How autonomous can art be?: Philosophical remarks on photorealism and postmodern-aesthetics

A slightly different German version of his article has been published in D. Kamper and W. v. Reijen (eds.), Die unvollendete Vernunft: Moderne versus Postmoderne (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp. 403–426.     

Duhem–Quine virtue epistemology

The Duhem?CQuine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination by appealing to a cluster of virtues called ??good sense??, and it has recently been argued by Stump (Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci, 18(1):149?C159, 2007) that good sense is a form of virtue epistemology. This paper considers whether Quine, who??s philosophy is heavily influenced by the very thesis that led Duhem to the virtues, is also led to a virtue epistemology in the face of underdetermination. Various sources of Quinian epistemic normativity are considered, and it is argued that, in conjunction with other normative commitments, Quine??s sectarian solution to underdetermination amounts to a skills based virtue epistemology. The paper also sketches formal features of the novel form of virtue epistemology common to Duhem and Quine that challenges the adequacy of epistemic value truth-monism and blocks any imperialist naturalization of virtue epistemology, as the epistemic virtues are essential to the success of the sciences themselves.     

Responses to novelty in phobic and non-phobic cynomolgus monkeys: The role of subject characteristics and object features

In two previous studies it has been shown that most surrogate-reared cynomolgus monkeys became phobic of a harmless object (a big paper bag) while most mother-reared monkeys approached that object. Results of the first study seemed to indicate that the phobic reaction was restricted to the bag. Barnett and Cowan (Interdisciplinary Science Review, 1, 43–62, 1976) and Suomi (Anxiety disorder in childhood, pp. 1–23, 1986), however, reported that subjects (respectively rats and monkeys) that avoided a first novel object also avoided subsequent novel objects. In the present study we exposed phobic (bag-avoiding) and non-phobic (bag-approaching) monkeys from the study by Röder, Timmermans and Vossen (Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 221–231, 1989) to several big and small novel objects. Our results show that, irrespective of their rearing conditions, subjects that were phobic also avoided big novel objects while subjects that were non-phobic approached big novel objects. The reaction to small novel objects was independent of the previous reaction to the bag.     

The realism that duhem rejected in Copernicus

Pierre Duhem rejected unambiguously the strong version of realism that he believed was held by Copernicus. In fact, although Copernicus believed that his theory was clearly superior to Ptolemy's, he seems to have recognized that his theory was at best only approximately true. Accordingly, he recognized that his arguments were not demonstrative in the traditional sense but probable and persuasive. Duhem regarded even the belief in probably true explanations as misguided. Nevertheless, Duhem recognized that, even if metaphysical intuition does not enter into the content of physical theories, the rejection of hypotheses could be explained only by appeal to common sense. Hence, Duhem held a qualified instrumentalism according to which physical theories are not realist, but the terms of ordinary experience and empirical laws are realist. Accordingly, Duhem rejected the complete subordination of science to philosophy as well as the complete separation of science from philosophy. Duhem's history of cosmological doctrines reflects his belief in the origin of the subordination of science to philosophy and of the struggle to achieve the proper balance without being driven to the opposite extreme of their complete separation.     

Holism a century ago: The elaboration of Duhem's thesis

Duhem first expounds the holistic thesis, according to which an experimental test always involves several hypotheses, in articles dating from the 1890s. Poincaré's analysis of a recent experiment in optics provides the incentive, but Duhem generalizes this analysis and develops a highly original methodological position. He is led to reject inductivism. I will endeavor to show the crucial role history of science comes to play in the development of Duhem's holism.     

