Building phrases in language production: An MEG study of simple composition

Although research on language production has developed detailed maps of the brain basis of single word production in both time and space, little is known about the spatiotemporal dynamics of the processes that combine individual words into larger representations during production. Studying composition in production is challenging due to difficulties both in controlling produced utterances and in measuring the associated brain responses. Here, we circumvent both problems using a minimal composition paradigm combined with the high temporal resolution of magnetoencephalography (MEG). With MEG, we measured the planning stages of simple adjective–noun phrases (‘red tree’), matched list controls (‘red, blue’), and individual nouns (‘tree’) and adjectives (‘red’), with results indicating combinatorial processing in the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), two regions previously implicated for the comprehension of similar phrases. These effects began relatively quickly (∼180 ms) after the presentation of a production prompt, suggesting that combination commences with initial lexical access. Further, while in comprehension, vmPFC effects have followed LATL effects, in this production paradigm vmPFC effects occurred mostly in parallel with LATL effects, suggesting that a late process in comprehension is an early process in production. Thus, our results provide a novel neural bridge between psycholinguistic models of comprehension and production that posit functionally similar combinatorial mechanisms operating in reversed order.     

Temporal processing capabilities in repetition conduction aphasia

This study investigates the temporal resolution capacities of the central-auditory system in a subject (NP) suffering from repetition conduction aphasia. More specifically, the patient was asked to detect brief gaps between two stretches of broadband noise (gap detection task) and to evaluate the duration of two biphasic (WN-3) continuous noise elements, starting with white noise (WN) followed by 3 kHz bandpass-filtered noise (duration discrimination task). During the gap detection task, the two portions of each stimulus were either identical (“intra-channel condition”) or differed (“inter-channel condition”) in the spectral characteristics of the leading and trailing acoustic segments. NP did not exhibit any deficits in the intra-channel condition of the gap detection task, indicating intact auditory temporal resolution across intervals of 1–3 ms. By contrast, the inter-channel condition yielded increased threshold values. Based upon the “multiple-looks” model of central-auditory processing, this profile points at a defective integration window operating across a few tens of milliseconds – a temporal range associated with critical features of the acoustic speech signal such as voice onset time and formant transitions. Additionally, NP was found impaired during a duration discrimination task addressing longer integration windows (ca. 150 ms). Concerning speech, this latter time domain approximately corresponds to the duration of stationary segmental units such as fricatives and long vowels. On the basis of our results we suggest, that the patient’s auditory timing deficits in non-speech tasks may account, at least partially, for his impairments in speech processing.     

A connectionist model of a continuous developmental transition in the balance scale task

A connectionist model of the balance scale task is presented which exhibits developmental transitions between ‘Rule I’ and ‘Rule II’ behavior [Siegler, R. S. (1976). Three aspects of cognitive development. Cognitive Psychology,8, 481–520.] as well as the ‘catastrophe flags’ seen in data from Jansen and van der Maas [Jansen, B. R. J., & van der Maas, H. L. J. (2001). Evidence for the phase transition from Rule I to Rule II on the balance scale task. Developmental Review, 21, 450–494]. The model extends a connectionist model of this task [McClelland, J. L. (1989). Parallel distributed processing: Implications for cognition and development. In R. G. M. Morris (Ed.), Parallel distributed processing: Implications for psychology and neurobiology (pp. 8–45). Oxford: Clarendon Press] by introducing intrinsic variability into processing and by allowing the network to adapt during testing in response to its own outputs. The simulations direct attention to several aspects of the experimental data indicating that children generally show gradual change in sensitivity to the distance dimension on the balance scale. While a few children show larger changes than are characteristic of the model, its ability to account for nearly all of the data using continuous processes is consistent with the view that the transition from Rule I to Rule II behavior is typically continuous rather than discrete in nature.     

