Must an Educated Being Be a Human Being?

This paper argues that an educated being logically does not have to be a human. Philosophers analyzing the concept of education have reached a consensual notion of the matter; but in applying that idea, they have barely discussed whether or not human beings are the only entities that may be educated. Using their notion as the core of a heuristic conception of education, this paper attempts to show that in some contexts it might make sense to predicate education of certain non-human entities. In addition, the paper examines the place of beliefs, reflective intelligence, practical thinking, and feelings in education. It concludes by discussing its implications for educational theory and practice and for the connections between the educated being and personhood and the right to education.

Properties of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Abstract

While it is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different ‘kinds of being’ and identifies various ‘structures’ that compose them, there has been little discussion about what these kinds and structures of being are. This paper defends the ‘Property Thesis’, the position that kinds of being (and their structures) are properties of the entities that have them. I give two arguments for this thesis. The first is grounded in the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of being as ‘characteristics’ and ‘determinations’, which are just two different words for ‘properties’, in the broadest senses of these terms. The second argument is based on the fact that kinds and structures of being play three roles that properties are supposed to play: they account for similarities between things, they are what predicates express, and they are what abstract nouns refer to.     

Being articulate: Rede in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Being and Time’s emphasis on practical activities has attracted much attention as an approach to meaning not modelled exclusively on language. However, understanding this emphasis is made more difficult by Heidegger’s notion of Rede (‘Articulacy’ or ‘Discourse’), which he routinely characterizes as both language-like and basic to all disclosure. This paper assesses whether this notion can be both interpreted coherently and reconciled with Heidegger’s emphasis on intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. It begins by identifying two functions of Articulacy – the demonstrative and articulatory – and a potential source of incoherence in Heidegger’s analysis. Having reviewed some standard approaches to Heideggerian Articulacy, I show how Heidegger’s discussion of predicative judgements (‘Statements’) implies that language can be linked with different kinds of content. This allows Heidegger’s analysis to be read coherently, provided Articulacy is understood as having distinct purposive and predicative modes. The final section shows how this reading preserves a close connection between Articulacy and language while accommodating intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours.     

Animate being: an inquiry into Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Continental Philosophy Review - This paper questions the ontological integrity of Dasein as Heidegger specifies Being in Being and Time. It does so with reference to the real-life, real-time...     

Being ‘Spiritual’ and Being ‘Religious’ in Europe: Diverging Life Orientations

The present study shows that being ‘spiritual’ and being ‘religious’ are becoming different life orientations for a large part of the population. As far as we know, for the first time, a sample from an European country shows that these orientations are reflected in two coherent clusters of beliefs, experiences, and practices of what we call ‘new spirituality’ on the one hand and ‘traditional, church-related religion’ on the other hand. In addition, it appears that ‘only spiritual’ (and not ‘religious’) people and ‘only religious’ (and not ‘spiritual’) people have less ‘intensive’ spiritual/religious lives than people who describe themselves as ‘both spiritual and religious’. The ‘both’ category is not homogenous, probably as a result of the different associations which its members have of the conceptions of ‘spiritual’ and ‘religious’. The people in this category can be sub-divided in two sub-groups which show different profiles.     

Is Being Emotionally Inexpressive Cool?

Despite a recognition that consumers want to be cool and value cool brands, the literature has only just begun to delineate what makes things cool. Writing by scholars, quotes by celebrities, and norms in fashion advertising are consistent with the view that people become cool by being emotionally inexpressive. The relationship between emotional expression and coolness, however, has not been empirically tested. Our research uses an experimental approach to examine whether being emotionally inexpressive makes people seem more or less cool than smiling. In contrast to the belief that being inexpressive is cool, we find that in noncompetitive contexts—an endorser in a clothing advertisement and an athlete interacting with fans—being inexpressive makes people seem cold rather than cool. On the other hand, in competitive contexts—such as an athlete facing his opponent—being inexpressive makes people seem cool by making them appear dominant. Our results have important implications for marketers, advertisers, and consumers trying to cultivate a cool image.     

