Integrating personality,context, relationship,and emotion type into a model of display rules

This research sets out to examine individual variations in perceptions of display rules. Based upon Mischel and Shoda’s [Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review, 102, 246–268.] model of the Cognitive-Affective Personality System (CAPS), we proposed that extraversion and neuroticism would serve to explain within-cultural individual differences and within-individual differences in endorsement of display rules. To test this hypothesis, participants reported the expressivity level of the display rule they endorsed by responding to the revised version of the Display Rule Assessment Inventory. Multi-level analyses showed that compared to those of introverts, the display rules of extraverts tended to be more suppressive when the relationship was distant rather than close. Extraversion also enhanced a neurotic’s degree of suppression in public compared to private situations. Processes describing how personality interacts with situations in personalizing display rules were offered in light of the CAPS model to account for these interactions between personality and situation in the operation of display rules for emotional expression.     

The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?

Thefalse consensus effectand theoverconfidence in judgmenteffect are often referred to as established “facts” of psychology. At present, the empirical support for these effects is inadequate and logically flawed. We argue that, absent other information, using one's own response to a situation as an observation of size 1 could be an effective use of data and could lead to anincreasein the accuracy of predicting others’ behavior. In an empirical examination of such use, we find a robustpositivecorrelation between the degree to which people believe that a majority of others are like them and their accuracy in predicting those others’ responses, whether this correlation is evaluated within items across people, across items within people, or across items across people. In addition, we show that the finding of overconfidence in judgment follows analytically from the functional relationship used to demonstrate it, a “finding” that is easily reversed by considering the inverse relationship. Specifically, we argue that regression effects account for the evidence cited in support of overconfidence. While not definitive, our empirical findings call into the question the acceptance of these two effects—as commonly defined—as facts.     

Socializing the newcomer: The mediating role of leader–member exchange

We expand organizational socialization research by integrating social exchange theory, specifically leader–member exchange (LMX), as an important mediator in explaining newcomer attachment to the job, occupation, and organization. Using temporally-lagged data from 213 newcomers across 12 telemarketing organizations, we found that newcomer perceptions of LMX mediate the association between supervisory socialization tactics (i.e. supervisory job-focused advice, guidance, and role modeling) and occupational identification as well as between supervisory socialization tactics and perceived person-organization fit – but not between supervisory socialization tactics and job satisfaction. Our study specifies (1) LMX as a compelling mediating mechanism within the new employee ‘on-boarding’ process and (2) the immediate supervisor as an important relational source for newcomer attitudes.     

Lifespan aging and belief reasoning: Influences of executive function and social cue decoding

Older adults often perform poorly on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests that require understanding of others’ beliefs and intentions. The course and specificity of age changes in belief reasoning across the adult lifespan is unclear, as is the cause of the age effects. Cognitive and neuropsychological models predict that two types of processing might influence age differences in belief reasoning: executive functioning and social cue detection. In the current study we assessed 129 adults aged between 18 and 86 on novel measures of ToM (video clips and verbal vignettes), which manipulated whether true or false belief reasoning was required. On both video and verbal tasks, older adults (aged 65–88) had specific impairments in false belief reasoning, but showed no such problem in performing true belief tasks. Middle-aged adults (aged 40–64) generally performed as well as the younger adults (aged 18–39). Difficulties in updating information in working memory (but not inhibitory problems) partially mediated the age differences in false belief reasoning. Also, the ability to decode biological motion, indexing social cue detection, partially mediated age-related variance in the ability to interpret false beliefs. These results indicate that age differences in decoding social cues and updating information in memory may be important influences on the specific problems encountered when reasoning about false beliefs in old age.     

Who do you think I think I am? Accuracy in perceptions of others’ self-esteem

This study was conducted to assess the accuracy of perceptions of others’ self-esteem and to examine the potential moderating variables of target gender, perceiver gender, and degree of acquaintance. Degree of acquaintance was the only hypothesized moderator reliably related to accuracy. An overall tendency to overestimate targets’ self-esteem was evinced, but was not related to any of the hypothesized moderators. The data suggested that perceivers are influenced by a false consensus effect when estimating others’ level of self-esteem, independent of their degree of acquaintance with targets. Implications of the findings and directions for future investigation are discussed.     

