The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis

In this paper we shall argue that mentalistic action explanations, which form an essential component of a mature theory of mind, are conceptually and developmentally derived from an earlier and purely teleological interpretational system present in infancy. First we summarize our evidence demonstrating teleological action explanations in one-year-olds. Then we shall briefly contrast the structure of teleological vs. causal mentalistic action explanations and outline four logical possibilities concerning the nature of the developmental relationship between them. We shall argue for the view that causal mentalistic action explanations are constructed as useful theoretical extensions of the earlier, purely teleological, nonmentalistic interpretational stance.     

Apparent causality affects perceived simultaneity

The present research addresses the question of how visual predictive information and implied causality affect audio–visual synchrony perception. Previous research has shown a systematic shift in the likelihood of observers to accept audio-leading stimulus pairs as being apparently simultaneous in variants of audio–visual stimulus pairs that differ in (1) the amount of visual predictive information available and (2) the apparent causal relation between the auditory and visual components. An experiment was designed to separate the predictability and causality explanations, and the results indicated that shifts in subjective simultaneity were explained completely by changes in the implied causal relations in the stimuli and that predictability had no added value. Together with earlier findings, these results further indicate that the observed shifts in subjective simultaneity due to causal relations among auditory and visual events do not reflect a mere change in response strategy, but rather result from early multimodal integration processes in event perception.     

RECkoning with representational apriorism in evolutionary cognitive archaeology

In evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the school of thought associated with the traditional framework has been deeply influenced by cognitivist intuitions, which have led to the formulation of mentalistic and disembodied cognitive explanations to address the emergence of artifacts within the archaeological record of ancient hominins. Recently, some approaches in this domain have further enforced this view, by arguing that artifacts are passive means to broadcast/perpetuate meanings that are thoroughly internal to the mind. These meanings are conveyed either in the form of a Language of Thought, constituted by sub-personal, content-bearing mental representations, or in that of a natural language. In both cases, however, material culture stands as the physical derivative of computations run over representations, which include abstract concepts, semantic relationships, and meta-representations about intensional states, a conception hereby indicated as “representational apriorism”. In this paper, I will argue that such mentalistic models are plagued by the fundamental problems of content, substance, and origin, which affect the representational substrates required for the production of artifacts. At the same time, these models fail the criterion of minimalism at the crux of conditional cognitive archaeology, because they propose overly costly explanations which are insufficiently constrained by material evidence. An alternative proposal, based on the principles of radical enactive cognitive science, is hereby introduced in order to counter this mentalistic drift. It is concluded that a radical enactive cognitive archaeology is able to dissolve the deep problems confronting the mentalistic paradigm, while providing minimalistic cognitive explanations about the emergence of Paleolithic artifacts.     

Out of sorts? Some remedies for theories of object concepts: a reply to Rhemtulla and Xu (2007)

Responds to comments made by Rhemtulla and Xu on the current authors' original paper Concepts of individual objects (e.g., a favorite chair or pet) include knowledge that allows people to identify these objects, sometimes after long stretches of time. In an earlier article, the authors set out experimental findings and mathematical modeling to support the view that judgments of identity depend on people's beliefs about the causal connections that unite an object's earlier and later stages. This article examines M. Rhemtulla and F. Xu's (2007) critique of the causal theory. The authors argue that M. Rhemtulla and F. Xu's alternative sortal proposal is not a necessary part of identity judgments, is internally inconsistent, leads to conflicts with current theories of categories, and encounters problems explaining empirical dissociations. Previous evidence also suggests that causal factors dominate spatio-temporal continuity and perceptual similarity in direct tests. The authors conclude that the causal theory provides the only existing account consistent with current evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved).     

In search of how people change. Applications to addictive behaviors.

How people intentionally change addictive behaviors with and without treatment is not well understood by behavioral scientists. This article summarizes research on self-initiated and professionally facilitated change of addictive behaviors using the key trans-theoretical constructs of stages and processes of change. Modification of addictive behaviors involves progression through five stages--pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance--and individuals typically recycle through these stages several times before termination of the addiction. Multiple studies provide strong support for these stages as well as for a finite and common set of change processes used to progress through the stages. Research to date supports a trans-theoretical model of change that systematically integrates the stages with processes of change from diverse theories of psychotherapy.     

