Attribution difficulty and memory for attribution-relevant information

This research compared the processing and retrieval of attribution-relevant information when the attributional inference is easy or difficult to make. Subjects attributed behavioral events to the person or to the situation, based on several items of context information. Each context sentence implied either the person or the entity as causal agent. When the attributional inference was difficult to make (an equal number of context sentences implied actor and entity as the causal agent), subjects recalled more of the behavioral events, recalled more context sentences, and were less confident in their attributions than when the attributional inference was easy to make (most context sentences implied the same causal agent). Subjects also recalled context information that was implicationally incongruent with the majority of the other context sentences with a higher probability than when that same information was implicationally congruent.     

Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences

Adults’ causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do; Experiments 1 and 2). Toddlers succeed only when the events are initiated by a dispositional agent (Experiment 3), when the events involve direct contact between objects (Experiment 4), or when the events are described using causal language (Experiment 5). This suggests that causal language may help children extend their initial causal representations beyond agent-initiated and direct contact events.     

Individual differences in visual imagery determine how event information is remembered

Individuals differ in how they mentally imagine past events. When reminiscing about a past experience, some individuals remember the event accompanied by rich visual images, while others will remember it with few of these images. In spite of the implications that these differences in the use of imagery have to the understanding of human memory, few studies have taken them into consideration. We examined how imagery interference affecting event memory retrieval was differently modulated by spatial and object imagery ability. We presented participants with a series of video-clips depicting complex events. Participants subsequently answered true/false questions related to event, spatial, or feature details contained in the videos, while simultaneously viewing stimuli that interfered with visual imagery processes (dynamic visual noise; DVN) or a control grey screen. The impact of DVN on memory accuracy was related to individual differences in spatial imagery ability. Individuals high in spatial imagery were less accurate at recalling details from the videos when simultaneously viewing the DVN stimuli compared to those low in spatial imagery ability. This finding held for questions related to the event and spatial details but not feature details. This study advocates for the inclusion of individual differences when studying memory processes.     

Exploring Temporal Progression of Events Using Eye Tracking

This study investigates the representation of the temporal progression of events by means of the causal change in a patient. Subjects were asked to verify the relationship between adjectives denoting a source and resulting feature of a patient. The features were presented either chronologically or inversely to a primed event context given by a verb (to cut: long–short vs. short–long). Effects on response time and on eye movement data show that the relationship between features presented chronologically is verified more easily than that between features presented inversely. Post hoc, however, we found that the effects of temporal order occurred only when subjects read the features more than once. Then, the relationship between the features is matched with the causal change implied by the event context (contextual strategy). When subjects read the features only once, subjects respond to the relationship between the features without taking into account the event context.     

Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality

Two experiments investigated Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects appears to evoke an immediate perception that the first motion caused the second, as in a collision. Launching was embedded in event sequences where a third event (a colour change of the second object) was established as a competing predictor of the second motion, in an attempt to see whether subjects' learning of alternative predictive relationships would influence their causal impressions of launch events. In Experiment 1 subjects saw launch events in which temporal contiguity at the point of impact was varied so that an impact was varied so that an impact itself did not reliably predict when the second object would move. Half of these scenes, however, contained a colour change of the second object which did reliably predict when it would move. In accordance with Michotte's theory, subjects' ratings of the degree of perceived causality were not affected by the colour change. In Experiment 2 subjects saw scenes that contained launch events with or without temporal contiguity and a colour change. These were interspersed with events in which a colour change alone did or did not precede the second motion. Thus, movement of the second object was either contingent on or independent of the impact. Subjects repeatedly (a) rated perceived causality in single launch events and (b) judged the necessity of collisions for movement in the overall set of events. These responses dissociated, in that ratings type (a) showed only a substantial contiguity effect, whereas judgements of type (b) showed both a contingency and a much smaller contiguity effect. These results appear to support a distinction between judged and perceived causality and are discussed with respect to Michotte's theory of direct causal perception.     

