Coda--after "The end of the end of ideology"

Replies to comments by M. Glassman and D. Karno and R. K. Unger, on the author's original article on ideology. J. T. Jost thanks Glassman and Karno for returning him to his philosophical roots. Glassman and Karno argued in favor of an "instrumental pragmatist" approach to the study of ideology that emphasizes the strategic, purposive, goal-directed nature of political rhetoric and belief. He agrees that such an approach is helpful and empirically sound. He also agrees that ideological movements are often orchestrated by elites (e.g., party leaders) for strategic political purposes in a top-down manner. There are several other points, however, on which Glassman and Karno seem to misunderstand him. Regarding Unger's comments, Unger pointed out, quite correctly, that Jost said relatively little about the role of religious ideology in his discussion of ideological polarization in the United States. The ideological gulf between religious traditionalists and secular humanists has indeed been widening since 1980, and it corresponds strongly to right-left differences in political attitudes. Jost mentioned, somewhat cryptically, at the end of his article that "similarly fruitful analyses could be undertaken with respect to religious and other belief systems," and he is grateful for Unger's invitation to elaborate on this point.     

Understanding the Determinants of Political Ideology: Implications of Structural Complexity

There has been a substantial increase in research on the determinants and consequences of political ideology among political scientists and social psychologists. In psychology, researchers have examined the effects of personality and motivational factors on ideological orientations as well as differences in moral reasoning and brain functioning between liberals and conservatives. In political science, studies have investigated possible genetic influences on ideology as well as the role of personality factors. Virtually all of this research begins with the assumption that it is possible to understand the determinants and consequences of ideology via a unidimensional conceptualization. We argue that a unidimensional model of ideology provides an incomplete basis for the study of political ideology. We show that two dimensions—economic and social ideology—are the minimum needed to account for domestic policy preferences. More importantly, we demonstrate that the determinants of these two ideological dimensions are vastly different across a wide range of variables. Focusing on a single ideological dimension obscures these differences and, in some cases, makes it difficult to observe important determinants of ideology. We also show that this multidimensionality leads to a significant amount of heterogeneity in the structure of ideology that must be modeled to fully understand the structure and determinants of political attitudes.     

Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence

Ideology is a potent motivational force; human beings are capable of committing atrocities (as well as acts of generosity and courage) and sacrificing even their own lives for the sake of abstract belief systems. In this article, we summarize the major tenets of a model of political ideology as motivated social cognition (Jost et al. in Psychol Bull 129:339–375, 2003a, Psychol Bull 129:389–393, 2003b, Person Soc Psychol Bull 33:989–1007, 2007), focusing on epistemic, existential, and relational motives and their implications for left-right (or liberal-conservative) political orientation. We review behavioral evidence indicating that chronically and temporarily activated needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust are positively associated with conservatism (or negatively associated with liberalism). Studies from neuroscience and genetics suggest that right- (vs. left-) wing orientation is associated with greater neural sensitivity to threat and larger amygdala volume, as well as less sensitivity to response conflict and smaller anterior cingulate volume. These findings and others provide converging evidence for Jost and colleagues’ model of ideology as motivated social cognition and, more broadly, reflect the utility of an integrative political neuroscience approach to understanding the basic cognitive, neural, and motivational processes that give rise to ideological activity.     

Religious ideology, a neglected variable

Comments on an article by J. T. Jost, which presented interesting data relating some personality dimensions to voting patterns in the last three U.S. presidential elections. R. K. Unger is surprised that in his extensive review of the role of ideology, Jost ignored the role of religious ideology in political attitudes and voting behavior. There is ample evidence that level of religious observance (sometimes labeled religiosity, hierarchical religious beliefs, or religious fundamentalism) played a role in 2004 and earlier presidential elections. The relationship between religious ideology and political attitudes is correlational, and one needs to look further for an explanation of their impact. A number of studies indicate relationships between religious fundamentalism and what Jost has termed "system-justifying ideologies." Unger suggests that religiosity has been largely ignored by psychologists interested in social and political behaviors. It is quite possible that religiosity is related to the various personality dimensions discussed by Jost. But we cannot learn more about these potential connections if we continue to ignore the importance of religious ideology as a psychological variable.     

Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology

Ideology is a central construct in political psychology. Even so, the field's strong claims about an ideological public rarely engage evidence of enormous individual differences: a minority with real ideological coherence and weak to nonexistent political belief organization for everyone else. Here, I bridge disciplinary gaps by showing the limits of mass political ideology with several popular measures and components—self-identification, core political values (egalitarian and traditionalism's resistance to change), and policy indices—in representative U.S. surveys across four decades (Ns ~ 13 k–37 k), plus panel data testing stability. Results show polar, coherent, stable, and potent ideological orientations only among the most knowledgeable 20–30% of citizens. That heterogeneity means full-sample tests overstate ideology for most people but understate it for knowledgeable citizens. Whether through top-down opinion leadership or bottom-up ideological reasoning, organized political belief systems require political attention and understanding to form. Finally, I show that convenience samples make trouble for ideology generalizations. I conclude by proposing analytic best practices to help avoid overclaiming ideology in the public. Taken together, what first looks like strong and broad ideology is actually ideological innocence for most and meaningful ideology for a few.     

When the Advantaged Become Disadvantaged: Men's and Women's Actions Against Gender Discrimination

Intergroup theories suggest that different social identities will either discourage or encourage the taking of action against discrimination (Bartky, 1977; Jost & Banaji, 1994). However, research (e.g., Branscombe, 1998) has shown that discrimination is a less negative experience for men than for women. As such, it is possible that men may take greater action than women, regardless of identity. However, men's response to their perceived disadvantage had not yet been tested. Among those induced to ascribe to a gendered stereotype identity, men endorsed more action than women did. Among those induced to ascribe to an identity based on a gendered social experience, women endorsed marginally more action than men did. Differences in responses are proposed to be a function of the different efficacy levels developed by each gender within each social identity.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

Social Issues,Authoritarianism, and Ideological Conceptualization: How Policy Dimensions and Psychological Factors Influence Ideological Labeling

Ideology's crucial theoretical and empirical role in explaining political behavior makes it imperative that scholars understand how individuals conceptualize and apply ideological labels. The existing literature on this topic is quite limited, however, because it relies almost exclusively upon data from the 1970s and 1980s, and it does not examine how psychological factors influence conceptualizations of ideological labels. This article uses data from two original laboratory experiments to test the relative impact of four major policy dimensions on participants' evaluations of candidate ideology and to test authoritarianism's role in shaping ideological conceptualization. These analyses indicate that individuals most often define liberalism and conservatism primarily in terms of social policies closely associated with religious values, each of which invert traditional ideological orientations toward the appropriate size and role of government. The causal mechanism shaping this relationship is authoritarianism, because, I argue, the religious social policy dimension most clearly evokes the deep‐seated value conflicts associated with an authoritarian view of political conflict.     

Ideological rupturing

Seeking to rectify the asocial nature of conventional social psychological investigation, some researchers and scholars have sought ways to better understand what is shared in everyday thinking and have, accordingly, focused their attention on the notion of ideology. Although this vein of scholarship has reclaimed the social domain, it has not thoroughly accounted for the way that ideologies can be imposed, and as such, does not adequately address the concept in a way that honors its origin and development. In this paper, I articulate a conceptual framework that can be used to underpin research on momentary ideological impositions in relation to people's negotiation of imposed value orientations—moments that can be described as instances of ideological rupturing. After situating this articulation in relation to the work of other ideology‐focused psychologists, I introduce a recent enactment of educational policy as an illustrative case of ideological rupturing. In so doing, I present a narrative approach that is grounded in dialogic activity as an ideal way to investigate instances of ideological rupturing.     

Religion,Human Rights,and Neo‐liberalism in a Post‐Humanist Era

In a modern and secularized world, churches and religious groups that fight in the public sphere for social justice justify these actions in the name of defending human rights. This has been the path taken to express in non‐religious language what they understand to be a God‐given mission. Based on the distinction between civil rights, political rights, and social rights, which make up the set of human rights, this article analyzes the relationship between the notion of religious mission and the struggle for human rights; how neoliberal ideology, in an anti‐humanist perspective, criticizes the notion of social rights and social justice with the denial of any human right above the laws of the market; and the challenges that this neoliberal ideology poses for the justification of the social and political action of religious groups and institutions in the contemporary globalized world with a growing post/anti‐humanist culture.     

