公民道德建设与核心价值认同

社会主义核心价值体系本质上是实践性的,必须得到全社会的广泛认同和普遍实践,这是实现社会主义根本目的的需要,是引领社会精神需求的需要,是应对全球化挑战的需要。公民道德建设是使社会主义核心价值体系得到广泛认同的重要实践方式,这是由于社会主义核心价值体系是公民道德建设的灵魂和根本,而道德价值是核心价值体系的构成和基础。因此,公民道德建设如何在实践中创新主体、创新内容、创新形式、创新方法,决定着社会主义核心价值体系在何种程度上成为社会成员的共识。     

社会主义核心价值体系的科学内涵

社会主义核心价值体系是立足于社会主义经济基础之上的价值认同系统.在社会主义核心价值体系这一有机体中,马克思主义指导思想居于最高层面,是指对作为认识世界、改造世界的理论基础的马克思主义的价值认同,从根本上说,是指对人类社会发展规律的价值认同;中国特色社会主义的共同理想是指对国家、民族追求的未来美好发展前景的价值认同;以爱国主义为核心的民族精神和以改革创新为核心的时代精神,是指对实现共同理想的动力之源的价值认同;社会主义荣辱观居于重要地位,它指的是对公民思想行为选择标准的价值认同.准确地把握社会主义核心价值体系的科学内涵及其精神实质,是建设社会主义核心价值体系的前提,对于倡导和谐理念,培育和谐精神,打牢全党全国各族人民团结奋斗的思想道德基础,具有极为重要而又深远的理论意义和实践意义.     

和谐文化与社会主义核心价值体系建设——学习《中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定》

建设和谐文化,是构建社会主义和谐社会的重要任务,社会主义核心价值体系是建设和谐文化的根本.建设和谐文化,最根本的就是要坚持社会主义核心价值体系,而确立和实践社会主义核心价值体系,必须以全体社会成员的道德修养和素质为基础.     

社会主义核心价值体系方法论探析

社会主义核心价值体系是关系社会主义意识形态建设的重要理论和实践课题。建设社会主义核心价值体系,既要从内涵的角度阐明其具体理论和价值意蕴,又要从方法论的角度探析其逻辑和实践路径。概言之,要着重从社会主义核心价值体系的理论特性、实践特征、价值特色这三重维度来理解和把握其精神和实质。     

论社会主义核心价值体系与公民道德建设的关系

社会主义核心价值体系是社会主义意识形态的本质体现,代表着社会主义先进文化建设的大方向、大趋势和大目标,是社会主义文化软实力的中枢和动力源。将社会主义核心价值纳入公民道德建设的全过程并以此作为根本的价值目标、指导思想和重点内容,不仅是我国社会和时代发展的迫切需要,也是公民道德建设取得持续效果和上档次、上水平的内在要求。公民道德建设既是社会主义核心价值体系建设的重要方面,又体现和反映着社会主义核心价值体系的要求。社会主义核心价值体系必须贯彻到公民道德建设过程中去,并成功地引领公民道德建设,只有这样,核心价值体系才能真正担纲社会价值导向和价值培育的职责,成为价值整合和价值凝聚的枢纽和原点。     

社会主义核心价值体系培育的两个向度

社会主义核心价值体系重在培育。社会主义核心价值体系的培育与其本身的内在品质、何以可能密切相关。提高自身的合法性与魅力,是社会主义核心价值体系培育的前提基础和内在要求。增强社会主义核心价值体系的合法性与魅力,从理论品质维度来看,就要使其客观全面反映马克思主义理论精髓,保持其真理性、彻底性、完备性、自洽性与先进性;从实践要求维度来看,就要提高其对社会需要的满足度,保持其实践性、先进性、人民性、批判性、开放性与创新性。     

价值观的分化、整合与核心价值体系建设

价值观的分化和整合及其辩证运动是改革开放以来中国社会价值观变迁的重要表现形式.一般而言,价值观的分化具有“差异”、“矛盾”和“冲突”三种状态;不同阶层之间、不同区域之间和代际之间是改革开放以来价值观分化的三大表现;社会转型、利益分化和价值观自身的变迁逻辑是价值观分化的三大根源.价值观整合则与社会整合和利益整合密切相关,是价值观变迁的重要内容,而多维核心价值体系的整合将成为未来中国社会价值观整合的基本方向和重要趋势.弥合价值观分化,实现价值观整合,是社会主义核心价值体系建设的根本任务之一.     

