The hare and the snail: Dissociating visual orienting from conscious perception

A method for investigating attentional effects of peripheral visual objects, independently of perceptual identification, is described. We report an experiment using this method which shows that visual processing of peripheral objects differs radically, depending on whether participants move attention in response to an object or consciously perceive that object. When luminance contrast was reduced, conscious perceptual discrimination of peripheral letters was massively slower and less accurate—but both low and high contrast letters elicited rapid attentional orienting effects and these rapid orienting effects were equal in magnitude across low and high contrast. This pattern is consistent with known differences in luminance sensitivity between the dorsal and ventral visual processing streams, and with rapid dorsal–ventral interaction mediated via re-entrant feedback. Our findings show that the control system responsible for rapid movements of attention is exquisitely sensitive to visual form information at low levels of contrast, and involves a different neurocognitive pathway to that which gives rise to conscious perception.     

Seeing what we know and understand: How knowledge shapes perception

Expertise in object recognition, as in bird watching or X-ray specialization, is based on extensive perceptual experience and in-depth semantic knowledge. Although it has been shown that rich perceptual experience shapes elementary perception and higher level discrimination and identification, little is known about the influence of in-depth semantic knowledge on object perception and identification. By means of recording event-related brain potentials (ERPs), we show that the amount of knowledge acquired about initially unfamiliar objects modulates visual ERP components already 120 msec after object presentation, and causes gradual variations of activity in similar brain systems within a later timeframe commonly associated with meaning access. When perceptual analysis is made more difficult by blurring object pictures, knowledge has an even stronger effect on perceptual analysis and facilitates recognition. These findings demonstrate that in-depth knowledge not only affects involuntary semantic memory access, but also shapes perception by penetrating early visual processes traditionally held to be immune to such influences.     

On the perception of shape from shading

The extraction of three-dimensional shape from shading is one of the most perceptually compelling, yet poorly understood, aspects of visual perception. In this paper, we report several new experiments on the manner in which the perception of shape from shading interacts with other visual processes such as perceptual grouping, preattentive search (“pop-out”), and motion perception. Our specific findings are as follows: (1) The extraction of shape from shading information incorporates at least two “assumptions” or constraints—first,that there is a single light source illuminating the whole scene, and second, that the light is shining from “above” in relation to retinal coordinates. (2) Tokens defined by shading can serve as a basis for perceptual grouping and segregation. (3) Reaction time for detecting a single convex shape does not increase with the number of items in the display. This “pop-out” effect must be based on shading rather than on differences in luminance polarity, since neither left-right differences nor step changes in luminance resulted in pop-out. (4) When the subjects were experienced, there were no search asymmetries for convex as opposed to concave tokens, but when the subjects were naive, cavities were much easier to detect than convex shapes. (5) The extraction of shape from shading can also provide an input to motion perception. And finally, (6) the assumption of “overhead illumination” that leads to perceptual grouping depends primarily on retinal rather than on “phenomenal” or gravitational coordinates. Taken collectively, these findings imply that the extraction of shape from shading is an “early” visual process that occurs prior to perceptual grouping, motion perception, and vestibular (as well as “cognitive”) correction for head tilt. Hence, there may be neural elements very early in visual processing that are specialized for the extraction of shape from shading.     

Contextual illusions reveal the limit of unconscious visual processing

The perception of even the most elementary features of the visual environment depends strongly on their spatial context. In the study reported here, we asked at what level of abstraction such effects require conscious processing of the context. We compared two visual illusions that alter subjective judgments of brightness: the simultaneous brightness contrast illusion, in which two circles of identical physical brightness appear different because of different surround luminance, and the Kanizsa triangle illusion, which occurs when the visual system extrapolates a surface without actual physical stimulation. We used a novel interocular masking technique that allowed us to selectively render only the context invisible. Simultaneous brightness contrast persisted even when the surround was masked from awareness. In contrast, participants did not experience illusory contours when the inducing context was masked. Our findings show that invisible context is resolvable by low-level processes involved in surface-brightness perception, but not by high-level processes that assign surface borders through perceptual completion.     

On the perception of shape from shading.