社会主义核心价值体系融入大学生思想政治教育的调查与思考

对江苏、安徽两省大学生和高校思想政治理论课教师进行的调查显示,大学生对社会主义核心价值体系基内容能基本了解和认可,对社会主义核心价值体系建设的措施的也持积极的看法。同时,调查也表明当前大学生在马克思主义信仰、理想信念等方面的认识上存在着许多不足;高校思想政治课教师的理论素养、思想政治理论课教学也存在不少亟待解决的问题。应高度重视社会主义核心价值体系融入大学生思想政治教育的极端重要性,通过改进高校思想政治理论课教学、开展大学生个人品德建设、注重解决现实生活中使人困惑的问题以及整合利用多种课外教育资源、增加社会实践环节等措施来加强和改进大学生的社会主义核心价值体系教育。     

The Greta Thunberg Effect: Familiarity with Greta Thunberg predicts intentions to engage in climate activism in the United States

Despite Greta Thunberg's popularity, research has yet to investigate her impact on the public's willingness to take collective action on climate change. Using cross-sectional data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults (N = 1,303), we investigate the “Greta Thunberg Effect,” or whether exposure to Greta Thunberg predicts collective efficacy and intentions to engage in collective action. We find that those who are more familiar with Greta Thunberg have higher intentions of taking collective actions to reduce global warming and that stronger collective efficacy beliefs mediate this relationship. This association between familiarity with Greta Thunberg, collective efficacy beliefs, and collective action intentions is present even after accounting for respondents’ overall support for climate activism. Moderated mediation models testing age and political ideology as moderators of the “Greta Thunberg Effect” indicate that although the indirect effect of familiarity with Greta Thunberg via collective efficacy is present across all age-groups, and across the political spectrum, it may be stronger among those who identify as more liberal (than conservative). Our findings suggest that young public figures like Greta Thunberg may motivate collective action across the U.S. public, but their effect may be stronger among those with a shared political ideology. Implications for future research and for broadening climate activists’ appeals across the political spectrum are discussed.     

The Discursive Frames of Political Psychology

The aim of this article is to apply elements of contemporary social theory to the major theoretical, methodological, and ideological divisions across political psychology and to consider both the origins and the impact of a range of theories and models. In so doing, we clarify some of the complexity surrounding the discursive and cultural origins of political psychology. On the basis of this analysis, we aim to overcome the redundant binaries and dualisms—both conceptual and geo‐spatial—that have characterized the field up to now. These binary pairs relate to matters of epistemology, ideology, and methodology, and we show how each pair has been the basis of claims made regarding continental differences. As we shall see, such black‐and‐white thinking limits our capacity to understand the nature and potential of political psychology. Instead we wish to encourage a greater degree of universalism and globalism that is appropriate to political psychology as it evolves into a broader global discipline. We argue that political psychology as a field must attempt to deal with the consequences of an increasingly borderless world in which political identities are becoming more fluid, increasingly hybridized, and open to transformation.     

On Hannah Arendt: The Worldly In-Between of Human Beings and its Ethical Consequences

Abstract

In this paper, I show how a concept of ethics can be derived from Hannah Arendt’s theory of action in The Human Condition, which contains from her call for action. When she looks at the ‘political actor’, as well as at the concept of ‘political situation’, her ethical claim is first of all the need to take initiative, to act. Hence, ‘political situations’ as she defines them are discussed as common responsibilities. But common responsibility is rooted in the in-between of human beings, rather than in individual human nature and is determined by Arendt’s principle of humanity. Therefore, at the centre of an implicit Arendtian ethics stands the world and the in-between of human beings.     

The end of the end of ideology

The "end of ideology" was declared by social scientists in the aftermath of World War II. They argued that (a) ordinary citizens' political attitudes lack the kind of stability, consistency, and constraint that ideology requires; (b) ideological constructs such as liberalism and conservatism lack motivational potency and behavioral significance; (c) there are no major differences in content (or substance) between liberal and conservative points of view; and (d) there are few important differences in psychological processes (or styles) that underlie liberal versus conservative orientations. The end-of-ideologists were so influential that researchers ignored the topic of ideology for many years. However, current political realities, recent data from the American National Election Studies, and results from an emerging psychological paradigm provide strong grounds for returning to the study of ideology. Studies reveal that there are indeed meaningful political and psychological differences that covary with ideological self-placement. Situational variables--including system threat and mortality salience--and dispositional variables--including openness and conscientiousness--affect the degree to which an individual is drawn to liberal versus conservative leaders, parties, and opinions. A psychological analysis is also useful for understanding the political divide between "red states" and "blue states."     

