Global cognitive decline in schizophrenia with remission of symptoms?

The relation of symptoms to cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia is still controversial. This study was aimed (i) at verifying if a homogeneous sample of 10 young treated outpatients in remission from psychotic symptoms displays a characteristic pattern of cognitive dysfunction and (ii) at testing the issue of a general cognitive impairment. The neuropsychological performance of the patients was confronted with a large control group by means of Equivalent Scores, a normative method widely used in Italy, which allows direct, reliable comparison between tests and between patients. We found that our patients, as a group, were affected by a basic activation deficit in attention and by a semantic impairment. These deficits in symptom-free patients could indicate that their brains are in some ways working differently from those of normal controls and that this pattern is not necessarily linked to psychotic symptoms: their neuropsychological impairment might reflect a basic difference in the way of processing information that is always present and is independent of general intellectual decay.     

Are sluggish cognitive tempo symptoms associated with executive functioning in preschoolers?

The aim of this study is to investigate whether sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) symptoms are associated with neurocognitive task performance and ratings of real-world executive functioning (EF) in preschoolers at risk for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The associations between parent- and teacher-rated SCT symptoms and neuropsychological task performance and ratings of EF in 61 4-year-old preschool children (51 boys, 10 girls) with self-regulation difficulties were examined, with regression analyses controlling for the effects of ADHD inattention symptoms. In the study sample, higher teacher-rated SCT symptoms are significantly associated with poorer performance on tasks of visual-perceptual abilities, auditory and visual attention, sustained and selective attention, inhibitory control, pre-numerical/numerical concepts, and slower processing speed, but SCT symptoms are not significantly associated with working memory, attention shifting or cognitive flexibility when controlling for ADHD inattention. Higher parent-rated SCT symptoms are significantly associated with visual-perceptual abilities. ADHD inattention symptoms are more strongly associated than SCT with daily life EF ratings; neither parent- nor teacher-rated SCT symptoms are significantly associated with daily life ratings of inhibition, working memory, or planning/organization after controlling for ADHD inattention. This study suggests that SCT symptoms contribute to EF deficits at least on neurocognitive tasks assessing visual-perceptual/spatial abilities, attention to detail and processing speed, as observed in this sample of young children at risk for ADHD, and may be an important intervention target.     

Failures of cognitive control or attention? The case of stop-signal deficits in schizophrenia

We used Bayesian cognitive modelling to identify the underlying causes of apparent inhibitory deficits in the stop-signal paradigm. The analysis was applied to stop-signal data reported by Badcock et al. (Psychological Medicine 32: 87-297, 2002) and Hughes et al. (Biological Psychology 89: 220-231, 2012), where schizophrenia patients and control participants made rapid choice responses, but on some trials were signalled to stop their ongoing response. Previous research has assumed an inhibitory deficit in schizophrenia, because estimates of the mean time taken to react to the stop signal are longer in patients than controls. We showed that these longer estimates are partly due to failing to react to the stop signal (“trigger failures”) and partly due to a slower initiation of inhibition, implicating a failure of attention rather than a deficit in the inhibitory process itself. Correlations between the probability of trigger failures and event-related potentials reported by Hughes et al. are interpreted as supporting the attentional account of inhibitory deficits. Our results, and those of Matzke et al. (2016), who report that controls also display a substantial although lower trigger-failure rate, indicate that attentional factors need to be taken into account when interpreting results from the stop-signal paradigm.     

Are expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal associated with stress-related symptoms?

Emotion dysregulation is thought to be critical to the development of negative psychological outcomes. Gross (1998b) conceptualized the timing of regulation strategies as key to this relationship, with response-focused strategies, such as expressive suppression, as less effective and more detrimental compared to antecedent-focused ones, such as cognitive reappraisal. In the current study, we examined the relationship between reappraisal and expressive suppression and measures of psychopathology, particularly for stress-related reactions, in both undergraduate and trauma-exposed community samples of women. Generally, expressive suppression was associated with higher, and reappraisal with lower, self-reported stress-related symptoms. In particular, expressive suppression was associated with PTSD, anxiety, and depression symptoms in the trauma-exposed community sample, with rumination partially mediating this association. Finally, based on factor analysis, expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal appear to be independent constructs. Overall, expressive suppression, much more so than cognitive reappraisal, may play an important role in the experience of stress-related symptoms. Further, given their independence, there are potentially relevant clinical implications, as interventions that shift one of these emotion regulation strategies may not lead to changes in the other.     

