Theological Realism and the Observability of God

A popular way of arguing for theological realism depends on analogies with defences of realism in the philosophy of science. This article questions the success and theological propriety of this strategy by comparing theological and scientific methodologies. First, for the analogies to work it is necessary to show that the theological counterparts of objections to scientific realism can be rebutted; however, it appears that orthodox theology cannot accomplish this. Second, the topic of un/observability in science and theology is analysed. It is shown that the two disciplines have different accounts of the topic and that comparisons between the two undermine a central argument of versions of theological realism based on the philosophy of science.     

Science as Structured Imagination

This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that scientific creativity — like other forms of creativity — is structured and constrained by prior ontological expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful epistemic tool to overcome these constraints. While current research on analogies in scientific understanding focuses on near analogies, where target and source domain are close, we argue that distant analogies — where target and source domain differ widely — are especially useful in periods of intense conceptual change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies from the history of science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists like Darwin, and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen.     

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AS A MODEL FOR STRUCTURING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

Abstract. A strategy for deeding systematically with such complex relationships as those between science and theology is presented after a brief overview of the historical record and illustrated in terms of the concept of divinity. The application of that strategy to the title relationships yields a multilogical/multilevel solution which presents certain analogies to or isomorphisms with the doctrine of the Trinity. These concern mainly the multilogical/multilevel character of both conceptualizations and the relational and contextual reasoning required to conceive them. Furthermore, certain characteristics of the doctrine facilitate the dialogue between theologians and scientists on account of their similarity with such scientific concepts as diversity in unity, multiplicity of relationships, nonseparability, and nonclassical logic.     

New Worlds,New Civilizations? From Science Fiction to Science Fact

ABSTRACT

Although long predicted on theoretical grounds, prior to the 1990s there was no observational evidence of worlds orbiting distant stars; however, the development of new technologies has enabled the discovery of thousands of these exoplanets. The diversity of these worlds exceeds scientific expectations and rivals foreshadowing by the most creative science fiction writers. Extrapolations based on statistical arguments and our understanding of how planetary systems form suggest exoplanets may outnumber the roughly 10 million quadrillion stars in the observable Universe. There are compelling reasons to expect conditions conducive to life on many of these worlds, but the existence of extraterrestrial life remains an open question. Although galaxy-spanning civilizations envisioned in science fiction remain unlikely, future contact with extraterrestrial species is not implausible, and in any case, the likelihood of having a human presence on Mars within the next few decades lends urgency to global, cross-cultural religious and ethical discussions.     

Macroscopic Oil Droplets Mimicking Quantum Behaviour: How Far Can We Push an Analogy?

We describe a series of experimental analogies between fluid mechanics and quantum mechanics recently discovered by a team of physicists. These analogies arise in droplet systems guided by a surface (or pilot) wave. We argue that these experimental facts put ancient theoretical work by Madelung on the analogy between fluid and quantum mechanics into new light. After re-deriving Madelung’s result starting from two basic fluid mechanical equations (the Navier–Stokes equation and the continuity equation), we discuss the relation with the de Broglie–Bohm theory. This allows to make a direct link with the droplet experiments. It is argued that the fluid mechanical interpretation of quantum mechanics, if it can be extended to the general N-particle case, would have a considerable advantage over the Bohm interpretation: it could rid Bohm’s theory of its non-local character.     

The Conflict Between Religion and Science in Light of the Patterns of Religious Belief Among Scientists

Recent summaries of psychologist James H. Leuba's pioneering studies on the religious beliefs of American scientists have misrepresented his findings and ignored important aspects of his analyses, including predictions regarding the future of religion. Much of the recent interest in Leuba was sparked by Edward J. Larson and Larry Witham's commentary in Nature (3 April 1997), “Scientists Are Still Keeping the Faith.” Larson and Witham compared the results of their 1996 survey of one thousand randomly selected American scientists regarding their religious beliefs with a similar survey published eighty years earlier by Leuba. Leuba's original studies are themselves problematical. Nonetheless, his notion that different fields of science have different impacts on the religion‐science relationship remains valid. Especially significant is his appreciation of religion as a dynamic, compelling force in human life: any waning of traditional beliefs does not mean a decrease in religious commitment but calls for a new spirituality in harmony with modern scientific teachings. Leuba's studies, placed in proper context, offer a broad historical perspective from which to interpret data about religious beliefs of scientists and the impact of science and scientists on public beliefs, and opportunity to develop new insight into the religion‐science relationship.     

Critical Notice: Paul Russell's The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism,Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)

In The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume's series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life,’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’” (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle” of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Hume's (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’” (2008, 3)? Or does Hume's skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature” (290)? Russell's controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Hume's fundamental intentions in the Treatise” is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Hume's irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.     