My face or yours? Event-related potential correlates of self-face processing

The neural basis of self-recognition is mainly studied using brain-imaging techniques which reveal much about the localization of self-processing in the brain. There are comparatively few studies using EEG which allow us to study the time course of self-recognition. In this study, participants monitored a sequence of images, including 20 distinct images of their own face, a friend’s face and a stranger’s face articulating different speech sounds, while EEG was recorded from 64 scalp electrodes. Differences in the ERP waveforms were observed very early on, with increased N170 and VPP amplitude to self relative to both friend and stranger measured over posterior and fronto-central sites, respectively. This ‘self effect’ was also marked at ∼250 ms where P2/N2 amplitude was significantly reduced for self-faces. By comparison, differences between friend and stranger faces did not emerge until 250 ms and beyond, where a more conventional ‘familiarity effect’ was observed. The data also point to a ‘less lateralized’ representation of self over posterior sites. These findings are consistent with both behavioral and fMRI studies which suggest that self-face processing is ‘special’ and are discussed with reference to EEG studies of face processing.     

Modulating younger and older adults’ performance in ignoring pictorial information during a word matching task

Using both behavioural and event-related potential (ERP) data, the current study sought to examine the neurophysiological underpinnings for the effect of distracting pictorial information on semantic word matching performance in younger and older adults. This was tested in the context of semantic relations between task-relevant word pairs, a task-irrelevant picture and the resultant N400 differences in ERP. Younger and older adults were shown a context word superimposed on a to-be-ignored picture, followed by a test word. Their task was to determine whether the prime and test words were semantically related. The to-be-ignored pictures were interfering (for ‘No’ trials), facilitating (for ‘Yes’ trials), or neutral (for both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ trials) to the expected responses. The interfering and facilitatory effects of to-be-ignored pictures were assessed under more automatic and more controlled conditions by manipulating the context–test interstimulus-interval (ISI) as 50 ms and 1000 ms, respectively. The analysis of the N400 at centro-parietal sites during test word display revealed similar N400 amplitudes for the ‘No’ response trials at the two ISIs, suggesting that younger and older adults showed an equivalent effect from interfering pictures. In contrast, younger adults showed greater reductions in the N400, as compared to older adults, for ‘Yes’ trials indicating differential effects in facilitation from to-be-ignored pictorial information, but only in the long ISI condition. The data are discussed in terms of age differences in resource demanding strategy use during a semantic word matching task, specifically during controlled retrieval.     

Binocular vision enhances a rapidly evolving affordance priming effect: Behavioural and TMS evidence

Extensive research has suggested that simply viewing an object can automatically prime compatible actions for object manipulation, known as affordances. Here we explored the generation of covert motor plans afforded by real objects with precision (‘pinchable’) or whole-hand/power (‘graspable’) grip significance under different types of vision. In Experiment 1, participants viewed real object primes either monocularly or binocularly and responded to orthogonal auditory stimuli by making precision or power grips. Pinchable primes facilitated congruent precision grip responses relative to incongruent power grips, and vice versa for graspable primes, but only in the binocular vision condition. To examine the temporal evolution of the binocular affordance effect, participants in Experiment 2 always viewed the objects binocularly but made no responses, instead receiving a transcranial magnetic stimulation pulse over their primary motor cortex at three different times (150, 300, 450 ms) after prime onset. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded from a pinching muscle were selectively increased when subjects were primed with a pinchable object, whereas MEPs from a muscle associated with power grips were increased when viewing graspable stimuli. This interaction was obtained both 300 and 450 ms (but not 150 ms) after the visual onset of the prime, characterising for the first time the rapid development of binocular grip-specific affordances predicted by functional accounts of the affordance effect.     

Indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals

We report three experiments to test the possibilities reasoners think about when they understand a conditional of the form ‘A only if B’ compared to ‘if A then B’. The experiments examine conditionals in the indicative mood (e.g., A occurred only if B occurred) and counterfactuals in the subjunctive mood (A would have occurred only if B had occurred). The first experiment examines the conjunctions of events that reasoners judge to be consistent with conditionals, e.g., A and B, not-A and not-B. It shows that people think about one possibility to understand ‘if’ and two possibilities to understand ‘only if’; they think about two possibilities to understand counterfactual ‘if’ and ‘only if’. The second experiment shows that the possibilities people think about when they understand ‘only if’ are in a different temporal order (e.g., B and A) to the possibilities they think about for ‘if’ (A and B). The third experiment shows that people make different inferences from ‘only if’ and ‘if’ conditionals and counterfactuals. The implications of the results for theories of counterfactual conditionals are considered.     

