Reichenbach, induction, and discovery

Conclusion I have applied a fairly general, learning theoretic perspective to some questions raised by Reichenbach's positions on induction and discovery. This is appropriate in an examination of the significance of Reichenbach's work, since the learning-theoretic perspective is to some degree part of Reichenbach's reliabilist legacy. I have argued that Reichenbach's positivism and his infatuation with probabilities are both irrelevant to his views on induction, which are principally grounded in the notion of limiting reliability. I have suggested that limiting reliability is still a formidable basis for the formulation of methodological norms, particularly when reliability cannot possibly be had in the short run, so that refined judgments about evidential support must depend upon measure-theoretic choices having nothing to do in the short run with the truth of the hypothesis under investigation. To illustrate the generality of Reichenbach's program, I showed how it can be applied to methods that aim to solve arbitrary assessment and discovery problems in various senses. In this generalized Reichenbachian setting, we can characterize the intrinsic complexity of reliable inductive inference in terms of topological complexity. Finally, I let Reichenbach's theory of induction have the last say about hypothetico-deductive method.     

Belief-content justification for cases of a priori justification: A neo-Haackian model

I differentiate justification of the subject (S-justification) from justification of the content of a belief (C-justification) and note the questions associated with truth conduciveness of justification. I employ Susan Haack’s analysis of empirical justification and show how, with certain adaptations, it can account for justification from non-experiential sources, if there are any. I give at least one example from mathematical visual thinking.     

Epistemic justification in the context of pursuit: a coherentist approach

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards—consistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system.     

Discovery as the context of any scientific justification

Summary The analysis of philosophically important themes can depart from two different angles. The first one investigates the various answers that have been given to a certain issue, like that of the problem of knowledge, the justification of theories, the notion of culture, etcetera. These answers are often mutually contradictory which, by the way, facilitates their overview (like the schemes of rationalism-empiricism, justification-discovery, universalism-relativism). A second approach starts from the problems (or: problematique) behind the divergent answers (e.g., foundationalism behind both, empiricism and rationalism).In the following sections the issue of discovery is discussed. Here the second line of approach has been followed, not only by making visible a same problematique, but more by trying to set out the common context of the discussion about context of discovery and context of justification. The idea is that this discussion, or better the shift taking place in that discussion, finds its reason in a context in which the distance between traditional methodology and contemporary scientific practice, also between scientific knowledge and the experience of reality has become greater. This is related to the deepening awareness of the cultural context of scientific method. Man and world, scientific method and cultural context are always interacting.From this point of view quite different philosophical approaches show nevertheless similar features pointing to new solutions. A more psychological approach to scientific method (like: Gordon's and Grmek's, even perhaps Gutting's reinterpretation of Popper) and a sociological one (e.g., Barnes, Bloor, and already Durkheim) are opposed to a more logically structured analysis of Nagel, Hempel, and also Popper. Nevertheless the view on the flexibility of scientific method defended along different lines by for instance Achinstein, Bachelard, Hesse, Piaget, Polanyi, Toulmin manifests a certain convergence in those divergent standpoints, the more so since often the cultural context of science is being stressed (e.g., Ladriére, Prigogine, Needham).The miscellany of philosophical orientations, presented in the following sections, can in this way perhaps give profile to deeper tendencies: to relate again scientific method to the context of culture and of human strategy in general. This does not blend, however, the distinction between context of justification and context of discovery. By changing their roles a new overview of this dilemma becomes possible. There is no juxtaposition of both, nor has the one to be absorbed by the other. The conclusion will be that there are still two contexts, but that one is wider, less defined and demarcated from the wider field of daily culture, and that the other is more restricted, functioning as a kind of safetydevice on behalf of the wider strategy of discovery. In such a way discovery is regarded as the wider context of the more restricted context of justification.     

Kant and modern physics—The synthetic a priori and the distinction between modal function and entity

In order to appreciate the meaning of Kant's concern for the synthetic a priori a distinction needs to be made between the dimension of functional aspects of reality, exhibiting universal (modal) laws (holding for all possible entities), and the dimension of entities characterized by specified type-laws (only holding for a limited class of entities). In particular attention is given to some properties of the first four cosmic aspects/modes: the numerical, the spatial, the kinematical and the physical. In passing a number of related issues are adressed, such as the after effect of the Greek gemometrization of matter, the Achilles' heel of positivism (the usage of property- terms), and an alternative formulation of the law of energy conservation.     

