Attentional capture by onsets and offsets

Three experiments were conducted to examine whether human infants would form a categorical representation for the spatial relation between. Experiment 1 showed that 6- and 7-month-olds familiarized with stimuli depicting a diamond in different locations between two reference bars subsequently preferred a stimulus displaying the diamond located outside the bars over a stimulus displaying the diamond located in a novel position between the bars. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that this preference could not be attributed to a failure to discriminate the location changes of the diamond between the bars or an a priori preference. The overall pattern of results indicates that 6- and 7-month-olds had formed a categorical representation for between. The findings are discussed in terms of factors affecting development of categorical representations for spatial relation information.     

Does changing the reference frame affect infant categorization of the spatial relation BETWEEN?

Past research has shown that variation in the target objects depicting a given spatial relation disrupts the formation of a category representation for that relation. In the current research, we asked whether changing the orientation of the referent frame depicting the spatial relation would also disrupt the formation of a category representation for that relation. Experiments 1 to 3 provided evidence that 6- and 7-month-olds formed a category representation for BETWEEN when a diamond shape was depicted in different locations between two vertical or horizontal reference bars during familiarization and in a novel location between the same orientation of bars during test. By contrast, in Experiment 4, same-age infants did not form a category representation for BETWEEN when the diamond shape was depicted between two vertical (or horizontal) bars during familiarization and between two horizontal (or vertical) bars during test. Moreover, in Experiment 5, 9- and 10-month-olds did form a category representation for BETWEEN when the orientation of the referent bars depicting the relation changed from familiarization to test. The findings suggest that the formation of category representations for spatial relations by infants is affected by changes to either target (figure) or referent (ground).     

Color-function categories that prime infants to use color information in an object individuation task

There is evidence for developmental hierarchies in the type of information to which infants attend when reasoning about objects. Investigators have questioned the origin of these hierarchies and how infants come to identify new sources of information when reasoning about objects. The goal of the present experiments was to shed light on this debate by identifying conditions under which infants’ sensitivity to color information, which is slow to emerge, could be enhanced in an object individuation task. The outcome of Experiment 1 confirmed and extended previous reports that 9.5-month-olds can be primed, through exposure to events in which the color of an object predicts its function, to attend to color differences in a subsequent individuation task. The outcomes of Experiments 2-4 revealed age-related changes in the nature of the representations that support color priming. This is exemplified by three main findings. First, the representations that are formed during the color-function events are relatively specific. That is, infants are primed to use the color difference seen in the color-function events to individuate objects in the test events, but not other color differences. Second, 9.5-month-olds can be led to form more abstract event representations, and then generalize to other colors in the test events if they are shown multiple pairs of colors in the color-function events. Third, slightly younger 9-month-olds also can be led to form more inclusive categories with multiple color pairs, but only when they are allowed to directly compare the exemplars in each color pair during the present events. These results shed light on the development of categorization abilities, cognitive mechanisms that support color-function priming, and the kinds of experiences that can increase infants’ sensitivity to color information.     

Form categorization in 10-month-olds

In five experiments, 10-month-olds were habituated to exemplars of a form category and tested for categorization in paired-comparison trials involving in-category versus out-of-category stimuli. Across these experiments, color was systematically manipulated during habituation and/or test trials. Infants categorized form when color was either held constant or varied during habituation, but failed to categorize form when exposed to color-constant stimuli during habituation and tested for categorization with novel-color form exemplars. Two subsequent experiments traced this failure to the narrow experience of exposure to color-constant exemplars during habituation. These results suggest that (a) infants' internal representation for a category will not include a stimulus dimension not varied in the exemplars from which the category was derived, but (b) if variation in that dimension is experienced, exemplars constructed of novel instances of that dimension will still be regarded as belonging to the category.     

Beyond the distributional input? A developmental investigation of asymmetry in infants’ categorization of cats and dogs

Two experiments are reported using a visual familiarization categorization procedure. In both experiments, infants were familiarized with sets of stimuli previously shown to contain asymmetric feature distributions that support an asymmetry in young infants' categorization of cats and dogs (i.e. infants' cat category excludes dogs but their dog category includes cats). In Experiment 1, the asymmetry was replicated in 4-month-old infants. In contrast, 10-month-old infants demonstrated exclusive category representations for both cats and dogs. In Experiment 2, an additional group of 10-month-olds demonstrated exclusive representations for both cats and dogs under conditions of very limited within-task category familiarization. Potential mechanisms underlying the shift from an asymmetric to a symmetric pattern of categorization in the first year are discussed.     

