To Forget or Not to Forget: The Effect of Probability of Test on Directed Forgetting

Two experiments investigated how individuals use explicit memory cues that designate different probabilities of test. As in typical directed forgetting studies, subjects received words explicitly cued as having either a 0% or a 100% chance of being on a subsequent memory test (i.e. forget and remember cues, respectively). In addition, some words were explicitly cued as having the potential to be either forgotten or remembered (i.e. a 50% cue). Recall of 50% words was between that of 0% and 100% words. In addition, the presence of 50% words lowered recall of the 100% words compared to that of a control group that did not receive the 50% words, but received the same number of 100% words. A think-aloud task indicated that these results were due to the 50% words being treated like either 100% or 0% words at encoding. The results are discussed in terms of the effect of different probabilities of test on the strategic processing and representation of information.     

Forgetting memory skepticism

Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self-defeating. If it does not threaten memory in this way, then the challenge leaves a foundation for an inference to the best explanation response, one we articulate and support.     

Forgetting trauma stimuli

Previous work reported in this journal suggested that the cognitive capacities of high dissociators are impaired under conditions of focused (selective) attention, but not under conditions of divided attention, compared with the cognitive capacities of low dissociators. Using a directed-forgetting paradigm, the current study demonstrated that under divided-attention demands, high dissociators have impaired memory for words associated with trauma (e.g., incest) but not for neutral words, as compared with low dissociators. In addition, high dissociators reported significantly more trauma history and significantly more betrayal trauma (abuse by a caregiver) than low dissociators. These results are consistent with the proposal that dissociation may aid individuals with histories of betrayal traumas to keep threatening information out of awareness.     

Justification and Forgetting

This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally (or some portion thereof). The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in doing so, criticizes views of Jennifer Lackey, David Owens, Michael Huemer, and George Pappas.     

Knowledge From Forgetting

This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.     

The Epistemology of Forgetting

The default view in the epistemology of forgetting is that human memory would be epistemically better if we were not so susceptible to forgetting—that forgetting is in general a cognitive vice. In this paper, I argue for the opposed view: normal human forgetting—the pattern of forgetting characteristic of cognitively normal adult human beings—approximates a virtue located at the mean between the opposed cognitive vices of forgetting too much and remembering too much. I argue, first, that, for any finite cognizer, a certain pattern of forgetting is necessary if her memory is to perform its function well. I argue, second, that, by eliminating “clutter” from her memory store, this pattern of forgetting improves the overall shape of the subject’s total doxastic state. I conclude by reviewing work in psychology which suggests that normal human forgetting approximates this virtuous pattern of forgetting.     

Forgetting of conditioned fear inhibition

Three experiments assessed retention of conditioned fear and of fear inhibition over long-term retention intervals (35 days in two experiments, 25 days in the third). Although excitatory conditioning was retained well, conditioned inhibition was not. This effect occurred when inhibition was assessed by compounding stimuli on an appetitive baseline and when it was assessed by testing cues on a baseline of unsignalled avoidance responding. Inhibition was also forgotten when the initial conditioning treatment was designed to reduce the role of possible proactive interference processes.     

No Retrieval-Induced Forgetting Under Stress

ABSTRACT— Stress affects memory, yet no study has investigated the effects of stress on memory inhibition: Remembering not only facilitates later recall, but also inhibits retrieval of related material, a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced forgetting. We investigated the effects of stress on this mechanism, which is thought to adaptively guide memory selection. Participants learned categorized lists and were then exposed to either a psychosocial laboratory stressor or a cognitively challenging control treatment. They then actively retrieved parts of the previously learned material. Finally, memory for all initially learned items was tested. In the stress group, unlike in the control group, intervening retrieval practice did not impair final recall. Moreover, salivary cortisol levels increased and psychological well-being decreased in the stress group only. Thus, psychosocial stress abolishes retrieval-induced forgetting. This effect may result from stress-induced hormone release from the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and may have implications for educational, legal, and clinical issues.     

Forgetting and recovering the unforgettable

Two experiments demonstrated striking, reversible forgetting effects that occurred even for a list of expletives. The experiments used a procedure based on the classic memory mechanisms of interference and retrieval cuing. Interference reduced recall dramatically, although appropriate cues triggered complete recovery. Distinctive, emotionally charged materials were quite susceptible to the forgetting and recovery effects. Thus, powerful forgetting effects can be obtained when participants have no intentions to forget and the materials involved are distinctive, emotional materials with sexual and violent content. This forgetting is reversible with appropriate cues. The false-memory debate can and must be informed by experimental investigations not only of false memories, but also of blocked and recovered memories.     

Forgetting the lessons of history

While a great deal of behavior analytic research has focussed on studying current contingencies, the amount of work done in the area of conditioning history is spotty, at best. Weiner (1964, 1969) conducted history research with human subjects, but little has followed in either the human or the nonhuman literature. Some direction can also be found in the literature studying the effects of conditioning on drug effects (e.g., Barrett, 1977; Urbain, Poling, Millam, & Thompson, 1978). However, "behavioral history" or "conditioning history" has not been a fully-developed area within behavior analysis. It is suggested that empirical work on history effects might have implications for (a) better understanding human-nonhuman behavioral differences and similarities, (b) clinical applications, especially where clients are resistant to behavioral change, and (c) theoretical assumptions in behavior analysis in relation to both basic and applied concerns.     

情绪性记忆的主动遗忘

情绪性记忆的主动遗忘, 是指人们有意识地主动地遗忘带有情绪色彩的记忆内容, 但更多的是那些带来痛苦的负性情绪性记忆。主动遗忘又分为定向遗忘和压抑遗忘, 项目法和字表法是实验室中研究定向遗忘的主要方法, 而白熊任务和TNT任务是研究压抑遗忘的主要范式, 研究者们围绕两种遗忘做了大量研究。未来的研究应更关注情绪性记忆遗忘的不同心理机制, 不同研究范式与心理机制的交互作用, 情绪性记忆遗忘的个体差异, 情绪性记忆遗忘中事件遗忘和情绪反应遗忘的分离等 问题。     

Forgetting the Unforgettable Through Conversation: Socially Shared Retrieval-Induced Forgetting of September 11 Memories

ABSTRACT— A speaker's selective recounting of memories shared with a listener will induce both the speaker and the listener to forget unmentioned, related material more than unmentioned, unrelated material. We extended this finding of within-individual and socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting to well-rehearsed, emotionally intense memories that are similar for the speaker and listener, but differ in specifics. A questionnaire probed participants' memory of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Questions and responses were grouped into category-exemplar structures. Then, participants selectively rehearsed their answers (using a structured interview in Experiment 1 and a joint recounting between pairs in Experiment 2 ). In subsequent recognition tests, response times yielded evidence of within-individual retrieval-induced forgetting and socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting. This result indicates that conversations can alter memories of speakers and listeners in similar ways, even when the memories differ. We discuss socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting as a mechanism for the formation of collective memories.