Resistance to persuasive messages as a function of majority and minority source status

Three experiments examined the extent to which attitudes following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter-persuasion. In Experiment 1, participants’ attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages which argued opposite positions (initial pro-attitudinal message and subsequent, counter-attitudinal counter-message). Attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a (second) counter-message than attitudes following majority endorsement of the initial message. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the message direction was reversed (counter-attitudinal initial message and pro-attitudinal counter-message) and showed that the level of message elaboration mediated the amount of attitude resistance. Experiment 3 included conditions where participants received only the counter-message and showed that minority-source participants had resisted the second message (counter-message) rather than being influenced by it. These results show that minority influence induces systematic processing of its arguments which leads to attitudes which are resistant to counter-persuasion.     

Majority versus minority influence: when,not whether,source status instigates heuristic or systematic processing

Two experiments investigated the extent of message processing of a persuasive communication proposed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both experiments crossed source status (majority versus minority) with message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to determine which source condition is associated with systematic processing. The first experiment showed a reliable difference between strong and weak messages, indicating systematic processing had occurred, for a minority irrespective of message direction (pro‐ versus counter‐attitudinal), but not for a majority. The second experiment showed that message outcome moderates when a majority or a minority leads to systematic processing. When the message argued for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the majority source; but when the message did not argue for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the minority source. Thus one key moderator of whether a majority or minority source leads to message processing is whether the topic induces defensive processing motivated by self‐interest. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bending without breaking: examining the role of attitudinal ambivalence in resisting persuasive communication

The present research aims at showing that ambivalence may serve an adaptive function: to preserve attitudes and to resist persuasion. In two experiments, participants were exposed to a counter‐attitudinal message attributed to an ingroup majority. Results of both experiments showed that individuals high in ambivalence changed toward the source more than individuals low in ambivalence at the direct level, while at the indirect level––where the link between attitudes and the source's message is less apparent––individuals low in ambivalence changed toward the source more than individuals high in ambivalence. Experiment 2 also showed that this effect is particularly true for high self‐monitoring participants, thereby supporting a motivational interpretation of the effect. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of caffeine on persuasion and attitude change: The role of secondary tasks in manipulating systematic message processing

Two experiments are reported that examine the effects of caffeine consumption on attitude change by using different secondary tasks to manipulate message processing. The first experiment employed an orientating task whilst the second experiment employed a distracter task. In both experiments participants consumed an orange‐juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not contain caffeine (placebo) prior to reading a counter‐attitudinal communication. The results across both experiments were similar. When message processing was reduced or under high distraction, there was no attitude change irrespective of caffeine consumption. However, when message processing was enhanced or under low distraction, there was greater attitude change in the caffeine vs. placebo conditions. Furthermore, attitudes formed after caffeine consumption resisted counter‐persuasion (Experiment 1) and led to indirect attitude change (Experiment 2). The extent that participants engaged in message‐congruent thinking mediated the amount of attitude change. These results provide evidence that moderate amounts of caffeine increase systematic processing of the arguments in the message resulting in greater agreement. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resisting persuasion by illegitimate means: a metacognitive perspective on minority influence

The present research tests a new metacognitive perspective on resistance in minority influence situations. It is proposed that when people initially resist persuasive messages from sources in the numerical minority, they can lose attitude certainty if they perceive that they have based their attitudes on the source's minority status and also believe this is an illegitimate basis for resistance. In three studies, participants were presented with a message from a minority source. In Study 1, participants became less certain of their attitudes after resisting this message. In Study 2, this effect only emerged when participants were led to believe they had based their attitudes on the source's minority status and this was an illegitimate thing to do. In Study 3, this effect was shown to have implications for persuasion in response to a second message. The implications of these findings for classic minority influence effects are discussed.     

Resisting persuasion by the skin of one's teeth: the hidden success of resisted persuasive messages

Recent research has suggested that when people resist persuasion they can perceive this resistance and, under specifiable conditions, become more certain of their initial attitudes (e.g., Z. L. Tormala & R. E. Petty, 2002). Within the same metacognitive framework, the present research provides evidence for the opposite phenomenon--that is, when people resist persuasion, they sometimes become less certain of their initial attitudes. Four experiments demonstrate that when people perceive that they have done a poor job resisting persuasion (e.g., they believe they generated weak arguments against a persuasive message), they lose attitude certainty, show reduced attitude-behavioral intention correspondence, and become more vulnerable to subsequent persuasive attacks. These findings suggest that resisted persuasive attacks can sometimes have a hidden yet important success by reducing the strength of the target attitude.     