The Duhem‐Quine thesis revisited

The Duhem‐Quine thesis is generally presented as the radical underdetermi‐ nation of a theory by experimental evidence. But there is a much‐neglected second aspect, i.e. the coherence or interrelatedness of the conceptual components of a theory. Although both Duhem and Quine recognised this aspect, they failed to see its consequences: it militates against the idea of radical underdetermination. Because scientific theories are coherent conceptual systems, empirical evidence penetrates, as it were, the periphery and allows the localisation of central, not just peripheral hypotheses. There is then no reason to deny the existence of crucial experiments. Both these ideas are denied in the Quine‐Duhem thesis. A discussion of the famous Stem‐Gerlach experiment and the role of fundamental physical constants shows, however, that localisation is not only possible but essential for the validity of scientific theories. Quine's famous ‘latitude of choice’ turns out to be severely restricted.     

Duhem,the Arabs,and the history of cosmology

Duhem has generally been understood to have maintained that the major Greek astronomers were instrumentalists. This view has emerged mainly from a reading of his 1908 publication To Save the Phenomena. In it he sharply contrasted a sophisticated Greek interpretation of astronomical models (for Duhem this was that they were mathematical contrivances) with a naive insistence of the Arabs on their concrete reality. But in Le Système du monde, which began to appear in 1913, Duhem modified his views on Greek astronomy considerably; his more subtle understanding included the recognition that many Greeks subordinated mathematical astronomy to physical theory. But he could not completely repudiate his earlier views about Greek astronomy in part because his extreme nineteenth century prejudices led him to continue to insist on a clear-cut demarcation between Greek and Arabic astronomy. The inevitable result is a certain unevenness in the Système and some glaring inconsistencies.     

Pierre Duhem's the aim and structure of physical theory: A book against conventionalism

I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's account of scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change.     

The use of restricted environmental stimulation therapy (REST) in the treatment of essential hypertension: Two case studies

The previous paper (Suedfeld et al., 1982, pp. 553–559) reported the use of Restricted Environmental Stimulation Therapy (REST) in treating hypertension. This paper reports the response of two patients to 24 hr of a similar treatment offered as an adjunct to a weight-control program. In both patients blood pressure dropped immediately following the REST session and remained lower for up to 9 months. The initial drop in blood pressure was independent of weight loss. These results are interpreted in terms of a psychobiological model of self-regulation.     

MAN OF SCIENCE,MAN OF FAITH: PIERRE DUHEM'S “PHYSIQUE DE CROYANT”

The essay “Physique de croyant” is an important statement of Pierre Duhem's position on the relation between his science and his religion. Duhem trod a difficult path, some might say an impossible one, in Republican France because he was both a physicist and a devout Catholic. In this essay, using “Physique de croyant” as a touchstone, I explore the way in which he tried to reconcile his conflicting allegiances. There are several strands in Duhem's strategy that need to be teased out. First, Duhem sought to defend his science against the charge that it was materialist and atheist. He did this with his claim, usually called the autonomy thesis, that physics and metaphysics are fundamentally different enterprises—that physics, properly conducted, has no metaphysical implications and requires no metaphysical support. This did not deny metaphysics its rightful territory. Second, Duhem used his segregationist position to defend the Roman Catholic Church against the assaults of the positivist scientism then in favor with the Republicans. Third, he also sought to protect his science against fellow Catholics who wanted to use it for polemical purposes. I develop and evaluate these lines of defense.     

Publication trends in school psychology: 1963–1973

Articles appearing in three school psychology journals from 1963–1973 were classified and organized into 16 topic areas. Trends of published interests over the years 1963–1966, 1967–1969, and 1970–1973 were identified. Articles concerning Professional Identity were most prominent in the early years of the decade covered; Instrument Development and Evaluation, an area which was consistently popular over the decade, ranked highest during the last period evaluated. The most noteworthy trend in publication has been the growing diversification of published interests in the field of school psychology.     

Duhem and history and philosophy of mathematics

The first part of this paper consists of an exposition of the views expressed by Pierre Duhem in his Aim and Structure of Physical Theory concerning the philosophy and historiography of mathematics. The second part provides a critique of these views, pointing to the conclusion that they are in need of reformulation. In the concluding third part, it is suggested that a number of the most important claims made by Duhem concerning physical theory, e.g., those relating to the Newtonian method, the limited falsifiability of theories, and the restricted role of logic, can be meaningfully applied to mathematics.I am indebted to Professors Douglas Jesseph and Philip Quinn for helpful comments on this paper.     