Contagion or restitution? When bad apples can motivate ethical behavior

When there is a “bad apple” in the group, are we more likely to follow the example or compensate for their sins? Three experiments showed that whether a group member’s unethical actions lead to contagion or restitution depends on the presence of out-group observers. In Experiment 1, participants were more likely to compensate for the transgression of an in-group member than an out-group member when there were out-group observers. Experiment 2 varied the presence of out-group observers and showed that such compensatory behaviors occur only in the presence of out-group members. We suggest that the presence of out-group observers trigger a self-categorization process that induces guilt in individuals for their group members’ transgressions. Indeed, associated guilt mediated the relationship between in-group member’s unethical behavior and participants’ compensatory behavior (Experiment 3). These results suggest that norms implied by others’ behavior and group categorization are important determinants of ethical behavior.     

Subjective person-organization fit: Bridging the gap between conceptualization and measurement

In this paper, we present a critical examination of the literature on subjective person-organization (P-O) fit and highlight several conceptual and measurement issues that may be perpetuating confusion in this literature. Specifically, we reviewed 46 empirical studies that have measured P-O fit perceptions and identified three primary sources of inconsistency among these studies, including (a) how P-O fit is conceptualized, (b) the operational definition of ‘organization,’ and (c) the content domain used to assess P-O fit. We discuss several implications of this review, including the potential role that individual differences play in fit perceptions. We also make a case for the development and adoption of uniform, validated measures of P-O fit that incorporate the multidimensional nature of fit.     

Eye movements reveal the time-course of anticipating behaviour based on complex, conflicting desires

The time-course of representing others’ perspectives is inconclusive across the currently available models of ToM processing. We report two visual-world studies investigating how knowledge about a character’s basic preferences (e.g. Tom’s favourite colour is pink) and higher-order desires (his wish to keep this preference secret) compete to influence online expectations about subsequent behaviour. Participants’ eye movements around a visual scene were tracked while they listened to auditory narratives. While clear differences in anticipatory visual biases emerged between conditions in Experiment 1, post-hoc analyses testing the strength of the relevant biases suggested a discrepancy in the time-course of predicting appropriate referents within the different contexts. Specifically, predictions to the target emerged very early when there was no conflict between the character’s basic preferences and higher-order desires, but appeared to be relatively delayed when comprehenders were provided with conflicting information about that character’s desire to keep a secret. However, a second experiment demonstrated that this apparent ‘cognitive cost’ in inferring behaviour based on higher-order desires was in fact driven by low-level features between the context sentence and visual scene. Taken together, these results suggest that healthy adults are able to make complex higher-order ToM inferences without the need to call on costly cognitive processes. Results are discussed relative to previous accounts of ToM and language processing.     

A connectionist model of a continuous developmental transition in the balance scale task

A connectionist model of the balance scale task is presented which exhibits developmental transitions between ‘Rule I’ and ‘Rule II’ behavior [Siegler, R. S. (1976). Three aspects of cognitive development. Cognitive Psychology,8, 481–520.] as well as the ‘catastrophe flags’ seen in data from Jansen and van der Maas [Jansen, B. R. J., & van der Maas, H. L. J. (2001). Evidence for the phase transition from Rule I to Rule II on the balance scale task. Developmental Review, 21, 450–494]. The model extends a connectionist model of this task [McClelland, J. L. (1989). Parallel distributed processing: Implications for cognition and development. In R. G. M. Morris (Ed.), Parallel distributed processing: Implications for psychology and neurobiology (pp. 8–45). Oxford: Clarendon Press] by introducing intrinsic variability into processing and by allowing the network to adapt during testing in response to its own outputs. The simulations direct attention to several aspects of the experimental data indicating that children generally show gradual change in sensitivity to the distance dimension on the balance scale. While a few children show larger changes than are characteristic of the model, its ability to account for nearly all of the data using continuous processes is consistent with the view that the transition from Rule I to Rule II behavior is typically continuous rather than discrete in nature.     

