I know your face but not where I saw you: Context memory is impaired for other-race faces

People are more likely to falsely identify a face of another race than a face of their own race. When witnesses make identifications, they often need to remember where they have previously encountered a face. Failure to remember the context of an encounter can result in unconscious transference and lead to misidentifications. Forty-five White participants were shown White and Black faces, each presented on one of five backgrounds. The participants had to identify these faces in an old/new recognition test. If participants stated that they had seen a face, they had to identify the context in which the face had originally appeared. Participants made more context errors with Black faces than with White faces. This shows that the own-race bias extends to context memory.     

Directed forgetting: differential effects on typical and distinctive faces

Directed forgetting (DF) occurs when stimuli presented during the study phase are followed by "forget" and "remember" cues. On a subsequent memory test, poor memory is observed for stimuli followed by the forget cues, compared to stimuli followed by the remember cues. Although DF is most commonly observed with verbal tasks, the present study extended intentional forgetting research for nonverbal stimuli and examined whether faces were susceptible to DF. Results confirmed that the presentation of a forget cue significantly reduced recognition for faces, as compared to faces followed by a remember cue. Additionally, a well-established finding in face recognition is that distinctive faces are better remembered than typical faces, and Experiment 2 assessed whether face appearance influenced the degree of DF. Results indicate that the DF effect observed in Experiment 1 was replicated in Experiment 2 and that the effect was more pronounced for those faces that were typical in appearance.     

Differentiating falsely recognized faces from incompletely remembered faces

This study describes an experimental method for determining whether people who recognize a face containing both some target features and some new features are falsely recognizing the face or whether they are incompletely remembering it. Twenty min. after studying a target face either one time or a third time, 136 participants were instructed to examine six test faces similar to the target and to select two test faces sharing only target features and no unstudied features. The likelihood of selecting two test faces sharing four target features and no incorrect features was significantly greater than chance only for the 67 participants who studied the target three times. Because the two faces selected as containing only target features did not share any unstudied features, they were not falsely recognized; instead, they were indicative of correct but incomplete memory for the thrice-studied target.     

Gaze control and recollective experience in face recognition

In two experiments, we examined the relation between gaze control and recollective experience in the context of face recognition. In Experiment 1, participants studied a series of faces, while their eye movements were eliminated either during study or test, or both. Subsequently, they made remember/know judgements for each recognized test face. The preclusion of eye movements impaired explicit recollection without affecting familiarity-based recognition. In Experiment 2, participants examined unfamiliar faces under two study conditions (similarity vs. difference judgements), while their eye movements were registered. Similarity vs. difference judgements produced the opposite effects on remember/know responses, with no systematic effects on eye movements. However, face recollection was related to eye movements, so that remember responses were associated with more frequent refixations than know responses. These findings suggest that saccadic eye movements mediate the nature of recollective experience, and that explicit recollection reflects a greater consistency between study and test fixations than familiarity-based face recognition.     

The person reference process in spontaneous trait inferences

Five studies examined whether spontaneous trait inferences uniquely reference the person who performed a trait-implying behavior. On each study trial in 5 studies, participants saw 2 faces and a behavioral sentence referring to one of them. Later, participants saw face-trait pairs and indicated whether they had seen the trait word in the sentence presented with the face. Participants falsely recognized implied traits more when these traits were paired with actors' faces than with control faces. This effect was replicated for a large set effaces (120), after a week delay between study and recognition test, when equal attention was paid to each face, and when the orientation of the face at recognition was different from the orientation at encoding.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

Source‐monitoring accuracy across repeated tests following directed forgetting

The repeated recall of items from lists that participants were earlier instructed to either remember or to forget was examined in two experiments. RR participants (those instructed to remember both lists they were presented) tended to recall more List 1 items than FR participants (those instructed to forget the first list and to remember the second list). FR participants recalled more List 2 items than did RR participants, but only when directed to report those items (Experiment 1), not when directed to report items from both lists (Experiment 2). Participants experienced difficulty correctly reporting the list source of items they recalled and incorrect source recall increased across tests, showing hypermnesia. This later result underscores the need for caution when assessing the accuracy of information retrieved from multiple sources across repeated tests. Together, the data patterns provide support for the retrieval dynamics account of hypermnesia, the context‐change account of directed forgetting, and limited support for the retrieval inhibition view of directed forgetting.     

Intentionally remembering or forgetting own- and other-race faces: Evidence from directed forgetting

People are better at remembering faces of their own relative to another ethnic group. This so-called own-race bias (ORB) has been explained in terms of differential perceptual expertise for own- and other-race faces or, alternatively, as resulting from socio-cognitive factors. To test predictions derived from the latter account, we examined item-method directed forgetting (DF), a paradigm sensitive to an intentional modulation of memory, for faces belonging to different ethnic and social groups. In a series of five experiments, participants during learning received cues following each face to either remember or forget the item, but at test were required to recognize all items irrespective of instruction. In Experiments 1 and 5, Caucasian participants showed DF for own-race faces only while, in Experiment 2, East Asian participants with considerable expertise for Caucasian faces demonstrated DF for own- and other-race faces. Experiments 3 and 4 found clear DF for social in- and outgroup faces. These results suggest that a modulation of face memory by motivational processes is limited to faces with which we have acquired perceptual expertise. Thus, motivation alone is not sufficient to modulate memory for other-race faces and cannot fully explain the ORB.     

