On Rules

This paper contains a brief overview of the area of admissible rules with an emphasis on results about intermediate and modal propositional logics. No proofs are given but many references to the literature are provided.     

Transformative Decision Rules

A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision probleminto another by altering the structure of the initial problem,either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability orvalue assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging to thisclass are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Levi'scondition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, andthe precautionary principle. In this paper some foundationalissues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated,and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules areproved.     

Rules and Games

Philosophia - We have taken a look at the rules of games in order to acquire some knowledge concerning constitutive rules and, probably, institutional phenomena in general. In this paper we tried...     

Rules and Mention

Lewis Carroll's well-known parable 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles' gives rise to a recalcitrant and general form of normative scepticism. I argue that the sceptical position inspired by the story is indeed a distinct form of scepticism, engendered by refusal to recognize that any rule reflected upon may possibly retaining its action-guiding force. I show that the sceptic's attitude builds upon the familiar fact that our reflection upon sources of psychological influence on us may loosen their grip by affording us reflective distance. I conclude by showing how the equally familiar phenomenon that reflection upon a rule does not automatically drain it of its force can be exploited in a satisfactory response to the sceptic.     

The Role of Rules

The question of rules is not an issue that separates the 'analytical' and 'Continental' traditions from one another; rather it is an issue that is a source of division within each tradition. Within Continental philosophy the problem of the rule-governed character of cognition goes back to Kant's dualism of sense and understanding. Many philosophers in the Continental tradition (notably, Nietzsche, Gadamer and Adorno) have retained a quasi-Kantian conception of judgement while rejecting the idea of it as rule-governed. But there have been exceptions to this within Continental philosophy, most prominently, Jürgen Habermas. The rules thesis was implicit in much of analytical philosophy as it was practised in Britain from the 1950s to the 1970s. The doctrine gave support to a conception of philosophy (so-called 'ordinary-language philosophy') as essentially an exercise in the articulation of certain kinds of tacit knowledge. It was advocated explicitly in such works as Searle's Speech Acts and Winch's The Idea of a Social Science . The equation of meaning and rules enjoyed further prestige, for it was taken by many philosophers to be the central doctrine to be extracted from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations . A most striking feature of the receding of the rules thesis has been the transformation of previously accepted interpretations of Wittgenstein's later philosophy (for example, by Stanley Cavell and John McDowell). Both adherents and opponents of the rules thesis have shared a common concern. In emphasizing the discontinuity between language and the subject-matter of the natural sciences both sides offer reassuringly positive answers to one of the besetting problems of twentieth-century philosophy: does philosophy have a distinctive subject-matter of its own?     

Re-Examination of Classroom Rules

Abstract

This article provides a contemplative, research-based discussion of classroom management by examining classroom rules. The introduction contains a discussion establishing the importance of effective classroom management strategies. The article also provides a consideration of the literature to gain a better understanding of ineffective and effective rules.     

Permissibility and Violable Rules

From a logical point of view, permissibility can be reduced to possibility by introducing demands which can be met. The alleged reduction is circular from a philosophical perspective, however, because demands are fundamentally deontic. This paper solves this problem by replacing demands which can be met with rules which can be satisfied and violated.

Superselection Rules for Philosophers

The overaraching goal of this paper is to elucidate the nature of superselection rules in a manner that is accessible to philosophers of science and that brings out the connections between superselection and some of the most fundamental interpretational issues in quantum physics. The formalism of von Neumann algebras is used to characterize three different senses of superselection rules (dubbed, weak, strong, and very strong) and to provide useful necessary and sufficient conditions for each sense. It is then shown how the Haag–Kastler algebraic approach to quantum physics holds the promise of a uniform and comprehensive account of the origin of superselection rules. Some of the challenges that must be met before this promise can be kept are discussed. The focus then turns to the role of superselection rules in solutions to the measurement problem and the emergence of classical properties. It is claimed that the role for “hard” superselection rules is limited, but “soft” (a.k.a. environmental) superselection rules or N. P. Landsman’s situational superselection rules may have a major role to play. Finally, an assessment is given of the recently revived attempts to deconstruct superselection rules.

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Order-Independent Transformative Decision Rules

A transformative decision rule alters the representation of a decision problem, either by changing the set of alternative acts or the set of states of the world taken into consideration, or by modifying the probability or value assignments. A set of transformative decision rules is order-independent in case the order in which the rules are applied is irrelevant. The main result of this paper is an axiomatic characterization of order-independent transformative decision rules, based on a single axiom. It is shown that the proposed axiomatization resolves a problem observed by Teddy Seidenfeld in a previous axiomatization by Peterson.     

Analytic Rules for Mereology

We present a sequent calculus for extensional mereology. It extends the classical first-order sequent calculus with identity by rules of inference corresponding to well-known mereological axioms. Structural rules, including cut, are admissible.     

The Moral Luck of Rules

The text reflects on the view of morality, according to which its central elements are rules that make a society efficient, bringing the greatest benefit. I show that rules represent a part of our “circumstantial luck,” and that their particularity often makes life more difficult. As we tend to internalise rules and interpret spontaneously the situations of our lives in their terms, we may be, in the cases of unfeasible rules, prone to view ourselves as failure. Generally, rule-like statements (including moral rules) more naturally serve as tools for reflection on our past (failures) than as guidelines for the future. The presence of rules in our lives thus calls for compassion towards those who have failed in terms of the rules that they acknowledge.