Intertwined ambiguities: Meat,in vitro meat,and the ideological construction of the marketplace

Political stakeholders play a critical role in the cultural construction of the marketplace, and consumers often look to them for guidance in framing ambiguous cultural and scientific issues. Unfortunately, however, the existing consumer culture literature usually focuses on consumers' use of ideology while neglecting stakeholders' ideological orientations. In order to address this gap, I ask two questions: First, how do stakeholders draw upon ideology in order to make sense of ambiguous goods and of the extant and potential reactions of consumers to these goods? Second, what are the potential political consequences of stakeholders' ideological commitments vis‐a‐vis supporters and outside audiences? I explore these questions by interviewing agrifood system stakeholders on the subject of in vitro meat, a nascent technology whereby meat is produced through stem cell cultures. Although ideology serves as a useful tool with which stakeholders can navigate labyrinth‐like cultural conundrums, stakeholders' ideological positions can also result in ambiguities, ironies, and incongruities. By investigating the beginnings of a potential consumer controversy, this study illuminates how ideology operates as an epistemic resource for political claims‐makers and how stakeholders' ideological commitments can result in either rewards or repercussions from allies and consumers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Support for Authoritarian Policies and Parties

Emotion, after a long period of inattention, began to attract greater scrutiny as a key driver of human behavior in the mid‐1980s. One approach that has achieved significant influence in political science is affective intelligence theory (AIT). We deploy AIT here to begin to understand the recent rise in support for right‐wing populist leaders around the globe. In particular, we focus on specific emotional appraisals on elections held at periods of heightened threat, including the two 2015 terror attacks in France, as influences on support for the far‐right Front National among conservatives. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, we speculate that threats can generate both anger and fear, and with very different political consequences. We expect fear to inhibit reliance on extant political dispositions such as ideological identification and authoritarianism, while anger will strengthen the influence of these same dispositions. Our core findings, across repeated tests, show that fear and anger indeed differentially condition the way habits of thought and action influence support for the far right in the current historical moment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is anger that mobilizes the far right and authoritarians. Fear, on the other hand, diminishes the impact of these same dispositions.     

The Political Psychology of Contemporary Anti-Politics: A Discursive Approach to the End-of-Ideology Era

This article advocates a discursive approach for examining political rhetoric. Such an approach is particularly useful for studying contemporary political ideology. The current political climate, especially in Britain, has been described as exemplifying a "Third Way," which is said to have replaced the old ideological division between "left" and "right" by a consensual, non-ideological politics. TThe discursive approach allow the analyst to look at the continuing dilemmas of an ideology that denies its ideological character. In discursive analyses of interviews with 20 elected local officials in the Midlands of England, the respondents (regardless of party affiliation) tended to give accounts that celebrated the development of consensual, less ideologically divisive politics. These accounts, however, were dilemmatic: As the speakers told of social change, they also stressed their own personal stability, as if they themselves existed outside the previous political climate. They also explicitly distanced themselves from the language of "left" and "right," but in this distancing a further ideological dilemma was detectable. All the local politicians were officially affiliated to a political party. In discursively subtle ways, the speakers used the left/right continuum as they distinguished between the parties, thereby showing the sort of variability that discursive theorists have noted in other contexts. The implications of such findings and of the discursive approach to studying ideology are discussed in relation to the possibilities for developing a critical political psychology.     

An “Ideology in Pieces” Approach to Studying Change in Teachers’ Sensemaking About Race,Racism, and Racial Justice

This article makes a unique contribution to the literature on teachers’ racialized sensemaking by proposing a framework of “ideology in pieces” that synthesizes Hall's (1982, 1996) theory of ideology and diSessa's (1993) theory of conceptual change. Hall's theory of ideology enables an examination of teachers’ sensemaking as situated within a structured society and diSessa's research on conceptual change provides an analytical lens to understand the elements of ideological sensemaking and the processes of ideological transformation. I use the framework of ideology in pieces to analyze and interpret the ideological sensemaking and transformation of a teacher engaged in a collaborative teacher research group in which participants explored issues of social justice in their high school math and science classrooms. The framework and analysis presented in the article offer a more comprehensive theory of teachers’ ideological sensemaking and transformation that includes their cognitive, social, and structural dimensions.