Learning and transfer of category knowledge in an indirect categorization task

Knowledge representations acquired during category learning experiments are ‘tuned’ to the task goal. A useful paradigm to study category representations is indirect category learning. In the present article, we propose a new indirect categorization task called the “same”–“different” categorization task. The same–different categorization task is a regular same–different task, but the question asked to the participants is about the stimulus category membership instead of stimulus identity. Experiment 1 explores the possibility of indirectly learning rule-based and information-integration category structures using the new paradigm. The results suggest that there is little learning about the category structures resulting from an indirect categorization task unless the categories can be separated by a one-dimensional rule. Experiment 2 explores whether a category representation learned indirectly can be used in a direct classification task (and vice versa). The results suggest that previous categorical knowledge acquired during a direct classification task can be expressed in the same–different categorization task only when the categories can be separated by a rule that is easily verbalized. Implications of these results for categorization research are discussed.     

Early development of perceptual expertise: Within-basic-level categorization experience facilitates the formation of subordinate-level category representations in 6- to 7-month-old infants

A behavioral manifestation of perceptual expertise is the shift in recognition downward toward the subordinate level. Here, a familiarization-novelty preference procedure was used to determine whether 6- to 7-month-old infants could be induced to form category representations for cats and dogs at the subordinate level. In Experiment 1, the infants succeeded in forming subordinate-level category representations for beagle dogs and Siamese cats, but only when provided with previous experience on a subordinate-level category-formation task from within the same basic-level category (i.e., Saint Bernard dogs or tabby cats). When the prior category-formation task involved a different basic-level category, subsequent subordinate-level category learning was not in evidence. The preferences in Experiment 1 were shown in Experiments 2 and 3 not to be attributable to a priori preference or within-category discrimination failure. The findings suggest that within-basic-level categorization experience can facilitate the formation of subordinate-level category representations in the first half-year of life.     

Infant perceptual and conceptual categorization: the roles of static and dynamic stimulus attributes

Infants' categorization of animals and vehicles based on static vs. dynamic attributes of stimuli was investigated in five experiments (N=158) using a categorization habituation-of-looking paradigm. In Experiment 1, 6-month-olds categorized static color images of animals and vehicles, and in Experiment 2, 6-month-olds categorized dynamic point-light displays showing only motions of the same animals and vehicles. In Experiments 3, 4, and 5, 6- and 9-month-olds were tested in an habituation-transfer paradigm: half of the infants at each age were habituated to static images and tested with dynamic point-light displays, and the other half were habituated to dynamic point-light displays and tested with static images. Six-month-olds did not transfer. Only 9-month-olds who were habituated to dynamic displays showed evidence of category transfer to static images. Together the findings show that 6-month-olds categorize animals and vehicles based on static and dynamic information, and 9-month-olds can transfer dynamic category information to static images. Transfer, static vs. dynamic information, and age effects in infant categorization are discussed.     

Basic-level category discriminations by 7- and 9-month-olds in an object examination task

This study examines 7- and 9-month-olds' ability to categorize cats as separate from dogs, and dogs as separate from cats in an object examination task. In Experiment 1, 7- and 9-month-olds (N = 30) familiarized with toy cat replicas were found to form a category of cat that included novel cats but excluded a dog and an eagle. In Experiment 2, 7- and 9-month-olds (N = 30) familiarized with toy dog replicas were found to form a category of dog that included a novel dogs and a novel cat but excluded an eagle. These results mirror those of 3- to 4-month-olds tested with visual preference methods and stand in contrast to previously reported object examination results. Analyses of the distribution of features in the exemplars used to familiarize infants suggest that, like the 3- to 4-month-olds, the 7- and 9-month-olds in these studies form categories within the task, and on the basis of feature distributions.     

6岁儿童的类别学习能力:类别表征、注意和分类策略

探讨了6岁儿童的类别学习能力、类别表征和分类策略。62名儿童参加了实验,实验1采用了"5/4模型"类别结构,实验2采用了"3/3类别结构"。结果发现:6岁儿童已经具备了一定的类别学习能力;相对于原型表征,6岁儿童更倾向于进行样例表征;6岁儿童在注意上具有定位在高典型性特征维度上的能力,但不具备定位在区分性特征维度上的能力;在类别学习策略上主要采用单维度分类策略和规则加例外的分类策略。     

Extending the ALCOVE model of category learning to featural stimulus domains

The ALCOVE model of category learning, despite its considerable success in accounting for human performance across a wide range of empirical tasks, is limited by its reliance on spatial stimulus representations. Some stimulus domains are better suited to featural representation, characterizing stimuli in terms of the presence or absence of discrete features, rather than as points in a multidimensional space. We report on empirical data measuring human categorization performance across a featural stimulus domain and show that ALCOVE is unable to capture fundamental qualitative aspects of this performance. In response, a featural version of the ALCOVE model is developed, replacing the spatial stimulus representations that are usually generated by multidimensional scaling with featural representations generated by additive clustering. We demonstrate that this featural version of ALCOVE is able to capture human performance where the spatial model failed, explaining the difference in terms of the contrasting representational assumptions made by the two approaches. Finally, we discuss ways in which the ALCOVE categorization model might be extended further to use “hybrid” representational structures combining spatial and featural components.     

