Bodily Violence,Agency, and Animals

Ethical theories in the Kantian tradition tend to centre heavily on rational agency, so it may appear challenging for such theories to account for the wrongness of bodily violence, especially the wrongness of bodily violence to animals who lack rationality. This article develops a Kantian explanation for the pro tanto wrongness of killing or injuring animals who have agency and lack rationality, based on a Kantian explanation for the pro tanto wrongness of killing or injuring people. Even though morality is grounded in the will of rational agents or the value of rational agency, one does not have to be a rational agent to be morally considerable.     

Moral Agency in Other Animals

Some philosophers have argued that moral agency is characteristic of humans alone and that its absence from other animals justifies granting higher moral status to humans. However, human beings do not have a monopoly on moral agency, which admits of varying degrees and does not require mastery of moral principles. The view that all and only humans possess moral agency indicates our underestimation of the mental lives of other animals. Since many other animals are moral agents (to varying degrees), they are also subject to (limited) moral obligations, examples of which are provided in this paper. But, while moral agency is sufficient for significant moral status, it is by no means necessary.     

Political Animals: Luck, Love and Dignity

Human beings are both needy and dignified. How should we think about the relationship between our neediness and our worth? Card argues well that our vulnerability to luck is intertwined in the very conditions of moral agency. We can see the merit of her approach even more clearly by turning to some difficulties the Stoics have in preserving dignity while removing vulnerability. Stoicism does, however, help us to sort through the difficulties involved as we try to combine love of particular people with respect for all human life. Richardson is correct to suggest that love itself can animate the concern for all humanity; I also agree with him that institutions must play a major role in any solution to problems of inequality between nations. Although the “capabilities approach” offers an attractive account of one part of the goal of just political institutions, combining, as Moody-Adams suggests, respect for difference with a commitment to universal norms, I now believe that the capabilities account should be combined with a form of Rawlsian political liberalism that protects spaces within which citizens may pursue the good as they understand it.     

Advocacy,Political Participation,and Citizenship: Lutheran Contributions to Public Theology1

Abstract : Martin Luther never developed a political theory, but his theology does inform the way Christians live in society, making it both public and political. Luther's “two kingdom theory” often has been misinterpreted to justify passivity and obedience toward civil authorities. Under closer examination, however, his theology applies to the everyday practices of politics, economics, and religious affairs. In the context of nation‐building, a Lutheran theology fosters citizenship not only as individual rights and responsibilities, but as active participation in civil society.     

Federico Zuolo,Animals, Political Liberalism and Public Reason, (Palgrave Macmillan), 2020

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice -     

Educating Political Adversaries: Chantal Mouffe and Radical Democratic Citizenship Education

Many scholars in the area of citizenship education take deliberative approaches to democracy, especially as put forward by John Rawls, as their point of departure. From there, they explore how students’ capacity for political and/or moral reasoning can be fostered. Recent work by political theorist Chantal Mouffe, however, questions some of the central tenets of deliberative conceptions of democracy. In the paper I first explain the central differences between Mouffe’s and Rawls’s conceptions of democracy and politics. To this end I take Eamonn Callan’s Creating Citizens as an example of Rawlsian political education and focus on the role of conflict and disagreement in his account. I then address three areas in which political education would need to change if it were to accept Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative approaches to democracy and her proposal for an agonistic public sphere. The first area is the education of political emotions; the second is fostering an understanding of the difference between the moral and the political; the third is developing an awareness of the historical and contemporary political projects of the “left” and “right.” I propose that a radical democratic citizenship education would be an education of political adversaries.

Grounding Citizenship: Toward a Political Psychology of Public Space

This article considers the political nature of public space and explores its psychological relevance as a natural arena of citizenship. Drawing on literature in social psychology, environmental psychology, and political geography, the article addresses how common understandings of normative behavior in public are often based on particular constructions of place and people‐space relations. In so doing, it shows how such culturally shared “locational” notions are essentially contested in relation to their political significance and ideological orientation within a particular public socio‐spatial context. It is argued that claims for and demands on public space are enshrined in broader struggles over the psychological boundaries of belonging, identity, and civic entitlements which are central to the contentious issue of citizenship. This is illustrated through the analysis of an emblematic struggle over a public space located in the Old Town of Barcelona between 1999 and 2007, triggered by the social appropriation of an undeveloped urban lot. The article pinpoints how considering the material dimension of public space may also enrich existing psychological approaches to citizenship.     

Gratitude,Citizenship and Education

Citizenship education is a complex matter, and not least the place of civic virtues in it. This is illustrated by a consideration of the civic virtue of gratitude. Two conceptions of gratitude are explored. Gratitude seen as a debt is examined and Kants exposition of it, including his objections to a persons getting himself into the position where he has to show gratitude as a beneficiary, is explored. An alternative conception of gratitude as recognition is developed. This, it is claimed, has more relevance to the kind of gratitude it would be appropriate for citizens of a democratic state to feel. The educational implications of these views are indicated.     

Applied Political Philosophy at the Rubicon: Will Kymlica's Multicultural Citizenship

Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship represents an extraordinary attempt to put applied political philosophy to work in the empirical context of contemporary political debates about immigration and ethnic minorities in western society. This paper explores the methodological and interpretative difficulties of combining normative and empirical goals, in a critical discussion of the examples Kymlicka makes of multicultural issues in France, Britain and the US. It goes on to argue that these weaknesses lie in the Rawlsian influence in Kymlicka's work, and that political philosophers may have to rethink their methodological approach if they wish to pursue further the kind of applied work which Kymlicka is aiming for.     

Gratitude, Ressentiment, and Citizenship Education

Patricia White (Stud Philos Educ 18:43–52, 1999) argues that the virtue gratitude is essential to a flourishing democracy because it helps foster universal and reciprocal amity between citizens. Citizens who participate in this reciprocal relationship ought to be encouraged to recognize that “much that people do does in fact help to make communal civic life less brutish, pleasanter and more flourishing.” This is the case even when the majority of citizens do not intentionally seek to make civic life better for others. Were citizens to recognize the appropriateness of gratitude in these situations, the bonds of our democratic communities would be strengthened. In this paper, I examine White’s argument more carefully, arguing that it fails to address adequately the difficulties that arise when we attempt to encourage the virtue of gratitude in our students. To address these difficulties, I turn to an unlikely source for democratic inspiration: Friedrich Nietzsche. In spite of his well-known anti-democratic sentiments, Nietzsche offers democratic citizens insights into the social value of gratitude. I argue that Nietzsche’s ideas resolve the educational difficulties in White’s argument and viably establish gratitude as an important democratic virtue that ought to be cultivated.