The history of religions and francophone research in Europe: Main disciplinary trends in Switzerland, France, Belgium and Luxemburg

This article provides an overview (as of September, 2008) of the state of the field of l’histoire des religions in the four french-speaking countries of Europe. It discusses the pioneers, along with their followers and influence, the position of principle institutions regarding teaching in the field, and the general orientations of each university, along with distinct emphases that reflect recent socio-political and cultural developments. This detailed panorama brings to light the relative weakness of french-speaking research in the field of l’histoire générale des religions. It calls attention to tensions between the former high status of this academic area, more than half of a century ago, and the disrepute into which its comparativist project has fallen over the last decades. It asks how French secularism – and the growing secularization of western societies more generally – may have influenced perceptions of the discipline, its orientations, and its position in today's academic market academic market. It also considers the impact of declining comprehension of religious phenomena among younger generations and correlated concerns with popularisation.     

Competition and men’s face preferences

Several studies have examined potentially adaptive shifts and sources of individual differences in women’s face preferences, but relatively few studies have looked for similar findings in men. Evidence suggests that men of higher mate-value may be better placed to compete for relationships with higher-quality women, and that contest competition may influence men’s perceptions of dominance. Here, we looked at the effects of winning/losing in male–male competition on men’s face preferences. Participants were randomly and unknowingly assigned to either win or lose the first-person shooter video game Counter-Strike: Source against an unseen male confederate who could control the outcome through game cheats. We found that, compared to men assigned to the losing condition, men assigned to the winning condition had significantly (p = 0.012) higher preferences for women’s facial femininity. Results suggest that the outcomes of male–male competition may alter men’s mate preferences.     

Looking good versus doing good: which factors take precedence when children learn about new tools?

We present two experiments exploring whether individuals would be persuaded to imitate the intentional action of an adult model whose actions suggest that the correct way to complete a task is with an inefficient tool. In Experiment 1, children ages 5–10 years and a group of adults watched an adult model reject an efficient tool in favor of one that was inefficient, but claim it was “made for” the task. Results indicated low rates of imitation of the model’s intentional choice until 9 and 10 years of age. In Experiment 2, children ages 3–11 years again watched a model reject a functional tool in favor of a nonfunctional one. This time, the demonstration took place on video. For half of the participants, the model from the video was present to offer a choice between the two tools (high-pressure condition), and for the other half, she was absent (low-pressure condition). Children also completed a social desirability questionnaire to explore relationships between imitation choices and personality. Results indicated that rates of imitation were associated with higher scores on the social desirability scale among children ages 3–7 years. Among 8- to 11-year-olds – and especially among 9- and 10-year-olds – the decision to copy the model’s intentional choice was more likely when the model was present than when she was absent. The findings reveal the contributions of age, personality, and social pressure to differences in imitation.     

Person and situation effects should be measured in the same terms. A comment on Funder (2006)

In a recent paper in this journal, Funder [Funder, D. C. (2006). Towards a resolution of the personality triad: persons, situations and behaviors. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 21–34] stated that the effects of person and situation on behavior were independent in principle. In this comment, we argue that Funder’s claim is not a basic law of psychology, but a product of the common statistical approach to define person effects by Pearson correlations and situation effects by differences in group means. As an alternative, we suggest using Intraclass correlations (ICC) with an absolute agreement definition as indicators of intraindividual stability. This approach enables us to directly determine, how much people’s behavior varies or remains the same across situations. We demonstrate the usefulness of the ICC approach, by applying it to both hypothetical and empirical data. However, the question which model is more appropriate is a conceptual one and cannot be answered empirically.     

