Practice effects, workload, and reaction time in deception

Cognitive theorists argue that deception may involve attentional capture, working memory load, or perceived incongruity with memory, whereas psychophysiologists argue for stimulus salience, arousal, and emotion. This article presents a comprehensive model of deception and assesses the effect of practice on deceptive responding. A three-session longitudinal study examined the effect of practice on reaction time (RT) in relation to deception and response congruity. Participants evaluated self-referent sentences and responded truthfully or deceptively. Findings indicate that deceptive responding generates longer RTs than does truthful responding and that this relationship remains constant with practice. We use these findings to support a cognitive model of deception.     

Electrophysiological markers of working memory usage as an index for truth-based lies

People prefer to lie using altered truthful events from memory, perhaps because doing so can increase their credibility while reducing cognitive and working memory (WM) load. One possible way to counter such deceptive behavior is to track WM usage, since fabricating coherent lies or managing between truth and lies is likely to involve heavy WM load. In this study, participants memorized a list of words in the study session and used these old words to provide deceptive answers when cued later, in the testing session. Our behavioral results showed that people needed more time to make a deceptive response during the execution stage, and this prolonged deceptive reaction time (RT) was negatively correlated with each participant’s WM capacity. Event-related potential findings showed a more negative-going frontal amplitude between the lie and truth conditions during the preparation stage, suggesting that WM preparatory processes can be detected long before a deceptive response is verbalized. Furthermore, we observed a larger positive frontal-central amplitude during the execution stage, which was negatively correlated with participants’ lie–truth RT differences, suggesting that participants’ efficiency in producing deceptive responses can be readily traced electrophysiologically. Together, these findings suggest that WM capacity and preparation are crucial to efficient lying and that their related electrophysiological signatures can potentially be used to uncover deceptive behaviors.     

Evidence of mnemonic ability selectively affecting truthful and deceptive response dynamics

In the executive model of deception, the telling of a lie necessitates the inhibition of a veridical prepotent response (the truth), and such inhibition incurs a temporal penalty, manifest as a longer response time. If memory processes are engaged in generating such truths, then memory function should affect truthful and deceptive response times. To investigate this we examined the relationship between performance on a semantic knowledge deception task and a test of verbal memory in 40 college students. We found that verbal memory performance differentially affects the temporal parameters of truth and deception.     

Keyboard dynamics discrepancies between baseline and deceptive eyewitness narratives

Information manipulation and cognitive load imposition make the production of deceptive narratives difficult. But little is known about the production of deception, and how its mechanisms may help distinguish truthful from deceitful narratives. This study focuses on the measurement of keystroke dynamics while typing truthful and deceptive eyewitness testimonies after a baseline assessment. While typing their narrative, some participants would undergo an auditory cognitive load. Results show that liars typed their story slower, and in less time than the truthful participants when compared to their respective baselines. The imposition of the auditory cognitive load showed adverse results, enhancing the amount of keystrokes and the time necessary to type the narrative. Classification shows better results for deceptive narrative when no auditory cognitive load is imposed. These results are discussed in terms of expanding current models to include the cognition of linguistic production and writing strategies.     

Effects of task-irrelevant emotional information on deception

Deception has been reported to be influenced by task-relevant emotional information from an external stimulus. However, it remains unclear how task-irrelevant emotional information would influence deception. In the present study, facial expressions of different valence and emotion intensity were presented to participants, where they were asked to make either truthful or deceptive gender judgments according to the preceding cues. We observed the influence of facial expression intensity upon individuals’ cognitive cost of deceiving (mean difference of individuals’ truthful and deceptive response times). Larger cost was observed for high intensity faces compared to low intensity faces. These results provided insights on how automatic attraction of attention evoked by task-irrelevant emotional information in facial expressions influenced individuals’ cognitive cost of deceiving.     