Cyclists’ intentions to yield for automated cars at intersections when they have right of way: Results of an experiment using high-quality video animations

What will cyclists do in future conflict situations with automated cars at intersections when the cyclist has the right of way? In order to explore this, short high-quality animation videos of conflicts between a car and a cyclist at five different intersections were developed. These videos were ‘shot’ from the perspective of the cyclist and ended when a collision was imminent should the car or the bicyclist not slow down. After each video participants indicated whether they would slow down or continue cycling, how confident they were about this decision, what they thought the car would do, and how confident they were about what the car would do. The appearance of the approaching car was varied as within-subjects variable with 3 levels (Car type): automated car, automated car displaying its intentions to the cyclists, and traditional car. In all situations the cyclist had right of way. Of each conflict, three versions were made that differed in the moment that the video ended by cutting off fractions from the longest version, thus creating videos with an early, mid, and late moment for the cyclist to decide to continue cycling or to slow down (Decision moment). Before the video experiment started the participants watched an introductory video about automated vehicles that served as prime. This video was either positive, negative, or neutral about automated vehicles (Prime type). Both Decision moment and Prime type were between subject variables. After the experiment participants completed a short questionnaire about trust in technology and trust in automated vehicles. 1009 participants divided in nine groups (one per Decision moment and Prime) completed the online experiment in which they watched fifteen videos (5 conflicts × 3 car types). The results show that participants more often yielded when the approaching car was an automated car than when it was a traditional car. However, when the approaching car was an automated car that could communicate its intentions, they yielded less often than for a traditional car. The earlier the Decision moment, the more often participants yielded but this increase in yielding did not differ between the three car types. Participants yielded more often for automated cars (both types) after they watched the negative prime video before the experiment than when they watched the positive video. The less participants trusted technology, and the capabilities of automated vehicles in particular, the more they were inclined to slow down in the conflict situations with automated cars. The association between trust and yielding was stronger for trust in the capabilities of automated vehicles than for trust in technology in general.     

The usefulness of distinguishing between a defensive and a nondefensive external locus of control

The study's purpose was to determine whether a distinction can be made between individuals adopting an external locus of control as a defense and those adopting the orientation because it reflects their life experience. It was hypothesized that the two groups differ in the amount of personal responsibility they accept for task outcomes. Internals and externals were identified and then further designated as high or low in action taking. Among externals, a high action-taking score implied defensiveness. Subjects randomly received either success or failure feedback on a presumed task of interpersonal sensitivity. Defensive externals varied their causal attributions as a function of outcome, whereas nondefensive externals did not (p < .05). The distinction between defensive and nondefensive external control was thus supported.     

Children's Inferences of Causal Events During Story Understanding

Second-grade children's inference of causal events was studied. Each of the 24 children heard 2 stories containing 6 event episodes. Each story was followed by either a sentence recognition or a cued-recall test. Event episodes explicitly stated an event followed by its outcome. Enablement episodes explicitly stated an action that was causally antecedent to the event, followed by the outcome of the event. Filler (control) episodes explicitly stated an action causally unrelated to the event, followed by the outcome of the event. The results indicate that the children more frequently inferred events from enablements than they inferred enablements from events, and that the children did not make the inferences at the time of reading, but instead made them when queried at the time of the test. This conclusion is suggested because there was false recognition of events but no false recall.     

Apparent causality affects perceived simultaneity

The present research addresses the question of how visual predictive information and implied causality affect audio–visual synchrony perception. Previous research has shown a systematic shift in the likelihood of observers to accept audio-leading stimulus pairs as being apparently simultaneous in variants of audio–visual stimulus pairs that differ in (1) the amount of visual predictive information available and (2) the apparent causal relation between the auditory and visual components. An experiment was designed to separate the predictability and causality explanations, and the results indicated that shifts in subjective simultaneity were explained completely by changes in the implied causal relations in the stimuli and that predictability had no added value. Together with earlier findings, these results further indicate that the observed shifts in subjective simultaneity due to causal relations among auditory and visual events do not reflect a mere change in response strategy, but rather result from early multimodal integration processes in event perception.     