Early stimulus processing in dysthymia and anhedonia.

Previous event-related brain potential (ERP) research has found that dysthymic subjects differ from control subjects during later stages of information processing. An important issue that emerges from this literature is whether differences found in these ERP components, typically associated with cognitive processing, can be attributed to earlier differences in basic perceptual processing. This study was undertaken to determine whether early processing deficits are apparent in dysthymic persons. Responses of dysthymics (n = 23) were compared with those of anhedonic (n = 15) and normal control (n = 17) subjects. ERPs were recorded while subjects heard tones at 55, 65, 75, 85, and 95 dB. Overall, N1-P1 and N1-P2 components of the ERP increased in a strong linear fashion as stimulus intensity increased. Dysthymics did exhibit a smaller N1-P2 response than normal subjects, which suggests the presence of difficulties in initial perceptual processing.     

Processing stages in overlapping tasks: evidence for a central bottleneck

This article examines the attentional limits responsible for task slowing in the overlapping task (refractory period) paradigm. Five experiments are reported in which stimulus factors were manipulated in visual search tasks performed in isolation or temporally overlapping with another task. Bottleneck models suggest that second-task slowing is caused by postponement of "attention-demanding" stages of the second task, while earlier "automatic" stages proceed unhindered. A prediction was derived from this class of models, namely that in the overlapping task condition the effect of second task factors that slow automatic stages should be reduced, whereas the effect of factors slowing later nonautomatic stages should be unchanged. The data (Experiments 1-4) exhibit such a pattern and suggest that encoding and comparison stages of the second task, but not response selection, occur in parallel with work on the first task. The absence of overadditive interactions in these experiments, and also the effects of manipulating first-task factors in Experiment 5, seems to argue against capacity sharing as the source of the slowing in this task combination. Some implications of these results for attention theory are discussed.     

Behavior analysis, mentalism, and the path to social justice

Traditional psychology is mentalistic in the sense that it appeals to inner causes in the explanation of behavior. Two examples of mentalism in traditional psychology are (a) dispositional attributions and (b) conventional treatments of intelligence. These examples may be linked to such pernicious social -isms as racism and sexism by noting that some individuals justify engaging in discriminatory conduct toward others by appealing to some deficient inner quality of those being discriminated against. This sort of mentalistic appeal ultimately prevents some members of our society from being integrated into society and from progressing down the path of social justice. Behavior analysis offers a constructional alternative to the mentalistic views of traditional psychology and allows our society as a whole to move down the path.     

Cognitive processing of multidimensional stimuli in schizophrenia: formal modeling of judgment speed and content

This article presents a formal, mathematical account of relations between response times on simple cognitive tasks and content of complex judgments involving multiple stimulus dimensions for people with schizophrenia. Changes in multidimensional judgments were viewed as the result of interference from increased stages of encoding with respect to the individual dimensions. Information on dimensional properties encoded earlier in a judgment trial was considered to be more susceptible to loss over the rest of the trial, because of a larger number of encoding stages applied to the remaining dimensional properties. Model predictions were tested with samples of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenic participants and controls. Unidimensional encoding speed was assessed by reaction times in an explicit similarity ratings task, and multidimensional judgment content was assessed by the relative importance of different stimulus dimensions to participants' ratings in an implicit similarity ratings task. Results support validity of the model.     

Infant social attention predicts preschool social cognition

Recent research examining infants' understanding of intentional action claims to be studying the early origins or precursors of children's later theories of mind If these infant understandings are continuous with later preschool achievements, there should be empirical connections between the two. We provide initial evidence that infants' social attention predicts later social cognition. Specifically, 14-month-olds' habituation to human intentional action significantly predicts later preschool mentalistic construal of persons, as measured on a Theory of Mind Scale.     

