Deciphering Subjective Trajectories for Life Satisfaction Using Self‐versus‐Normative Other Discrepancies,Self‐esteem and Hope

Drawing on temporal and social comparison perspectives, we examined sources of the widespread belief that life gets better and better over time by determining how young adults evaluate their past, present and anticipated future life satisfaction (LS) relative to beliefs about normative others. We assessed whether patterns of subjective LS trajectories based on self‐versus‐normative other discrepancies varied as a function of self‐esteem and whether such patterns were accounted for by hope, encompassing goal‐related cognitions and motivations. University participants (n = 394) completed measures of their own and normative others' past, present and anticipated future LS, as well as self‐esteem and hope scales. Results from latent growth curve analyses demonstrated that high‐self‐esteem and low‐self‐esteem individuals perceived normative others' LS as progressing on a similar upward subjective temporal trajectory; however, high‐self‐esteem individuals perceived self‐improvement from past to present LS and self‐consistency from present to future LS relative to others. Low‐self‐esteem individuals perceived self‐consistency from past to present LS and self‐improvement from present to future LS relative to others. These associations were accounted for by hope. This research highlights the utility of combining temporal and social comparison perspectives for understanding how people envision their LS unfolding over time. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do I get better looking each day? Changes in self‐perceptions of attractiveness as a function of temporal perspective

Do people perceive themselves as becoming more attractive across time? The present studies investigated whether individuals (a) judge their previous self as physically less attractive than their current self and (b) judge their future self to be physically more attractive than their current self. The studies also investigated when temporal biasing of attractiveness is most likely to occur. In Study 1, students rated their present and past attractiveness. The results revealed that participants' ratings of past attractiveness were lower than current ratings, but only among individuals for whom attractiveness was important to their self‐concept. In Study 2, participants rated their present attractiveness and their expected attractiveness in 5 years. The results revealed that ratings of future attractiveness were higher than current ratings, but only among individuals who frequently engage in social comparisons. The implications of the results are discussed with respect to self‐appraisals of attractiveness and psychological well‐being. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subjective well‐being and valuation of future health states: Discrepancies between anticipated and experienced life satisfaction

One way of informing health policy decisions is to ask people about the impact that different health states would have on their future subjective well‐being. The present research explored the relation between anticipated and experienced changes in health‐related subjective well‐being, and examined whether affective forecasting errors could be reduced by psychological distancing manipulations. Using survey methodology, we tested whether people can accurately estimate the impact of different possible health states on their subjective well‐being. We also manipulated psychological distance: Forecasts were made about present self, future self, or others. Based on construal level theory and past work on affective forecasting errors, our prediction was that increasing psychological distance may reduce the mismatch between anticipated and experienced impact of health states on subjective well‐being. We found that the impact of ill health on subjective well‐being was greatly overpredicted and that this overprediction was not eliminated when participants were asked to make predictions about themselves in the future or about other people. Consistent with past work, we found that our participants correctly expected that their subjective well‐being would deteriorate more if they experienced the highest levels of mental illness as compared to the highest intensities of pain or most severe limitations to physical functioning.     

Autobiographical memories and views of the future: In relation to dysphoria

The present study investigated dysphoric individuals' self‐referential processing of autobiographical memories and future personal events, in relation to specificity and response latency. Dysphoric individuals (n  =  17) and nondysphoric controls (n  =  17) were selected from a larger sample based on self‐reported depression. Participants completed an autobiographical memory task (AMT) and a future event task (FET), using pleasant and unpleasant (anxiety‐relevant, depression‐relevant) emotional word cues. In response to each emotional cue, participants were required to access and write down a specific personal memory and future event, respectively. Consistent with the hypotheses, dysphoric individuals were less specific in describing pleasant and unpleasant experiences (particularly pleasant), irrespective of time condition. As expected, dysphoric individuals' specificity for distinct depression‐relevant and anxiety‐relevant experiences did not differ significantly. As predicted, all participants were less specific in describing future personal events than in recalling personal memories. As predicted, dysphoric individuals took longer to think of pleasant memories and pleasant future experiences than controls but, as expected, groups did not differ significantly on mean reaction times for past and future unpleasant experiences. Overall, the data showed a degree of consistency in participants' past and future‐oriented processing of self‐referential material. Although considerable research has investigated autobiographical memories in relation to emotional disturbance, the present findings suggest that constructing future emotional experiences is also an important aspect of mental health.     

A Critical Test of Self‐Enhancement,Exposure, and Self‐Categorization Explanations for First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

The third‐person perception is the tendency for people to believe that others are more influenced by media content than themselves (W. P. Davison, 1983 ). The current study provides a critical test of self‐enhancement, exposure, and self‐categorization explanations for first‐ (i.e., self more influenced than others) and third‐person perceptions. Male and female participants (N = 323) judged the extent to which pornography elicited“aroused and excited” (i.e., male normative) versus“repulsed and offended” (i.e., female normative) reactions in themselves relative to average men and women. Men perceived an average woman to be more repulsed and offended by pornography than themselves, and women perceived an average man to be more aroused and excited than themselves (i.e., large third‐person perceptions). Further, men perceived themselves to be more aroused and excited by pornography than an average woman (independent of the degree to which pornography was judged as antisocial), and women perceived themselves to be more repulsed and offended than an average man (i.e., large first‐person perceptions). There were relatively small effects for same sex comparisons independent of norm. The pattern and magnitude of first‐ and third‐person perceptions are consistent with self‐categorization theory, irreconcilable with the exposure hypothesis, and difficult to reconcile with the self‐enhancement explanation.     