Cognitive tuning,encoding, and the attribution of causality

Subjects were given a transmission or reception set before or after viewing a videotape of an event which involved an extreme outcome. The results indicated that transmitters made relatively extreme attributions to plausible causal agents when the set was given prior but not subsequent to viewing the event. The results also showed that subjects who had been given a transmission set before viewing the videotape exhibited relatively high recognition of aspects of the event they observed. It is suggested that the data provide support for an encoding interpretation of transmission-reception differences in the attribution of causality.     

Emerging perception of causality in action-and-reaction sequences from 4 to 6 months of age: Is it domain-specific?

Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.     

Individuals Intolerant of Uncertainty: The Maintenance of Worry and Distress Despite Reduced Uncertainty

The intolerance of uncertainty model of worry posits that individuals worry as a means to cope with the discomfort they feel when outcomes are uncertain, but few experimental studies have investigated the causal relationships between intolerance of uncertainty, situational uncertainty, and state worry. Furthermore, existing studies have failed to control for the likelihood of future negative events occurring, introducing an important rival hypothesis to explain past findings. In the present study, we examined how individuals with high and low trait intolerance of uncertainty differ in their behavioral, cognitive, and emotional reactions to situational uncertainty about an upcoming negative event (watching emotionally upsetting film clips), holding constant the likelihood of that negative event taking place. We found that although individuals high in trait prospective intolerance of uncertainty reported a higher degree of belief that being provided with detailed information about the upcoming stressor would make them feel more at ease, they did not experience an actual decrease in distress or state worry upon being provided with more information, during anticipation of the film clips, or during the film clips themselves. Our results suggest that heightened distress regarding negative events may be more central than intolerance of uncertainty to the maintenance of worry.     

Memory for questions and amount of processing

Two experiments were carried out on how questions are remembered. Subjects watched a videotape of a series of simple events and then answered 18 questions about these events. The questions were all of the same general syntactic form (e.g., “Did the pencil fall against the jug on A?”, where A refers to a particular location). They were designed to elicit three sorts of answer: “yes,” “no” because the event took place at another location, and “no” because the event did not take place at all. After the subjects had answered the questions, they were given an unexpected test of their ability to recall them. A difference in the memorability of the questions was predicted on the basis of a procedural theory of comprehension and a hypothesis about memory subjects should cease to process a question when they realize that it concerns an event that did not take place, and such questions should be harder to remember because they are processed to a lesser degree than the other sorts of question. Experiment 1 confirmed the predictions, but its results in part could be accounted for by assuming that subjects recalled the original events and used them as a cue to remembering the questions. Experiment 2 eliminated this explanation by showing that when subjects do not have to answer certain questions, their recall of them is very poor. However, the same differences in the memorability of the three sorts of question were obtained for both answered and unanswered questions.     

Priming Sex-Role Stereotypic Event Schemas With Rock Music Videos: Effects on Impression Favorability,Trait Inferences,and Recall of a Subsequent Male-Female Interaction

Two experiments examined the effects of priming on appraisal and recall of a subsequent social interaction. Popular rock music videos depicting sex-role stereotypic themes were used to prime sex-role stereotypic schemas. Two commonly available sex-role stereotypic event schemas ("boy-meets-girl" and "boy-dumps-girl") were identified in rock music videos. Subjects were exposed to one of these two types of videos (or neutral videos) before watching an interaction between a man and a woman that had been constructed to be schematically consistent or inconsistent with either the boy-meets-girl or the boy-dumps-girl schema. In Experiment 1, consistent with predictions from contemporary schematic processing theories, greater and more accurate recall of the actors' behaviors was found when the interaction was schema-inconsistent with the priming videos than when it was schema-consistent. In addition, after either stereotypic priming videos, both actors were liked more when their behavior was schema-consistent than when it was schema-inconsistent. Trait judgments in Experiment 2 showed that more positive traits were also ascribed to both actors when behaviors occurring during the interaction had been made schema-consistent rather than schema-inconsistent by the priming videos. The findings argue that, by serving as priming stimuli, rock music videos can produce strong, predictable, and nonconscious cognitive effects on viewers.     