关于知觉干扰效应的ERP研究

利用ERP技术,采用知觉干扰效应的经典实验范式,首次从神经生理水平上探究知觉干扰效应的内部机制。结果发现,递进条件和标准条件均诱发了P2,P3,N400和晚期正成分LPC。在P2,P3和LPC成分上,标准条件的波幅均显著大于递进条件;在N400成分上,递进条件比标准条件波幅更负,潜伏期更长。此外,对递进条件下靶字各模糊水平（Level 1～Level 5）的ERPs进行比较分析表明,N400成分的波幅在各模糊水平间的差异均不显著。基本支持失匹配理论及词汇自动加工理论。     

Dynamic processes in emotion regulation choice

ABSTRACT

Because emotion regulation (ER) processes operate over time, they potentially change the context in which subsequent ER processes occur. To test this proposal, fifty-two healthy participants completed the ER choice task. Thirty standardized low- and high-intensity negative images were used to generate different emotional contexts in which participants selected between distraction or reappraisal strategies to decrease the intensity of their negative emotion. Participants then implemented their selected strategy and rated their negative emotion. Using a dynamic perspective, we examined as predictors of ER strategy choice, in addition to current stimulus intensity, several contextual factors from the immediately preceding trial: preceding stimulus intensity and strategy choice, and the intensity of negative affect following the previous strategy implementation and thus preceding the current trial. Results replicated earlier findings that participants are more likely to choose distraction for high-intensity images. Extending earlier findings, selecting reappraisal in the preceding trial and greater negative affect preceding the current trial were associated with lower odds of choosing distraction. The lack of significant interactions among the current and preceding trial factors suggests that these effects on ER choice were direct and not through moderating the effect of current stimulus intensity. These findings support dynamic theories of ER.     

Repetition effects in word and pseudoword identification: comment on Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel

Two recent articles by Feustel, Shiffrin, and Salasoo (1983) and Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel (1985) argue that word identification is based on episodic memory as well as semantic (or "permanent, abstract") memory. The earlier article argued for separate processing stages affected by repetition (episodic memory) and lexicality (semantic memory). To account for the new finding that number of repetitions interacts with lexicality, the later article invokes the same two types of memory, operating in parallel rather than serially. We argue that Salasoo et al.'s data are compatible with a wide variety of competing theories, including some that do not involve episodic memory at all. We question the relevance of a complex formal model shown by the authors to account for the main trends in the data, because it makes little use of key properties of episodic memory. Furthermore, we show that two variants of a less complex model inspired by logogen theory fit the data as well or better than the model of Salasoo et al., using fewer free parameters. We argue that what is needed is not an existence proof that one particular complex model can fit a body of data, but experimental manipulations that successfully discriminate between broad classes of competing theories.     

Selective attention to the color and direction of moving stimuli: Electrophysiological correlates of hierarchical feature selection

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded from subjects who attended to pairs of adjacent colored squares that were flashed sequentially to produce a perception of movement. The task was to attend selectively to stimuli in one visual field and to detect slower moving targets that contained the critical value of the attended feature, be it color or movement direction. Attention to location was reflected by a modulation of the early P1 and N1 components of the ERP, whereas selection of the relevant stimulus feature was associated with later selection negativity components. ERP indices of feature selection were elicited only by stimuli at the attended location and had distinctive scalp distributions for features mediated by “ventral” (color) and “dorsal” (motion) cortical areas. ERP indices of target selection were also contingent on the prior selection of location but initially did not depend on the selection of the relevant feature. These ERP data reveal the timing of sequential, parallel, and contingent stages of visual processing and support early-selection theories of attention that stipulate attentional control over the initial processing of stimulus features.     

The visual search analogue of latent inhibition: Implications for theories of irrelevant stimulus processing in normal and schizophrenic groups

Latent inhibition (LI) is a robust phenomenon that is demonstrated when a previously inconsequential stimulus is less effective in a new learning situation than a novel stimulus. Despite LI’s simplicity, there is considerable disagreement as to its theoretical basis. Attentional theories claim that unattended stimulus preexposures reduce stimulus associability. Alternatively, it has been asserted that associability is unaffected and that LI is a result of competition/retrieval processes. The present article reviews a series of visual search studies, some with normal subjects, both undifferentiated and divided into low and high schizotypals, and others with pathologies that entail dysfunctional attention, such as schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease, and anxiety. The visual search conditions were designed to model those of traditional LI experiments, while tapping attentional processes independently of the learning scores that index LI. A variety of evidence from these and other studies is used to support the involvement of attentionaland retrieval processes in LI. A model of the mechanism of action of these processes in LI is presented, together with its application to schizophrenia.     