The relation between children's conceptual functioning with color and color term acquisition

Young children experience considerable difficulty in learning their first few color terms. One explanation for this difficulty is that initially they lack a conceptual representation of color sufficiently abstract to support word meaning. This hypothesis, that prior to learning color terms children do not represent color as an abstraction, was tested in two experiments using samples of 25- to 39-month-olds and 20- to 32-month-olds. Children's ability to conceptually represent color and their knowledge of color terms were assessed, and a strong association was found between the ability to make inferences based on color and the comprehension of color words. Children who did not comprehend color terms were unsuccessful at a conceptual task that required them to represent color as a property independent of the particular objects that displayed it. The results suggest that the initial absence of an abstract representation of color contributes to the difficulty that young children encounter when first learning color words.     

Is the asymmetry in young infants’ categorization of humans versus nonhuman animals based on head,body, or global gestalt information?

Quinn and Eimas (1998) reported an asymmetry in the exclusivity of the category representations that young infants form for humans and nonhuman animals: category representations for nonhuman animal species were found to exclude humans, whereas a category representation for humans was found to include nonhuman animal species (i.e., cats, horses). The present experiment utilized the familiarization/novelty-preference procedure with 3- and 4-month-olds to determine the perceptual cues (i.e., whole stimulus, head alone, body alone) that provided the basis for this asymmetry. The data revealed the asymmetry to be observable only with the whole animal stimuli and not when infants were provided with information from just the head or the body of the exemplars. The results indicate that the incorporation of nonhuman animal species into a category representation for humans is based on holistic information.     

Asymmetrical responding to male versus female other-race categories in 9- to 12-month-old infants

Faces can be categorized along various dimensions including gender or race, an ability developing in infancy. Infant categorization studies have focused on facial attributes in isolation, but the interaction between these attributes remains poorly understood. Experiment 1 examined gender categorization of other-race faces in 9- and 12-month-old White infants. Nine- and 12-month-olds were familiarized with Asian male or female faces, and tested with a novel exemplar from the familiarized category paired with a novel exemplar from a novel category. Both age groups showed novel category preferences for novel Asian female faces after familiarization with Asian male faces, but showed no novel category preference for novel Asian male faces after familiarization with Asian female faces. This categorization asymmetry was not due to a spontaneous preference hindering novel category reaction (Experiment 2), and both age groups displayed difficulty discriminating among male, but not female, other-race faces (Experiment 3). These results indicate that category formation for male other-race faces is mediated by categorical perception. Overall, the findings suggest that even by 12 months of age, infants are not fully able to form gender category representations of other-race faces, responding categorically to male, but not female, other-race faces.     

Representation at different levels in a conceptual hierarchy

The present study examines the influence of hierarchical level on category representation. Three computational models of representation – an exemplar model, a prototype model and an ideal representation model – were evaluated in their ability to account for the typicality gradient of categories at two hierarchical levels in the conceptual domain of clothes. The domain contains 20 subordinate categories (e.g., trousers, stockings and underwear) and an encompassing superordinate category (CLOTHES). The models were evaluated both in terms of their ability to fit the empirical data and their generalizability through marginal likelihood. The hierarchical level was found to clearly influence the type of representation: For concepts at the subordinate level, exemplar representations were supported. At the superordinate level, however, an ideal representation was overwhelmingly preferred over exemplar and prototype representations. This finding contributes to the increasingly dominant view that the human conceptual apparatus adopts both exemplar representations and more abstract representations, contradicting unitary approaches to categorization.     

Contrast and assimilation in categorization and exemplar production

We studied contrast and assimilation in three tasks: an exemplar-production task, a categorization task, and a combined categorization-then-production task. On each trial of the first task, subjects produced a circle when prompted with a category label. In the second task, they classified lines that differed in length into one of four categories. On each trial of the combined task, they classified two lines and then produced a line when prompted by a category label. All three tasks converged on the same conclusion: subjects' representation of the categories (measured in pixels in the production tasks and by the direction of errors in classification) shifted systematically from trial to trial. When successive stimuli were from the same category, the representation of that category was pulled toward the exemplar from the previous trial. When successive stimuli were from different categories, the representations of the neighbouring categories were pushed from the category of the initial stimulus. We conclude that accounts of categorization and identification must accommodate both assimilation and contrast as a function of trial-to-trial shifts in representation.     