Reaction Time‐based Detection of Concealed Information in Relation to Individual Differences in Executive Functioning

Executive functioning has been shown to play an essential role in a person's ability to accurately and efficiently execute deceptive responses. The present study relates individual differences in executive functions and anxiety to the accuracy and latency of deceptive responses in a reaction time (RT)‐based Concealed Information Test with pictorial stimuli extracted from a mock crime scenario. Results indicated that the pictorial RT‐based Concealed Information Test successfully differentiated between guilty and innocent participants. In terms of executive functions, set‐shifting and inhibition were directly related to deception accuracy and speed, respectively. However, enhanced underlying working memory skills (both verbal and spatial) were associated with longer RTs for item classification. No strong associations were noted with anxiety dimensions. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to neurocognitive models of deception and to the process of deception detection. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Use of Deception as a Compliance-Gaining Strategy

This study argues that the persuasive message behaviors of truthful and deceptive communicators may differ strategically. Participants (N = 283) responded to three interpersonally oriented persuasive situations and wrote out instances of compliance-gaining messages. Approximately half the respondents were required to use deception in their persuasive messages. A comparison of truthful and deceptive compliance-gaining messages revealed significant differences in the types of persuasive messages generated: Truthful persuaders composed messages involving positive and negative sanctions; deceptive persuaders composed messages based on rationale or explanation.     

Adaptation and communicative design.

Two theoretical frameworks that examine the nature of adaptability and mutual influence in interaction, interpersonal deception theory and interaction adaptation theory, were used to derive hypotheses concerning patterns of interaction that occur across time in truthful and deceptive conversations. Two studies were conducted in which senders were either truthful or deceptive in their interactions with a partner who increased or decreased involvement during the latter half of the conversation. Results revealed that deceivers felt more anxious and were more concerned about self‐presentation than truthtellers prior to the interaction and displayed less initial involvement than truthtellers. Patterns of interaction were also moderated by deception. Deceivers increased involvement over time but also reciprocated increases or decreases in receiver involvement. However, deceivers were less responsive than truthtellers to changes in receiver behavior. Finally, partner involvement served as feedback to senders regarding their own performance.     

SELF-MONITORING,REHEARSAL, AND DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATION

This study examined the effects of self-monitoring and rehearsal on the ability of observers to detect deception and on the behavioral correlates of deception. It was hypothesized that observers would be more accurate at detecting deception perpetrated by low self-monitors than by high self-monitors, with the difference particularly pronounced when messages were rehearsed. In addition, low self-monitors communicating spontaneously were expected to display greater rates of verbal and nonverbal responding than high self-monitors who planned their communications. Sixteen high and low self-monitors both lied and told the truth (either spontaneously or after 20-minute rehearsals) regarding their feelings while viewing slides of pleasant landscapes and of disfigured burn victims. Analysis of the responses of the 151 observers who made veracity judgments supported the hypothesis concerning accuracy of deception detection. Coding of 10 verbal and nonverbal behaviors revealed that unrehearsed low self-monitors displayed significantly greater pause and nonfluency rates than rehearsed high self-monitors. Additional findings are reported regarding the effects of self-monitoring, rehearsal, and truthful versus deceptive communication on the behavioral correlates of deception.     

Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining

This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions.     

Skulking around the dinosaur: Eliciting cues to children's deception via strategic disclosure of evidence

Research has shown that cues to deception are more salient as an effect of strategic use of evidence (SUE) during interviews. This study examined the feasibility of the SUE‐technique for eliciting cues to children's deception. Experiment 1 investigated verbal cues to deception as a function of early vs. late disclosure of evidence. Eighty‐four children (12–14 years) either guilty or innocent of a mock crime were interviewed. As predicted, deceptive statements were significantly more inconsistent with the evidence than truthful statements, and this was more pronounced as a function of late compared to early disclosure of evidence. In Experiment 2, adult observers (N = 168) made veracity assessments of the videotaped statements. Observers in the late disclosure condition achieved an accuracy rate higher than chance (63.1%), whereas accuracy rates in the early disclosure condition were at chance level (56%). Accuracy rates were significantly higher for truthful (70.2%), than deceptive statements (48.8%). Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On being happy and gullible: Mood effects on skepticism and the detection of deception

