The Reduction of Causal Processes

The principle that causes always render their effects more likely is fundamental to the enterprise of reducing facts of causation to facts about (objective) chances. This reductionist enterprise faces famous difficulties in accommodating common-sense intuitions about causal processes, if it insists on cashing out causal processes in terms of streams of events in which every event that belongs to the stream is a cause of the adjoining event downstream of it. I shall propose modifications to this way of cashing out causal processes, still well within the reductionist faith. These modifications will allow the reductionist to handle processes successfully, on the assumption that the reductionist proposal is itself otherwise satisfactory. I shall then argue that the reductionist enterprise lies squarely behind the Theory of Relativity, and so has all the confirmatory weight of Relativity behind it. However this is not all good news for reductionists. For throughout I shall simply assume that the reductionist proposal, to the effect that causes are just chance-raisers, is correct. AndI shall sidestep problems with that proposal as such. And so I shall show that, if in the end we find the reductionist proposal unsatisfactory, it cannot be on grounds of its treatment of causal processes as such. Thus, while I shall argue that causal processes pose no extra trouble for redutionists, I shall be making a case that all the action between reductionists and their opponents should be focused upon the proposal to reduce the two-term causal relation itself to relations amongst probabilities.     

Cognitive flexibility as a meta-competency / Flexibilidad cognitiva como meta-competencia

Abstract

There exists a large body of research that has studied cognitive flexibility as an executive function assessed through shifting and set-switching tasks. This approach has been criticized as overly narrow and reductionist, thereby undermining the relevance of cognitive flexibility beyond tightly controlled cognitive tasks. In light of such limitations, we review the extant literature and reflect on the understanding of cognitive flexibility as (1) an cognitive approach to novelty processing and (2) as a conative disposition towards novelty. We present a theoretical model of cognitive flexibility as a meta-competency reflected in adaptive performance which emerges as a strategic response to novelty in dynamic environments. This meta-competency draws on a confluence of cognitive and conative variables that are actively and adaptively harnessed by an individual under specific circumstances.     

The intuitive concept of art

A great deal of work in analytic philosophy of art is related to defining what counts as art. So far, cognitive approaches to art have almost entirely ignored this literature. In this paper, I discuss the role of intuition in analytic philosophy of art to show how an empirical research program on art could take advantage of existing work in analytic philosophy. I suggest that the first step of this research program should be to understand how people intuitively categorize something as art. Drawing on results from cognitive science and analytic philosophy, I show that the intuitive categorization of an artifact as art rests on the intentions attributed (frequently implicitly) to the creator of the artifact based both on its appearance and on background knowledge. I discuss how the issue of categorization is related to other empirical issues concerning our relationship to works of art, such as perception, appreciation, interpretation, and evaluation.     

Seeing off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony

I commit myself to the 'common-sense restraint' that testimony is in fact an important source of knowledge. This has the consequence of making the dispute between reductionists and anti-reductionists a question of the possibility of reducing the epistemic status of testimony to that of other epistemic resources such as perception, memory and inference. I accept arguments (from Coady and Stevenson) against the possibility of global reductionism, but little importance can be attached to their victory if the local reductionist threat (from Fricker) is not met. The strength of the local reductionist case rests on the plausibility of a distinction between developmental and mature epistemic phases, and on a reductionist stipulation of default settings. I claim that the distinction is either irrelevant or detrimental to the local case, and that default settings are more perspicuously thought of as due to the irreducible reliability of testimony.     

Multiple realization and methodological pluralism

Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a foundation of the “antireductionist consensus.” More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic grounds, as well as on more “metaphysical” grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for multiple realization. I take up the reorganization involved in language dysfunctions to deal with questions concerned with multiple realization and neural plasticity. Beginning with Broca’s case for localization and the nineteenth century discussion of “reorganization,” and returning to more recent evidence for neural plasticity, I argue that, in the end, there is substantial support for multiple realization in cognitive systems; I further argue that this is wholly consistent with a recognition of methodological pluralism in cognitive science.     

An Argument Against Reduction in Morality and Epistemology

To avoid Moore’s open question objection and similar arguments, reductionist philosophers argue that normative (e.g. moral and epistemic) and natural terms are only coextensive, but not synonymous. These reductionists argue that the normative content of normative terms is not a feature of their extension, but is accounted for in some other way (e.g. as a feature of these terms’ meaning). However, reductionist philosophers cannot account for this “normative surplus” while remaining true to their original reductionist motivations. The reductionist’s theoretical commitments both require and forbid a reductionist account of the normative content of moral and epistemic concepts.     

Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity

In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence.     

Bratman on identity over time and identification at a time

According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events (such as desires and beliefs) involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry (which I call “identification reductionism”) contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper, I discuss Michael Bratman’s well-known identification reductionist theory and his general strategy of grounding an agent’s identification at a time in the agent’s identity over time. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy, argue that Bratman’s theory cannot satisfy both, and show that his general strategy for grounding an agent’s identification at a time in the agent’s identity over time is without merit.     

Undermined

A popular strategy for understanding the probabilities that arise in physics is to interpret them via reductionist accounts of chance—indeed, it is sometimes claimed that such accounts are uniquely well-suited to make sense of the probabilities in classical statistical mechanics. Here it is argued that reductionist accounts of chance carry a steep but unappreciated cost: when applied to physical theories of the relevant type, they inevitably distort the relations of probability that they take as input.     

The self as a system of multilevel interacting mechanisms

This paper proposes an account of the self as a multilevel system consisting of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms. It argues that the functioning of the self depends on causal relations between mechanisms operating at different levels. In place of reductionist and holistic approaches to cognitive science, I advocate a method of multilevel interacting mechanisms. This method is illustrated by showing how self-concepts operate at several different levels.     