Are age-related changes in cognitive function driven by age-related changes in sensory processing?

Although there has been keen interest in the association among measures of sensory function and cognitive function for many years, in general, measures of sensory function have been confined to one or two senses and measures of threshold sensitivity (acuity). In this study, rigorous psychophysical measures of threshold sensitivity, temporal gap detection, temporal order identification, and temporal masking have been obtained, in hearing, vision, and touch. In addition, all subjects completed 15 subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd edition (WAIS–III). Data were obtained from 245 adults (18–87 years old) for the WAIS–III and for 40 measures of threshold sensitivity and temporal processing. The focus in this report is on individual differences in performance for the entire data set. Principal-components (PC) factor analysis reduced the 40 psychophysical measures to eight correlated factors, which were reduced further to a single global sensory processing factor. Similarly, PC factor analysis of the 15 WAIS–III scores resulted in three correlated factors that were further reduced to a single global cognitive function factor. Age, global sensory processing, and global cognitive function were all moderately and significantly correlated with one another. However, paired partial correlations, controlling for the third of these three measures, revealed that the moderate correlation between age and global cognitive function went to zero when global sensory processing was controlled for; the other two partial correlations remained intact. Structural models confirmed this result. These analyses suggest that the long-standing observation of age-related changes in cognitive function may be mediated by age-related changes in global sensory processing.     

Are variations among right-handed individuals in perceptual asymmetries caused by characteristic arousal differences between hemispheres?

We propose that much of the variance among right-handed subjects in perceptual asymmetries on standard behavioral measures of laterality arises from individual differences in characteristic patterns of asymmetric hemispheric arousal. Dextrals with large right-visual-field (RVF) advantages on a tachistoscopic syllable-identification task (assumed to reflect characteristically higher left-hemisphere than right-hemisphere arousal) outperformed those having weak or no visual-field asymmetries (assumed to reflect characteristically higher right-hemisphere than left-hemisphere arousal). The two groups were equal, however, in asymmetries of error patterns that are thought to indicate linguistic or nonlinguistic encoding strategies. For both groups, relations between visual fields in the ability to discriminate the accuracy of performance followed the pattern of syllable identification itself, suggesting that linguistic and metalinguistic processes are based on the same laterally specialized functions. Subjects with strong RVF advantages had a pessimistic bias for rating performance, and those with weak or no asymmetries had an optimistic bias, particularly for the left visual field (LVF). This is concordant with evidence that the arousal level of the right hemisphere is closely related to affective mood. Finally, consistent with the arousal model, leftward asymmetries on a free-vision face-processing task became larger as RVF advantages on the syllable task diminished and as optimistic biases for the LVF, relative to the RVF, increased.     

Differences in adult and adolescent listeners’ ratings of valence and arousal in emotional prosody

ABSTRACT

Judgments of emotional stimuli’s valence and arousal can differ based on the perceiver’s age. With most of the existing literature on age-related changes in such ratings based on perceptions of visually-presented pictures or words, less is known about how youth and adults perceive and rate the affective information contained in auditory emotional stimuli. The current study examined age-related differences in adolescent (n?=?31; 45% female; aged 12–17, M?=?14.35, SD?=?1.68) and adult listeners’ (n?=?30; 53% female; aged 21–30, M?=?26.20 years, SD?=?2.98) ratings of the valence and arousal of spoken words conveying happiness, anger, and a neutral expression. We also fitted closed curves to the average ratings for each emotional expression to determine their relative position on the valence-arousal plane of an affective circumplex. Compared to adults, adolescents’ ratings of emotional prosody were generally higher in valence, but more constricted in range for both valence and arousal. This pattern of ratings is suggestive of lesser differentiation amongst emotional categories’ holistic properties, which may have implications for the successful recognition and appropriate response to vocal emotional cues in adolescents’ social environments.     

Attentional interference effects of emotional pictures: threat, negativity, or arousal?