关于西方哲学范畴Being及其汉译

Being始终是西方存在论(ontology)的核心范畴,实际上是整个西方哲学的基础。研究它,引出正确的理解,其重要性不言而喻。值得注意的是,对这个范畴的探究在汉语学界长期在某种程度上纠缠于“存在”和“是”两个译名之争,这不免失诸舍本逐末。确切说来,把Being汉译为“存在”或系词“是”,实为把Being理解为“存在”或“是”。同时,对于这个术语的译述来说,中西方语言和思维习惯的差异也没有什么干系。问题的关键在于应把Being放到西方哲学的学理历史与境中去审视,由此彰显其本义,汉译问题也就迎刃而解。一、Being这个哲学范畴巴门尼德最早提…     

Why Care about Being an Agent?

The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments to the exercise of our other capacities for which being a full-blown agent is a necessary condition. Thus, the only kind of reason available is hypothetical rather than categorical. The status of this reason may seem to undermine the importance of this answer. I show, however, that it both achieves much of what we want when we cite categorical reasons and highlights why agency is valuable.     

Husserl’s Way to Authentic Being

In a journal entry from 1906, Husserl complains of lacking “internal stability” and of his desire to “achieve” it. My claim in this paper is that the “phenomenological method,” which he made public in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie was, and is, a means to achieve the inner harmony that Husserl longed for. I do not provide an analysis of why Husserl might have felt the way he did; my aim is to show what internal stability might be and how one might achieve it. I conclude that the phenomenological method is the means, the “how,” to internal stability, which I characterize as “clarity” and “harmony” regarding our beliefs and, and ultimately, our authentic comportment.     

Is Loneliness the Same as Being Alone?

The cognitive discrepancy model predicts that loneliness occurs when individuals perceive a difference between their desired and actual levels of social involvement. Using data from a sample of high school sophomore students, the present investigation was designed to go beyond previous research that has tested this model by examining the predicted nonlinear relationships between desired and actual social contact and feelings of loneliness. Analyses indicated that support for the cognitive discrepancy model of loneliness was found only for measures of close friendships. Specifically, the discrepancy between the students' ideal number and actual number of close friends was found to be related in a nonlinear fashion to feelings of satisfaction with close friendships and loneliness after control for the number of close friends. Implications of these findings for theoretical models of loneliness are discussed.     

On Being a “Hip” Doctor Today

A brief survey of the history of medicine is described. A gradual disappearance of patients from modern medical practice is noted, and the appearance of symptoms to take their place is evident. Theories of several high-profile medical thinkers who aim to put patients as persons back into modern medical treatment are compared and contrasted. The scope that those theories provide for medical treatment which takes into account more than the sum of a patient's symptoms, or the whole of his or her worldview, including religious belief and practice, is considered. How such leeway invites combining modern allopathic medicine and its emphasis on alleviating symptoms of sickness with alternative and complementary therapies, which raise issues about the relationship between human spirituality and healing and health, is explored.     

Synchronicity and “Being Endowed with Meaning”

Jung developed over 50?years a paradigmatic idea of an acausal principle, which he called synchronicity. His hypothesis on synchronicity states that, complementary to causality, there exists a further explanatory principle whose effects appear as acausal but meaningful events. Therewith Jung added to the triadic principles of space, time and causality a fourth principle: synchronicity. The experience of individual synchronicities points to a general acausal and meaningful orderedness in nature which apparently exists outside man. Jung published Answer to Job and Synchronicity at the same time, for he attempted to open up a new path to the “state of spiritualization” Beseeltheit of Matter by making the assumption that “being is endowed with meaning.” According to Jung there exists a latent meaning in the cosmos, which existed long before human consciousness developed. He believed that “on the organic level it might be possible to regard biological morphogenesis in the light of the synchronistic factor.” One of many examples in the biological evolution is a Cretaceous-Palaeogene worldwide catastrophe approx. 65 million years ago that resulted in the mass extinction of the dinosaurs. It is understood as the result of a meteorite impact. This catastrophe was a most meaningful chance from the point of view of the mammals, including modern man. We modern humans finally came into existence thanks to a series of cosmic happenings, which were based on causality and synchronicity. What is true for our personal individuation is also true for biological or historical developments: an acausal but meaningful principle is secretly at work.     

