Not Intentional,Not Unintentional

Philosophia - In contemporary philosophy of action, the existence of intentional and unintentional action is relatively uncontroversial. What is controversial is whether there exists a third kind...     

Not Scotist

Abstract

Several lines of recent scholarship have identified developing Protestant thought as Scotist and, specifically, have contended a dominance of the Scotist concept of the univocity of being in early modern Protestantism. The present essay examines early-modern Reformed metaphysics and theology and demonstrates that the contention is unfounded. Rather, the more typical approach to the language of being and related issues of predication concerning God and creatures in Reformed circles was advocacy of the analogia entis, often understood in a classical Thomist manner as an analogy of proportionality.     

Not Propositions

Current computational accounts of meaning in the cognitive sciences are based on abstract, amodal symbols (e.g., nodes, links, propositions) that are arbitrarily related to their referents. We argue that such accounts lack convincing empirical support and that they do not provide a satisfactory account for linguistic meaning. One historic set of results supporting the abstract symbol view has come from investigation into comprehension of negated sentences, such as “The buttons are not black.” These sentences are presumed to be understood as two propositions composed of abstract symbols. One proposition corresponds to “the buttons are black,” and it is embedded in another proposition corresponding to “it is not true.” Thus, the propositional account predicts (a) that comprehension of negated sentences should take longer than comprehension of the corresponding positive sentence (because of the time needed to construct the embedding), but (b) that the resulting embedded propositions are informationally equivalent (but of opposite valence) to the simple proposition underlying the positive sentence. Contrary to these predictions, Experiment 1 demonstrates that negated sentences out of context are interpreted as situationally ambiguous, that is, as conveying less specific information than positive sentences. Furthermore, Experiment 2 demonstrates that when negated sentences are used in an appropriate context, readers do not take longer to understand them. Thus, difficulty with negation is demonstrated to be an artifact of presentation out of context. After discussing other serious problems with the use of abstract symbols, we describe the Indexical Hypothesis. This embodied account of meaning does not depend on abstract symbols, and hence it provides a more satisfactory account of meaning.     

Not quite neo-sentimentalism

The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts requires being rationally compelled to form evaluative beliefs in response to certain emotions.     

Not Practising Theology

Many pastors are prepared for a vocation they do not practice while they are performing a ministry they have not learned. While providing pastoral care they are eager to help, support, and comfort but they hesitate to theologize, to practice theology. At least three considerations may offer an explanation for this paradoxical fact: 1. Most pastors consider theology to be static and historical instead of dynamic and interactional; 2. Students of theology never learn to practice theology, therefore, as a minister, they prefer to listen and refuse to speak; 3. Many ministers mask a lack of courage and motivation in publicly professing what they privately believe, by providing therapeutic help to those who are in pastoral need.     

I Am Not My Body,This Is Not My Body

This paper suggests that during severe and prolonged traumatic experiences such as trauma type II, one may develop disownership toward the entire body. In this situation one’s body becomes a pure object and as such an integral part of the hostile environment. This article applies Merleau-Ponty’s approach to perception in order to improve our understanding of this process.     

Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.     

Not a Total Failure

In this paper I offer a partial defence of Armstrong’s totality relation as a solution to the problem of so-called “negative existentials”.     

It's Not a Story

This writing presents a firsthand account of living with the certain knowledge that you can't rely on your brain the way you used to. Epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, brain tumor—what do these words really mean day by day, moment by moment? The author blends poetry and prose in her account of forging a new relationship with her own brain. Activities that were once routine are now difficult and even dangerous. No longer is her brain a silent partner as she navigates the debilitating, embarrassing, and occasionally humiliating symptoms of her disease. Can I really get through this shower? How much help do we need today, Brain? Mindfulness practice helps the author become more aware of her moment-by-moment experience. Her therapist prods her to dig into her own story, but the author resists. She resists and yet she shares her story that may not be a story.