Empathy,culture and self‐humanising: Empathising reduces the attribution of greater humanness to the self more in Japan than Australia

People tend to ascribe greater humanness to themselves than to others. Previous research has indicated that this “self‐humanising” bias is independent of self‐enhancement and robust across cultures. The present study examined the possible role of empathy in reducing this bias in Japan (N = 80) and Australia (N = 80). Results showed that unlike Australians, Japanese participants who recalled personal experiences of empathising with others were less likely to self‐humanise than those in a neutral condition. The effect of the empathy manipulation was not observed in Australia. The findings suggest that empathy may reduce self‐focus and enable perceivers to appreciate the full humanness of others, but this effect may be culturally contingent.     

The effect of red color on perceived self‐attractiveness

Recent research showed that individuals are perceived as more attractive when presented with the color red. We seek to extend these findings by studying the effects of red color on individuals' perception of self‐attractiveness, rather than the attractiveness of others. Based on the color‐in‐context theory, we hypothesized that individuals would perceive themselves as more attractive under red chromatic conditions. In three experiments, participants were asked to wear a red or a blue shirt and rated their own attractiveness. As expected, participants in the red shirt condition indicated a higher level of self‐attractiveness than participants in the blue condition. Moreover, the results showed that the self‐perception red effect was mediated by the individuals' self‐perceived sexual receptivity and self‐perceived status.     

The I That Buys: Narcissists as Consumers

Which people are most swayed by self‐image motives and hence most likely to make consumer choices in line with those motives? This article contends that the answer is narcissists—individuals who see themselves, and who want others to see them, as special, superior, and entitled and who are prone to exhibitionism and vanity. This work hypothesizes that narcissists will, to validate their excessively positive self‐views, strive to purchase the high‐prestige products (i.e., expensive, exclusive, new, and flashy). In so doing, they will regulate their own esteem by increasing their apparent status and consequently earning others’ admiration and envy. This article also hypothesizes that narcissists will show greater interest in the symbolic than utilitarian value of products and will exhibit, even controlling for self‐esteem, more pronounced self‐enhancement phenomena such as endowment and self‐signaling effects.     

Misattribution in Virtual Groups: The Effects of Member Distribution on Self‐Serving Bias and Partner Blame

Interest in virtual groups has focused on attribution biases due to the collocation or distribution of partners. No previous research examines self‐attributions in virtual groups, yet self‐attributions—the acknowledgment of personal responsibility or its deflection—potentially determines learning and improvement. This study reviews research on attributions in virtual groups and the effects of distance on members’ proclivity to blame others or themselves. An experiment involved groups whose members were geographically collocated, distributed, or mixed, working over 2 weeks exclusively using asynchronous computer‐mediated communication. Attributions for participants’ own poor performance reflected a self‐serving bias in completely distributed groups, whose members eschewed personal responsibility and blamed their partners more than in collocated groups. Mixed groups’ results help distinguish among competing theoretical perspectives. Moreover, an externally imposed observational goal mitigated attributional bias among distributed members by raising awareness of the sociotechnical effects of communication medium among those for whom the goal was successfully induced.     

Do Our Facebook Friends Make Us Feel Worse? A Study of Social Comparison and Emotion

People often compare themselves to others to gain a better understanding of the self in a process known as social comparison. The current study discusses how people engage in a social comparison process on Facebook, and how observing content from their Facebook friends may affect their emotions. A 2 (comparison direction) × 2 (relational closeness) × 2 (self‐esteem) between‐subjects experiment was conducted with 163 adult participants. The results revealed a significant 3‐way interaction such that people with high self‐esteem would be happier receiving positive information than negative information from their close friends, but the effect would be the opposite if the information was from a distant friend. There was no such difference for people with low self‐esteem.     

Sometimes inclusion breeds suspicion: Self‐uncertainty and belongingness predict belief in conspiracy theories

In the present contribution, the author investigated the idea that messages communicating inclusion by others lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs about impactful societal events than messages communicating exclusion by others. These effects of belongingness, however, were expected only among people who experience high levels of self‐uncertainty. In Study 1, a manipulation of belongingness predicted belief in conspiracy theories only among people with unstable self‐esteem (an individual difference indicator of self‐uncertainty), while controlling for self‐esteem level. In Study 2, a manipulation of belongingness influenced belief in conspiracy theories only among participants who were experimentally induced to feel uncertain about themselves. It is concluded that among self‐uncertain people, inclusion breeds suspicion about the causes of impactful and harmful societal events.     