Semantic approaches in the philosophy of science

In this article I give an overview of some recent work in philosophy of science dedicated to analysing the scientific process in terms of (conceptual) mathematical models of theories and the various semantic relations between such models, scientific theories, and aspects of reality. In current philosophy of science, the most interesting questions centre around the ways in which writers distinguish between theories and the mathematical structures that interpret them and in which they are true, i.e. between scientific theories as linguistic systems and their non-linguistic models. In philosophy of science literature there are two main approaches to the structure of scientific theories, the statement or syntactic approach—advocated by Carnap, Hempel and Nagel—and the non-statement or semantic approach—advocated, among others, by Suppes, the structuralists, Beth, Van Fraassen, Giere, Wójcicki. In conclusion, I briefly review some of the usual realist inspired questions about the possibility and character of relations between scientific theories and reality as implied by the various approaches I discuss in the course of the article. The models of a scientific theory should indeed be adequate to the phenomena, but if the theory is ‘adequate’ to (true in) its conceptual (mathematical) models as well, we have a model-theoretic realism that addresses the possible meaning and reference of ‘theoretical entities’ without relapsing into the metaphysics typical of the usual scientific realist approaches.     

SIMONE WEIL'S SPIRITUAL CRITIQUE OF MODERN SCIENCE: AN HISTORICAL‐CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Simone Weil is widely recognized today as one of the profound religious thinkers of the twentieth century. Yet while her interpretation of natural science is critical to Weil's overall understanding of religious faith, her writings on science have received little attention compared with her more overtly theological writings. The present essay, which builds on Vance Morgan's Weaving the World: Simone Weil on Science, Necessity, and Love (2005), critically examines Weil's interpretation of the history of science. Weil believed that mathematical science, for the ancient Pythagoreans a mystical expression of the love of God, had in the modern period degenerated into a kind of reification of method that confuses the means of representing nature with nature itself. Beginning with classical (Newtonian) science's representation of nature as a machine, and even more so with the subsequent assimilation of symbolic algebra as the principal language of mathematical physics, modern science according to Weil trades genuine insight into the order of the world for symbolic manipulation yielding mere predictive success and technological domination of nature. I show that Weil's expressed desire to revive a Pythagorean scientific approach, inspired by the “mysterious complicity” in nature between brute necessity and love, must be recast in view of the intrinsically symbolic character of modern mathematical science. I argue further that a genuinely mystical attitude toward nature is nascent within symbolic mathematical science itself.     

OAKESHOTT ON THE CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: NEED THERE BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Michael Oakeshott reflected on the character of religious experience in various writings throughout his life. In Experience and Its Modes (1933) he analyzed science as a distinctive “mode,” or account of experience as a whole, identifying those assumptions necessary for science to achieve its coherent account of experience in contrast to other modes of experience whose quests for coherence depend on different assumptions. Religious experience, he thought, was integral to the practical mode. The latter experiences the world as interminable tension between what is and what ought to be. The question, Is there a conflict between science and religion? is, in Oakeshott's approach, the question, Is there a conflict between the scientific mode of experience and the practical mode? Insofar as we tend to treat every question as a practical one, these questions seem to make sense. But Oakeshott's analysis leads to the view that scientific experience and religious experience are categorically different accounts of experience abstracted from the whole of experience. They are voices of experience that may speak to each other, but they are not ordered hierarchically. Nor can either absorb the other without insoluble contradictions.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.     

OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF A SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW

Abstract. Understanding the structure of a scientific world view is important for the dialogue between science and religion. In this essay, I define comprehensive worldview and distinguish it from the more focused non comprehensive worldview. I explain that scientists and the public at large agree that modern research works in a scientific as opposed to nonscientific worldview. I give some of the essential elements of any scientific worldview that differentiate it from nonscientific ones. These elements are the general pre suppositions of science, the methods of science, and the articles of justification for the conclusions science puts forward. I question whether a scientific worldview can allow philosophical and theological tenets, which might appear to stand opposed to scientific paradigms, and conclude that the answer lies in the scope of its comprehensiveness.     

ARE SCIENCE AND HUMANISM SUITED TO ENTER THE ANCIENT QUEST OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY? A RESPONSE TO LLUÍS OVIEDO

This response reverses the title of Lluís Oviedo's essay (2006) while retaining the structure. In the pendulum swing between science and humanism, theology finds its uniqueness not in refuting either but in subverting them: subverting the scientific quest for certainty without denying its pursuit, and subverting the humanist quest for the unique dignity of the human by reducing it to the most despoiled creature, yet finding in it the presence of the divine. Theological pursuit is about reason and its limits, about brokenness and glory in it. Yet the engagement is unavoidable, for without the scientific pursuit of certainty, incompleteness could never be established; without the humanist search for the uniqueness of the human, its admixed and impure character would not be recognized. The concept of hybridity tries to convey that and is presented in three instantiations: the conflation of the human with machine (cyborg), of humans and other animals (oncomouse), and of the human and the divine. Following these ontological cases of hybridity, at the epistemological level theology becomes hybrid “science” in search of the mythos in the midst of logos, and conversely it is hybrid humanism, for it locates God in the greatest depravity of mammalian existence.     