Are we more likely to believe or disbelieve another person depending on our mood state? Based on past research on interpersonal communication and recent work on affect and social cognition, we predicted and found that negative mood increased and positive mood decreased people’s skepticism and their ability to detect deception, consistent with the more externally focused, accommodative processing style promoted by negative affect. After a mood induction using positive, neutral or negative films, participants viewed deceptive or truthful interviews with individuals who denied committing a theft. Judgments of the targets’ guilt and their truthfulness were collected. As predicted, negative mood increased judges’ skepticism towards the targets, and improved their accuracy in detecting deceptive communications, while judges in a positive mood were more trusting and gullible. The relevance of these findings for everyday judgments of trust and the detection of deception are considered, and their implications for recent affect-cognition theories are discussed.     

Detecting Deceit in Pairs of Children1

This study examined adults’ ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive pairs of children. Adult observers (N = 88) judged the veracity of one of 22 truthful or deceptive pairs of children (12–13 years). The children were interviewed separately about their real or imagined encounters with an unknown man. Analyses showed that the overall accuracy was 62.5%; significantly better than chance level of 50%. Deception detection accuracy was higher when watching both pair members than when watching one child. The analysis of self‐reported cues to deception given by observers showed that the consistency between the children's statements was the most frequent cue. An analysis of the actual consistency of children's statements showed significantly more contradictions in the deceptive statements.     

A truth that’s told with bad intent: An ERP study of deception

Human social cognition critically relies on the ability to deceive others. However, the cognitive and neural underpinnings of deception are still poorly understood. Why does lying place increased demands on cognitive control? The present study investigated whether cognitive control processes during deception are recruited due to the need to inhibit a tendency to state the truth, or reflect deceptive intent more generally. We engaged participants in a face-to-face interaction game and examined event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants lied and told the truth with or without deceptive intention. The same medial frontal negative deflection (N450) occurred when participants lied and when they told the truth with deceptive intent. This suggests that the main challenge of lying is not to inhibit a tendency to state the truth. Rather, the challenge is to handle the cognitive conflict resulting from the need to keep others’ mental states in mind while deceiving them.     

Earlier detection facilitates skilled responses to deceptive actions

High-skilled and recreational rugby players were placed in a semi-immersive CAREN Lab environment to examine susceptibility to, and detection of, deception. To achieve this, a broad window of seven occlusion times was used in which participants responded to life-size video clips of an opposing player ‘cutting’ left or right, with or without a deceptive sidestep. Participants made full-body responses to ‘intercept’ the player and gave a verbal judgement of the opponent's final running direction. Response kinematic and kinetic data were recorded using three-dimensional motion capture cameras and force plates, respectively. Based on response accuracy, the results were separated into deception susceptibility and deception detection windows then signal detection analysis was used to calculate indices of discriminability between genuine and deceptive actions (d’) and judgement bias (c). Analysis revealed that high-skilled and low-skilled players were similarly susceptible to deception; however, high-skilled players detected deception earlier in the action sequence, which enabled them to make more effective behavioural responses to deceptive actions.     

测谎中反馈加工的认知神经机制：一项ERP研究

在一个模拟“杀人——侦探”游戏情境中,被试先完成模拟杀人任务,在随后的测谎阶段使用有反馈的ERP测谎范式,以反馈的形式告知被试测谎结果（“+0.5”或“-2”,分别代表“撒谎逃过检测”或“撒谎被发现”）时的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现,在反馈出现后的200～300ms时间段,表示“撒谎被抓住”比“撒谎逃过检测”的反馈信息诱发了一个更正性的ERP成分（P200-300）,在300～400ms时间段,两种反馈诱发的ERP成分（P300）没有差异,而在450～500ms时间段, “撒谎逃过检测”比“撒谎被抓住”的反馈信息诱发了一个更负性的ERP成分（N500）,负性反馈没有诱发FRN。这些结果表明：P200-300、P300和N500都是与加工测谎结果信息有关的ERP成分。P200-300可能对测谎结果的效价（正性或负性）敏感;P300可能反映被试对测谎结果主观意义大小的评价;而N500可能反映测谎结果所导致的大脑皮层兴奋程度。     

