adjacent and remote items, associations between an item and its ordinal position, or both? A dear answer to this question is lacking in the literature on human serial memory because it is difficult to control for a "naive" subject's linguistic competence and extensive experience with serial tasks. In this article, we present evidence that rhesus monkeys encode the ordinal positions of items of an arbitrary list when there is no requirement to do so. First, monkeys learned four nonverbal lists (1–4). each containing four novel items (photographs of natural objects). The monkeys then learned four 4-item lists that were derived exclusively and exhaustively from Lists 1 through 4, one item from each list. On two derived lists, each item s original ordinal position was maintained. Those lists were acquired with virtually no errors. The two remaining derived lists, on which the original ordinal position of each item was changed, were as difficult to learn as novel lists. The immediate acquisition of lists on which ordinal position was maintained shows that knowledge of ordinal position can develop without the benefit of language, extensive list-learning experience, or explicit instruction to encode ordinal information.     

Learning by observation in rhesus monkeys

Habit memory provides us with a vast repertoire of learned rules, including stimulus-reward associations, that ensures fast and adapted decision making in daily life. Because we share this ability with monkeys, lesion and recording studies in rhesus macaques have played a key role in understanding the neural bases of individual trial-and-error habit learning. Humans, however, can learn new rules at a lower cost via observation of conspecifics. The neural properties underlying this more ecological form of habit learning remain unexplored, and it is unclear whether the rhesus macaque can be a useful model in this endeavor. We addressed this issue by testing four monkeys from the same social group in their usual semi-natural habitat using a well-established marker of habit memory, concurrent discrimination learning. Each monkey learned 24 lists of 10 object-reward associations each. For one list out of two, monkeys could observe the testing session of another member of the group prior to being tested with the same list themselves. Learning was faster for these lists than for those learned solely by trial-and-error. Errors to criterion (9/10 correct responses) were reduced by 39%, and faultless performance could be achieved for up to 5 of the 10 pairs. These data demonstrate that rhesus macaques spontaneously observe a conspecific learning new stimulus-reward associations, and substantially benefit from this observation. They ascertain that the neural underpinnings of socially-mediated forms of habit learning can be explored using the powerful tools of monkey research, including neurophysiological recordings.     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) let lesser rewards pass them by to get better rewards

Self-control is defined as foregoing an immediate reward to gain a larger delayed reward. Methods used to test self-control comparatively include inter-temporal choice tasks, delay of gratification tasks, and accumulation tasks. To date, capuchin monkeys have shown different levels of self-control across tasks. This study introduced a new task that could be used comparatively to measure self-control in an intuitive context that involved responses that required no explicit training. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were given a choice between two food items that were presented on a mechanized, revolving tray that moved those foods sequentially toward the monkeys. A monkey could grab the first item or wait for the second, but was only allowed one item. Most monkeys in the study waited for a more highly preferred food item or a larger amount of the same food item when those came later, and they inhibited the prepotent response to grab food by not reaching out to take less-preferred foods or smaller amounts of food that passed directly in front of them first. These data confirm that the mechanisms necessary for self-control are present in capuchin monkeys and indicate that the methodology can be useful for broader comparative assessments of self-control.     

Colour versus quantity as cues in reverse-reward-competent squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

To assess the relative salience of colour and quantity cues, squirrel monkeys previously trained to reach for the smaller of two quantities of food in a reverse-reward contingency task received colour discrimination training. After initial failure to discriminate between two colours of dots under a differential reinforcement regime, they learned the task when the S- colour was associated with zero reward. The monkeys then showed good retention on the original reverse-reward task of 1 versus 4 with pairs of dots presented in S+ or S- colours. However, on "mismatch" trials of 1S- versus 4S+ , only 2 of 4 monkeys tested showed a preference--1 monkey chose based on quantity, the other based on colour. Individual differences and the possible roles of overshadowing and blocking are discussed.     

