Evolutionary psychology and rational-emotive theory: Time to open the floodgates

Main tenets, issues, and controversies for evolutionary psychology (EP), particularly its cognitive aspects, are introduced, clarified, and applied to the theory and philosophy of rational-emotive therapy (RET). Specifically, key concepts in EP are applied to Ellis' genetic postulate for cognitive demandingness and grandiosity, and are incorporated into Ruth's (1992) RET evolutionary proposal. The following issues are examined for demanding and grandiose thinking: nature (genetic) vs. nurture (learned), plasticity vs. unmodifiability, acquisition ease and modification-elimination difficulty, natural inseparability of cognition and emotion, natural inseparability of cognitive content and process, social selection pressures and the human psyche, competitive individualism vs. natural self-interest, evolutionary counter-balancing and false mutually exclusive dichotomies, epigenetic rules and Darwinian algorithms, current adaptions vs. ancestral remnants, child and adult adaption, Darwinism vs. Lamarckism, and ethical considerations.William J. Ruth, Ph.D., Staff Psychologist and Practicum Supervisor. School PsychologistPrivate Practice and Independent Research, Hartsdale, NY.     

Modern application of evolutionary theory to psychology: key concepts and clarifications

Darwinian selection has become the centerpiece of biology, and in the past few decades many psychologists and anthropologists have recognized the value of using an evolutionary perspective to guide their work. With a focus on evolved psychological mechanisms and associated information processing features, evolutionary psychology has risen as a compelling and fruitful approach to the study of human psychology and behavior. In this article we review the instrument of evolution: natural selection, the products of evolution, and the impact of evolutionary thinking on modern psychological science. We conclude that as prejudicial barriers are overcome, as more evolutionary psychological work is conducted, and as hypothesized psychological mechanisms are substantiated in other disciplines, evolutionary psychology will emerge as the metatheory for psychology.     

The Scala naturae revisited: evolutionary scales and anagenesis in comparative psychology

Recent suggestions that evolutionary scales have a place in theorization about the evolution of behavior have been based on the concept of anagenesis, formerly associated with notions of biological progress. An associated concept is that of grades, often used as units of anagenetic advance. Advocates of anagenetic analysis in comparative psychology cite the writings of biologists Bernard Rensch, Julian Huxley, George Gaylord Simpson, and Stephen Jay Gould to support the usefulness of anagenesis but treat the positions of each of these theorists as if they were the same. In fact, they differ considerably in their definition of anagenesis and in its application to specific issues in evolution. The anagenetic approach is criticized as axiological and frequently anthropocentric. Although the formation of grades can be useful, a sequence of grades must not be assumed to represent historical stages in the evolution of specific structures or behaviors.     

Evolutionary psychology is not the only productive evolutionary approach to understanding consumer behavior

I respond to Vladas Griskevicius and Douglas T. Kendrick (G&;K) and Gad Saad's (S) defenses of the view that Consumer Studies would benefit from the appeal to evolution in all work aimed at understanding consumer behavior. I argue that G&;K and S's reliance on one theoretical perspective, that of evolutionary psychology, limits their options. Further, I point out some specific problems with the theoretical perspective of evolutionary psychology. Finally, I introduce some alternative evolutionary approaches to studying human behavior that could profitably be adopted in consumer research.     

Evolutionary developmental psychology: Contributions from comparative research with nonhuman primates

Evolutionary developmental psychology is a discipline that has the potential to integrate conceptual approaches to the study of behavioral development derived from psychology and biology as well as empirical data from humans and animals. Comparative research with animals, and especially with nonhuman primates, can provide evidence of adaptation in human psychological and behavioral traits by highlighting possible analogies (i.e., similar function, but independent evolution) or homologies (i.e., inheritance from a common ancestor) between human traits and similar traits present in animals. Data from nonhuman primates have played a crucial role in our understanding of infant attachment to the caregiver as a developmental adaptation for survival. Primate and human data are also consistent in suggesting that female interest in infants during the juvenile years may be a developmental adaptation for reproduction that facilitates the acquisition of maternal skills prior to the onset of reproduction.     

Rape and evolutionary psychology: a critique of Thornhill and Palmer's theory

In this article, we present a critical evaluation of Thornhill and Palmer's [(2000). Rape: a natural history. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.] evolutionary theory of rape. This theory attempts to explain rape in terms of evolutionary theory and asserts that rape is either directly or indirectly associated with inherited mechanisms that increased our ancestors' reproductive success. We first provide an introduction and overview of some of the fundamental concepts in the field of evolutionary psychology (EP) and then summarize the major elements of Thornhill and Palmer's theory. Thornhill and Palmer offer two main lines of argument in support of their theory — a positive and a negative argument. The positive argument involves the development of an explicit case for the coherency, scope, empirical adequacy, and explanatory depth of their evolutionary account of rape. The negative argument relies upon refuting what Thornhill and Palmer call the “standard social science model” (SSSM) of rape. The present paper advances some general criticisms of Thornhill and Palmer's theory and then specifically addresses both their positive and negative arguments. We conclude that Thornhill and Palmer have not established that their evolutionary theory of rape is a better theory than social science explanations. At best, their argument presents a strong case for the important, but not exclusive, role of biological factors in the etiology of rape and gender relationships. At this point in time, there are too many unanswered questions concerning the nature of the relevant adaptations and the contribution of environmental and cultural factors to conclude that evolutionary theories are sufficient to explain sexual aggression.     