To think or not to think,that is the question: Individual differences in suppression and rebound effects in autobiographical memory

Two studies explored the effects of forget instructions on autobiographical memory at immediate test and following delays of either 12–13 months, or 3–4 months. Using the Autobiographical Think/No-Think procedure (cf., Noreen & MacLeod, 2013), 24 never-depressed participants (Study 1) first generated 12 positive and 12 negative autobiographical memories and associated cues. Participants were then asked to recall the memory associated with some of the cues (i.e., ‘think’ condition), or to avoid saying or thinking about the memory associated with other cues (i.e., ‘no-think’ condition). Participants were then asked to recall the memories associated with all the cues at immediate test and following a delay of 12–13 months. Participants were found to be successful at forgetting both positive and negative autobiographical memories following ‘no-think’ instructions at immediate test but this forgetting effect did not persist following a 12–13 month delay. This pattern of remembering and forgetting was replicated in a second study (using 27 never-depressed participants) following a 3–4 month delay. Participants who had been less successful at forgetting ‘no-think’ memories at immediate test, were more likely to show rebound effects for those memories following a delay compared to memories which received neither ‘think’ nor ‘no-think’ instructions. Individual differences in inhibitory control and the efficacy of potential therapeutic interventions of ‘no-think’ instructions are considered.     

Grammatical aspect and event recognition in children’s online sentence comprehension

This study investigated whether or not the temporal information encoded in aspectual morphemes can be used immediately by young children to facilitate event recognition during online sentence comprehension. We focused on the contrast between two grammatical aspectual morphemes in Mandarin Chinese, the perfective morpheme –le and the (imperfective) durative morpheme –zhe. The perfective morpheme –le is often used to indicate that an event has been completed, whereas the durative morpheme –zhe indicates that an event is still in progress or continuing. We were interested to see whether young children are able to use the temporal reference encoded in the two aspectual morphemes (i.e., completed versus ongoing) as rapidly as adults to facilitate event recognition during online sentence comprehension. Using the visual world eye-tracking paradigm, we tested 34 Mandarin-speaking adults and 99 Mandarin-speaking children (35 three-year-olds, 32 four-year-olds and 32 five-year-olds). On each trial, participants were presented with spoken sentences containing either of the two aspectual morphemes while viewing a visual image containing two pictures, one representing a completed event and one representing an ongoing event. Participants’ eye movements were recorded from the onset of the spoken sentences. The results show that both the adults and the three age groups of children exhibited a facilitatory effect trigged by the aspectual morpheme: hearing the perfective morpheme –le triggered more eye movements to the completed event area, whereas hearing the durative morpheme –zhe triggered more eye movements to the ongoing event area. This effect occurred immediately after the onset of the aspectual morpheme, both for the adults and the three groups of children. This is evidence that young children are able to use the temporal information encoded in aspectual morphemes as rapidly as adults to facilitate event recognition. Children’s eye movement patterns reflect a rapid mapping of grammatical aspect onto the temporal structures of events depicted in the visual scene.     

Change deafness for simultaneous voices

Apparent changes in auditory scenes are often unnoticed. This change deafness phenomenon was examined in auditory scenes that comprise human voices. In two experiments, listeners were required to detect changes between two auditory scenes comprising two, three, and four talkers who voiced four‐syllable words. One of the voices in the first scene was randomly selected and was replaced with a new word in change trials. The rationale was that higher stimulus familiarity conferred by human voices compared to other everyday sounds, together with encoding and memory advantages for verbal stimuli and the modular processing of speech in auditory processing, should positively influence the change detection efficiency, and the change deafness phenomenon should not be observed when listeners are explicitly required to detect the obvious changes. Contrary to the prediction, change deafness was significantly observed in three‐ and four‐talker conditions. This indicates that change deafness occurs in listeners even for highly familiar stimuli. This suggests the limited ability for perceptual organization of auditory scenes comprising even a relatively small number of voices (three or four).     