The extraction of three-dimensional shape from shading is one of the most perceptually compelling, yet poorly understood, aspects of visual perception. In this paper, we report several new experiments on the manner in which the perception of shape from shading interacts with other visual processes such as perceptual grouping, preattentive search ("pop-out"), and motion perception. Our specific findings are as follows: (1) The extraction of shape from shading information incorporates at least two "assumptions" or constraints--first, that there is a single light source illuminating the whole scene, and second, that the light is shining from "above" in relation to retinal coordinates. (2) Tokens defined by shading can serve as a basis for perceptual grouping and segregation. (3) Reaction time for detecting a single convex shape does not increase with the number of items in the display. This "pop-out" effect must be based on shading rather than on differences in luminance polarity, since neither left-right differences nor step changes in luminance resulted in pop-out. (4) When the subjects were experienced, there were no search asymmetries for convex as opposed to concave tokens, but when the subjects were naive, cavities were much easier to detect than convex shapes. (5) The extraction of shape from shading can also provide an input to motion perception. And finally, (6) the assumption of "overhead illumination" that leads to perceptual grouping depends primarily on retinal rather than on "phenomenal" or gravitational coordinates. Taken collectively, these findings imply that the extraction of shape from shading is an "early" visual process that occurs prior to perceptual grouping, motion perception, and vestibular (as well as "cognitive") correction for head tilt. Hence, there may be neural elements very early in visual processing that are specialized for the extraction of shape from shading.     

Effects of absolute luminance and luminance contrast on visual discrimination in low mesopic environments

Recent research revealed considerable decline in visual perception under low luminance conditions. However, systematic studies on how visual performance is affected by absolute luminance and luminance contrast under low mesopic conditions (<0.5 cd/m²) is lacking. We examined performance in a simple visual discrimination task under low mesopic luminance conditions in three experiments in which we systematically varied base luminance and luminance contrast between stimulus and background. We further manipulated eccentricity of the stimuli because of known rods and cones gradients along the retina. We identified a “deficiency window” for performance as measured by d’ when luminance was < 0.06 cd/m² and luminance contrast as measured by the luminance ratio between stimulus and background was below < 1.7. We further calculated performance-based luminance as well as contrast efficiency functions for reaction times (RTs). These power functions demonstrate the contrast asymptote needed to decrease RTs and how such a decrease can be achieved given various combinations of absolute luminance and luminance contrast manipulations. Increased eccentricity resulted in slower RTs indicative of longer scan distances. Our data provide initial insights to performance-based efficiency functions in low mesopic environments that are currently lacking and to the physical mechanisms being utilized for visual perception in these extreme environments.     

Gestalt Psychology as a Missing Link in Ernst Cassirer’s Mythical Symbolic Form

The main goal of this article is to investigate the mythical symbolic form in Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Form regarding its connection with visual perception. The article argues that mythical symbolic form is rooted in Gestalt principles of perception for organizing the perceptual field, and shows that these principles shape the main features of space and time in Cassirer’s mythical symbolic form. This argument challenges Heidegger’s critique of Cassirer’s definition of a mythical symbolic form that it is directionless and not grounded in man’s being. The combination of Gestalt principles and mythical symbolic forms supports the argument about the active role of visual perception, and clarifies Cassirer’s application and re-definition of Kantian and Neo-Kantian concepts. The investigation opens a perspective for comprehending the mythic-religious phenomenon as well as for comprehending visual perception.     

Glowing greys and surface-white: the photo-geometric factors of luminosity perception

The perception of luminosity is thought to depend upon the intensity of the stimulus: a surface begins to appear self-luminous when it emits or reflects a certain amount of light. This is known as the luminosity threshold. It is a common opinion among vision scientists that such a threshold is correlated to the intensity of a perceptually white surface, in the sense that only an area of the visual field with luminance higher than perceived surface-white will appear luminous. Here we show grey colours that appear luminous in virtue of surrounding luminance ramps. These ramps are intended to mimic halos seen around light sources in natural environments. The results of three experiments indicate that the phenomenon is in direct contradiction to the aforementioned assumptions and suggest the existence of separate perceptual pathways for self-luminosity perception and for surface-colour perception.     

Hearing lips in a second language: visual articulatory information enables the perception of second language sounds

We investigated the effects of visual speech information (articulatory gestures) on the perception of second language (L2) sounds. Previous studies have demonstrated that listeners often fail to hear the difference between certain non-native phonemic contrasts, such as in the case of Spanish native speakers regarding the Catalan sounds /ɛ/ and /e/. Here, we tested whether adding visual information about the articulatory gestures (i.e., lip movements) could enhance this perceptual ability. We found that, for auditory-only presentations, Spanish-dominant bilinguals failed to show sensitivity to the /ɛ/–/e/ contrast, whereas Catalan-dominant bilinguals did. Yet, when the same speech events were presented audiovisually, Spanish-dominants (as well as Catalan-dominants) were sensitive to the phonemic contrast. Finally, when the stimuli were presented only visually (in the absence of sound), none of the two groups presented clear signs of discrimination. Our results suggest that visual speech gestures enhance second language perception at the level of phonological processing especially by way of multisensory integration.     

