Spatial reasoning with external visualizations: what matters is what you see, not whether you interact

Three experiments examined the effects of interactive visualizations and spatial abilities on a task requiring participants to infer and draw cross sections of a three-dimensional (3D) object. The experiments manipulated whether participants could interactively control a virtual 3D visualization of the object while performing the task, and compared participants who were allowed interactive control of the visualization to those who were not allowed control. In Experiment 1, interactivity produced better performance than passive viewing, but the advantage of interactivity disappeared in Experiment 2 when visual input for the two conditions in a yoked design was equalized. In Experiments 2 and 3, differences in how interactive participants manipulated the visualization were large and related to performance. In Experiment 3, non-interactive participants who watched optimal movements of the display performed as well as interactive participants who manipulated the visualization effectively and better than interactive participants who manipulated the visualization ineffectively. Spatial ability made an independent contribution to performance on the spatial reasoning task, but did not predict patterns of interactive behavior. These experiments indicate that providing participants with active control of a computer visualization does not necessarily enhance task performance, whereas seeing the most task-relevant information does, and this is true regardless of whether the task-relevant information is obtained actively or passively.     

Psychological distance and emotional experience: what you see is what you get

Recent research suggests that perceiving negative emotion-eliciting scenes approaching intensifies the associated felt emotion, while perceiving emotion-eliciting scenes receding weakens the associated felt emotion (Muhlberger, Neumann, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). In the present studies, we sought to extend these findings by examining the effects of imagining rather than perceiving such changes to negative emotion-eliciting scenes. Across three studies, we found that negative scenes generally elicited less negative responses and lower levels of arousal when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking, and more negative responses and higher levels of arousal when imagined moving toward participants and growing, as compared to the responses elicited by negative scenes when imagined unchanged. Patterns in responses to neutral scenes undergoing the same imagined transformations were similar on ratings of emotional arousal, but differed on valence-generally eliciting greater positivity when imagined moving toward participants and growing, and less positivity when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking. Moreover, for these effects to emerge, participants reported it necessary to explicitly imagine scenes moving closer or farther. These findings have implications for emotion regulation, and suggest that imagined spatial distance plays a role in mental representations of emotionally salient events.     

Moral value transfer from regulatory fit: what feels right is right and what feels wrong is wrong

People experience regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000) when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit suits their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit feels right. Fit violation feels wrong. Four studies tested the proposal that experiences of fit can transfer to moral evaluations. The authors examined transfer of feeling wrong from fit violation by having participants in a promotion or prevention focus recall transgressions of commission or omission (Studies 1 and 2). Both studies found that when the type of transgression was a fit violation, participants expressed more guilt. Studies 3 and 4 examined transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit. Participants evaluated conflict resolutions (Study 3) and public policies (Study 4) as more right when the means pursued had fit.     

On what there is: Representation and history

Premise: our representational system has had a relatively invariant core throughout human history (cf. Sellars's manifest image). Major theses: (i) When philosophical argument establishes the existence of an entity, that entity is a representing, not a represented. (ii) Most of the documents in the history of philosophy are on a par (as dialogical resources) with current philosophical literature for establishing or controverting such existence claims. (iii) The use of mathematics (initially the mathematized neo-Platonism of classical mechanics) allowed modern physical science to break with the perennial system of representation; in consequence, a portion of the representings of modern physical scientists do not belong to the historically invariant core. This limits the dialogical resources of physical science and the applicability of arguments from perennial philosophy to science. It also explains the relative irrelevance of pre-17th century science to contemporary physical scientists in contrast to the relevance of pre-17th century philosophy to contemporary philosophers. It also supports thesis (iv), that logic (broadly conceived) in central to all serious philosophical enterprises, since logic is the central tool for exhibiting and criticizing the rationale(s) of our representational system(s). Support for these theses will be found in the paper.     

Direct instruction: What it is and what it is becoming

This essay describes the principles of Direct Instruction design and delivery used to establish clear, unambiguous communication and maximize student responding. Direct Instruction research findings are summarized: achievement of low-income students in Follow Through, longitudinal results, and the effectiveness of Direct Instruction for students with handicaps. Finally, new directions for Direct Instruction, technological applications and instruction of higher-order skills, are discussed.     

