Motivational influence on the quality of memories: recall of general autobiographical memories related to desired attributes

This article concerns recall of general autobiographical memories in motivated self‐perception. General memories, comprising abstraction of repeated or similar behaviours, have more impact on how one defines oneself than do specific memories. In a study, participants were first induced to believe that either extraversion or introversion leads to success. In the recall task that followed, introversion‐success participants recalled more general memories related to introversion than did extraversion‐success participants. In contrast, extraversion‐success participants recalled more general extraverted memories than did introversion‐success participants. Thus, to preserve a positive self‐image as characterized by desirable attributes, recall may be directed towards generation of general memories related to the attributes. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

In search of information that confirms a desired self-perception: motivated processing of social feedback and choice of social interactions

The present studies examined how the motivation to see oneself as characterized by desirable attributes may influence feedback seeking and social preferences. In Study 1, participants were first led to believe that extraversion or introversion is conducive of success. Next, they received false feedback about themselves, related to extraversion and to introversion. In a surprise recall, extraversion-success participants remembered extraversion feedback more accurately and introversion feedback less, compared to introversion-success participants. Study 2 examined preferences for others as potential sources of feedback. The findings revealed that extraversion-success participants preferred others who perceived them as extraverted, whereas introversion-success participants preferred others who perceived them as introverted. Thus, people appear to rely on how others regard them to realize a desired self-perception. These processes, oriented more toward social and interpersonal aspects of the self, complement the more intrapersonal processes of motivated self-perception studied in the past.     

When I and me are different: assimilation and contrast in temporal self‐comparisons

In two studies, we show that comparisons with past or possible future selves shape current self‐evaluation and that the direction of this influence is determined by one's current comparison focus. In Study 1, participants primed to focus on similarities versus dissimilarities were asked to remember an introverted or extraverted past self and then to evaluate their current level of extraversion. Participants who focused on similarities assimilated current self‐evaluations to the past self, whereas those who focused on dissimilarities contrasted current self‐evaluations away from the past self. In Study 2, participants imagined a possible future self that differed from their current self in terms of body weight. Participants who imagined a moderate weight change exhibited assimilation to the possible self, whereas those who imagined an extreme weight change exhibited contrast. These studies highlight the important role cognitive factors such as comparison focus play in shaping the consequences of temporal self‐comparisons. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Introspection &; remembering

We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving with images. In support of this argument we review developmental evidence that children’s episodic remembering is independent of and emerges after mastery of the false belief task but emerges together with the use of imagery for solving visual rotation tasks.     

Field and observer modes of remembering

Abstract

Nigro and Neisser (1983) contrasted two ways of remembering personal experiences: the rememberer may ‘see’ the event from his or her perspective as in normal perception, or ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would. Several factors contribute to the determination of perspective, but Nigro and Neisser also reported that many subjects claimed they could change to another perspective at will. We sampled personal memories from several life periods and assessed ability to change the initially reported perspective. Changing was easier for recent or vividly recalled events, harder for older and less vividly recalled events. Memory perspectives may differ in other aspects than their imagery. A second study was conducted to determine whether affective experience is altered when perspectives are changed. The affect experienced decreased when shifting from a field to an observer perspective, but did not change with the converse shift. These studies provide further evidence that remembering is more than retrieval. The information that enters awareness is determined by the information sources in memory and the organisational scheme adopted for recollection.     

Employing autobiographical memory perspective to influence self‐congruence and brand preference

This paper advances our understanding of consumer behavior by examining the influence of autobiographical memory perspective on consumer's self‐congruence. While extant research has primarily restricted itself to the consequences of self‐congruence, this work focuses on an antecedent, by examining the psychological processes associated with the consumer's autobiographical memory perspective and the resulting impact on self‐congruence. Through three experiments, we demonstrate that visualizing autobiographical memories from a first‐person versus a third‐person perspective impacts consumers' self‐brand congruence differently under varied circumstances. Specifically, differing degrees of self‐brand congruence are experienced when consumers focus on differences (vs. similarities) between their present and recalled selves, combined with distinct autobiographical memory perspectives. The autobiographical memory perspective is identified as a key determinant of consumers' perceived change in self‐image, which, in turn, has a cascading effect on their self‐brand congruence. Thus, consumers' perceived change in self‐image is identified as the mechanism underlying the main effect. Furthermore, as an important component of self‐image, this research determines and examines a moderating influence of self‐esteem in the relationship between autobiographical memory perspective and self‐congruence. Collectively, these results facilitate our understanding of the autobiographical memory perspective as an antecedent of consumer's self‐congruence, with implications for nostalgia advertising and retro branding.     

