Variations in Level of Moral Judgment as a Function of Type of Dilemma and Moral Choice

This study compares the predictive power of two models of moral judgment: (a) Kohlberg's model, which predicts stage consistency across varying content, and (b) a model that predicts variations in stage as a function of complex interactions between people and social contexts. Forty university students were asked to make and justify choices on three moral dilemmas—a dilemma involving the sale of defective merchandise (selling dilemma) and two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test of moral judgment. Half the participants made hypothetical choices on the selling dilemma; the other half were offered a selfish incentive—money—for concealing the defects in the merchandise. In support of the interactional model, (a) participants scored lower on the selling dilemma than on Kohlberg's test, (b) the monetary incentive affected moral choices, (c) participants justified the choice to conceal defects in the merchandise with significantly lower stage moral judgments than they invoked in support of the decision to disclose its defects, and (d) participants who upheld the choice to disclose supported it with higher stage justifications than those who rejected it. Surprisingly, however, participants who stood to make money disclosed more about the defects in the article and charged less than participants who did not.     

The Relational Model: International Relations and Dissemination in Italy: A Historical Account

In this paper we attempt to describe how the relational model spread in Italy primarily from the microcosm of the Institute that we founded—ISIPSÉ—and in which we tried to create a community within which we could study the contemporary theories and meet the psychoanalysts who gave life to the relational movement. We describe a process of creating a cultural space that allows us to dialogue directly with those who contributed to the evolution of contemporary psychoanalysis. Today in psychoanalytic literature the growing importance of the implicit refers primarily to the importance of the body in the analytic relationship. Therefore we believe that in the training of therapists attention for an embodied, physical transmission of psychoanalysis makes the transition from theory to clinical situation more consistent and smoother.     

OLD TEXTS,NEW MASKS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF MISREADING EVOLUTION ONTO HISTORICAL ISLAMIC TEXTS

With the increasing interest in Islam and evolution, some Islamic thinkers have vehemently rejected evolution, while others have eagerly embraced it. However, those seeking to embrace evolution sometimes err in their interpretation of historical writings. Indeed, there are texts written by famous historical scholars of Islam who seem to suggest that humans have evolved from lower forms of species. These include Ibn Khaldūn, Jalāl ad‐Dīn Rūmī, al‐Jāhiz, and The Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al Safā). Although this may be true, such readings are a mistaken interpretation of the aforementioned authors who are actually referring to some form of the scalae naturae (the Great Chain of Being). This reference to the Great Chain of Being is unknown to some contemporary readers who mistakenly believe these writers to be discussing an evolutionary or a proto‐evolutionary theory. This article demonstrates how and why these historical records do not actually represent any notion of evolution as it is currently understood, in the hope of avoiding any further erroneous claims that seem to be proliferating among modern thinkers.     

Habits and beliefs that guide self-regulated learning: Do they vary with mindset?

Prior research by Kornell and Bjork (2007) and Hartwig and Dunlosky (2012) has demonstrated that college students tend to employ study strategies that are far from optimal. We examined whether individuals in the broader—and typically older—population might hold different beliefs about how best to study and learn, given their more extensive experience outside of formal coursework and deadlines. Via a web-based survey, however, we found striking similarities: Learners’ study decisions tend to be driven by deadlines, and the benefits of activities such as self-testing and reviewing studied materials are mostly unappreciated. We also found evidence, however, that one's mindset with respect to intelligence is related to one's habits and beliefs: Individuals who believe that intelligence can be increased through effort were more likely to value the pedagogical benefits of self-testing, to restudy, and to be intrinsically motivated to learn, compared to individuals who believe that intelligence is fixed.     

Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects

In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic projects called respectively ‘deciding what to believe’ and ‘settling the question’. Depending on which project is in hand, according to Davies, the diagnoses of its failure—if indeed it fails—will differ. I believe that, by introducing the idea that the effectiveness of a valid argument may be epistemic project-relative, Davies has pointed the way to an important reorientation of the debates about Moore's Proof. But I wish to take issue with much of the detail of his proposals. I argue that Davies's characterization of his two projects is misleading (§1), and his account of their distinction defective (§2). I then canvass some suggestions about how it may be improved upon and about how further relevant kinds of epistemic projects in which Moore's argument may be taken to be a move can be characterized, bringing out how each of these projects impinges differently on the issue of the Proof's failure and of its diagnosis (§§3 and 4). In conclusion (§5) I offer an overview of the resulting terrain.     

Commentary on “deconstructing difference: Gender,splitting, and transitional space”;

This essay identifies Kohut's major contribution as methodological: that psychoanalytic inquiry entails the sustained empathic immersion in the patient's psychological experience. Kohut's consistent employment of this method enabled him to discover that it was not instinctual drive derivatives but selfobject needs that were central to all psychological relationships. This discovery was the basis for the transformation of analysts’ approach to the “narcissistic”; aspects of a wide variety of disorders—a transformation whose theoretical and therapeutic importance rivals the revolutionary approach taken by Freud to the vicissitudes of psychosexuality and its disturbances. The author describes the major areas of progress in self psychology—much of which centers on the growing recognition that the health and vitality of the self depend on complex relational, or intersubjective, selfobject experiences. He indicates how this recognition is changing our perspectives on transference and countertransference and is improving our ability to respond optimally to our patients. He describes how optimal responsiveness constitutes the guiding principle for therapeutic work, and how it may both constitute, and be different from, “being empathic.”;     

A Contemporary View of Some of Joseph Sandler's Key Concepts

Three of Sandler's seminal papers—“The Background of Safety” (1960a), “The Concept of the Representational World” (1962), and “Countertransference and Role Responsiveness” (1976)—are scrutinized and discussed to explore the evolution of his thinking over some 40 years. His early insistence on the importance of feeling states and intrapsychic mechanisms and processes, especially those relating to internal objects and internal object relationships, are emphasized as well as the interactions and complementary relationship between theoretical formulations and clinical findings, as exemplified in his research activities in the Index Department of the Anna Freud Centre in London and in his paper on countertransference and role responsiveness. Interrelationships with other concepts, both clinical and theoretical, show up in Sandler's work as well as that of other eminent authors up to the present time, and similarities in conceptualizations are highlighted. Sandler's continuous efforts to clarify psychoanalytic concepts and to integrate differing psychoanalytic conceptualizations and models are illustrated by references to and quotations from the salient papers.     

Defense,dreams and rationality

Are some mental activities rational but unconscious? Psychopathological symptoms, it is said, have a sense — they are seen as “compromise-formations” which express the “intentions” of agents even though the agents are totally unaware of “bringing about” such symptoms. Philosophers, who often claim that such a conception is simply contradictory or incoherent, have shed little light on the puzzles and apparent paradoxes that surround the issue. It is argued here that Freud's two models of explanation — the mechanistic and the intentionalistic — each fail to provide a basis for an explanatory account of the phenomenon of unconscious defense. An examination of the problem of dream “composition” helps explain why Freud's dependence upon “rational homunculi” is inappropriate and misleading. Finally, an alternative model which depends neither upon Freud's version of mechanism nor upon his lavish anthropormorphism is suggested. Ladies and Gentlemen, — It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened in the course of the treament that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too had a sense.     

Tension within Triangulation

Philosophers disagree about how meaning connects with history. Donald Davidson, who helped deepen our understanding of meaning, even disagreed with himself. As Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig note, Davidson's account of radical interpretation treats meaning as ahistorical; his Swampman thought experiment treats it as historical. Here I show that while Lepore and Ludwig are right that Davidson's views are in tension, they are wrong about its extent. Unbeknownst to them, Davidson's account of radical interpretation and Swampman thought experiment both rely—in different ways—on the same model of triangulation. I revise one of those ways to resolve the tension within Davidson's views. I close by detailing what role history should play in Davidson's views overall.     

