Creativity and the artwork: the perspectives of a painter and a philosopher

Creativity in Robert Henri's view is a gratuitous act, shot through with mystery; what is left after such an act is the artwork itself as concrete evidence that such a heightened state of consciousness has been achieved. This paper will examine Henri's understanding of the nature of creativity from his perspective as a twentieth century New York painter, in conjunction with Eliot Deutsch's theoretical insights as a philosopher deeply interested in the nature of the experience of an artwork. In his Essays on the nature of art, Deutsch presents the view that the experience of an artwork involves the assimilation of the work's aesthetic force, the recognition of its meaning, the discernment of its formal dimensions, and ‘calls for a special appropriation that yields an integrated wholeness’. This paper presents commonalities between Henri's and Deutsch individual perspectives and discusses some value‐centred educational implications that could be drawn from these commonalities.     

On the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities

We argue that in spite of their apparent dissimilarity, the methodologies employed in the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities can both be justified by appeal to a single principle of inductive reasoning, viz., the principle of symmetry. The difference between these two methodologies consists in the way in which information about the single-trial probabilities in a repeatable chance process is extracted from the constraints imposed by this principle. In the case of a posteriori reasoning, these constraints inform the analysis by fixing an a posteriori determinant of the probabilities, whereas, in the case of a priori reasoning, they imply certain claims which then serve as the basis for subsequent probabilistic deductions. In a given context of inquiry, the particular form which a priori or a posteriori reason may take depends, in large part, on the strength of the underlying symmetry assumed: the stronger the symmetry, the more information can be acquired a priori and the less information about the long-run behavior of the process is needed for an a posteriori assessment of the probabilities. In the context of this framework, frequency-based reasoning emerges as a limiting case of a posteriori reasoning, and reasoning about simple games of chance, as a limiting case of a priori reasoning. Between these two extremes, both a priori and a posteriori reasoning can take a variety of intermediate forms.     

Presupposition and the a priori

This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with ‘ $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}$ ’ abbreviating ‘it is knowable a priori that’).

(AK) For all ?, ψ such that ? semantically presupposes ψ: if $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\phi, \,\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\psi .$

Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative items of knowledge are made explicit. Likewise, certain kinds of analytic truth turn out to carry semantic presuppositions that make them ineligible as items of a priori knowledge. On a happier note, I argue that (AK) offers an appealing, theory-neutral explanation of the a posteriori character of certain necessary identities, as well as an interesting rationalization for a commonplace linguistic maneuver in philosophical work on the a priori.     

Actuality and the a priori

Book Information Nietzsche's Middle Period. Nietzsche's Middle Period Ruth Abbey New York Oxford University Press 2000 xvii + 208 Hardback £33.50 By Ruth Abbey. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. xvii + 208. Hardback:£33.50,     

Toward a synthetic approach to the Rorschach: the case of a psychotic child.

Much Rorschach research on case material focuses on the utility of a single scoring system, set of variables, or scale in isolation from other systems, scales, or perspectives. This approach fails to acknowledge the complexity of the Rorschach and to reflect the manner in which sophisticated clinicians select and synthesize various perspectives during the clinical inference and decision-making process. A case of a psychotic child is presented to illustrate the utility of a synthetic approach to the Rorschach. The strengths and weaknesses of various Rorschach perspectives in addressing specific diagnostic issues is explored through the case material.     

An Account of the Psychotherapeutic Process from the Perspective of a Client with a Disability

No abstract available for this article.     

Avoidance of a return to the first component of a chain from the terminal component

Three pigeons were trained on a chained fixed interval-fixed ratio schedule. Avoidance behavior which postponed a return to the first chain component from the second component was maintained on a second response key concurrently with the second component. When the fixed interval length was increased, avoidance rates first increased and then decreased as a function of fixed interval length. As the fixed ratio requirement was increased for one subject, avoidance rates first declined and then increased at larger fixed ratio values. Avoidance behavior maintained by postponing the first chain component was similar to avoidance behavior maintained by postponing a time out period.