What Makes Good Ministry Good? Women in Ministry

Abstract

What are the special ethical issues faced by women in ministry? In this article conventional assumptions about ethics in ministry, taken from the work of Gaylord Noyce, are compared with the experiences, attitudes and expectations of ordered and lay members of the Anglican Church of Canada and the United Church of Canada in two Canadian regions. The similarities and differences are then explored in conjunction with more contemporary theories. Conventional approaches to pastoral ethics and women in ministry limit concern to issues of discrimination in wages, employment and advancement. This article concludes that while such discrimination exists, it is not nearly as great a concern for women as the fear of sexual harassment. This fear is not only great but well founded. The research supports the claim that for a woman to be engaged in good ministry, she is required to do it differently from men.     

Is Good Sex Good for You? Rethinking Sexuality and Health

Despite the central importance of sexuality to human well‐being, the study of sexuality remains marginalized within health psychology, which hampers the ability of clinicians and policy‐makers to promote comprehensive health and well‐being. In this review we discuss the evidence that sexual functioning makes critical contributions to human health, focusing specifically on findings linking sexual activity to morbidity and mortality, to the health‐promoting effects of intimate relationships, and to processes of emotion regulation. We argue that researchers studying the psychology of health and well‐being should more substantively integrate sexuality into their research agendas. Health psychologists’ specific expertise in investigating and interpreting complex, reciprocal associations between subjective emotional states, health‐relevant cognitions, and health‐relevant behavior can make a notable contribution to elucidating some of the most intruiging correlations between sexuality and health that have emerged from medical and epidemiological studies. If we want to foster optimum physical and mental health among youths and adults, we must rigorously investigate the multiple mechanisms through which positive sexual functioning plays a unique and fundamental role in human well‐being across the life course.     

What Good are Counterexamples?

Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of justified true beliefsthat are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude thatknowledge is not justified true belief? Only if we have reason totrust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide rangeof cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have agreater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliableintuitions. What’s distinctive about the faulty intuitions, Iargue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a simple,systematic and largely successful theory in favour of a complicated,disjunctive and idiosyncratic theory. So maybe respecting theGettier intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead havebeen explaining why we are all so easily misled by these kinds ofcases.     

Do Good Feminists Compete?

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are “mini-wars” which encourage hatred; (2) while not “miniwars,” competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, some competition may be useful.     

What is Good Reasoning?

What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections.     

What is the Good/ Good of the FORM of the GOOD?

‘Good’ is nothing specific but is transcendentally or generally applied over specific, and specified, ‘categories’. These ‘categories’ may be seen—at least for the purposes of this note—as under Platonic Forms. The rule that instances under a category or form need a Form to be under is valid. It may be tautological: but this is OK for rules. Not being specific, however, ‘good’ neither needs nor can have a specifying Form. So, on these grounds, the Form of the Good is otious. Any rule of the kind, ‘Everything needs a Form, so good needs a Form of the Good’ is mistaken, in that good is not a kind, but a transcendental. To give a Form to the transcendental ‘good’ is a mistake: it is a Rylian category mistake. And the Form of the Good either does no work, or works unprofitably in any but an aesthetic sense.     

Long Term “Good” Marriages

ABSTRACT

Most studies investigating the key factors of a happy or healthy marriage have concentrated on the early stages of family life (Kaslow, 1981, 1982; Lewis, Beavers et al., 1976) and/or provided a general overview of “normal family processes” (Beavers, 1977; Walsh, 1982). Often they do not consider the variables which are associated with satisfaction in marriages of long duration. Therefore, the goal of (his article and the study of 20 couples married between 25 and 46 years that is discussed herein is to focus on long-term married couples who chose to stay together after their child rearing and launching years are likely to be over, in order to determine what the essential ingredients are for such longevity. It is hoped that the literature review plus the new material presented herein will help to expand the knowledge base on this topic.     

What's So Good About Aging?

Despite the many claims by gerontologists that aging is an important and positive life experience, it is associated with many losses and much deterioration. Indeed, people seem to be willing to spend great sums in fruitless attempts to ward off its effects. On the other side, despite the many negative consequences of aging, many older persons seem quite content and able to cope well with its vicissitudes. We might do better not to celebrate the joys of aging but to admire the resilience of those who endure it.     