Ordinal judgments of symbolic stimuli by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): the effects of differential and nondifferential reward

Ordinal learning was investigated in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In Experiment 1, both species were presented with pairings of the Arabic numerals 0 to 9. Some monkeys were given food rewards equal to the value of the numeral selected and some were rewarded with a single pellet only for choosing the higher numeral within the pair. Both species learned to select the larger numeral, but only rhesus monkeys that were differentially rewarded performed above chance levels when presented with novel probe pairings. In Experiment 2, the monkeys were first presented with arrays of 5 familiar numerals (from the range 0 to 9) and then arrays of 5 novel letters (from the range A to J) with the same reward outcomes in place as in Experiment 1. Both species performed better with the numerals, suggesting that an ordinal sequence of all stimuli had been learned during Experiment 1, rather than a matrix of two-choice discriminations.     

Recognition and categorization of biologically significant objects by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): the domain of food.

To survive, organisms must be able to identify edible objects. However, we know relatively little about how humans and other species distinguish food items from non-food items. We tested the abilities of semi-free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to learn rapidly that a novel object was edible, and to generalize their learning to other objects, in a spontaneous choice task. Adult monkeys watched as a human experimenter first pretended to eat one of two novel objects and then placed replicas of the objects at widely separated locations. Monkeys selectively approached the object that the experimenter had previously eaten, exhibiting a rapidly induced preference for the apparently edible object. In further experiments in which the same objects were used as tools or were manipulated at the face but not eaten, we fail to observe an approach bias, providing evidence that the monkeys' pattern of approach in the earlier experiments was specific to objects that were eaten. Subsequent experiments tested how monkeys generalized their preference for an edible object by first allowing them to watch a human experimenter eat one of two objects and then presenting them with new objects composed of the same substance but differing from the original, edible object in shape or color. Monkeys ignored changes in the shape of the object and generalized from one edible object to another on the basis of color in conjunction with other substance properties. Finally, we extended this work to infant rhesus monkeys and found that, like adults, they too used color to generalize to novel food objects. In contrast to adults, however, infants extended this pattern of generalization to objects that were acted on in other ways. These results suggest that infant monkeys form broader object categories than adults, and that food categories become sharpened as a function of maturational or experiential factors.     

Colour versus quantity as cues in reverse-reward-competent squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

To assess the relative salience of colour and quantity cues, squirrel monkeys previously trained to reach for the smaller of two quantities of food in a reverse-reward contingency task received colour discrimination training. After initial failure to discriminate between two colours of dots under a differential reinforcement regime, they learned the task when the S? colour was associated with zero reward. The monkeys then showed good retention on the original reverse-reward task of 1 versus 4 with pairs of dots presented in S + or S? colours. However, on “mismatch” trials of 1S? versus 4S + , only 2 of 4 monkeys tested showed a preference—1 monkey chose based on quantity, the other based on colour. Individual differences and the possible roles of overshadowing and blocking are discussed.     

Quantity representation in children and rhesus monkeys: linear versus logarithmic scales

The performances of 4- and 5-year-olds and rhesus monkeys were compared using a computerized task for quantity assessment. Participants first learned two quantity anchor values and then responded to intermediate values by classifying them as similar to either the large anchor or the small anchor. Of primary interest was an assessment of where the point of subjective equality (PSE) occurred for each species across four different sets of anchors to determine whether the PSE occurred at the arithmetic mean or the geometric mean. Both species produced PSEs that were closer to the geometric mean for three of four anchor sets. This indicates that monkeys and children access either a logarithmic scale for quantity representation or a linear scale that is subject to scalar variability, both of which are consistent with Weber's law and representation of quantity that takes the form of analog magnitudes.     

Ordinal-list integration for symbolic, arbitrary, and analog stimuli by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Two numeral-trained monkeys learned to produce 3 5-item lists of Arabic numerals, colors, and arbitrary signs in the correct sequence. The monkeys then responded at above-chance levels when the authors tested them with nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of items from different lists, indicating their use of ordinal-position information. The authors also tested the monkeys with nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of an analog quantity and an item from 1 of the 3 learned lists. Although the monkeys were not trained to serially order analog quantities, 1 monkey correctly integrated the analog quantities with the lists of numerals, colors, and signs. The consistent use of an ordinal rule, despite different types of training and varying degrees of experience with the 4 types of stimuli, suggested that the monkey had a robust concept of ordinality.