Early differentiation within the animate domain: are humans something special?

This report investigates whether preverbal infants distinguish between humans and mammals within the animate domain. In Experiment 1, 3 groups, aged 7, 9, and 11 months (N = 58), participated in an object-examination task. Infants were presented with 10 different three-dimensional toy models from one category (humans or mammals), followed by an exemplar from the other category. All groups habituated to the familiarization stimuli and dishabituated to the out-of-category item. In Experiment 2, 2 groups of infants, aged 5 and 7 months (N = 40), participated in a familiarization-novelty preference task. Four pairs of color photos of objects from the same category were presented twice, and then infants received a test pair that included one new object from the already-familiar category and one out-of-category item. Infants habituated only to humans, and 7-month-olds, but not 5-month-olds, dishabituated to the out-of-category exemplar. Implications for the development of categorical thinking during the first year of life are discussed.     

Infants' sensitivity to correlations between static and dynamic features in a category context

Four experiments with the habituation procedure investigated 14-22-month-olds' ability to attend to correlations between static and dynamic features embedded in a category context. In Experiment 1, infants were habituated to four objects that exhibited invariant relations between moving features and motion trajectory. Results revealed that 14-month-olds did not process any independent features, 18-month-olds processed individual features but not relations among features, and 22-month-olds processed relations among features. In Experiment 2, 14-month-olds differentiated all of the features in the events in a simpler discrimination task. In Experiments 3a and 3b, 22-month-olds failed to show sensitivity to correlations between dynamic and static features in a category context. In Experiment 4, 22-month-olds, but not 18-month-olds, generalized the learned feature-motion relation to a novel instance. The results are discussed in relation to infants' developing ability to attend to correlations, constraints on learning, category coherence, and the development of the animate-inanimate distinction.     

Does category-training facilitate 11-month-olds’ acquisition of unfamiliar category-property associations?

The ability to form category-property links allows infants to extend a property from one category member to another. In two experiments, we examined whether orienting infants to the demands of the task, through categorization training, would facilitate 11-month-old infants’ category-property extensions when familiarized with a single exemplar of an unfamiliar animal category. In Experiment 1, 11-month-olds (N = 35) were trained with two familiar animal-sound pairings (i.e., dog-bark, cat-meow), familiarized with two unfamiliar animal-sound pairings and then tested on their learning and generalization of the unfamiliar animal-sound associations. Across two conditions, Experiment 2 familiarized 11-month-olds (N = 69) to one familiar (i.e., dog-bark) and one novel animal-sound pairing. Conditions differed in their presentation of familiarization trials (i.e., random or blocked). Infants were then tested on their learning and extension of the animal-sound associations. In both experiments, infants did not demonstrate learning of the original animal sound pairing, nor generalization of the sound property to new members of the animal categories. These results indicate that the two category training paradigms implemented in the current studies did not facilitate 11-month-olds’ ability to learn or generalize an unfamiliar animal-sound association, when familiarized with a single exemplar.     

Aligning Logical and Psychological Contributions to the Understanding of Human Reasoning

Modern logic is an abstract study of consequence rather than a mechanistic study of reasoning. This abstract view has much to offer psychological studies of the representations which implement human reasoning. This paper reviews recent results showing the abstract equivalence of all the main psychological competence models of syllogistic reasoning. Their apparently contrasting representations are computationally equivalent for the kind of data presented. The true empirical contrasts between theories lie in other details of implementation — in whether integrated representations are constructed and in the sequence of cases considered. These contrasts are independent of sentential, graphical or mental model representation.Logic is also a guide to representation requirements. Linear syllogism models are representable by sequences of tokens, whereas categorial syllogism models generally require attribute binding. However, one consequence of the present semantic analysis is that all categorial syllogism competence models converge on an algorithm which avoids representation of more than a single sequence.The paper goes on to consider what evidence could distinguish the representations implementing reasoning in working memory. The example of dual task paradigms is considered and some conceptual questions are raised about the identification of the modalities of working memory subsystems with linguistic and spatial representations. Carefully distinguishing memory medium from memory interpretation leads to the conclusion that it is the interpretation of the contents of memory which determines whether it holds spatial or linguistic information. It is argued that the critical dimension for understanding reasoning processes is the expressiveness of interpretation of representations.