Perception in chess and beyond: Commentary on Linhares and Freitas (2010)

Linhares and Freitas (2010; LF) argue that experts use analogical or semantic similarity, similarities that are not available from direct surface representations. LF make their case using a critique of Chase and Simon (1973b) and the presentation of a few chess positions and examples from other domains. Their conclusion is that models such as CHREST (Gobet et al., 2001) and theories such as the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973b) and the template theory ( [Gobet and Simon, 1996a] and [Gobet and Simon, 1996b]) are inadequate for dealing with these issues. They propose an alternative paradigm, which they call “experience recognition.” Although we find this issue an interesting one, the separation between pattern recognition and problem solving is a lot more complex than LF portray. We instead suggest that a “revolution” in our to date successful modelling is not necessary. Especially in the chess domain, LF’s examples do not make the point they claim. Furthermore, their criticisms of CS are incorrect, and they have failed to mention a large number of experimental results that have supported the hypothesis of location-specific encodings. Although we agree that experts use semantic information and similarities, these ideas already possess analogues in CHREST, which can form the basis of further evolution of the theory.     

Chunks in expert memory: evidence for the magical number four ... or is it two?

This study aims to test the divergent predictions of the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973) and template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a, 2000) with respect to the number of chunks held in visual short-term memory and the size of chunks used by experts. We presented game and random chessboards in both a copy and a recall task. In a within-subject design, the stimuli were displayed using two presentation media: (a) physical board and pieces, as in Chase and Simon's (1973) study; and (b) a computer display, as in Gobet and Simon's (1998) study. Results show that, in most cases, no more than three chunks were replaced in the recall task, as predicted by template theory. In addition, with game positions in the computer condition, chess Masters replaced very large chunks (up to 15 pieces), again in line with template theory. Overall, the results suggest that the original chunking theory overestimated short-term memory capacity and underestimated the size of chunks used, in particular with Masters. They also suggest that Cowan's (2001) proposal that STM holds four chunks may be an overestimate.     

Recall of random and distorted chess positions: Implications for the theory of expertise

This paper explores the question, important to the theory of expert performance, of the nature and number of chunks that chess experts hold in memory. It examines how memory contents determine players’ abilities to reconstruct (1) positions from games, (2) positions distorted in various ways, and (3) random positions. Comparison of a computer simulation with a human experiment supports the usual estimate that chess Masters store some 50,000 chunks in memory. The observed impairment of recall when positions are modified by mirror image reflection implies that each chunk represents a specific pattern of pieces in a specific location. A good account of the results of the experiments is given by the template theory proposed by Gobet and Simon (in press) as an extension of Chase and Simon’s (1973b) initial chunking proposal, and in agreement with other recent proposals for modification of the chunking theory (Richman, Staszewski, & Simon, 1995) as applied to various recall tasks.     

An electrophysiological comparison of visual categorization and recognition memory

Object categorization emphasizes the similarities that bind exemplars into categories, whereas recognition memory emphasizes the specific identification of previously encountered exemplars. Mathematical modeling has highlighted similarities in the computational requirements of these tasks, but neuropsychological research has suggested that categorization and recognition may depend on separate brain systems. Following training with families of novel visual shapes (blobs), event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded during both categorization and recognition tasks. ERPs related to early visual processing (N1, 156–200 msec) were sensitive to category membership. Middle latency ERPs (FN400 effects, 300–500 msec) were sensitive to both category membership and old/new differences. Later ERPs (parietal effects, 400–800 msec) were primarily affected by old/new differences. Thus, there was a temporal transition so that earlier processes were more sensitive to categorical discrimination and later processes were more sensitive to recognition-related discrimination. Aspects of these results are consistent with both mathematical modeling and neuropsychological perspectives.     

Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections.     