Interpreting imaginative play in child psychotherapy: Towards a phenomenological hermeneutic approach

Abstract

Despite renewed interest and technical advances in play therapy with children, its theoretical basis remains weak. A phenomenological hermeneutic approach to play therapy offers a philosophically grounded theoretical understanding of the meaning of children's expressions through imaginative play in a therapeutic context. Drawing upon Gadamer's ontological concept of play and Ricoeur's theory of interpretation, a child's imaginative play is seen as a text that calls for interpretation. The understanding and interpretation of imaginative play in play therapy is illustrated by means of a case vignette of a young physically abused child.     

Élan Vital Revisited: Bergson and the Thermodynamic Paradigm

The received view of Bergson's philosophy of life is that it advances some form of vitalism under the heading of an “élan vital.” This paper argues against the vitalistic interpretation of Bergson's élan vital as it appears in Creative Evolution (1907) in favor of an interpretation based on his overlooked reflections on entropy and energetics. Within the interpretation developed here, the élan vital is characterized not as a spiritualistic “vital force” but as a tendency of organization opposed to the tendency of entropic degradation. It is then shown how Bergson's view of evolution and living organization resonates with more contemporary scientific approaches belonging to a “thermodynamic paradigm” in theoretical biology in different respects, including the critique of neo‐Darwinism and the positing of a driving force behind evolution. Finally, the special interest that Bergson's philosophical biology bears today is considered in terms of the connection between the concepts of élan vital and duration.     

The philosophy of economic modelling: a critical survey

Economic modelling, the heart of orthodox economics, has long been accused of neglecting the interpretation of its models needed to generate knowledge claims about the real world. It is argued that recent developments in the philosophy of model and theory can help us to evaluate the scientific and policy relevance of economic models. McCloskey's attempt to finesse this issue by reference to the rhetoric of economics is argued not to be congruent with economics' revealed explanatory and policy objectives. Blaug's adherence to a Popper-Lakatos mode of appraisal may be a little dated, but none of the more recent approaches to the metaphysical foundations of economics—such as scientific realism, constructive empiricism or 'causal holism'—seem able to rebuff the criticism explicit and implicit in the recent work of, for example, Hausman and Rosenberg. An example of 'modelling without theory' and Rapport's recent defence of economic modelling's practice suggest the need for further detailed evaluation by case-studies of the development and application of economic models.     

New interpretative styles: Progress or contamination? Psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychopathology1

Psychoanalysis has started to recoup, often quite implicitly, a more phenomenological stance, ever since psychoanalysts have started working with borderline and psychotic patients. As many of these patients have commonly been through traumatic experiences, psychoanalysts have been using an approach that questions the role of traditional psychoanalytical interpretation and pays more attention to the patient's inner conscious experiences; this approach is characteristic of a specifi c form of contemporary psychiatry: phenomenological psychopathology, founded by Karl Jaspers in 1913 and developed into a form of psychotherapy by Ludwig Binswanger, with his Daseinsanalyse. If what we could call a phenomenological ‘temptation’ has been spreading over psychoanalysis, so too has a psychoanalytical ‘temptation’ always been present in phenomenological psychopathology. In fact, even though this branch of psychiatry has led us towards a deeper understanding of the characteristics of psychotic being‐in‐the‐world, its therapeutic applications have never been adequately formalised, much less have they evolved into a specifi c technique or a structured psychotherapeutic approach. Likewise, phenomenological psychotherapy has always held an anaclitic attitude towards psychoanalysis, accepting its procedures but refusing its theoretical basis because it is too close to that of the objectifying natural sciences. Psychoanalytic ‘temptation’ and phenomenological ‘temptation’ can thus be considered as two sides of the same coin and outline a trend in psychoanalytic and phenomenological literature which points out the fundamental role of the patient's inner conscious experiences in the treatment of borderline and psychotic patients.     