Social and Temporal Comparisons Made by Individuals Living With HIV Disease: Relationships to Adherence Behavior1

When faced with the uncertainty of serious illness, individuals cope by comparing themselves to other people (social comparisons) and to other times in their lives (temporal comparisons). Participants were 44 individuals being treated for HIV who completed questionnaires measuring comparisons, adherence, and self‐efficacy; 34 also completed qualitative interviews that were coded for comparisons. High levels of comparison to worse‐off others, worse‐off past selves, and better‐off future selves were prevalent. Comparisons to worse‐off others resulting in positive affect were associated with greater medication adherence; comparisons to better‐off others resulting in negative affect were related to worse adherence. Self‐efficacy to adhere mediated the relationship between comparison and adherence. Individuals who are uncertain about treatment outcomes may engage in social comparison to gain specific knowledge about adherence.     

Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

Comparisons over time: Temporal trajectories,social comparison,and self‐evaluation

Social comparison information fluctuates over time. We examined how people evaluate their task performance and ability after receiving test feedback specifying not only that they ranked above or below average, but also that their social status was rising, falling, or remaining constant. Participants' self‐evaluations were more positive when their social standing was rising over time rather than remaining constant. On the other hand, participants whose status was falling did not evaluate themselves less favorably than those with a constant position in the performance distribution. These reactions to performance feedback were observed on self‐evaluations of ability, but not on more even‐handed assessments of performance. Implications for social comparison and self‐evaluation maintenance theories are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On being peripheral: effects of identity insecurity on personal and collective self‐esteem

We examined collective self‐esteem and personal self‐esteem as a function of anticipated changes in one's prototypicality within a valued ingroup. In Study 1 (N = 80), all participants received information that they were currently peripheral group members. Expectations for the future were then manipulated, with some expecting to become more prototypical and others expecting they would be even more peripheral in the future. In addition, the source of future movement (either the group or the self) was varied. It was found that when the group was the source of movement, those who expected to shift to a more prototypical position in the future had higher collective self‐esteem than those who expected to change to an even more peripheral position. In contrast, those who anticipated an even more peripheral position had higher personal self‐esteem than those who expected to become more prototypical in the future. In Study 2 (N = 100), intragroup position at present (peripheral versus prototypical) and future intragroup position (peripheral versus prototypical) were manipulated orthogonally. It was found that future expectations only affected self‐esteem among those with an insecure current identity, but not among those who were currently prototypical of the ingroup. In addition, ingroup favoritism was mediated by self‐esteem changes among those whose identity was insecure. The importance of a dynamic framework for investigating group processes is stressed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self–other differences in multiattribute decision making: Compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies

When making decisions where options involve multiple attributes, a person can choose to use a compensatory, utility maximizing strategy, which involves consideration and integration of all available attributes. Alternatively, a person can choose a noncompensatory strategy that extracts only the most important and reliable attributes. The present research examined whether other‐oriented decisions would involve greater reliance on a noncompensatory, lexicographic decision strategy than self‐oriented decisions. In three studies (Mturk workers and college students), the difference in other‐oriented versus self‐oriented decisions in a medical decision context was explained by a subsample of participants that chose the death minimizing operation on all 10 decisions (Study 1) and a subsample of participants who self‐reported that they used a strategy that minimized the chance of death on every decision (i.e., a lexicographic mortality heuristic; Study 2). In Study 2, tests of mediation found that self‐reported use of the mortality heuristic completely accounted for the self–other effect on decisions. In Study 3, participants were more likely to report prospectively that they would adopt the mortality heuristic when making decisions for others than for themselves, suggesting that participants were not mistakenly inferring a lexicographic decision strategy from their past behavior. The results suggest that self–other effects in multiattribute choice involve differential use of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies and that beyond this group difference, individual differences in the use of these strategies also exist within self‐oriented and other‐oriented decisions.     

Self‐Representations in Immersive Virtual Environments1

This experiment varied whether individuals interacted with virtual representations of themselves or of others in an immersive virtual environment. In the self‐representation condition, half of the participants interacted with a self‐representation that bore photographic resemblance to them, whereas the other half interacted with a self‐representation that bore no resemblance to them. In the other‐representation condition, participants interacted with a representation of another individual. The experimental design was a 2 (Participant Gender) × 3 (Agent Identity: high‐similarity self‐representation vs. low‐similarity self‐representation vs. other representation). Overall, participants displayed more intimacy‐consistent behaviors for representations of themselves than others. Implications of using immersive virtual environment technology for studying the self are discussed.     

Motivated self and recall: visual perspectives in remembering past behaviors

The present study examined motivational influences on visual perspectives in remembering past events and behaviors. Participants were first induced to believe that extraversion or introversion is conducive of success. Next, they recalled in details two introverted past behaviors. Introversion‐success participants, presumably motivated to see themselves as introverted, recalled and visualized the behaviors more from a first‐person actor perspective than did extraversion‐success participants (who recalled the behaviors from a third‐person observer perspective). Remembering past behaviors from a first‐person actor perspective implies that the behaviors are true of the self and impacts self‐definition to a relatively greater degree. The findings thus extend the influence of desired self to how people remember past events. They also contribute to the integration of motives in research on the link between self‐inferences and the subjective experience of remembering. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.