Spotting animals in natural scenes: efficiency of humans and monkeys at very low contrasts

The ability of monkeys to categorize objects in visual stimuli such as natural scenes might rely on sets of low-level visual cues without any underlying conceptual abilities. Using a go/no-go rapid animal/non-animal categorization task with briefly flashed achromatic natural scenes, we show that both human and monkey performance is very robust to large variations of stimulus luminance and contrast. When mean luminance was increased or decreased by 25–50%, accuracy and speed impairments were small. The largest impairment was found at the highest luminance value with monkeys being mainly impaired in accuracy (drop of 6% correct vs. <1.5% in humans), whereas humans were mainly impaired in reaction time (20 ms increase in median reaction time vs. 4 ms in monkeys). Contrast reductions induced a large deterioration of image definition, but performance was again remarkably robust. Subjects scored well above chance level, even when the contrast was only 12% of the original photographs (≈81% correct in monkeys; ≈79% correct in humans). Accuracy decreased with contrast reduction but only reached chance level -in both species- for the most extreme condition, when only 3% of the original contrast remained. A progressive reaction time increase was observed that reached 72 ms in monkeys and 66 ms in humans. These results demonstrate the remarkable robustness of the primate visual system in processing objects in natural scenes with large random variations in luminance and contrast. They illustrate the similarity with which performance is impaired in monkeys and humans with such stimulus manipulations. They finally show that in an animal categorization task, the performance of both monkeys and humans is largely independent of cues relying on global luminance or the fine definition of stimuli.     

Controlling low-level image properties: The SHINE toolbox

Visual perception can be influenced by top-down processes related to the observer’s goals and expectations, as well as by bottom-up processes related to low-level stimulus attributes, such as luminance, contrast, and spatial frequency. When using different physical stimuli across psychological conditions, one faces the problem of disentangling the contributions of low- and high-level factors. Here, we make available the SHINE (spectrum, histogram, and intensity normalization and equalization) toolbox for MATLAB, which we have found useful for controlling a number of image properties separately or simultaneously. The toolbox features functions for specifying the (rotational average of the) Fourier amplitude spectra, for normalizing and scaling mean luminance and contrast, and for exact histogram specification optimized for perceptual visual quality. SHINE can thus be employed for parametrically modifying a number of image properties or for equating them across stimuli to minimize potential low-level confounds in studies on higher level processes.     

Working memory modulates the perception of time

Recent research has indicated that reentrant feedback from the contents of working memory can enhance neural representations and the perceptual strengths of matching stimuli in the visual field. However, whether the contents of working memory can also distort conscious experiences of perception remains unclear. Our present results show that the durations of perceptual stimuli matching the nontemporal representations in working memory tend to be perceived as longer than those of mismatching stimuli. This is the first demonstration that working memory can lead to distortions of time perception. Our findings are consistent with the ideas that the perceived duration of a stimulus depends on the magnitude of the neural responses to that stimulus in visual cortex and that there is a common system for representing both temporal and nontemporal magnitudes. We conclude that top-down modulation from the nontemporal contents of working memory distorts the perceptual experience of temporal duration.     

Object recognition and Random Image Structure Evolution

We present a technique called Random Image Structure Evolution (RISE) for use in experimental investigations of high-level visual perception. Potential applications of RISE include the quantitative measurement of perceptual hysteresis and priming, the study of the neural substrates of object perception, and the assessment and detection of subtle forms of agnosia. In simple terms, RISE involves the measurement of perceptual and/or neural responses as visual stimuli are systematically transformed—in particular, as recognizable objects evolve from, then dissolve into, randomness. Points along the sequences corresponding to the onset and offset of subjects’ percepts serve as markers for quantitatively and objectively characterizing several perceptual phenomena. Notably, these image sequences are created in a manner that strictly controls a number of important low-level image properties, such as luminance and frequency spectra, thus reducing confounds in the analysis of high-level visual processes. Here we describe the RISE paradigm, report the results of a few basic RISE experiments, and discuss a number of experimental and clinical applications of this approach.     

The role of occlusion in the perception of depth, lightness, and opacity

A theory is presented that explains how the visual system infers the lightness, opacity, and depth of surfaces from stereoscopic images. It is shown that the polarity and magnitude of image contrast play distinct roles in surface perception, which can be captured by 2 principles of perceptual inference. First, a contrast depth asymmetry principle articulates how the visual system computes the ordinal depth and lightness relationships from the polarity of local, binocularly matched image contrast. Second, a global transmittance anchoring principle expresses how variations in contrast magnitudes are used to infer the presence of transparent surfaces. It is argued that these principles provide a unified explanation of how the visual system computes the 3-D surface structure of opaque and transparent surfaces.     

Colour vision brings clarity to shadows

We have revealed a new role for colour vision in visual scene analysis: colour vision facilitates shadow identification. Shadows are important features of the visual scene, providing information about the shape, depth, and movement of objects. To be useful for perception, however, shadows must be distinguished from other types of luminance variation, principally the variation in object reflectance. A potential cue for distinguishing shadows from reflectance variations is colour, since chromatic changes typically occur at object but not shadow boundaries. We tested whether colour cues were exploited by the visual system for shadow identification, by comparing the ability of human test subjects to identify simulated shadows on chromatically variegated versus achromatically variegated backgrounds with identical luminance compositions. Performance was superior with the chromatically variegated backgrounds. Furthermore, introducing random colour contrast across the shadow boundaries degraded their identification. These findings demonstrate that the visual system exploits inbuilt assumptions about the relationships between colour and luminance in the natural visual world.     