Five-year retrospective on stuttering theory, research, and therapy: 1982–1987

From time to time it is worthwhile looking back and reviewing significant developments in theorizing about, researching, and treating stuttering. Retrospectives of this type have been published in the Journal of Fluency Disorders for the periods 1972–1977, and 1977–1982. The present article is the third in this series of reviews and encompasses the period 1982–1987.     

Cumulative Index 1978–2002 (Volumes 1–25)

Other Index

Cumulative Index 1978–2002 (Volumes 1–25)     

Duhem in different contexts: Comments on Brenner and Martin

These comments consist of reflections on the papers Anastasios Brenner and R. N. D. Martin presented at the Conference on Pierre Duhem: Historian and Philosopher of Science. I argue they present nicely complementary accounts of Duhem's turn to history of science: Brenner emphasizes reasons internal to Duhem's philosophical concern with scientific methodology while Martin highlights reasons derived from the broader context of Duhem's engagement with religious controversies of his culture. I go on to suggest that seeing Duhem in this broader perspective can help us cope with the conflicts between science and religion in our own culture.     

Cumulative Index Volumes 39–48 (1996–2000)

Other Index

Cumulative Index Volumes 39–48 (1996–2000)     

The transcendental dimension of “praxis” in Husserl's phenomenology

This paper is a revised and reformed version of Husserl-genshogaku to jissen no mondai (Husserl's phenomenology and the problem of praxis) in: The Japanese Society for Ethics ed., Rinrigaku-nenpo (Annals of Ethics) No. 35 (Tokyo: Keiotsushin, 1986), pp. 105–121. It is my duty to express my gratitude to Mrs. Yu Tani for her advices about English and stylization.     

Christopher Clavius and the classification of sciences

I discuss two questions: (1) would Duhem have accepted the thesis of the continuity of scientific methodology? and (2) to what extent is the Oxford tradition of classification/subalternation of sciences continuous with early modern science? I argue that Duhem would have been surprised by the claim that scientific methodology is continuous; he expected at best only a continuity of physical theories, which he was trying to isolate from the perpetual fluctuations of methods and metaphysics. I also argue that the evidence does not support the conclusion that early modern doctrines about mathematics and physics are continuous with the subalternation of sciences from Grosseteste, Bacon, and the theologians of fourteenth-century Oxford. The official and dominant context for early modern scientific methodology seems to have been progressive Thomism, and early modern thinkers seem to have pitted themselves against it.     

Duhem and cartwright on the truth of laws

Nancy Cartwright has drawn attention to how explanations are actually given in mathematical sciences. She argues that these procedures support an antirealist thesis that fundamental explanatory laws are not true. Moreover, she claims to be be essentially following Duhem's line of thought in developing this thesis. Without wishing to detract from the importance of her observations, it is suggested that they do not necessarily require the antirealist thesis. The antirealist interpretation of Duhem is also disputed. It is argued that Duhemian points, often understood antirealistically, bear a realist construal, and that antirealist interpretations of Duhem typically run into problems of consistency or of reducing his position to absurdity.     

Maiocchi on Duhem,howard on Duhem and Einstein: Historiographical comments

These comments center on the methodological stance that Howard and Maiocchi recommend to us when we are doing history of philosophy. If Howard and Maiocchi are right, both Duhem and Einstein developed closely related versions of conventionalism and realism, and in both of their philosophies the conventionalist and realist moments were mutually compatible. Duhem's holism and, arguably, Einstein's as well, denies the need for across-the-board literalism, and both of them had important reasons for denying that convergence was required or even desirable for realism. Thus, for those who are caught up in the current disputes, serious consideration of the discrepancies between the standard current versions of realism and conventionalism and the positions that contextualist analyses reveal to have been advocated by Duhem and Einstein may uncover some of the tacit assumptions that impede the resolution or advancement of our disputes.