The cognitive load of narrative lies

Lying is assumed to increase cognitive load, and it has been shown to slow response times to simple questions. We employed a dual‐task methodology, the detection response task (DRT), to assess cognitive load in telling narrative lies in a live, open‐question interview. The DRT requires participants to press a button in response to a tactile stimulus every 3–5 s while performing a primary task, in this case, recounting either truthful or deceitful narratives. We found weak support for slowing in the time to initiate a narrative response when lying. In contrast, we found strong support for an increase in cognitive load when producing a narrative lie, as measured by both slowed DRT responses and increased response omissions, although this effect decreased with time on task. We advocate dual‐task methodologies such as the DRT for increasing understanding of the assumptions made by theories of deception and for refining lie detection techniques.     

Lay Persons' and Police Officers' Beliefs Regarding Deceptive Behaviour

Research on the detection of deception, via non-verbal cues, has shown that people's ability to successfully discriminate between truth and deception is only slightly better than chance level. One of the reasons for these disappointing findings possibly lies in people's inappropriate beliefs regarding ‘lying behaviour’. A 64-item questionnaire originally used in Germany, which targets participants' beliefs regarding truthful and deceptive behaviour, was used. The present study differed from previous research in three ways: (i) instead of a student population, police officers and lay people were sampled, (ii) both people's beliefs regarding others' deceptive behaviour and their beliefs regarding their own deceptive behaviour were examined, and (iii) both non-verbal cues to, and content characteristics of, deceptive statements were examined. Results were consistent with previous studies, which found significant differences between people's beliefs regarding deceptive behaviour and experimental observations of actual deceptive behaviour. Further, police officers held as many false beliefs as did lay people and finally, participants were more accurate in their beliefs regarding their own deceptive behaviour than they were in their beliefs regarding others' behaviour.     

Täuschungsstrategien von Kindern, Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen

Criteria-Based Content Analysis (22) is part of the Statement Validity Assessment (SVA), a method used for assessing the credibility of witness’ statements. CBCA relies on two assumptions, one referring to the cognitive strain of inventing a complex false declaration, the other being related to self presentation as a competent, reliable and truthful person by avoiding potentially “damaging” contents. When evalutating statements, forensic experts take into account that cognitive capacity - and thus potential content quality of a false declaration - increases with age. On the other hand there is no empirical evidence for an improvement of deceptive self-presentation strategies so far. Recent studies on content-related deceptive strategies with children and adults support the assumption that children as well as adults do apply specific deception strategies. Due to methodological differences, however, a direct comparison between these studies to obtain results on possible age effects has not been possible. The aim of this study was to investigate whether children, adolescents and adults differ in the content-related deceptive strategies they apply. Children (n = 48), adolescents (n = 73) and adults (n = 50) were given an age appropriate standardized questionnaire about their content-related deception strategies. Results show age differences in the strategic value assigned to certain content characteristics.     

Are errors differentiable from deceptive responses when feigning memory impairment? An fMRI study

Previous neuroimaging studies have suggested that the neural activity associated with truthful recall, with false memory, and with feigned memory impairment are different from one another. Here, we report a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that addressed an important but yet unanswered question: Is the neural activity associated with intentional faked responses and with errors differentiable? Using a word list learning recognition paradigm, the findings of this mixed event-related fMRI study clearly indicated that the brain activity associated with intentional faked responses was different to the activity associated with errors committed unintentionally. For intentional faked responses, significant activation was found in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate region, and the precuneus. However, no significant activation was observed for unintentional errors. The results suggest that deception, in terms of feigning memory impairment, is not only more cognitively demanding than making unintentional errors but also utilizes different cognitive processes.