Suppression and justification processes to reduce in-group bias in a multiculturalism diversity context

IntroductionThis study investigates the impact of an organisational multiculturalism perspective of diversity on in-group bias towards people of foreign origin.ObjectiveWe hypothesise that organisational multiculturalism constitutes a norm which creates a positive context for intergroup relations. We expect that when workers perceive that their organisation recognises group differences, their own values are influenced, namely egalitarian values and perceived value violation. The value-related mediators are conceptualised in the frame of justification-suppression model (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) respectively as suppression and justification.MethodData were collected from a sample of 402 workers who completed an anonymous questionnaire.ResultsBased on structural equation modelling, results show that the perception of organisational multiculturalism is negatively and indirectly related to in-group bias through both suppression and justification processes.ConclusionThis study highlights that the perception of the normative context of an organisation is related to workers’ attitudes. The results are discussed consistent with the literature on diversity.     

The contingent a priori and the publicity of a priori knowledge

Kripke maintains that one who stipulatively introduces the term ‘one meter’ as a rigid designator for the length of a certain stick s at time t is in a position to know a priori that if s exists at t then the length of s at t is one meter. Some (e.g., Soames 2003) have objected to this alleged instance of the contingent a priori on the grounds that the stipulator's knowledge would have to be based in part on substantive metalinguistic knowledge. I examine Soames's argument for the a posteriority of the relevant metalinguistic knowledge, and I argue that its main premise is false.     

Effects of harmonics on relative pitch discrimination in a musical context

The contribution of different harmonics to pitch salience in a musical context was examined by requiring subjects to discriminate a small (1/4 semitone) pitch change in one note of a melody that repeated in transposition. In Experiment 1, performance was superior when more harmonics were present (first five vs. fundamental alone) and when the second harmonic (of tones consisting of the first two harmonics) was in tune compared with when it was out of tune. In Experiment 2, the effects of harmonics 6 and 8, which stand in octave-equivalent simple ratios to the fundamental (2∶3 and 1∶2, respectively) were compared with harmonics 5 and 7, which stand in more complex ratios (4:5 and 4:7, respectively). When the harmonics fused into a single percept (tones consisting of harmonics 1, 2, and one of 5, 6, 7, or 8), performance was higher when harmonics 6 or 8 were present than when harmonics 5 or 7 were present. When the harmonics did not fuse into a single percept (tones consisting of the fundamental and one of 5, 6, 7, or 8), there was no effect of ratio simplicity.     

Actuality and the a priori

Book Information Nietzsche's Middle Period. Nietzsche's Middle Period Ruth Abbey New York Oxford University Press 2000 xvii + 208 Hardback £33.50 By Ruth Abbey. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. xvii + 208. Hardback:£33.50,     

Presupposition and the a priori

This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with ‘ $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}$ ’ abbreviating ‘it is knowable a priori that’).

(AK) For all ?, ψ such that ? semantically presupposes ψ: if $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\phi, \,\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\psi .$

Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative items of knowledge are made explicit. Likewise, certain kinds of analytic truth turn out to carry semantic presuppositions that make them ineligible as items of a priori knowledge. On a happier note, I argue that (AK) offers an appealing, theory-neutral explanation of the a posteriori character of certain necessary identities, as well as an interesting rationalization for a commonplace linguistic maneuver in philosophical work on the a priori.     

The relative contribution of content and context factors on the interpretation of conditionals

Previous research showed that conditional reasoning is affected by the content and the context of the studied problems. In this study, we investigate in detail the relative effect of three factors, namely the number of alternative or disabling reasons, speaker control, and pragmatic type, on the interpretation of conditionals. These factors were subject to prior research, but mostly in a fragmented way. This study indicates that some important nuances must be added to earlier findings. The number of alternatives and disablers, the speaker control, and the pragmatic type of conditional statements all have a considerable effect on how we interpret these sentences and reason with them, but they do not have equal weight. Alternatives/disablers play a significant but very limited role on the interpretation of conditionals, while the influence of speaker control and of pragmatic type is far more imperative.     

Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability

I examine Reichenbach’s theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman’s interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach’s view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach’s account from Kant’s apriorism is the problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl’s theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost.     

Spacetime and the abstract/concrete distinction

Earlier versions of this paper were read at seminars at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, at the North Carolina Philosophical Society meeting in February 1986, and at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December 1986. I am grateful for the comments I received on those, and other less formal, occasions. My greatest debts are to Catherine Elgin, David Lewis, William Lycan, Michael Resnik, Jay Rosenberg, and George Schlesinger.