The effects of autobiographical memory and visual perspective on working memory

The present research aims to explore whether recalling and writing about autobiographical memory from different perspectives (first-person perspective vs. third-person perspective) could affect cognitive function. The participants first performed a working memory task to evaluate their working memory capacity as a baseline and then were instructed to recall (Study 1) or write about (Study 2) personal events (failures vs. successes) from the first-person perspective or the third-person perspective. Finally, they performed the working memory task again. The results suggested that autobiographical memory and perspective influence working memory interactively. When recalling a success, the participants who recalled from the third-person perspective performed better than those who recalled from the first-person perspective on the working memory capacity task; when recalling a failure, the opposite was true.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: Examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

Remembering from any angle: the flexibility of visual perspective during retrieval

When recalling autobiographical memories, individuals often experience visual images associated with the event. These images can be constructed from two different perspectives: first person, in which the event is visualized from the viewpoint experienced at encoding, or third person, in which the event is visualized from an external vantage point. Using a novel technique to measure visual perspective, we examined where the external vantage point is situated in third-person images. Individuals in two studies were asked to recall either 10 or 15 events from their lives and describe the perspectives they experienced. Wide variation in spatial locations was observed within third-person perspectives, with the location of these perspectives relating to the event being recalled. Results suggest remembering from an external viewpoint may be more common than previous studies have demonstrated.     

Memory for positive,negative and neutral events in younger and older adults: Does emotion influence binding in event memory?

When remembering an event, it is important to remember both the features of the event (e.g., a person and an action) and the connections among features (e.g., who performed which action). Emotion often enhances memory for stimulus features, but the relationship between emotion and the binding of features in memory is unclear. Younger and older adults attempted to remember events in which a person performed a negative, positive or neutral action. Memory for the action was enhanced by emotion, but emotion did not enhance the ability of participants to remember which person performed which action. Older adults were more likely than younger adults to make binding errors in which they incorrectly remembered a familiar actor performing a familiar action that had actually been performed by someone else, and this age-related associative deficit was found for both neutral and emotional actions. Emotion not only increased correct recognition of old events for older and younger adults but also increased false recognition of events in which a familiar actor performed a familiar action that had been performed by someone else. Thus, although emotion may enhance memory for the features of an event, it does not increase the accuracy of remembering who performed which action.     

Moods and Memories: Elation, depression, and the remembering of the events of one's life

Three experiments investigated the influence of current mood states on the remembering of past events of one's own life. In the first and the second experiment, participants were induced to experience either the mood state of elation or the mood state of depression. They then reported events and experiences that had occurred during the previous week. In the first and the second experiments, using converging methods for assessing memory for past events, participants differentially reported past events and experiences whose affective quality was congruent with their current mood states: participants in elated mood states preferentially reported pleasant events and happy experiences, and participants in depressed mood states preferentially reported unpleasant events and unhappy experiences. Additional evidence from the second experiment suggests that the differential remembering of affectively positive or affectively negative events requires that, at the time of the remembering of these events, participants actually experience the mood states of elation or depression and not simply attempt to remember past events that could account for elation or depression. In the third experiment, designed to assess the plausibility of “experimental demand” interpretations of these findings, participants who experienced ostensibly effective mood inductions that were actually ineffective failed to manifest differential remembering of affectively positive and affectively negative events. Implications of this series of experiments for understanding the mechanisms that may link moods and memories, as well as the intrapersonal and the interpersonal consequences of mood states, are discussed.     

On the Road to Self-Perception: Interpretation of Self-Behaviors Can Be Altered by Priming

ABSTRACT In 3 experiments, some participants read a story describing ambiguously mean behaviors performed by another person. Other participants read the story and imagined that they performed the behaviors. Results showed that (a) exposure to a conceptual priming manipulation caused assimilation effects in actor meanness judgments, regardless of whether the actor was self or other, (b) tasks designed neither to heighten self-concept accessibility nor to threaten the self moderated the effects of conceptual meanness primes on self-meanness judgments, and (c) this lack of moderation occurred despite considerable evidence of self–enhancement effects elsewhere in self-judgments. A fourth experiment examined the extent to which priming affected interpretations of real self or other behavior. Results were consistent with the idea that priming altered event interpretation and subsequent judgments but also suggested that judgments were influenced by self-enhancement motivation. Implications of the results for theorizing in personality and self-knowledge acquisition are discussed.     

