Environmental control and the perception of control

The perception of control may be established if an individual is provided with an opportunity to choose and if the outcome of the choice is moderately uncertain. In turn, perceived control has been shown to enhance motivation and performance. In the present experiment, the effects of uncertainty about environmental control were examined by measuring the speed with which choices were made. When control was implicitly provided, decision latencies were shorter than when control was either explicitly available or not available at all. Paradoxically, providing information about control may reduce uncertainty and thereby diminish the perception of control. The contribution of control and choice to the development of perceived control is discussed.This research is based on a thesis by the first author submitted in partial fulfillment of the master of science degree at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and was supported by a grant from the U.S. Army Research Office to the second author.     

Putting the client in control: The perception of control in the behavioral treatment of anxiety

Traditional explanations of anxiety reduction through behavioral interventions such as extinction, habituation, reciprocal inhibition, and counterconditioning do not adequately account for all instances and aspects of anxiety reduction and clinical methods employed in contemporary behavior therapy. This article examines the role of an additional process — the alterations of perceptions of control — believed to be operative in anxiety reduction. We discuss three targets for establishing control in behavioral treatments of anxiety: (1) control over one's physiological responding while in an anxiety-producing situation, (2) control over the anxiety-producing stimulus or situation itself, and (3) control over the conduct of exposure. These three types of control perceptions are differentially important for different types of anxiety disorders. Implications for the conduct of behavioral treatments and possibilities for increasing client perceptions of control in anxiety treatment programs are outlined. We also recommend that client perceptions of control should be systematically assessed in order to relate them to treatment successes and failures.     

On the development of stimulus control

Pigeons were trained to peck one key when presented with white noise at any of five intensities lower than a reference intensity, and to peck another key when presented with white noise at any of five intensities greater than the reference intensity. The shape of the stimulus control curves (proportion of responses to one key versus stimulus intensity) changed from a horizontal line at the beginning of training to the sigmoid form of typical psychometric functions at the end of training. The development of stimulus control is described in terms of a model based on the theory of signal recognition and a concept of attention.     

Psychotherapy and the locus of control

Underlying various actions of both the therapist and the patient are expectations about the measure to which an individual's experiences are the product of powerful external forces or of the person's own actions and decisions. While most of our anthropological theories support the notion that a person's experience is subject to an external locus of control, neither that view nor the opposite emphasizing freedom and autonomy is adequate for the therapeutic enterprise. THere are elements of truth in both positions that ned to be incorporated in therapeutic expectations if the enterprise is to proceed in an orderly fashion.     

Timing and the control of variation

Two rat experiments shed light on how variation in behavior is regulated. Experiment 1 used the peak procedure. On most trials, the 1st bar press more than 40 s after signal onset ended the signal and produced food. Other trials lasted much longer and ended without food. On those trials, the variability of bar-press duration increased greatly after the 1st response more than 40 s after signal onset. In Experiment 2, which asked whether the increase was due to the omission of expected reward or the decrease in reward expectation, reward expectation had a strong effect on response duration, whereas omission of expected reward had little effect. In both experiments, response rate and response duration changed independently, suggesting that they reflect different parts of the underlying mechanism. In Experiment 1, response durations implied that timing of the signal was more accurate than the rate-vs.-time function might suggest. Experiment 2 suggested that lowering reward expectation increases variation in response form.     

The myth of the control of suffering

Is it true that the suffering associated with chronic illness can be controlled in all but a few intractable cases? The bio-ethical literature gives the impression that suffering is primarily pain and that a competent physician should be able to control suffering. This perception jibes neither with my forty years of clinical experience nor with suffering as depicted in novels. Using Kenaz' novel,The Way to the Cats as a starting point, I argue that, with regard to suffering and illness, fiction is closer to reality than professional literature, and suffering is far more than pain. I content that the control of suffering is a modern myth. This argument applies equally well to the control of non-insulin dependent diabetes. Patient selection, duration of follow-up, remembering what we want to remember, bias, self-fulfilled prophecy, and asking the wrong questions are offered as partial explanation for the gap between perception and reality. The complexity of suffering and the elusiveness of its control should be honestly recognized.     

Limits of control: The effects of uncontrollability experiences on the efficiency of attentional control

Two experiments were conducted to explore the effects of experiencing uncontrollability on the efficiency of attentional control. The experience of uncontrollability was induced either by unsolvable tasks (Experiment 1) or by tasks in which non-contingent feedback was provided (Experiment 2). A version of the Attentional Network Test-Interactions with an additional measure of vigilance (ANTI-V) was used to evaluate the efficiency of the attentional networks (i.e., alerting, orienting, and executive). Results of both experiments revealed a decreased efficiency of executive attention in participants who experienced stable control deprivation but no negative effects in participants who were able to restore their sense of previously deprived control. Additionally, when participants were asked to perform unsolvable tasks and did not receive feedback (Experiment 1), detrimental effects on the orienting network and vigilance were observed. The motivational and cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects of various uncontrollability experiences on conflict resolution and attentional control are discussed.     