The stability of the morning affect scale across age and gender

A limitation of the morningness–eveningness literature is the assumption that morningness is a ‘fixed’ construct. Morningness–eveningness scales are often developed on young adult samples, yet studies report that eveningness peaks in young adults with a shift to morningness from the age of 25 to 35 years of age. This age related change in morningness–eveningness may explain why these scales have limited success when applied in older samples. We tested this argument by developing a measurement model based on the Composite Scale of Morningness using a sample aged <30 years of age. Tucker’s congruence coefficient and confirmatory factor analysis indicated this solution was not a good fit in three older age groups. In contrast, we repeated this assessment using the ‘morning affect’ scale. This scale comprises items that measure morningness preference only. Model fit indicators suggested the ‘morning affect’ scale was a good fit across four age groups and gender.     

The Attentional Boost Effect: Transient increases in attention to one task enhance performance in a second task

Recent work on event perception suggests that perceptual processing increases when events change. An important question is how such changes influence the way other information is processed, particularly during dual-task performance. In this study, participants monitored a long series of distractor items for an occasional target as they simultaneously encoded unrelated background scenes. The appearance of an occasional target could have two opposite effects on the secondary task: It could draw attention away from the second task, or, as a change in the ongoing event, it could improve secondary task performance. Results were consistent with the second possibility. Memory for scenes presented simultaneously with the targets was better than memory for scenes that preceded or followed the targets. This effect was observed when the primary detection task involved visual feature oddball detection, auditory oddball detection, and visual color-shape conjunction detection. It was eliminated when the detection task was omitted, and when it required an arbitrary response mapping. The appearance of occasional, task-relevant events appears to trigger a temporal orienting response that facilitates processing of concurrently attended information (Attentional Boost Effect).     

Speaking two languages at once: Unconscious native word form access in second language production

Bilingualism research has established language non-selective lexical access in comprehension. However, the evidence for such an effect in production remains sparse and its neural time-course has not yet been investigated. We demonstrate that German-English bilinguals performing a simple picture-naming task exclusively in English spontaneously access the phonological form of –unproduced– German words. Participants were asked to produce English adjective-noun sequences describing the colour and identity of familiar objects presented as line drawings. We associated adjective and picture names such that their onsets phonologically overlapped in English (e.g., green goat), in German through translation (e.g., blue flower – ‘blaue Blume’), or in neither language. As expected, phonological priming in English modulated event-related brain potentials over the frontocentral scalp region from around 440 ms after picture onset. Phonological priming in German was detectable even earlier, from 300 ms, even though German was never produced and in the absence of an interaction between language and phonological repetition priming at any point in time. Overall, these results establish the existence of non-selective access to phonological representations of the two languages in the domain of speech production.     

Effects of signal uncertainty on statistical decisions

The experimental task involved statistical judgements about parameters of a random sample of dots displayed sequentially from a ‘signal’ or ‘noise’ distribution. Signal uncertainty was introduced by presenting small signal subsets of dots within larger observation sequences. Observer detection performance was adversely affected by this kind of signal uncertainty, but in the same way and to similar extent as that expected on the basis of ‘ideal’ and ‘independent’ statistical decision strategies.     

Statisticism in personality psychologists’ use of trait constructs: What is it? How was it contracted? Is there a cure?

‘Statisticism’ is meant to characterize a way of thinking in psychology that invests virtually boundless trust in the aptness of statistical concepts and methods to reveal the ‘lawfulness’ of human psychological functioning and behavior. In the article, I discuss how statisticism came to infect the thinking of mainstream 20th century personality investigators and how – if at all – the discipline might be cured. Unfortunately, mainstream thinking within the sub-discipline of personality psychology has long sanctioned an understanding of the statistical findings issuing from studies of individual differences in personality traits that is faithful to neither of the so-called ‘frequentist’ or ‘subjectivist’ traditions. Instead, such findings are widely regarded as a scientifically acceptable warrant for claims to knowledge about objective states of affairs existing for individuals within the samples one has studied. I suggest that the prospects for eradicating dubious fruits of this form of statisticism will hinge importantly on (a) the ability of theoretically and philosophically-oriented psychologists to re-instill within the discipline a healthy respect for the power of conceptual analysis more generally, and, following this, (b) concern within the discipline for the fact that the deep and abiding conceptual problem described above in fact does exist.     

