The Paradox of Self–Consciousness Revisited

The so–called paradox of self–consciousness suggests that self–consciousness, understood as the capacity to think about oneself in a first–person way, cannot be explained. The author of the paradox contends that the only way to avert this result is by invoking the notion of nonconceptual first–person thought. This contention is rooted in adherence to the Linguistic Priority Principle, which dictates that pre–and nonlinguistic creatures lack concepts. I argue that the latter claim is dubious, and that the paradox of self–consciousness can be better disarmed by denying the dependence of first–person conceptual thought on first–person language.     

Shoemaker, Self–Blindness and Moore's Paradox

I show how the 'inner–sense' (quasi–perceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from self–blindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be self–blind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and self–knowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is third–person evidence available to the self–blind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.     

Privileged Self–Knowledge and Externalism: A Contextualist Approach

Many people argue that privileged self–knowledge is incompatible with semantic externalism. I develop a contextualist approach to self–knowledge, and examine what this approach should lead us to say about the apparent incompatibility. Though such contextualism compels us to re–think the notion of privilege associated with self–knowledge, it can contain the damage wreaked by the externalist doctrine.     

Self–Serving Perceptions of Terrorism Among Israelis and Palestinians

Definitions of political violence as terrorism are often tainted by self–serving motivations. Groups in conflict in particular tend to justify the use of indiscriminate violent means by highly regarded political ends. This study explores such self–serving perceptions of terrorism in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In two surveys during December 2001, Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians were asked whether 11 local and international incidents were acts of terrorism in their view, and whether they were considered acts of terrorism by the international community. Self–serving judgments on both sides were expected, but their extent is striking, and they extend also to the international incidents. Israeli Arabs judge all acts of violence as terrorism in high percentages. Israeli Jews and Palestinians' definitions present a mirror image; however, they do not project these definitions to the international community. Instead, they perceive an international norm largely divergent from their own point of view, inflating world judgment of their own acts of violence as terrorism and underestimating world judgment of the other side's violence, in what amounts to a hostile–world phenomenon.     

Self–Objectification and its Psychological Outcomes for College Women

The objectification of women by our society can become internalized by women, resulting in negative psychological outcomes. Using Fredrickson and Roberts' (1997) objectification theory, we tested a model of the relationships between self–objectification and disordered eating and depressive symptoms in a sample of undergraduate women ( n = 384). One postulate of self–objectification theory is that self–objectification can lead to a lack of internal awareness, which may mediate the relationship between self–objectification and restrictive eating, bulimic, and depressive symptoms. Results of structural equation modeling suggest that self–objectification has a direct relationship to restrictive eating, bulimic, and depressive symptoms. The mediational role of internal awareness was relevant for depressive symptoms but not for restrictive eating or bulimic symptoms. Depressive symptoms did, however, mediate the relationship between self–objectification and bulimic symptoms. The relevance of our findings to the understanding of objectification theory are discussed and future areas of research recommended.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, intentionalists argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and motivationists argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of twisted self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both twisted and straight self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

Accepting Threatening Information: Self–Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases

Why do people resist evidence that challenges the validity of long–held beliefs? And why do they persist in maladaptive behavior even when persuasive information or personal experience recommends change? We argue that such defensive tendencies are driven, in large part, by a fundamental motivation to protect the perceived worth and integrity of the self. Studies of social–political debate, health–risk assessment, and responses to team victory or defeat have shown that people respond to information in a less defensive and more open–minded manner when their self–worth is buttressed by an affirmation of an alternative source of identity. Self–affirmed individuals are more likely to accept information that they would otherwise view as threatening, and subsequently to change their beliefs and even their behavior in a desirable fashion. Defensive biases have an adaptive function for maintaining self–worth, but maladaptive consequences for promoting change and reducing social conflict.     

The Doomsday Argument and the Self–Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum

In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self–indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argument (or the other counter–intuitive results that flow from related thought–experiments). A developed theory of observation selection effects shows why the doomsday argument is inconclusive, and how one can consistently reject both it and (SIA).     

Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness

Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson 2000 , Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003a, 2003b, 2009, Thomas 2003 , Smith 2004 , Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, 2013 ). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as (i) an awareness of a tree or (ii) an awareness of an awareness of a tree.