Costs and benefits of collaborative remembering

Collaborative inhibition, the poorer memory performance of collaborative groups as compared with nominal (noninteracting) groups was measured in the free recall of categorized lists. In Experiment 1, collaborative inhibition was present in four‐person groups, but not in pairs of two‐person groups, where each was compared with performance in four‐person nominal groups. However, on a final individual free recall test, members of two‐ and four‐person collaborative groups recalled a higher proportion of the list than members of nominal groups. In Experiment 2, recall in three‐person collaborative groups was less than in three‐person nominal groups but only on the first of three successive study‐test trials. On the final individual free recall test, members of collaborative groups recalled more words than members of nominal groups. Despite inhibiting recall and reminiscence, collaboration benefits remembering when collaborators are subsequently tested individually. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An intraindividual process approach to the relationship between extraversion and positive affect: is acting extraverted as "good" as being extraverted?

This article investigates whether rapid variation within a person in extraversion is associated with positive affect variation in that person. In Study 1, participants reported their extraversion and positive affect every 3 hr for 2 weeks. Each participant was happier when acting extraverted than when acting introverted. Study 2's diary methodology replicated the relationship for weekly variations in positive affect. Study 3's experimental methodology replicated the relationship when extraversion was manipulated within a fixed situation. Thus, the relationship between extraversion and positive affect, previously demonstrated between persons, also characterizes the internal, ongoing psychological functioning of individuals and is likely to be explained by something capable of rapid intraindividual variation. Furthermore, traits and states are at least somewhat isomorphic, and acting extraverted may increase well-being.     

How temporal distance from past selves influences self‐perception

The present studies examine how perceived temporal distance from past selves influences perceptions of the current self. Participants recalled their past self either at age 9 or 15. These two past selves differ in levels of identification with gender and thus denote different standards of comparison. Three hypotheses were tested. Temporal distance should determine whether recalled past selves produce assimilation or contrast effects on the current self. Second, temporal comparison effects should be weaker when people recall their past in terms of stable, relatively enduring characteristics (e.g. traits). Third, past selves should to a greater extent be biased by stereotypical knowledge about former lifetime periods the farther away individuals feel from past selves. Past selves coloured by stereotypical knowledge are more extreme and should thus produce stronger judgemental effects on the current self. The results supported the hypotheses. Implications for autobiographical remembering are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by a common set of constructive processes. In the present study, we directly addressed this assertion in the context of third-person perspectives that arise during remembering and episodic future thought. Specifically, we examined the frequency with which participants remembered past events or imagined future events from third-person perspectives. We also examined the different viewpoints from which third-person perspective events were remembered or imagined. Although future events were somewhat more likely to be imagined from a third-person perspective, the spatial viewpoint distributions of third-person perspectives characterizing remembered and imagined events were highly similar. These results suggest that a similar constructive mechanism may be at work when people remember events from a perspective that could not have been experienced in the past and when they imagine events from a perspective that could not be experienced in the future. The findings are discussed in terms of their consistency with—and as extensions of—the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.     

Aligning inside and outside perspectives of the self: A cross‐cultural difference in self‐perception

Past research shows that European Americans tend to take a first‐person perspective to understand the self and are unlikely to align the inside look with the outside gaze, whereas Asians tend to take a third‐person perspective and are likely to shift their inside look in the direction of the outsize gaze. In three experiments, we compared Asians and European Americans' self‐perceptions when the presence of their parents in the background of self‐perception was primed or otherwise. Without the priming, both European Americans and Asians viewed themselves more positively from their own perspective than from their parents' perspective. With the priming, only Asians lowered the positivity of their self‐perceptions to match the perceived positivity of the self in the parents' perspective. These results suggest that Asians do not have a static, passive tendency to assimilate their self‐views into the perceived external assessments of the self. Rather, their self‐views are fluid and flexible.