Sad people are more accurate at face recognition than happy people

Mood has varied effects on cognitive performance including the accuracy of face recognition (Lundh & Ost, 1996). Three experiments are presented here that explored face recognition abilities in mood-induced participants. Experiment 1 demonstrated that happy-induced participants are less accurate and have a more conservative response bias than sad-induced participants in a face recognition task. Using a remember/know/guess procedure, Experiment 2 showed that sad-induced participants had more conscious recollections of faces than happy-induced participants. Additionally, sad-induced participants could recognise all faces accurately, whereas, happy- and neutral-induced participants recognised happy faces more accurately than sad faces. In Experiment 3, these effects were not observed when participants intentionally learnt the faces, rather than incidentally learnt the faces. It is suggested that happy-induced participants do not process faces as elaborately as sad-induced participants.     

Self-evaluation as a moderating factor of strategy change in directed forgetting benefits

In list method directed forgetting, instructing people to forget a studied word list usually results in better recall for a newly studied list. Sahakyan and Delaney (2003) have suggested that these benefits are due to a change in encoding strategy that occurs between the study of the first list and the study of the second list. To investigate what might mediate such strategy change decisions, in two experiments we induced bothforget and remember participants to evaluate their memory performance on the two lists. In Experiment 1, they were asked to explicitly recall the items from the first list before studying the second list. In Experiment 2, after the study of the first list, the participants provided a rapid aggregate judgment of learning. Evaluation eliminated the differences between the forget and remember groups for the second list in both experiments, because the remember group achieved recall levels comparable to those for the forget group. The role of performance evaluation in mediating directed forgetting benefits is discussed.     

A developmental study of the own-age face recognition bias in children

The own-age bias is one in which people recognize faces of people their own age more accurately than faces of other ages (e.g., Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005, 2006) and appears to be, at least, partially based on experience (Harrison & Hole, 2009). Indeed, Hills and Lewis (2011a) have shown that 8-year-old faces are more accurately recognized by 8-year-old children than by 6- or 11-year-old children, suggesting the own-age bias develops rapidly. The present study explores the own-age bias in a developmental study in participants aged 6-10 years. Ninety participants (divided into 3 groups of 30 on the basis of their age at the first time of testing) undertook a standard old/new recognition paradigm in which their recognition accuracy was measured for 8- and 20-year-old faces. Results showed that when the participants were 8 years old, they recognized 8-year-old faces more accurately than when they were 7 or 9 years old. This effect was found to be based on mechanisms that differ from simple developmental improvement. This is the first study to show the development of the own-age bias in face recognition using a longitudinal design. These results show that the face recognition system is updated on the basis of recent experience and/or motivation to process faces, creating recognition biases.     

Thinking of critical words during study is unnecessary for false memory in the Deese,Roediger, and McDermott procedure

Do participants in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure demonstrate false memory because they think of nonpresented critical words during study and confuse them with words that were actually presented? In two experiments, 160 participants studied eight visually presented DRM lists at a rate of 2 s or 5 s per word. Half of the participants rehearsed silently: the other half rehearsed overtly. Following study, the participants' memory for the lists was tested by recall or recognition. Typical false memory results were obtained for both memory measures. More important, two new results were observed. First, a large majority of the overt-rehearsal participants spontaneously rehearsed approximately half of the critical words during study. Second, critical-word rehearsal at study enhanced subsequent false recall, but it had no effect on false recognition or remember judgments for falsely recognized critical words. Thinking of critical words during study was unnecessary for producing false memory.     

Effect of study context on item recollection

We examined how visual context information provided during encoding, and unrelated to the target word, affected later recollection for words presented alone using a remember–know paradigm. Experiments 1A and 1B showed that participants had better overall memory—specifically, recollection—for words studied with pictures of intact faces than for words studied with pictures of scrambled or inverted faces. Experiment 2 replicated these results and showed that recollection was higher for words studied with pictures of faces than when no image accompanied the study word. In Experiment 3 participants showed equivalent memory for words studied with unique faces as for those studied with a repeatedly presented face. Results suggest that recollection benefits when visual context information high in meaningful content accompanies study words and that this benefit is not related to the uniqueness of the context. We suggest that participants use elaborative processes to integrate item and meaningful contexts into ensemble information, improving subsequent item recollection.     

Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to actors' faces: evidence from a false recognition paradigm

A false recognition paradigm showed that spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) are bound to the person performing a trait-implying behavior. In 6 experiments, participants memorized faces and behavioral sentences. When faces were paired with implied traits in a recognition test, participants falsely recognized these traits more often than unrelated traits paired with the same faces or the same traits paired with familiar faces. The effect was obtained for a large set of behaviors (120). each presented for 5 s, and for behaviors that participants did not subsequently recognize or recall. Antonyms of the implied traits were falsely recognized less often than unrelated traits, suggesting that STIs have extended implications. Explicit person-trait judgments predicted both false recognition and response times for implied traits.     