Attentional interference arising from emotional pictures was examined. Participants had to ignore emotional pictures while solving math problems (Study 1, N = 126) or detecting the location of a line (Study 2, N = 60). Data analyses tested predictions of 3 theories. Evolutionary threat theory predicts interference by snake pictures. Categorical negativity theory predicts interference by negative pictures regardless of their intensity. According to arousal theory, arousal level predicts interference effects. The results supported arousal theory, with the most arousing pictures (strong unpleasant pictures, oppositesex models) producing the strongest interference. The findings are interpreted in the context of process models of emotions that postulate an initial relevance check before further processing of valence and other appraisal dimensions.     

Are responsibility attitudes related to obsessive-compulsive symptoms in schoolchildren?

In spite of a growth in cognitive conceptualizations of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, relatively little has been done to extend such concepts to childhood. This study investigated the relationship between responsibility attitudes and obsessive-compulsive symptoms in normal children. A measure of responsibility attitudes in children was constructed on the basis of Salkovskis' Responsibility Attitudes Scale. This measure (Responsibility Attitudes Scale for Children) was administered together with the Leyton Obsessive Inventory Child Version and the Children's Depression Inventory to a sample of two hundred and two 10-14-year-old schoolchildren in Iceland. The responsibility measure correlated moderately and similarly with the Leyton Obsessive Inventory Child Version and the Children's Depression Inventory. In a hierarchical regression analysis predicting Leyton Obsessive Inventory Child Version scores, age and gender were entered in the equation first, followed by Children's Depression Inventory scores and, finally, Responsibility Attitudes Scale for Children scores. It was shown that Responsibility Attitudes Scale for Children scores added significantly to the prediction of Leyton Obsessive Inventory Child Version over and above the other variables. It is concluded that the study of the role of responsibility attitudes in children's obsessive-compulsive symptoms is at least promising.     

Are effects of emotion expression on trait impressions mediated by babyfaceness? Evidence from connectionist modeling

Two studies provided evidence that bolsters the Marsh, Adams, and Kleck hypothesis that the morphology of certain emotion expressions reflects an evolved adaptation to mimic babies or mature adults. Study 1 found differences in emotion expressions' resemblance to babies using objective indices of babyfaceness provided by connectionist models that are impervious to overlapping cultural stereotypes about babies and the emotions. Study 2 not only replicated parallels between impressions of certain emotions and babies versus adults but also showed that objective indices of babyfaceness partially mediated impressions of the emotion expressions. babyface effects were independent of strong effects of attractiveness, and babyfaceness did not mediate impressions of happy expressions, to which the evolutionary hypothesis would not apply.     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

Are emotional intelligent workers also more empathic?

This paper analyzes whether emotional intelligence and self‐monitoring are related to empathy among a sample of workers in both the public and private employment sectors. Two hundred and forty‐two employees (42.5% men and 57.5% women) with a mean age of 35.21 years (SD = 10.07, range 18–61) completed a questionnaire that measured the variables of interest. The results showed that emotion regulation, a dimension of emotional intelligence, accounts for most of the variance of empathy, followed by the ability to understand emotions and the management of others' emotions. Furthermore, gender did not yield any moderator effect on the relations among emotional intelligence, self‐monitoring and empathy. We conclude that the intrapersonal aspects of emotional intelligence, in particular, emotion regulation, help explain the empathy of workers. The implications of these findings are discussed herein.     

Disruption of proofreading by irrelevant speech: Effects of attention,arousal or memory?

A series of five experiments examined the effects of irrelevant speech on proofreading and memory. Four of the experiments used a proofreading task and showed that the deleterious effects of irrelevant speech: (1) depend on the speech being meaningful, (2) are only present when the burden on short-term memory is low and (3) are manifested in a lower detection rate for non-contextual as opposed to contextual errors. Neither the spatial location of the speech (either in terms of spatial dispersion of sources or spatial movement of a single source) nor the intensity of the speech (in a range bounded by 50 dB(A) and 70 dB(A)) had any effect on proofreading. Late selection models of attention are favoured by the results in preference to models having arousal, short-term memory or early selection in attention as their basis. A final experiment showed serial recall for visual lists to be impaired by the presence of any speech-like sound (including reversed speech and speech in an unfamiliar language) which suggests a set of phenomena qualitatively different from those associated with proofreading. Throughout the article the practical consequences of the findings are emphasized.     