Systematic and heuristic processing of majority and minority-endorsed messages: the effects of varying outcome relevance and levels of orientation on attitude and message processing

Two experiments investigated the conditions under which majority and minority sources instigate systematic processing of their messages. Both experiments crossed source status (majority vs. minority) with message quality (strong vs. weak arguments). In each experiment, message elaboration was manipulated by varying either motivational (outcome relevance, Experiment 1) or cognitive (orientating tasks, Experiment 2) factors. The results showed that when either motivational or cognitive factors encouraged low message elaboration, there was heuristic acceptance of the majority position without detailed message processing. When the level of message elaboration was intermediate, there was message processing only for the minority source. Finally, when message elaboration was high, there was message processing for both source conditions. These results show that majority and minority influence is sensitive to motivational and cognitive factors that constrain or enhance message elaboration and that both sources can lead to systematic processing under specific circumstances.     

Source Credibility and Attitude Certainty: A Metacognitive Analysis of Resistance to Persuasion

Recent research (Tormala & Petty, 2002) has demonstrated that when people resist persuasion, they can perceive this resistance and become more certain of their initial attitudes. This research explores the role of source credibility in determining when this effect occurs. In two experiments, participants received a counterattitudinal persuasive message. When participants counterargued this message, they became more certain of their attitudes, but only when it came from a source with high expertise. When the message came from a source with low expertise, resisting it had no impact on attitude certainty. This effect was shown using both a traditional measure of attitude certainty (Experiment 1) and a well‐established consequence of certainty—the correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intentions (Experiment 2). In addition, the effect was confined to high elaboration conditions, and occurred even when participants were not explicitly instructed to counterargue. These results are consistent with a metacognitive framework proposed to understand resistance to persuasion.     

The sleeper effect in persuasion: a meta-analytic review

A meta-analysis of the available judgment and memory data on the sleeper effect in persuasion is presented. According to this effect, when people receive a communication associated with a discounting cue, such as a noncredible source, they are less persuaded immediately after exposure than they are later in time. Findings from this meta-analysis indicate that recipients of discounting cues were more persuaded over time when the message arguments and the cue had a strong initial impact. In addition, the increase in persuasion was stronger when recipients of discounting cues had higher ability or motivation to think about the message and received the discounting cue after the message. These results are discussed in light of classic and contemporary models of attitudes and persuasion.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

Regulatory Fit and Persuasion: Basic Principles and Remaining Questions

How can researchers and practitioners use regulatory fit theory to increase the effectiveness of their attempts to change attitudes and behavior? In this article, we extract from the literature a set of basic processes by which fit can influence persuasion and describe different methods for inducing fit. Regulatory fit can influence persuasion by: (i) making message recipients feel right during message reception; (ii) increasing recipients’ strength of engagement with the message, which contributes to processing fluency; and (iii) influencing elaboration likelihood. Integral methods induce fit within the persuasion situation (as with framing of message arguments, source delivery style, and decision means), whereas incidental methods induce fit independent of the persuasion situation. We discuss common difficulties researchers may encounter with these techniques, and clarify existing confusions about regulatory fit and regulatory focus theory. Throughout, we highlight important questions that must be addressed to attain a complete understanding of regulatory fit.     

Majority versus minority influence and prediction of behavioral intentions and behavior

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and minority influence on attitude-consistent behavioral intentions. In the first experiment, when attitudes were changed via minority influence there was a greater likelihood to engage in an attitude-consistent behavioral intention than when attitudes were changed via majority influence. This suggests that minority influence leads to stronger attitudes (based on systematic processing) that are more predictive of behavioral intentions, while attitude change via majority influence is due to compliance through non-systematic processing. Further support for this interpretation comes from the finding that the amount of message-congruent elaboration mediated behavioral intention. When there was no attitude change, there was no impact on behavioral intention to engage in an attitude-consistent behavior. Experiment 2 explored the role of personal relevance of the topic and also included a real behavioral measure. When the topic was of low personal relevance, the same pattern was found as Experiment 1. When the topic was of high personal relevance, thus increasing the motivation to engage in systematic processing, attitudes changed by both a majority and minority source increased behavioral intention and actual behavior. The results are consistent with the view that both majorities and minorities can lead to different processes and consequences under different situations.     

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (‘majority’ versus ‘minority’), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

We're Closer than I Thought: Social Network Heterogeneity,Morality, and Political Persuasion

Literature in the area of social networks indicates that increases in perceived social network attitudinal heterogeneity generate increased openness to attitude change. Recent evidence in the area of morality, however, shows that morally based attitudes are particularly resistant to persuasion and can result in the rejection of disagreeing others. Positing that considering morality would reduce network influence, an experiment varied moral cues presented along with a non‐network persuasive message while holding the actual content constant. Results demonstrate that morality and network composition interact to predict persuasion, such that when people are not cued to consider morality increased network heterogeneity predicts increased persuasion, but when identical messages are presented in a way that invokes morality the impact of network heterogeneity disappears or even reverses marginally. This interactive effect was replicated in two very different political issues: gay adoption and nationalized healthcare. Implications for persuasion by morally motivated sources independent of the effects of specific moral arguments are discussed.     