Remembering parts and wholes: Configural processing in face recollection

In two experiments, we examined the role of configural processing on states of awareness in face recognition. Configural processing was manipulated by presenting upright and inverted faces during study and test. After studying facial photographs of humans (Experiment 1) and horses (Experiment 2), participants provided a remember/know judgement for each recognised test face. In both experiments, disrupted configural processing had selective effects on states of awareness, so that inversion reduced remember, but not know, responses. Experiment 2 revealed disproportionate inversion effects in that the difference in remember responses between upright and inverted items was significant for human faces but not horses. These findings suggest that configural processing facilitates explicit recollection by providing a distinctive combination of nonsalient event attributes.     

Directed forgetting of emotional stimuli in borderline personality disorder

On the basis of clinical literature, the authors hypothesized that individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) would show biased information processing when they were exposed to negative affective stimuli of a particular type. Individuals with BPD and controls were tested using a directed forgetting paradigm. Study participants were exposed to 3 types of words (borderline, neutral, positive) and were cued to either remember or forget each word as it was presented. There were no group differences on a free recall task for words in the remember condition. However, participants with BPD recalled significantly more of the borderline words from the forget condition than did controls. In other words, borderline participants remembered borderline words that they were instructed to forget. These results may be consistent with enhanced encoding of salient words and perhaps related themes in BPD individuals.     

Directed forgetting of autobiographical events

Two diary experiments demonstrated directed forgetting (DF) of autobiographical events, previously observed only for less complex memory items. Using a 2-week diary paradigm, we compared recall between a group of participants who were directed to forget Week 1 memories (forget group) and a group who did not receive a forget instruction (remember group). In Experiment 1, the forget group remembered fewer items from Week 1 than did the remember group. The effect was observed for negative and positive valence events, as well as for high and low emotional intensity events. The effect was replicated in Experiment 2 despite a memorable holiday (Valentine's Day) that occurred during the manipulation week. Forget participants remembered fewer low emotional intensity items in Experiment 2. We conclude that intentional forgetting is a plausible explanation for the loss of some autobiographical memories.     

The recall of stereotypes: the effects of incidentally activated directed forgetting instructions

Based on the automotive model (J. A. Bargh, 1990) and the directed forgetting paradigm, the present study investigated whether incidentally activated forget and remember cues can lead to similar effects as explicitly given instructions. To this end, the present paper attempted to replicate the findings of Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Ford (1997) employing their category primes (child abuser, neutral), study lists (List 1, List 2), and procedure. Using explicit directed forgetting instructions, Experiment 1 showed that the recall of the stereotypically relevant words (List 1) was higher when participants were given a remember than a forget instruction. This effect was found regardless of the prime conditions. Similarly, Experiment 2 showed that participants in the child abuser and neutral prime conditions recalled more stereotypically relevant words (List 1) when they were implicitly cued to remember than to forget these words. Experiment 3 showed that cognitively busy participants in the child-abuser, but not in the neutral prime condition, recalled more to-be-forgotten stereotypical words than nonbusy participants. These results are consistent with Macrae et al. s findings, and show that the effects of directed forgetting instructions are similar regardless of whether they were given explicitly or were activated incidentally. Results are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance.     

Item-Cued Directed Forgetting of Related Words and Pictures in Children and Adults: Selective Rehearsal Versus Cognitive Inhibition

The main purpose of this study was to compare the relative importance of selective rehearsal and cognitive inhibition in accounting for developmental changes in the directed-forgetting paradigm developed by R. A. Bjork (1972). In two experiments, children in Grades 2 and 5 and college students were asked to remember some words or pictures and to forget others when items were categorically related. Their memory for both items and the associated remember or forget cues was then tested with recall and recognition. Fifth graders recognized more of the forget-cued words than college students did. The pattern of results suggested that age differences in rehearsal and source monitoring (i.e., remembering whether a word had been cued remember or forget) were better explanatory mechanisms for children's forgetting inefficiencies than retrieval inhibition was. The results are discussed in terms of a multiple process view of inhibition.     

Item-cued directed forgetting of related words and pictures in children and adults: selective rehearsal versus cognitive inhibition

The main purpose of this study was to compare the relative importance of selective rehearsal and cognitive inhibition in accounting for developmental changes in the directed-forgetting paradigm developed by R. A. Bjork (1972). In two experiments, children in Grades 2 and 5 and college students were asked to remember some words or pictures and to forget others when items were categorically related. Their memory for both items and the associated remember or forget cues was then tested with recall and recognition. Fifth graders recognized more of the forget-cued words than college students did. The pattern of results suggested that age differences in rehearsal and source monitoring (i.e., remembering whether a word had been cued remember or forget) were better explanatory mechanisms for children's forgetting inefficiencies than retrieval inhibition was. The results are discussed in terms of a multiple process view of inhibition.