Memory for objects in canonical and noncanonical viewpoints

This article investigates how the perspective from which we see an object affects memory. Object identification can be affected by the orientation of the object. Palmer, Rosch, and Chase (1981) coined the term canonical to describe perspectives in which identification performance is best. We present two experiments that tested the effects of object perspective on memory. Our results revealed a double dissociation between task (recognition and recall) and type of object perspective. In recognition, items studied in the noncanonical viewpoint produced higher proportions of “old” responses than did items studied in the canonical viewpoint, whereas new objects presented from a noncanonical viewpoint produced fewer “old” responses than did new objects presented from the canonical viewpoint. In free recall, conversely, objects studied from the noncanonical viewpoint produced lower recall rates than did objects studied from the canonical viewpoint. These results, which reveal a pattern similar to word frequency effects, support the psychological reality of canonical viewpoints and the frequencyof-exposure-based accounts of canonical viewpoint effects. 2008 Psychonomic Society, Inc     

A Pattern-recognition Theory of Search in Expert Problem Solving

Understanding how look-ahead search and pattern recognition interact is one of the important research questions in the study of expert problem solving. This paper examines the implications of the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), a recent theory of expert memory, on the theory of problem solving in chess. Templates are “chunks” (Chase & Simon, 1973) that have evolved into more complex data structures and that possess slots allowing values to be encoded rapidly. Templates may facilitate search in three ways: (a) by allowing information to be stored into LTM rapidly; (b) by allowing a search in the template space in addition to a search in the move space; and (c) by compensating loss in the “mind's eye” due to interference and decay. A computer model implementing the main ideas of the theory is presented, and simulations of its search behaviour are discussed. The template theory accounts for the slight skill difference in average depth of search found in chess players, as well as for other empirical data.     

Effects of interpolated processing on experts’ recall of schematic information

The present study, using schematic sport diagrams, examined the perceptual chunking hypothesis (Chase & Simon, 1973a; 1973b) that visual patterns are represented by labels in a limited-capacity, short-term memory. This study, which employed three subject-skill levels and an interpolated processing paradigm, indicated that for experts, information extracted during an 8-second study period has great longevity and durability. Interpolated processing demands, along with an additional encoding activity of a second diagram presentation, had minimal effects on recall performance. This evidence supports the position that meaningful and familiar information abstracted during a brief exposure period is immediately processed in long-term memory, thus facilitating subsequent retrieval.     

Penal Non-substitution

There are two broad historic approaches to the so-called governmentalview of the atonement (which is better described, from its definingcharacteristic, as penal non-substitution): the Grotian or Arminianversion, and the New England or Calvinistic version. The importantdifferences of emphasis between these two approaches are re-examined.One version of the doctrine, drawing on the work of the NewEngland theologian Jonathan Edwards Jnr (1745–1801), isdefended against several criticisms often made of the theory.It is argued that, although not without problems, penal non-substitutionis a robust account of atonement that should be taken much moreseriously than it has been in the recent literature.     

Autonomy and Conjugal Love: A Reply to Golash

In my response to Golash I distinguish between two steps in my original argument. The first relates to the special value of conjugal (two-person) love relationships. I defend this step against criticisms, arguing that the two-person relationship provides a form of recognition that is of special importance to us and cannot be found in other sorts of relationship. The two-person relationship is one that, at least as private individuals, we have special reason to pursue. The second step concerns the claim that the special value of such relationships tends to promote the autonomy of those who have them. It is this second step that is important for the argument that a liberal state – one, at any rate, that takes itself to be in the business of safeguarding the pre-conditions of autonomy – could have reason to favour marriage or some form of civic partnership over other forms of intimate adult tie. However, I admit that Golash puts forward plausible – if anecdotal – arguments against this second step. I therefore agree that I need to be more tentative about this step than I was in the original paper.     

Legal,Tender: The Deferred Romance of Pedagogical Relation in <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Paper Chase</Emphasis>

Films depicting educational relationships typically emphasize personal connections between students and teachers over the educational goals that such relations facilitate. In doing so, these films raise the question of how teachers stand in relation to their institutional roles in such a way as to inspire students’ desires for knowledge. In this paper, in order to examine the influence of institutional roles in defining teacher–student relationships, we analyze “The Paper Chase,” a film in which teacher and student have no personal connection but in which the drama of student desire is nonetheless clearly featured. Drawing from Plato’s erotics, in which the soul is shaped by desire for that which it lacks, and from Jacques Lacan’s theories of desire and transference, we argue that “The Paper Chase” portrays educational desire as rooted in the differential of authority between teacher and student.     

Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons

Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism. But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting “hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option.     

Problems for virtue theories in epistemology

This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically, both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important topic for future work.     

Friedrich Schlegel and the Character of Romantic Ethics

Recent years have witnessed a rehabilitation of early German Romanticism in philosophy, including a renewed interest in Romantic ethics. Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) is acknowledged as a key figure in this movement. While significant work has been done on some aspects of his thought, his views on ethics have been surprisingly overlooked. This essay aims to redress this shortcoming in the literature by examining the core themes of Schlegel’s ethics during the early phase of his career (1793–1801). I argue that Schlegel’s position stands out against both the dominant Kantianism of his era, as well as against some of fellow Romantics. I show how Schlegel anticipates contemporary philosophers such as Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, John McDowell, and Stanley Cavell in both his criticisms of traditional moral theory and in his attempts to develop a positive position.     

Shared structure need not be shared set-structure

Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models. I wish to thank Katherine Brading, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Antigone Nounou, Stathis Psillos, Dean Rickles, Mauricio Suarez and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticisms, and Gregory Janzen for editorial suggestions. Research for this paper was funded by a generous SSHRC grant for which I am grateful     

中国哲学的认识主体修养论

The epistemology in Chinese philosophy remarkably emphasizes the cultivation of cognitive subjects. According to such epistemology, intelligence arises from benevolence, and thus morality should be valued to gain knowledge. In this way, epistemology is integrated with theories of values and cultivation. The cultivation of cognitive subjects in Chinese philosophy mainly involves a stance, attitudes, ways of thinking and feelings of a cognitive subject. To expatiate and develop the theory of the cultivation of cognitive subjects in Chinese philosophy has much meaning for the construction of a modern Chinese-style Marxist philosophy system. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (8): 49–54     

Rigid Designators for Properties

Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of designation, or rigid designation. Third, I argue that my position does not founder by way of failing to assign rigidity the work of grounding a posteriori necessity. I thank Steve Schwartz and Bernard Linsky for helpful feedback on this paper     

Episodic Memory in Adult Age and Effects of Sibship Size and Birth Order: Longitudinal Data

This study examined the effects of sibship size and birth order on episodic memory performance in adulthood and old age. Participants were 1,141 healthy individuals aged 35–80 years, who took part in a longitudinal project on age, health, and memory. Episodic memory measurements over a 5-year interval included tests of recognition (recognition of faces, family names, first names, and nouns) and tests of recall (free recall of sentences, free recall and cued recall of nouns, and recall of activities). Results showed significant effects for both recall and recognition, that is, the smaller the sibship size is for an individual and the earlier born, the better memory performance. These results demonstrate that the effects of sibship size and birth order previously shown in children and adolescents (Belmont and Marolla, Science 182:1096–1101, 1973; Zajonc and Markus, Psych Rev 82:74–88, 1975; Zajonc, Am Psychol 56:490–496, 2001) are robust over time and hold over a large adult range.     

The Role of Verbal Threat Information in the Development of Childhood Fear. “Beware the Jabberwock!”

Rachman’s (Behaviour Research and Therapy 15:372–387, 1977; Clinical Psychology Review 11:155–173, 1991) three pathways theory proposed that childhood fears not only arise as a consequence of direct learning experiences, but can also be elicited by means of threat information transmission. This review looks at the scientific evidence for this idea, which has accumulated during the past three decades. We review research on the influences of media exposure on children’s fears, retrospective parent and child reports on the role of threat information in fear acquisition, and experimental studies that explored the causal effects of threat information on childhood fears. We also discuss possible mechanisms by which threat information exerts its influence and the processes relevant to understand the role of this type of learning experience in the origins of fear. Finally, implications for the prevention and intervention of childhood fears are briefly explored, and potential leads for future research will be highlighted.