The control of death and the death of control: The effects of mortality salience,neuroticism, and worldview threat on the desire for control

Two studies were designed to examine whether neuroticism would moderate the effect of mortality salience on desire for control. In Study 1, participants completed a neuroticism scale, contemplated their mortality or a control topic, and then completed a desire for control scale. Results indicated that those low in neuroticism evidenced an increase in desire for control following mortality salience whereas those high in neuroticism showed decreased desire for control. Study 2 used a 2 (neuroticism level) ×2 (worldview threat) ×2 (mortality salience) design to examine whether confident faith in a belief system is responsible for the increased desire for control among low neuroticism participants. Here results indicated that if participants scoring low in neuroticism were confronted with a threat to their worldview and were then reminded of their death, they showed reduced desires for control. Discussion focuses on the implications of these results for understanding the relationship between neuroticism, desire for control, and terror management processes.     

Culpable control and the psychology of blame

A culpable control model is advanced to describe the conditions that encourage as well as mitigate blame and to assess the process by which blame and mitigation occur. The fundamental assumptions of the model are that evidence concerning harmful events is scrutinized for its contribution to personal control and spontaneously evaluated for its favorableness or unfavorableness. Spontaneous evaluations encourage a blame-validation mode of processing in which evidence concerning the event is reviewed in a manner that favors ascribing blame to the person or persons who evoke the most negative affect or whose behavior confirms unfavorable expectations. The author delineates the elements of perceived control and then discusses spontaneous evaluation influences on control and blame assessments. The blame-validation process is described next. Finally, the culpable control model is compared with extant theories of blame and responsibility and its basic tenets summarized.     

Modeling the neurological control of human movements

Although computer models have been extensively used in recent years to understand the way physical systems operate and interact, the enormous power of mathematical modeling and computer simulations has been difficult to implement for the benefit of neuroscientists studying the human motor control system. Nevertheless, homeomorphic models are now being used to explain and predict the neural and biomechanical aspects of different human movements. This paper argues for the importance of regarding model simulations as a supplementary approach to traditional methods of experimental investigation by drawing examples from both the experimental and the modeling literature. The discussion focuses on studies of the triphasic control signal for fast, goal-directed movements and on aspects of sampled data control for slow, tracking movements. The aim of this viewpoint article is to promote a more widespread use of modeling and simulation in the field of motor control.     

Limits on the generalizability of context-driven control

Context-driven control refers to the fast and flexible weighting of stimulus dimensions that may be applied at the onset of a stimulus. Evidence for context-driven control comes from interference tasks in which participants encounter a high proportion of incongruent trials at one location and a high proportion of congruent trials at another location. Since the size of the congruency effect varies as a function of location, this suggests that stimulus dimensions are weighted differently based on the context in which they appear. However, manipulations of condition proportion are often confounded by variations in the frequency with which particular stimuli are encountered. To date, there is limited evidence for the context-driven control in the absence of stimulus frequency confounds. In the current paper, we attempt to replicate and extend one such finding [Crump, M. J. C., & Milliken, B. (2009). The flexibility of context-specific control: Evidence for context-driven generalization of item-specific control settings. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 1523–1532]. Across three experiments we fail to find evidence for context-driven control in the absence of stimulus frequency confounds. Based on these results, we argue that consistency in the informativeness of the irrelevant dimension may be required for context-driven control to emerge.     

Saccade size control in reading: Evidence for the linguistic control hypothesis

In Experiment 1, it is shown that during reading the eye makes larger saccades near long words than near short words. The effects are reduced when the subject’s peripheral vision is diminished by the use of a moving “window” centered on the subject’s fixation point, outside of which letters are replaced by Xs. In Experiment 2, it is shown that even if linguistic predictions are kept constant, the eye tends to make longer jumps when approaching THE than when approaching a three-letter verb. This “THE-skipping” effect is weaker if THE is compared with an auxiliary (HAD, WAS, or ARE) than if it is compared with a less frequently occurring verb (ATE, RAN, MET). It follows that knowledge of the lexicon can combine with information from peripheral vision fast enough to influence saccade size from moment to moment.     

On the perceptual control of bimanual performance

The author compares some critical findings of F. Mechsner and his colleagues with related results from other laboratories to point out that when higher levels of representation are available, those levels might come to be the focus of attention and control motor actions by overriding constraints at lower levels of the system.