Attentional sensitization of unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.     

弗洛伊德的得意门生——亚伯拉罕和费伦茨对精神分析发展的贡献

亚伯拉罕和费伦茨都是弗洛伊德的早期弟子,他们在精神分析早期理论以及治疗技术的创新和发展中都有着重要的贡献。亚伯拉罕重新划分了弗洛伊德的心理性欲发展阶段并探讨了前俄狄浦斯期的母子关系,这都深深影响了后来的客体关系学派;费伦茨发展了弗洛伊德的性诱惑理论并在治疗技术上做出了许多革新,这为精神分析后来的发展开辟出了更广阔的道路。     

Manipulation is key: on why non-mechanistic explanations in the cognitive sciences also describe relations of manipulation and control

A popular view presents explanations in the cognitive sciences as causal or mechanistic and argues that an important feature of such explanations is that they allow us to manipulate and control the explanandum phenomena. Nonetheless, whether there can be explanations in the cognitive sciences that are neither causal nor mechanistic is still under debate. Another prominent view suggests that both causal and non-causal relations of counterfactual dependence can be explanatory, but this view is open to the criticism that it is not clear how to distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory relations. In this paper, I draw from both views and suggest that, in the cognitive sciences, relations of counterfactual dependence that allow manipulation and control can be explanatory even when they are neither causal nor mechanistic. Furthermore, the ability to allow manipulation can determine whether non-causal counterfactual dependence relations are explanatory. I present a preliminary framework for manipulation relations that includes some non-causal relations and use two examples from the cognitive sciences to show how this framework distinguishes between explanatory and non-explanatory, non-causal relations. The proposed framework suggests that, in the cognitive sciences, causal and non-causal relations have the same criterion for explanatory value, namely, whether or not they allow manipulation and control.     

Asymmetrical Relations, Identity and Abortion

ABSTRACT In this article I freely use the thought of Charles Hartshorne to defend the ethical permissibility of abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. In the later stages of pregnancy the fetus has an ethical status similar to that of a sentient yet non-rational animal, a status which should generate in us considerable ethical respect. The distinctiveness of this Hartshornian approach lies in the effort to bring metaphysics to bear on a controversial issue in applied ethics. In particular, the metaphysical issue of temporal relations is crucial to consider in the effort to ascertain the ethical status of the fetus. Two symmetrical (immoderate) theories of temporal relations are criticised, one of which provides the basis for opposition to abortion, a theory wherein one is internally related both to one's past and to one's future. An asymmetrical (moderate) theory of temporal relations is defended, a theory wherein one is internally related to one's past yet externally related to the future. This latter theory would permit abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.     

‘Goals’ are not an integral component of imitation

Several theories suggest that actions are coded for imitation in terms of mentalistic goals, or inferences about the actor’s intentions, and that these goals solve the correspondence problem by allowing sensory input to be translated into matching motor output. We tested this intention reading hypothesis against general process accounts of imitation using the pen-and-cups task. The task has three components: participants place a pen in one of two cups, using their right or left hand, and one of two grips. Previous research has revealed a colour minimum error pattern; when one of the components is differentially coloured (e.g., one cup is red and the other blue), accuracy is greatest on the coloured dimension. We found the colour minimum error pattern, not only in the standard version of the task, where participants imitate the actions of a human model, but also in three novel variants of the task, in which participants responded on the basis of spatial or arbitrary stimulus–response mappings to ‘geometric’, non-biological stimuli. These stimuli do not afford the attribution of intentions, and therefore our results support generalist theories of imitation by showing that the colour minimum error pattern is due, not to intention reading, but to the operation of task-general processes of perception, attention and motor control.