Bridging developmental systems theory and evolutionary psychology using dynamic optimization

Interactions between evolutionary psychologists and developmental systems theorists have been largely antagonistic. This is unfortunate because potential synergies between the two approaches remain unexplored. This article presents a method that may help to bridge the divide, and that has proven fruitful in biology: dynamic optimization. Dynamic optimization integrates developmental systems theorists’ focus on dynamics and contingency with the ‘design stance’ of evolutionary psychology. It provides a theoretical framework as well as a set of tools for exploring the properties of developmental systems that natural selection might favor, given particular evolutionary ecologies. We also discuss limitations of the approach.     

Toward an alternative evolutionary theory of religion: looking past computational evolutionary psychology to a wider field of possibilities

Cognitive science of the last half-century has been dominated by the computational theory of mind and its picture of thought as information processing. Taking this picture for granted, the most prominent evolutionary theories of religion of the last fifteen years have sought to understand human religiosity as the product or by-product of universal information processing mechanisms that were adaptive in our ancestral environment. The rigidity of such explanations is at odds with the highly context-sensitive nature of historical studies of religion, and thus contributes to the apparent tug-of-war between scientific and humanistic perspectives. This essay argues that this antagonism stems in part from a deep flaw of computational theory, namely its notion of information as pre-given and context-free. In contrast, non-computational theories that picture mind as an adaptive, interactive process in which information is jointly constructed by organism and environment offer an alternative approach to an evolutionary understanding of human religiosity, one that is compatible with historical studies and amenable to a wide range of inquiries, including some limited kinds of theological inquiry.     

Evolutionary social psychology: Prospects and pitfalls

The principles of evolutionary psychology and the traditional assumptions of social psychology are highly compatible. Both disciplines trace observed behavioral variability to situational variability. Both assume that psychological mechanisms sensitive to social information are central to causal accounts of social behavior. Questions about the origins and functions of these psychological mechanisms are indispensable for understanding social behavior. Evolutionary psychology provides conceptual tools for addressing these questions. Several pitfalls must be avoided by practitioners of evolutionary social psychology. Specifically, we must jettison notions of genetic determinism and behavioral unmodifiability, eliminate false dichotomies between “genetic” and “learned,” and place cross-cultural variability in a sensible theoretical context. Attending to the reliable phenomena discovered by traditional social psychology and the conceptual frameworks provided by modern evolutionary psychology will produce the most informed evolutionary social psychology.     

Oversimplifying evolutionary psychology leads to explanatory gaps

Comments on Evolutionary psychology: Controversies, questions, prospects, and limitations (see record 2010-02208-001) by Confer et al. They argued that SST cannot explain the existence of either homosexuality or suicide within the human species. We contend that a sufficiently nuanced evolutionary position has no difficulties explaining either phenomenon. Also in this account, it is assumed that all psychological functioning must serve survival and reproduction. However, since evolution selects against certain qualities (it does not select for qualities, as it is commonly, but incorrectly, described), two types of qualities should remain intact for any species: (a) those that facilitate survival and reproduction and (b) those that do not impede survival and reproduction at the population level.     

Examining the acceptance of and resistance to evolutionary psychology

The field of psychology remains a divided one. Several different sub-disciplines (e.g., developmental, cognitive, behaviorism, social, etc.) form what could be a unified scientific area. However, there is no widely accepted theory of unification. Charles Darwin once theorized that evolutionary theory would change the foundation of psychology; but over the years, evolutionary psychology has been met with hostile resistance from some of the prominent psychologists within the other sub-disciplines. Yet in recent years, all of the divided sub-disciplines of psychology have been slowly implementing evolutionary principles into their literature and research. This slow integration of evolutionary psychology into the other sub-disciplines indicates the possibility of a unified psychology with evolution as its foundation. This paper briefly reviews the literature within each major sub-discipline of psychology to show their implementation of evolutionary psychological theories, indicating the possibility of evolutionary psychology becoming the unifying paradigm upon which the entire field of psychology can be based. A call for action to continue this process is also discussed.     

Evolutionary psychology: the emperor's new paradigm

For some evolutionary psychology is merely a field of inquiry, but for others it is a robust paradigm involving specific theories about the nature and evolution of the human mind. Proponents of this paradigm claim to have made several important discoveries regarding the evolved architecture of the mind. Highly publicized discoveries include a cheater-detection module, a psychological sex difference in jealousy, and motivational mechanisms underlying parental love and its lapses, which purportedly result in child maltreatment. In this article, I argue that the empirical evidence for these "discoveries" is inconclusive, at best. I suggest that, as the reigning paradigm in evolutionary psychology has produced questionable results, the evolutionary study of human psychology is still in need of a guiding paradigm.