Encoding of others’ beliefs without overt instruction

Under what conditions do people automatically encode and track the mental states of others? A recent investigation showed that when subjects are instructed to track the location of an object but are not instructed to track a belief about that location in a non-verbal false-belief task, they respond more slowly to questions about an agent’s belief, suggesting that belief information was not encoded or tracked automatically [Apperly, I. A., Riggs, K. J., Simpson, A., Samson, D., & Chiavarino, C. (2006). Is belief reasoning automatic? Psychological Science, 17, 841-844]. In the current experiments, we show that if belief probes occur closer in time to the events that signal the content of the agent’s false belief, responses to those probes are faster than responses to probes about reality, and as fast as responses to probes about belief when instructed to track them, suggesting (i) beliefs may get encoded automatically in response to certain cues and (ii) that belief information rapidly decays unless it is maintained via ‘top-down’ instructions.     

Spatial cueing in time–space synesthetes: An event-related brain potential study

Some people report that they consistently and involuntarily associate time events, such as months of the year, with specific spatial locations; a condition referred to as time–space synesthesia. The present study investigated the manner in which such synesthetic time–space associations affect visuo-spatial attention via an endogenous cuing paradigm. Reaction times and ERPs were recorded as 12 time–space synesthetes and 12 control participants did a peripheral target detection task, cued by three different types of centrally presented cues: arrows pointing left or right, direction words “left” or “right”, and month names associated with either the left or the right side of the synesthete’s mental calendar (e.g., “October” or “May”). Cues were followed by probes on the left or right side of the screen, and participants responded to the probes with button presses. Behavioral and ERP data suggested that for synesthetes, month words functioned more effectively as cues to direct attention in space. In synesthetes but not controls, a comparison of ERPs to probes cued by months revealed effects of cue validity on the P3b component peaking 370 ms post-onset and on the subsequent positive slow wave (pSW) observed 600–900 ms post-onset (both larger for invalid probes). No effects of cue validity were observed on early visual potentials (N1) for probes cued by months. The findings suggest that in these time–space synesthetes cue validity influenced post-perceptual processes, such as stimulus evaluation and categorization, with no evidence for enhanced visual processing.     

Discourse-mediation of the mapping between language and the visual world: Eye movements and mental representation

Two experiments explored the mapping between language and mental representations of visual scenes. In both experiments, participants viewed, for example, a scene depicting a woman, a wine glass and bottle on the floor, an empty table, and various other objects. In Experiment 1, participants concurrently heard either ‘The woman will put the glass on the table’ or ‘The woman is too lazy to put the glass on the table’. Subsequently, with the scene unchanged, participants heard that the woman ‘will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass.’ Experiment 2 was identical except that the scene was removed before the onset of the spoken language. In both cases, eye movements after ‘pour’ (anticipating the glass) and at ‘glass’ reflected the language-determined position of the glass, as either on the floor, or moved onto the table, even though the concurrent (Experiment 1) or prior (Experiment 2) scene showed the glass in its unmoved position on the floor. Language-mediated eye movements thus reflect the real-time mapping of language onto dynamically updateable event-based representations of concurrently or previously seen objects (and their locations).     

9 is always on top: assessing the automaticity of synaesthetic number-forms

For number-form synaesthetes, digits occupy idiosyncratic spatial locations. Atypical to the mental number line that extends horizontally, the synaesthete (L) experiences the numbers 1-10 vertically. We used a spatial cueing task to demonstrate that L’s attention could be automatically directed to locations within her number-space - being faster to detect targets appearing in synaesthetically cued locations. We sought to eliminate any influence of strategy on L’s performance by: (a) shortening the cue-target onset to 150 ms, (b) making the cues counterpredictive, and (c) instructing L to use an opposing strategy. If L’s performance was attributable to intentionally using the cue to predict target location, these manipulations should eliminate any cuing effects consistent with her synaesthesia. However, L showed an attentional bias compatible with her number-form, except when explicitly instructed of the opposing strategy and given enough time (800 ms). Therefore, we attribute L’s resilient cueing effects to the automaticity of her number-form.