Cognitive Processing and the Functional Matching Effect in Persuasion: The Mediating Role of Subjective Perceptions of Message Quality

In two experiments, we examined the hypothesis that subjective perceptions of message quality mediate the functional matching effect in persuasion. In Experiment 1, participants whose attitudes and behaviors serve primarily a value-expressive function (i.e., low self-monitors) or a social-adjustive function (i.e., high self-monitors) were exposed to persuasive messages that contained value-expressive, social-adjustive, or both types of arguments in favor of voting. Functionally-relevant messages (i.e., the social-adjustive message for high self-monitors and the value-expressive message for low self-monitors) produced enhanced perceptions of message quality and persuasiveness, more positive attitudes, and more message-related behavior than functionally nonrelevant messages. Functionally mixed messages were generally more effective than messages containing only functionally nonrelevant arguments, but less effective than messages containing only functionally relevant arguments. Path analyses indicated that the influence of functional relevance on attitudes and behavior was significantly mediated by subjective perceptions of the quality of the message. In Experiment 2, we exposed participants to a functionally relevant or nonrelevant voting appeal five days before a presidential election. Results replicated those of Experiment 1; functionally relevant messages produced more favorable attitudes, and this effect was mediated by enhanced perceptions of message quality. Finally, postmessage attitudes exerted a significant influence on whether participants voted in the election, and this effect was mediated by voting intentions. Discussion focuses on the subjective nature of message evaluation and on the cognitive processes underlying the functional matching effect in persuasion.     

Circumventing resistance: Using values to indirectly change attitudes

Most research on persuasion examines messages that directly address the attitude of interest. However, especially when message recipients are inclined to resist change, indirect methods might be more effective. Because values are rarely attacked and defended, value change could serve as a useful indirect route for attitude change. Attitudes toward affirmative action changed more when the value of equality was attacked (indirect change) than when affirmative action was directly attacked using the same message (Experiments 1-2). Changes in confidence in the value were responsible for the indirect change when the value was attacked (controlling for changes in favorability toward the value), whereas direct counterarguments to the message were responsible for the relative lack of change when the attitude was attacked directly (Experiment 2). Attacking the value of equality influenced attitudes toward policies related to the value but left policy attitudes unrelated to the value unchanged (Experiment 3). Finally, a manipulation of value confidence that left attitudes toward the value intact demonstrated similar confidence-based influences on policies related to the value of freedom (Experiment 4). Undermined value confidence also resulted in less confidence in the resulting policy attitudes controlling for the changes in the policy attitudes themselves (Experiments 3 and 4). Therefore, indirect change through value attacks presented a double threat-to both the policy attitudes and the confidence with which those policy attitudes were held (potentially leaving them open to additional influence). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Social influence: The role of originality

Two experiments investigated the role of message originality vs. conventionality in social influence. It was hypothesized that subjects would generate more original proposals when confronted with a minority advocating an original viewpoint than when confronted with a conventional minority proposal or with an original majority proposal. In the first experiment, subjects exposed to an original minority paired with a conventional majority produced a wider range and more original proposals than those exposed either to a conventional minority paired with a conventional majority or to a majority source only. The second experiment further demonstrated that the original message induced creative processing only when attributed to a minority source but not when attributed to a majority source. It also showed that the original minority elicited creative processing mainly when paired with a conventional majority, but not when paired with a majority advocating an equally original position. Findings are interpreted in the frame of Nemeth's (1986) minority influence theory.     

Mood and multiple source characteristics: mood congruency of source consensus status and source trustworthiness as determinants of message scrutiny

This research deals with the interplay of mood and multiple source characteristics in regard to persuasion processes and attitudes. In a four-factorial experiment, mood (positive vs. negative), source consensus status (majority vs. minority), source trustworthiness (high vs. low), and message strength (strong vs. weak) were manipulated. Results were in line with predictions of a mood-congruent expectancies perspective rather than competing predictions of a mood-as-information perspective. Specifically, individuals in both moods evinced higher message scrutiny given mood-incongruent (vs. mood-congruent) source characteristics. That is, across source trustworthiness, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given a minority (majority) versus a majority (minority) source. Furthermore, across source consensus, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given an untrustworthy (trustworthy) versus a trustworthy (untrustworthy) source. Additional analyses revealed that processing effort increased from doubly mood-congruent source combinations (low effort) over mixed-source combinations (intermediate effort) to doubly mood-incongruent combinations (high effort). Implications are discussed.     

The phenomenology of minority–majority status: Effects on innovation in argument generation

In three experiments, we manipulated participants' perceived numerical status and compared the originality and creativity of arguments generated by members of numerical minorities and majorities. Independent judges, blind to experimental conditions, rated participants' written arguments. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that participants assigned to a numerical minority generated more original arguments when advocating their own position than did numerical majorities. In Study 3, an equal‐factions control group was included in the design, and all participants were instructed to argue for a counter‐attitudinal position. Those in the numerical minority generated more creative arguments than those in both the majority and equal‐factions conditions, but not stronger arguments. We propose cognitive and social processes that may underlie our obtained effects and discuss implications for minority influence research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.