IAN BARBOUR ON RELIGION AND THE METHODS OF SCIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT

Abstract. Two aspects of Ian Barbour's position on the relation between religion and science are considered. First is his preference for comparing religions as a whole to scientific paradigms. It is suggested that the concept of a tradition as defined by Alasdair MacIntyre is more useful than Thomas Kuhn's paradigm. Thus, the Christian tradition could be compared to the Aristotelian or Newtonian scientific traditions. Within traditions, both religious and scientific, we find schools with enough agreement on fundamentals to be designated research programs, as defined by Imre Lakatos; here fruitful comparisons between theology and science are possible. Barbour's critical realism is intended as a compromise between highly rationalistic and sociological accounts of science. However, rationalism and sociology of science are answers to two different sets of questions rather than extremes on a spectrum of answers to the same question. Thus, there is no middle position between them, and no compromise need be found.     

Pragmatism and Philosophy of Science: A Critical Survey

After delineating the distinguishing features of pragmatism, and noting the resources that pragmatists have available to respond effectively as pragmatists to the two major objections to pragmatism, I examine and critically evaluate the various proposals that pragmatists have offered as a solution to the problem of induction, followed by a discussion of the pragmatic positions on the status of theoretical entities. Thereafter I discuss the pragmatic posture toward the nature of explanation in science. I conclude that pragmatism has (a) a generally compelling solution to Hume’s problem of induction; (b) no specific position on the status of theoretical entities, although something like the non‐realism of the sort developed by van Fraassen seems a defensible candidate for most pragmatists in general, even though there are non‐trivial objections to van Fraassen’s position; and (c) central to the pragmatic conception of scientific explanation is the abandonment of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for sentences to provide adequate explanations, and a drift in the direction of a contextualist account of explanation.     

Forschungsprogramm und Wissenschaftsentwicklung

For Imre Lakatos hismethodology of scientific research programmes was not only a philosophical theory of science and scientific change but also the conceptual foundation of empirical and historical studies of science. At least terminologically this view is today widely accepted: The concept of aresearch programme is used in all sorts of literature on science. In the present paper I argue that this concept can lead to serious distortions of empirical and historical studies of science if it is not detached from the Lakatosian philosophical framework. Themethodology of scientific research programmes has three main pitfalls, which may lead to disorientations of empirical and historical studies of science: (1) Contrary to what the term research programme may suggest, it offers no perspective on scientific research as an object of analysissui generis; (2) its concept of science is too narrow and covers only minor parts of what counts as science in the real world; (3) it reduces history of science to a mere sequence of research programmes and thereby eliminates the fact that there is an evolution of the structure of research programmes, too.

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Der vorliegende Beitrag ist die überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung eines Vortrages, den der Verfasser im Juli 1988 auf einem vomInstitut für Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft gemeinsam mit demInterdisziplinären Institut für Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg veranstalteten Kolloqium gehalten hat.     

Scientific objectivity and the logics of science

This paper develops an account of scientific objectivity for a relativist theory of evidence. It briefly reviews the character and shortcomings of empiricist and wholist treatments of theory acceptance and objectivity and argues that the relativist account of evidence developed by the author in an earlier essay offers a more satisfactory framework within which to approach questions of justification and intertheoretic comparison. The difficulty with relativism is that it seems to eliminate objectivity from scientific method. Reconceiving objectivity as a function of the social character of science, rather than of individually practiced methods, allows us to claim that science is objective even if relativism is true, and provides a more realistic account of scientific objectivity than is possible on either the empiricist or the wholist accounts.     

On Science of Metaphors and the Nature of Systemic Reasoning

Scientific method is presented not as a means for investigating a true and objective character of universal reality, but as a metaphorical tool applied for mutual co-ordination of experiences. By acknowledging the co-orientational and metaphoric roots of science, religion, arts, and ordinary linguistic communications alike, potential for their fruitful interdependent application becomes apparent. References to the paradigms of constructivism and objectivism are drawn in parallel in outlining the tracks along which the proposed concept of co-creation of experiential qualities is arrived at. Systemic reasoning based on analogies between different levels of complexity of natural systems emanates as an imaginative aspect of creative thinking.