Are preferences in emotional processing affected by distraction? Examining the age-related positivity effect in visual fixation within a dual-task paradigm

Recent research has suggested that age-related positivity effects are eliminated under conditions of dual-task load (Knight et al., 2007, Emotion, 7, 705; Mather & Knight, 2005, Psychology and Aging, 20, 554), because the cognitive control resources necessary to enact such preferences are not available when individuals are distracted by competing information. We further examined how older adults' emotional information processing preferences are affected by distracting information by utilizing a within-subjects dual-task measure. Younger and older adults viewed a series of positive, negative, and neutral images both in conditions of full and divided attention. Fixation preferences to valenced images were assessed through eye tracking. Regardless of whether images were viewed in full or divided attention conditions, older adults demonstrated a preference in their fixation for positive and neutral in comparison to negative images. These results provide evidence that older adults' positive fixation preferences may not always necessitate full, cognitive control.     

High emotional arousal and failures in reality monitoring: Pathways to auditory hallucinations in non‐psychotic children?

Recent research has confirmed the presence of auditory hallucinations in non‐psychotic children, with this research also suggesting that such hallucinations may be more common than previously thought. While auditory hallucinations in children have frequently been associated with high levels of emotional stress, there is still a poor understanding of how this stress may precipitate hallucinations, and why some children experience hallucinations while others seem not to. The current study assessed the association between high levels of trauma symptomatology, anxiety and depression, and the presence of hallucinations against matched controls. Results indicated that hallucinating children had significantly higher mean anxiety, depression and, in particular, re‐experiencing scores than did the children in the control group. These results were examined within the framework of reality monitoring, that is, the ability to distinguish between externally or internally generated sources of information. The notion of high levels of emotional distress decreasing the efficiency of reality monitoring and leading to the possibility of confusion between internally and externally generated stimuli was discussed, with the conclusion advanced that the misattribution of an externally generated source – either held as a memory or as a traumatic re‐experiencing – as an internally generated one, underlies hallucinatory experiences.     

Activated or deactivated? Understanding how cognitive appraisals can drive emotional activation in the aftermath of daily work events

Introduction

Past research has highlighted the relevance of cognitive appraisals in the link events-emotions (e.g., appraisal of an event's importance and its pleasant or unpleasant valence). We hypothesized a 3-way interaction between affective events (hassles and uplifts), cognitive appraisals of importance and intrinsic pleasantness on emotional activation.

How is physiological arousal related to self-reported measures of emotional intensity and valence of events and their autobiographical memories?

Research suggests that emotionally intense experiences that elicit higher-than-average physiological arousal responses lead to particularly durable and detailed autobiographical memories. Yet, the lack of objective measures of physiological arousal while events unfold in everyday life makes it hard to corroborate this lab finding. Also, it is uncertain how well arousal maps onto self-reports of the phenomenological characteristics of autobiographical events and memories. Here, we examined how physiological measures of arousal, taken while everyday life events develop, correlate with self-reports. Our results showed that physiological arousal during an event not only was related to self-evaluations of its assessed physical reaction —at the time of report—, but also predicted evaluations of physical reaction, positivity, and importance of their memories one week after. Further analyses revealed that, while arousal affected evaluations of emotional intensity of events and memories, this relationship was moderated by participants’ level of awareness about their own emotional processes.     

Self-discrepancies in clinical depression and social phobia: cognitive structures that underlie emotional disorders?

Previous research indicates that self-discrepancies are cognitive structures that can induce emotional discomfort. The present study compared clinically depressed and social phobic subjects (plus controls) to determine whether different self-discrepancies were associated with the two disorders. In Part 1, it was shown that the depressives possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ideal/own self-states, whereas the social phobics possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ought/other self-states. In a later, ostensibly unrelated study, subjects responded verbally to questions about other people while their mood changes, skin conductance responses, and verbalizations were recorded. The questions included attributes from the subject's ideal and ought self-states that were mismatches with attributes from his or her actual self, as well as mismatch attributes from other subjects. Priming with self-referential mismatches induced momentary syndromes of dejection or agitation (depending on the type of mismatch). The depressives and social phobics showed the greatest increases in dejection and agitation, respectively, according to their dominant self-discrepancy. The results suggest that specific cognitive structures may underlie clinical depression and anxiety.