Partners’ Attributions for Service Members’ Symptoms of Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

The association of service members’ combat-related PTSD with partners’ distress is weaker when spouses/partners believe that service members experienced more traumatic events during deployment. Also, when simultaneously examining partners’ perceptions of all PTSD symptoms, perceptions of reexperiencing symptoms (the symptoms most obviously connected to traumatic events) are significantly negatively related to distress in partners. These findings are consistent with the notion that partners may be less distressed if they make external, rather than internal, attributions for service members’ symptoms. The present study explicitly tests this possibility. Civilian wives of active duty service members completed measures regarding their own marital satisfaction, their perceptions of service members’ combat exposure during deployments, their perceptions of service members’ symptoms of PTSD, and their attributions for those symptoms. External attributions were significantly positively associated with perceptions of combat exposure (r_p = .31) and reexperiencing symptoms (β = .33) and significantly negatively associated with perceptions of numbing/withdrawal symptoms (r_p = –.22). In contrast, internal attributions were significantly negatively associated with perceptions of reexperiencing symptoms (β = –.18) and significantly positively associated with perceptions of numbing/withdrawal symptoms (β = .46). Internal attributions significantly moderated the negative association of PTSD symptoms with marital satisfaction, such that the association strengthened as internal attributions increased. These findings are the first explicit support for an attributional understanding of distress in partners of combat veterans. Interventions that alter partners’ attributions may improve marital functioning.     

Do people automatically track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure

Recent findings suggest that tracking others’ beliefs is not always effortful and slow, but may rely on a fast and implicit system. An untested prediction of the automatic belief tracking account is that own and others’ beliefs should be activated in parallel. We tested this prediction measuring continuous movement trajectories in a task that required deciding between two possible object locations. We independently manipulated whether participants’ belief about the object location was true or false and whether an onlooker’s belief about the object location was true or false. Manipulating whether or not the agent’s belief was ever task relevant allowed us to compare performance in an explicit and implicit version of the same task. Movement parameters revealed an influence of the onlooker’s irrelevant belief in the implicit version of the task. This provides evidence for parallel activation of own and others’ beliefs.     

One-year-olds’ understanding of nonverbal gestures directed to a third person

We investigated whether infants comprehend others’ nonverbal communicative intentions directed to a third person, in an ‘overhearing’ context. An experimenter addressed an assistant and indicated a hidden toy's location by either gazing ostensively or pointing to the location for her. In a matched control condition, the experimenter performed similar behaviors (absent-minded gazing and extended index finger) but did not communicate ostensively with the assistant. Infants could then search for the toy. Eighteen-month-old infants were skillful in using both communicative cues to find the hidden object, whereas 14-month-olds performed above chance only with the pointing cue. Neither age group performed above chance in the control condition. This study thus shows that by 14–18 months of age, infants are beginning to monitor and comprehend some aspects of third party interactions.     

Do we listen to advice just because we paid for it? The impact of advice cost on its use

When facing a decision, people often rely on advice received from others. Previous studies have shown that people tend to discount others’ opinions. Yet, such discounting varies according to several factors. This paper isolates one of these factors: the cost of advice. Specifically, three experiments investigate whether the cost of advice, independent of its quality, affects how people use advice. The studies use the Judge–Advisor System (JAS) to investigate whether people value advice from others more when it costs money than when it is free, and examine the psychological processes that could account for this effect. The results show that people use paid advice significantly more than free advice and suggest that this effect is due to the same forces that have been documented in the literature to explain the sunk costs fallacy. Implications for circumstances under which people value others’ opinions are discussed.     

Preschoolers use speakers’ preferences to learn words

In two studies, we investigated preschoolers’ ability to use others’ preferences to learn names for things. Two studies demonstrated that preschool children make smart use of others’ preferences. In the first study, preschool children only used information about others’ preferences when they were clearly linked to referential intentions. The second study established that children only used others’ preferences to learn words when the preference and intention information came from the same person. Both studies reveal impressive use of mental state information for word learning purposes.     

Do 10-month-old infants understand others' false beliefs?

As adults, we know that others’ mental states, such as beliefs, guide their behavior and that these mental states can deviate from reality. Researchers have examined whether young children possess adult-like theory of mind by focusing on their understanding about others’ false beliefs. The present research revealed that 10-month-old infants seemed to interpret a person’s choice of toys based on her true or false beliefs about which toys were present. These results indicate that like adults, even preverbal infants act as if they can consider others’ mental states when making inferences about others’ actions.