When Danny said no! Refusal of treatment by a patient of questionable competence

The patient we call Danny was a mildly mentally retarded male in his mid-thirties who adamantly refused kidney dialysis when it was offered as the only therapeutic option for his progressive kidney failure. It was uncertain how fully Danny understood the implications of his refusal. To complicate the case still further, several “advocates” emerged to speak on Danny's behalf — each with a somewhat different interpretation of the situation and different sets of value presuppositions and ethical principles to apply to the choice. We chronicle the development of this situation through a series of scenes; and in each scene we also attempt to clarify the ethical and medico-legal issues involved at that point. Danny was finally permitted to make this decision for himself — though more by default than by an agreement by all parties to honor his autonomy. Our hope is that this presentation will lead to further discussion and clarification of these important issues.     

Fishapod in the Rocks: Fossils and Biblical Creation Texts

Abstract

Genesis 1:20–25 speaks of God creating water and land creatures. The fossil record suggests that vertebrates on land evolved from vertebrates of the water. In this article about creation through evolution, the author discusses a progression of fossil discoveries pertinent to the evolution of tetrapods, keeping in view the detractions of a Young Earth creationist, and finishing with a biblical-theological perspective on the evolution of tetrapods. The author's work grows out of his interest in exploring how a specific science (paleontology)—as viewed through specific discoveries and a specific evolutionary lineage—might engage actively with biblical creation passages.     

The Kantian Roots of Merleau-Ponty's Account of Pathology

One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his use of psychological case studies in pathology. For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally. In this paper, I show that although Merleau-Ponty is surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, his work is deeply indebted to an earlier philosophical study of pathology offered by the German Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1929). More specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty, in fact, follows Cassirer in placing Kant's notion of the productive imagination at the centre of his account of pathology and the features of existence it illuminates. Recognizing the debt Merleau-Ponty's account of pathology has to the Kantian tradition not only acts as a corrective to more recent interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's views of pathology (Dreyfus, Romdenh-Romluc), but also recommends we resist the prevailing tendency to treat Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as anti-Kantian. Instead, my interpretation seeks to restore Merleau-Ponty's place within the Kantian tradition.     

Understanding social suffering: a phenomenological investigation of the experience of inequality

As global market conditions erode traditional forms of solidarity, there is evidence of psychological disturbance among a number of social groups as a direct result. This paper investigates this issue among a disadvantaged working‐class group in South Yorkshire (England) and argues that understanding emerging forms of social suffering requires both a social and a person‐centred approach that transcends normal clinical/psycho‐analytic accounts. The attempt here is to create well‐founded terms of reference that will support investigators who seek to embed agents' case histories in a social‐psychological framework as they set about illuminating social pathologies. The paper attempts to trace the contours of pathology holistically by following its traces as they are manifest in everyday experience and articulated in conversation; thus putting agents' everyday perceptions of the data at the heart of this account. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief

G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It's raining, but I don't believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe, and has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic's Paradox, analogous to Moore's paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy, arguing both that akratic belief does not require belief‐akratic‐paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for an understanding of both Moorean and akratic belief.     

Why Do We Still Call Them “Paradoxes”

The fact that therapists label some events “paradoxical” may suggest that our current beliefs or theories are limited in their ability to adequately account for those phenomena. It is argued that our underlying belief in objectivity surrounds therapeutic “paradoxes” with a persistently paradoxical aura, and leads to confusion in our understanding of a variety of phenomena. Maturana's ideas regarding structure determinism, instructive interaction, and phenomenal domains are used to suggest an answer to these difficulties. It is claimed that the problematic status of many theoretical concepts (for example, communication, information, resistance, homeostasis, and pathology) is revealing of something quite important — that the experiential validity of instructive interaction repeatedly leads us into implicitly or explicitly employing instructive interaction in a domain where it can never be valid: the domain of theory and explanation.