社会主义核心价值体系的内涵及践行

社会主义核心价值体系作为我们党理论创新的重大成果,是我们党进一步加强社会主义和谐文化建设、巩固社会和谐方面的重要举措,进一步加深了我们对中国特色社会主义本质的认识,在新的时期全面推进中国特色社会主义伟大事业,具有重大而深远的意义.本文从哲学观照的角度,论述了其与"科学社会主义"一脉相承的逻辑基础,分析了其"有机统一"的系统结构,从其基本内容的四个方面进行了内涵解读,并就社会主义核心价值体系在思想认识、丰富发展、氛围营造、实事求是四个方面的践行要求给出了浅见.     

儒家传承核心价值观之经验与教训

儒家道德文化有着丰富而厚重的传承核心价值观的经验和教训.社会主义核心价值体系对社会思潮的有效引领必然要从儒家传承核心价值观的经验与教训中汲取营养.儒家传承核心价值观的基本经验在于形上立道、形下行道;明确主流、多元一核;政府立道、志士弘道;先尊德性、后道问学;基本教训在于徒法不利于推行核心价值观,不"依人建极"亦不利于核心价值观的传承.儒家传承核心价值观的经验与教训为社会主义核心价值体系对社会思潮的有效引领提供了可资借鉴的理论资源.     

论社会主义核心价值体系基本内容的层次结构

社会主义核心价值体系的基本内容是一种结构性存在,它所包含的四个方面的基本内容具有不同的性质,其中,马克思主义指导思想是导向性内容,中国特色社会主义共同理想是目标性内容,以爱国主义为核心的民族精神和以改革创新为核心的时代精神是情感性和动力性内容,社会主义荣辱观是基础性内容。从层次结构上看,社会主义核心价值体系所包含的四个方面的基本内容,从最低层次到最高层次,构成一个逻辑严谨、层次分明、由高到低、由理论到实践、由思想到行为的整体性框架结构,而每一层次也有着自身的层次结构特点。     

以社会主义核心价值体系引领当代社会思潮

从核心意识形态对民众意识的重要引导作用看,社会主义核心价值体系对当代社会思潮具有重要的引领价值,即用核心价值体系塑造人们的信仰、理想、道德观念,调动大众的主体积极性、主动性,使其成为社会主义核心价值体系的思想上的认同者,行动上的践行者。     

Moral paternalism,virtue, and autonomy

According to colour irrealism, material objects do not have colour; they only appear to have colour. The appeal of this view, prominent among philosophers and scientists alike, stems in large part from the conviction that scientific explanations of colour facts do not ascribe colour to material objects. To explain why objects appear to have colour, for instance, we need only appeal to surface reflectance properties, properties of light, the neurophysiology of observers, etc.

Typically attending colour irrealism is the error theory of ordinary colour judgement: ordinary judgements in which colour is ascribed to a material object are, strictly speaking, false. In this paper, I claim that colour irrealists who endorse the error theory cannot explain how we acquire colour concepts (yellow, green, etc.), concepts they must acknowledge we do possess. Our basic colour concepts, I argue, could not be phenomenal concepts that we acquire by attending to the colour properties of our experience. And, I explain, all other plausible explanations render colour concepts such that our ordinary colour judgements involving them are often true. Given the explanatory considerations upon which the irrealist's position is based, this is a severe problem for colour irrealism.     