Art and architecture as experience: an alternative approach to bridging art history and the neurosciences

In 1972, Michael Baxandal characterizes the processes responsible for the cultural relativism of art experience as highly complex and unknown in their physiological detail. While art history still shows considerable interest in the brain sciences forty years later, most cross-disciplinary studies today are referring to the neurosciences in an attempt to seek scientific legitimization of variations of a generalized and largely deterministic model of perception, reducing interaction between a work of art and its observers to a set of biological automatisms. I will challenge such an approach and take up art theory's interest in the historico-cultural and situational dimensions of art experience. Looking at two examples of large-scale installation and sculptural post-war American art, I will explore instable perceptions of depth and changing experiences of space that indicate complex interactions between perceptual and higher cognitive processes. The argument will draw on recent theories describing neuronal processes underlying multistable phenomena, eye movement, visual attention and decision-making. As I will show a large number of neuroscientific studies provide theoretical models that help us analyse not the anthropological constants but the influence of cultural, individual and situational variables on aesthetic experience.     

A model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments

Although aesthetic experiences are frequent in modern life, there is as of yet no scientifically comprehensive theory that explains what psychologically constitutes such experiences. These experiences are particularly interesting because of their hedonic properties and the possibility to provide self‐rewarding cognitive operations. We shall explain why modern art's large number of individualized styles, innovativeness and conceptuality offer positive aesthetic experiences. Moreover, the challenge of art is mainly driven by a need for understanding. Cognitive challenges of both abstract art and other conceptual, complex and multidimensional stimuli require an extension of previous approaches to empirical aesthetics. We present an information‐processing stage model of aesthetic processing. According to the model, aesthetic experiences involve five stages: perception, explicit classification, implicit classification, cognitive mastering and evaluation. The model differentiates between aesthetic emotion and aesthetic judgments as two types of output.     

Discourse analysis in neuropsychology: comment on Chapman and Ulatowska.

This paper discusses a recent article by Chapman and Ulatowska (1989, Brain and Language, 36, 651-658) on discourse analysis in aphasia. As such, the research in this area is interdisciplinary drawing from neuropsychology, as well as cognitive psychology, and, in part, aging. We illustrate problems that can arise when theoretical constructs and methodological considerations in this interdisciplinary approach are not rigorously observed. It is argued that definitive conclusions regarding the functional organization of the brain and discourse can be offered only when discourse analysis uses the state of the art from neuropsychology and cognitive psychology.     

Art history, the problem of style, and Arnold Hauser’s contribution to the history and sociology of knowledge

Much of Arnold Hauser??s work on the social history of art and the philosophy of art history is informed by a concern for the cognitive dimension of art. The present paper offers a reconstruction of this aspect of Hauser??s project and identifies areas of overlap with the sociology of knowledge??where the latter is to be understood as both a separate discipline and a going intellectual concern. Following a discussion of Hauser??s personal and intellectual background, as well as of the shifting political and academic setting of his work, the paper addresses one of Hauser??s central questions, viz. how best to square a thoroughgoing commitment to the social nature of art with the reality of successive artistic styles, given that the latter seem to be characterizable on purely formal grounds. This is followed by a discussion of Hauser??s conflicted views on the relation between art, science, and technology. This injects a tension into Hauser??s work, due to his initial reluctance to explain just how the aesthetic and the cognitive realms relate. The final part of the paper, through a closer examination of the analogies and disanalogies that Hauser sees between art history and the history of science, attempts to give a positive answer????on Hauser??s behalf??, as it were??to the question of whether art may be credited with a specific cognitive dimension of its own, and if so, what its contribution to our cognitive enterprise may consist in.     

Should the Changing Character of War Affect Our Theories of War?

War has changed so much that it barely resembles the paradigmatic cases of armed conflict that just war theories and international humanitarian law seemed to have had in mind even a few decades ago. The changing character of war includes not only the use of new technology such as drones, but probably more problematically the changing temporal and spatial scope of war and the changing character of actors in war. These changes give rise to worries about what counts as war and thus what norms to use in evaluating a particular conflict. In this paper, I develop an argument that the changing character of war gives us reasons to take reductionist revisions of just war theory seriously. By reductionist theories of war I mean those revisions within the just war tradition that suggest that we can use ordinary peacetime interpersonal analyses of moral responsibility and liability to harm to decide what justice requires in times of war.     

The Vasarhelyi method of child art psychotherapy: an adjunctive treatment in childhood depression

We describe the use of child art psychotherapy (CAP) following the Vasarhelyi method in an 11-year-old female with a history of anxiety and depression which limited her capacity to attend school and in a 15-year-old male who had a history of depressive symptoms with suicidal thinking. In each case, the use of other therapies such as cognitive behaviour therapy was not possible or unsuccessful. Through the creation of images, each young person revealed concerns which had not been previously verbalised, and recovery was linked in time to the revelation of these worries. We propose the use of the Vasarhelyi method of CAP as an adjunctive treatment of depression in young people.     

In the white cube: Museum context enhances the valuation and memory of art

Art museum attendance is rising steadily, unchallenged by online alternatives. However, the psychological value of the real museum experience remains unclear because the experience of art in the museum and other contexts has not been compared. Here we examined the appreciation and memory of an art exhibition when viewed in a museum or as a computer simulated version in the laboratory. In line with the postulates of situated cognition, we show that the experience of art relies on organizing resources present in the environment. Specifically, artworks were found more arousing, positive, interesting and liked more in the museum than in the laboratory. Moreover, participants who saw the exhibition in the museum later recalled more artworks and used spatial layout cues for retrieval. Thus, encountering real art in the museum enhances cognitive and affective processes involved in the appreciation of art and enriches information encoded in long-term memory.