Good God?!? Lamentations as a Model for Mourning the Loss of the Good God

This article will address the devastating psychological and social effects due to the loss of one's primary love-object, namely God in the case of faith communities and religious individuals. By using Melanie Klein's Object Relations Theory (Klein in Envy and gratitude and other works 1946/1963. The Free Press, New York, 1975a) as a way to enter the text of Lamentations, I will articulate an alternative reading that can serve as a model for Pastors and Educators to use when walking with individuals and communities through unspeakable losses. I will argue that Lamentations may be used as a tool for naming confounding depression and anxiety that stems from a damaged introjected object (one's personal God). This tool may provide individuals and communities a framework for placing anger and contempt upon God in order to re-assimilate this loved yet hated object, eventually leading toward healing and restoration of the self.     

Understanding What’s Good for Us

The ancient question of what a good life consists in is currently the focus of intense debate. There are two aspects to this debate: the first concerns how the concept of a good life is to be understood; the second concerns what kinds of life fall within the extension of this concept. In this paper, I will attend only to the first, conceptual aspect and not to the second, substantive aspect. More precisely, I will address the preliminary, underlying question of how to understand what it is in general for something to be good for someone, from which an understanding of the more particular concept of a good life may be derived.

Must new worlds also be Good?

The activities analysed by Spinosa et al., viz entrepreneurship, citizen action, and cultural leadership, are all central to the American experience. They have a common phenomenological structure and a common purpose, which is to ‘disclose new worlds’, i.e. so to reconfigure the collective perceptions as to bring about ‘large‐scale cultural and historical changes’. Each, more or less unselfconsciously, is an exercise of skill, an expression of freedom, and a building of solidarity through the recovery or discovery of human meanings. I argue that unless we know the ends to which skill and freedom tend, and in which meaning is found, all three (which the authors treat rather as ends in themselves) are underdescribed, and impossible to see as possessing or conferring value simply per se. The same goes for the original three activities. Cultural leadership, citizen action, and entrepreneurship can work as easily towards bad ends as good. To see them as virtual ends in themselves, then, is premature, and a kind of formalism.     

Can Sadness Be Good for You?

The subtle relationship between feeling and thinking, affect and cognition has fascinated philosophers and writers since time immemorial, yet, empirical research on this topic was relatively neglected by psychologists until recently. There have been many claims emphasising the beneficial cognitive and behavioural consequences of positive affect. Many recent works suggest that negative affect may also facilitate optimal performance in many situations, consistent with evolutionary theories suggesting the adaptive signalling function of various affective states. This paper reviews traditional and current psychological theories linking affect to social thinking and behaviour. A variety of empirical studies from our laboratory will also be presented, demonstrating that in many situations, negative affect promotes optimal performance in cognitive and social tasks, including tasks such as memory, social judgements, motivation, and strategic interpersonal behaviours. These results will be interpreted in terms of a dual‐process theory that predicts that negative affect promotes a more accommodative, vigilant, and externally focused thinking strategy. The relevance of these findings for recent affect–cognition theories will be discussed, and the practical implications of negative affect promoting improved social thinking and performance in a number of applied fields will be considered.     

How Bad Can Good People Be?

Can a virtuous person act contrary to the virtue she possesses? Can virtues have “holes”—or blindspots—and nonetheless count as virtues? Gopal Sreenivasan defends a notion of a blindspot that is, in my view, an unstable moral category. I will argue that no trait possessing such a “hole” can qualify as a virtue. My strategy for showing this appeals to the importance of motivation to virtue, a feature of virtue to which Sreenivasan does not adequately attend. Sreenivasan’s account allows performance alone to be a reliable indicator of the possession of virtue. I argue that, at least with respect to a classical, Aristotelian conception of virtue, this assumption is mistaken: a person is said to possess a virtue only when she is properly motivated. In my view, the nature of motivation required for the possession of Aristotelian virtue does not admit of blindspots. I am not primarily interested in details about the situationist critique of virtue theory but rather the implications that blindspots have for our conception of virtue. I argue that because the practical reasoning of the virtuous requires both cognitive and motivational coherence, the motivational structure of the virtuous agent cannot accommodate blindspots. My conclusion is neither a defense of motivational internalism nor of an idealized conception of Aristotelian virtue. My aim is to show that because blindspotted virtue does not cohere well with Aristotle’s conception of virtuous agency, friends of virtue theory must choose one or the other; they cannot have both.     

What is so Good about Moral Freedom?

Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil, so good indeed that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not 'morallyFree'. It is not easy to see how to fit these two theses into a single coherent package. If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it? I develop, but ultimately reject, what I take to be the most initially promising strategy for resolving this dilemma.     

Can a Robot Be a Good Colleague?

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper discusses the robotization of the workplace, and particularly the question of whether robots can be good colleagues. This might appear to be a strange...