The ties that bind what is known to the recall of what is new

Cued recall success varies with what people know and with what they do during an episode. This paper focuses on prior knowledge and disentangles the relative effects of 10 features of words and their relationships on cued recall. Results are reported for correlational and multiple regression analyses of data obtained from free association norms and from 29 experiments. The 10 features were only weakly correlated with each other in the norms and, with notable exceptions, in the experiments. The regression analysis indicated that forward cue-to-target strength explained the most variance, followed by backward target-to-cue strength. Target connectivity and set size explained the next most variance, along with mediated cue-to-target strength. Finally, frequency, concreteness, shared associate strength, and cue set size also contributed significantly to recall. Taken together, indices of prior word knowledge explain 49% of the recall variance. Theoretically driven equations that use free association to predict cued recall were also evaluated. Each equation was designed to condense multiple indices of word interconnectivity into a single predictor.     

Doing what is humanly possible

The subtle docetism which pervades orthodox discussions of the person and work of Christ can serve to vitiate the hope contained in the New Testament message. A reprise of the themes underlying the Christological controversies and modern discussions of the humanity of Christ demonstrates these contain clear implications for the practice of pastoral counseling.     

Seeing what is not seen

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.     

The ties that bind what is known to the recognition of what is new

Recognition success varies with how information is encoded (e.g., level of processing) and with what is already known as a result of past learning (e.g., word frequency). This article presents the results of experiments showing that preexisting connections involving the associates of studied words facilitate their recognition regardless of whether the words are intentionally encoded or are incidentally encoded under semantic or nonsemantic conditions. Words are more likely to be recognized when they have either more resonant connections coming back to them from their associates or more connections among their associates. Such results occur even though attention is never drawn to these associates. Regression analyses showed that these connections affect recognition independently of frequency, so the present results add to the literature showing that prior lexical knowledge contributes to episodic recognition. In addition, equations that use free-association data to derive composite strength indices of resonance and connectivity were evaluated. Implications for theories of recognition are discussed.     

肿瘤真是基因突变的产物吗--试论肿瘤疾病的本质及其发生发展的共性规律

解释肿瘤发生发展机制的学说很多,归纳起来无外两类,一是基因突变学说,二是细胞外遗传决定学说.突变理论认为肿瘤是细胞遗传物质发生不可逆改变的结果.外遗传决定学说认为肿瘤细胞遗传基因本身没有改变,而只是基因表达异常的结果,在适宜的环境中癌细胞可以再分化.     

Conflict adaptation: It is not what you expect

In two studies, a vocal Stroop task with eight different colours was employed in order to put two core assumptions of the original interpretation of the Gratton effect to the test. We verified whether top-down control processes can elicit conflict adaptation when episodic memory effects are controlled for and to what extent proactive adjustments driven by the subjects' expectancy for congruency level repetition contribute to this effect. Therefore, we presented Stroop stimuli without feature repetitions and investigated whether the induced expectancy manipulation of raising the amount of either congruency level repetitions or alternations in a training phase transferred to an unmanipulated test phase. Over the two experiments, a sequential modulation of the Stroop effect was found in the absence of stimulus feature repetitions, strongly confirming a share for top-down control processes in bringing about the Gratton effect. In the condition where congruency level repetitions were raised, a strong Gratton effect was found. When congruency level alternations outnumbered repetitions, the Gratton effect disappeared completely. However, this difference seemed mainly due to cumulative effects of local, dynamic, trial-to-trial control adjustments rather than expectancy-induced attentional shifting. Once the transition probability changed back to 50% in the test phase of each experiment, a similar Gratton effect was found in both conditions. Taken together, these results are best explained in terms of dynamic reactive control.     

Olfactory imagery: is exactly what it smells like

Philosophical Studies - Mental Imagery, whereby we experience aspect of a perceptual scene or perceptual object in the absence of direct sensory stimulation is ubiquitous. Often the existence of...