Reality monitoring of physically similar and conceptually related objects

Three studies showed that information used in determining a target memory’s source may be derived not only from the target event itself, but also from other nontarget events or memories. Subjects were more likely to claim that an imagined object was perceived when it physically resembled or was conceptually related to another specific item that was actually perceived, relative to when there was no physical resemblance or semantic relation. Furthermore, error rates for imagined items increased with the number of perceived items that they resembled. However, subjects’ orienting task at encoding (perceptually biased or perceptually plus conceptually biased) did not systematically affect error rates. The results indicate that reality monitoring decisions about a target object are influenced by similar physical and conceptual information that was derived from other objects.     

Causal perception of action-and-reaction sequences in 8- to 10-month-olds

Four experiments with 202 8- to 10-month-old infants studied their sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance in schematic events seen as goal-directed action and reaction by adults and whether this depends on attributes associated with animate agents. In Experiment 1, a red square moved toward a blue square without making contact; in “reaction” events blue moved away while red was approaching, whereas in “delay” events blue started after red stopped. Infants were habituated to one event and then tested on its reversal. Spatiotemporal features reversed for both events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. Infants dishabituated more to reversed reaction events than to reversed delay events. Squares moved rigidly or in a nonrigid animal-like fashion. Infants discriminated these, but motion pattern did not affect responses to reversal. Infants also discriminated reactions from launching and dishabituated to reversed reactions lacking self-initiated motion. These results suggest that sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance depends on the event structure but not pattern or onset typical of animal motion.     

The Effects of Hindsight Bias and Causal Attribution on Human Response to Environmental Events1

This research examined the influence of hindsight bias and causal attribution on perceptions of a technological disaster. After reading a fictitious account of a toxic substance spill near a populated area, subjects were provided with information that disease rates had either increased or had remained stable (hindsight conditions), or were presented with no outcome information (control condition). Subjects were then asked to predict the likelihood of increases in disease rates and to make causal attributions regarding the target company and residents of the disaster community. When compared to subjects provided with either no outcome information or with information that disease rates remained stable (positive-outcome condition), subjects told that disease rates had increased (negative-outcome condition) showed elevated predictions regarding future disease rates, ascribed greater responsibility for the accident to the target company, and reported more anger toward the company and greater sympathy for the residents. Subjects receiving positive outcome information and no outcome information did not significantly differ on these measures. In addition, results from a path analysis supported the efficacy of attribution theory to account for the cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences resulting from hindsight bias following a negative environmental event.     

Individual differences in causal learning and decision making

In judgment and decision making tasks, people tend to neglect the overall frequency of base-rates when they estimate the probability of an event; this is known as the base-rate fallacy. In causal learning, despite people's accuracy at judging causal strength according to one or other normative model (i.e., Power PC, DeltaP), they tend to misperceive base-rate information (e.g., the cause density effect). The present study investigates the relationship between causal learning and decision making by asking whether people weight base-rate information in the same way when estimating causal strength and when making judgments or inferences about the likelihood of an event. The results suggest that people differ according to the weight they place on base-rate information, but the way individuals do this is consistent across causal and decision making tasks. We interpret the results as reflecting a tendency to differentially weight base-rate information which generalizes to a variety of tasks. Additionally, this study provides evidence that causal learning and decision making share some component processes.     

Cause and covariate: Development of two related concepts

This study used a rule-analytic technique to investigate the role of event covariation in causal judgment. Junior high school and college subjects were shown information about the co-occurrences of two potentially related events and were asked to make either causal or covariation judgments about the two events. Subjects often failed to identify covariates as causes or identified as causes events which were either unrelated or related in the opposite direction to the event to be explained. Rule analyses indicated that use of mathematically flawed strategies resulted in erroneous covariation and causal judgments. Comparisons between the junior high and college samples showed parallel improvement with increasing age for the two judgments. Strategy analyses of the covariation and causal judgments showed that males defined causes and covariates by similar rules, but that females used different rules to make the two judgments.