论Being汉译两派之共同预设

关于Being的汉译纷争由来已久、至今未果.粗略地可将混战诸方简划为存在(有)派与是派.两派虽主张各异,却大概分享如下共同预设:(1)名词Being源于动词to be,故欲理解Being须回返to be;(2)to be具备两种不同、甚至互不相干的用法即系词用法和非—系词的存在用法.第1条预设是比较合理的,但第2条预设...     

Socrates’ Aversion to Being a Victim of Injustice

In the Gorgias, Plato has Polus ask Socrates if he would rather suffer injustice than perform it. Socrates’ response is justly famous, affirming a view that Polus himself finds incredible, and one that even contemporary readers find difficult to credit: “for my part, I would prefer neither, but if it had to be one or the other, I would choose to suffer rather than do what is unjust” (Gorgias 469c1-2). In this paper, we take up the part of Socrates’ response that Polus never engages and that has also been completely neglected by contemporary scholars, namely, Socrates’ explicit aversion to being a victim of injustice. We show that this same aversion—though one not nearly as strong as his aversion to doing injustice—appears in several texts, and we argue that the best explanation of such an aversion derives from two important features of Socratic philosophy, both of which have only recently been recognized in Socratic scholarship: (i) his virtue intellectualism, which conceives of virtue as a kind of craft that can be achieved in different degrees, and (ii) his conception of moral psychology, which allows for non-rational influences on how we perform the cognitive functions required for proper deliberation.     

Being Deluded After Being Excluded? How Emotion Regulation Deficits in Paranoia-Prone Individuals Affect State Paranoia During Experimentally Induced Social Stress

Emotion regulation (ER) has become a relevant construct to understanding paranoia. While the ER strategy called expressive suppression (e.g., poker face) may foster state paranoia by increasing arousal, another strategy called reappraisal (e.g., changing the perspective on situations) may reduce negative emotions and state paranoia when adaptively used. However, if reappraisal fails, this could increase paranoia. The aim of this study was to test the proposed effects of the ER strategies on state paranoia in the socially stressful situation of being excluded in paranoia-prone individuals. We conducted an experimental online study with N=116 participants who were randomized to a social inclusion or an exclusion condition using a virtual Cyberball ball-tossing game. They completed questionnaires on paranoia proneness and habitual ER strategies. Before and after the Cyberball task, participants rated their level of state paranoia. The impact of habitual ER strategies, paranoia proneness, and social stress on changes in state paranoia was investigated using linear regression analysis. The three-way interaction of social stress, paranoia proneness, and habitual reappraisal use significantly predicted state paranoia, t(114)=2.62, p=0.010. The decomposition of the interaction term revealed that in the social stress condition, the impact of reappraisal on state paranoia was moderated by the level paranoia proneness. Specifically, in high paranoia-prone individuals the use of reappraisal predicted higher state paranoia. The findings regarding habitual use of suppression were not significant. Although reappraisal is generally considered a functional strategy, its use in distressing social situations seems to be impaired in persons with higher paranoia proneness. A working model of emotion dysregulation in delusions is presented and possible implications for cognitive therapy of psychosis are discussed.     

Attracting Our Future into Being–the Syntony Quest

This article explores a new perception of causality and time. It is proposed that our present is not the result of our past; instead it emerges from our futures. The intention to bring into being a world and future where all of us can thrive has been shared by numerous people. Yet despite these intentions, we have not yet been able to effectuate the deeper transformational change required for bringing this forth at the pace and scale now required. This article offers the quintessence of this quest, to liberate our focus from our entrapment within the systems we defined.