Transparency: relation to depth, subjective contours, luminance, and neon color spreading

The perception of transparency is highly dependent on luminance and perceived depth. An image region is seen as transparent if it is of intermediate luminance relative to adjacent image regions, and if it is perceived in front of another region and has a boundary which provides information that an object is visible through this region. Yet, transparency is not just the passive end-product of these required conditions. If perceived transparency is triggered, a number of seemingly more elemental perceptual primitives such as color, contour, and depth can be radically altered. Thus, with the perception of transparency, neon color spreading becomes apparent, depth changes, stereoscopic depth capture can be eliminated, and otherwise robust subjective contours can be abolished. In addition, we show that transparency is not coupled strongly to real-world chromatic constraints since combinations of luminance and color which would be unlikely to arise in real-world scenes still give rise to the perception of transparency. Rather than seeing transparency as a perceptual end-point, determined by seemingly more primitive processes, we interpret perceived transparency as much a 'cause', as an 'effect'. We speculate that the anatomical substrate for such mutual interaction may lie in cortical feed-forward connections which maintain modular segregation and cortical feedback connections which do not.     

Action-dependent perceptual invariants: from ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations.     

Visual-auditory events: cross-modal perceptual priming and recognition memory.

Modality specificity in priming is taken as evidence for independent perceptual systems. However, Easton, Greene, and Srinivas (1997) showed that visual and haptic cross-modal priming is comparable in magnitude to within-modal priming. Where appropriate, perceptual systems might share like information. To test this, we assessed priming and recognition for visual and auditory events, within- and across- modalities. On the visual test, auditory study resulted in no priming. On the auditory priming test, visual study resulted in priming that was only marginally less than within-modal priming. The priming results show that visual study facilitates identification on both visual and auditory tests, but auditory study only facilitates performance on the auditory test. For both recognition tests, within-modal recognition exceeded cross-modal recognition. The results have two novel implications for the understanding of perceptual priming: First, we introduce visual and auditory priming for spatio-temporal events as a new priming paradigm chosen for its ecological validity and potential for information exchange. Second, we propose that the asymmetry of the cross-modal priming observed here may reflect the capacity of these perceptual modalities to provide cross-modal constraints on ambiguity. We argue that visual perception might inform and constrain auditory processing, while auditory perception corresponds to too many potential visual events to usefully inform and constrain visual perception.     

Testing the generality of the zoom-lens model: Evidence for visual-pathway specific effects of attended-region size on perception

There are volumes of information available to process in visual scenes. Visual spatial attention is a critically important selection mechanism that prevents these volumes from overwhelming our visual system’s limited-capacity processing resources. We were interested in understanding the effect of the size of the attended area on visual perception. The prevailing model of attended-region size across cognition, perception, and neuroscience is the zoom-lens model. This model stipulates that the magnitude of perceptual processing enhancement is inversely related to the size of the attended region, such that a narrow attended-region facilitates greater perceptual enhancement than a wider region. Yet visual processing is subserved by two major visual pathways (magnocellular and parvocellular) that operate with a degree of independence in early visual processing and encode contrasting visual information. Historically, testing of the zoom-lens has used measures of spatial acuity ideally suited to parvocellular processing. This, therefore, raises questions about the generality of the zoom-lens model to different aspects of visual perception. We found that while a narrow attended-region facilitated spatial acuity and the perception of high spatial frequency targets, it had no impact on either temporal acuity or the perception of low spatial frequency targets. This pattern also held up when targets were not presented centrally. This supports the notion that visual attended-region size has dissociable effects on magnocellular versus parvocellular mediated visual processing.     

Perception of ensemble statistics requires attention

To overcome inherent limitations in perceptual bandwidth, many aspects of the visual world are represented as summary statistics (e.g., average size, orientation, or density of objects). Here, we investigated the relationship between summary (ensemble) statistics and visual attention. Recently, it was claimed that one ensemble statistic in particular, color diversity, can be perceived without focal attention. However, a broader debate exists over the attentional requirements of conscious perception, and it is possible that some form of attention is necessary for ensemble perception. To test this idea, we employed a modified inattentional blindness paradigm and found that multiple types of summary statistics (color and size) often go unnoticed without attention. In addition, we found attentional costs in dual-task situations, further implicating a role for attention in statistical perception. Overall, we conclude that while visual ensembles may be processed efficiently, some amount of attention is necessary for conscious perception of ensemble statistics.