社会主义核心价值体系融入大学生思想政治教育的调查与思考

对江苏、安徽两省大学生和高校思想政治理论课教师进行的调查显示,大学生对社会主义核心价值体系基内容能基本了解和认可,对社会主义核心价值体系建设的措施的也持积极的看法。同时,调查也表明当前大学生在马克思主义信仰、理想信念等方面的认识上存在着许多不足;高校思想政治课教师的理论素养、思想政治理论课教学也存在不少亟待解决的问题。应高度重视社会主义核心价值体系融入大学生思想政治教育的极端重要性,通过改进高校思想政治理论课教学、开展大学生个人品德建设、注重解决现实生活中使人困惑的问题以及整合利用多种课外教育资源、增加社会实践环节等措施来加强和改进大学生的社会主义核心价值体系教育。     

Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value

Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians have disagreed, but rather two distinct concepts. I state a number of principles about intrinsic value that have typically (though not universally) been held by Mooreans, all of which are typically denied by Kantians. I show that there are distinct theoretical roles for a concept of intrinsic value to play in a moral framework. When we notice these distinct theoretical roles, we should realize that there is room for two distinct concepts of intrinsic value within a single moral framework: one that accords with some or all of the Moorean principles, and one that does not.     

The lover of the beautiful and the good: Platonic foundations of aesthetic and moral value

Though acknowledged by scholars, Plato’s identification of the Beautiful and the Good has generated little interest, even in aesthetics where the moral concepts are a current topic. The view is suspect because, e.g., it is easy to find examples of ugly saints and beautiful sinners. In this paper the thesis is defended using ideas from Plato’s ancient commentators, the Neoplatonists. Most interesting is Proclus, who applied to value theory a battery of linguistic tools with fixed semantic properties—comparative adjectives, associated gradable adjectives, mass nouns, and predicate negations—all with a semantics that demand a privative scale of value. It is shown how it is perfectly possible to interpret value terms Platonically over privative Boolean algebras so that beautifuland good diverge while at higher levels other value terms are coextensional. Considerations are offered that this structure conforms to actual usage.     

Chinese Philosophy of Value over the Past Four Decades

Chinese philosophy of value arose from reflection on the Cultural Revolution and an inherent need amidst the implementation of reform and opening up, and it was directly triggered by extensive discussions about the standard of truth. The development of the philosophy of value over the past forty years shifted from value to evaluation before moving on to the research topics of values, in particular core socialist values. Currently, its major characteristics are the unity of theoretical logic and practical logic, the mutual interaction between and enhancement of the study of the philosophy of value and research on Marxist philosophy, and exchanges and dialogues with foreign philosophies of value. Its main achievements in the philosophy of value include the implementation of a subjective paradigm based on the theory of practice and the theoretical construction and clarification of core socialist values. Future directions for the development of the philosophy of value include improving subjective interpretation on the basis of the theory of practice, deeply exploring value concepts and value principles in the new form of civilization, and bringing the philosophy of value into interaction with multidisciplinary research.     

REBT: Past,Present, and Future

After a walk down memory lane, I take a tour through Ellis’s shifts in philosophy, plus shifts in self theory, and concepts of value. I contrast them all as an appeal to authority compared to pragmatism. The changes in Ellis’s thinking seemed to me more a tribute to Ellis’s diversity and his monumental contribution to psychotherapy than his refusal to be pinned down to core concepts.     

Happiness,Rationality, Autonomy and the Good Life

The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness. So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life.     

Reasons for Actions and Desires

It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that allpractical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall callany approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a `Humean approach'.In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aimingto explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. I focus on just one argument in favour of the Humean approach, which I believe can be constructed as the background idea of many Humean accounts: the argument from motivation.I first present the argument from motivation and explain why it seems so compelling. However, I then develop an equally compellingobjection to desire-based approaches to reason, showing that they cannot accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. I show that this objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must be false. And, finally, I argue thatwe should reject the premise that claims that only desires can explain actions. This result is fatal for desire-based views of practical reason. My conclusion is that practical reasons should be based not on desires, but on values.