Dimensions of “uniquely” and “non‐uniquely” human emotions

Emotion scientists often distinguish those emotions that are encountered universally, even among animals ( “primary emotions”), from those experienced by human beings ( “secondary emotions”). No attempt, however, has ever been made to capture the lay conception about this distinction and to find the criteria on which the distinction is based. The first study presented in this paper was conducted in three countries involving four languages, so as to allow for cross‐cultural comparisons. Results showed a remarkable convergence. People from all samples not only differentiated between “uniquely human” and “non‐uniquely human” emotions on a continuum, but they did so on the same basis as the one used by emotion scientists to distinguish between “primary” and “secondary” emotions. Study 2 focused on the implicit use of such a distinction. When confronted with a human (animal) context, participants reacted faster to secondary (vs primary) emotions. The implications of the human uniqueness of some emotions within the social and interpersonal contexts are discussed.     

The breadth and boundaries of a self‐psychological immersion in shame a one‐and‐a‐half‐person perspective

Shame colors other feelings and perceptions about the self. From reflections about his own personal experiences and observations regarding a particular manic‐depressive patient, the author discusses the evolution of his current clinical and theoretical understanding of shame. The framework of analytic self psychology is offered as a particularly useful perspective from which to consider shame, with its emphasis on the concept of selfobject to account both for shame's development (through selfobject misattunement and unresponsive‐ness) and for its amelioration (through empathic mirroring, idealization, and twinning). A developmental sequence for shame is advanced reflecting limitations in selfobject responsiveness, and problems are noted in the ability of current self psychology theory to fully account for the alleviation of shame. The self plays its part in the construction of those selfobjects needed to ease shame, representing the “one‐and‐a‐half‐person psychology”; of the paper's subtitle. Finally, the important role of countertransference shame is considered through a clinical example of therapist disclosure of his own shame to his patient, utilized in order to repair an interrupted kinship selfobject transference.     

Jñānagarbha and the “God's‐eye view”

In trying to define the difference between conventional and ultimate truth, the Mādhyamika Buddhist author Jñānagarbha ends up in paradoxical formulations. Putnam's discussion of Nietzsche's remark that “as the circle of science grows larger it touches paradox at more places” is presented as an illustration for Jñānagarbha's case. No comparison of Putnam and Jñānagarbha is intended as regards the contents of their presentations, the focus being only on the logical form of their argumentation. The paradoxical nature of Jñānagarbha's doctrinal system is explained to derive from the logical incompleteness of formal systems. The paradox is also explained to work as a direction arrow pointing to what can only be realised in a mystical experience.     

Belief and Self‐consciousness

Abstract

This paper is about what is distinctive about first‐person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first‐person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed to revise my beliefs about myself. This point develops the insight that Anscombe and others had that those of an agent’s beliefs about himself that manifest that special self‐consciousness are not based on observation, testimony or inference. The puzzles show that this kind of self‐consciousness involves, not a special kind of belief or even a special kind of self‐reference, but a special kind of belief revision policy.     

Consciousness and content‐formation

General opposition to ‘progress’ is often seen as involving a personification of technology as an evil spirit. One version of ‘luddism’ is defended here as worthy of serious debate. ('Luddism’ is an attempt to justify a general presumption that technical progress is bad for us, so technical innovations should not count as true achievement.) Our luddite says, ‘If technical powers, misused, will cause more harm than good, these powers should count as bad. And such harmful misuse is likely, since the dramatic, half‐blind changes resulting from technology will shortly damage world systems, swamping their adjustment‐mechanisms. “Superhuman”; powers go sour with merely human wisdom. “Know‐how”; tends inherently to pull ahead of “know‐whether”; ‘. This version of luddism is contrasted with various caricatures; luddite research priorities are outlined. Serious discussion is invited of the dangers inherent in further empowering fallible humanity.     

Hegel and self‐actualization

Abstract

Hegel says that mind develops through three phases, which he calls soul, consciousness, and mind. By referring to these three phases as the Primary level, the Social level and the Realizing level, it makes it clearer that they link up with thoroughly familiar phenomena in the field of psychotherapy and with contemporary life generally. In fact, they give a new angle on the whole process of self‐actualization, which throws light on many topics in humanistic psychology.     

Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples

Abstract

I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt‐type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt‐type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections     

Evolution‐revolution and the cosmos

The purpose of this paper is to sketch some remarks about the evolution of psychology within contemporary cognitive sciences and its consequences on the definition of the object of a (one) scientific psychology. Arguments are stated on empirical experience from interdisciplinary research and on experimental investigations in psycholinguistics and knowledge representation.     

Mother‐child relationships and creativity

The present study focused on the relationship between young children's level of differentiation and creative potential as assessed by the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT). The mothers of high and low creative children were interviewed in order to establish the degree to which they encouraged differentiation in their children. Their level of involvement with their children was also evaluated using the Family Relations Test (FRT). Mothers of high creative children were less emotionally involved with their children than other mothers, less likely to be perceived as overprotective, and less likely to deny their feelings of hostility towards them. They were more self‐confident and self‐realized in their homes and had higher occupational levels than other mothers. The present study also assessed the level of differentiation in both creative and uncreative children with the Draw‐a‐Person and Kinetic Family Drawing Tests. Results indicated that highly creative children were more differentiated than uncreative children.     

Parapsychology and the mind‐body problem

The paper argues that there are effectively only two tenable theories of the mind‐brain relationship: ‘epiphenomenalism’ and ‘radical dualism’ (interactionism). So long as account is taken only of the conventional sciences, the odds are heavily stacked in favour of epiphenomenalism. However, once the findings of parapsychology are admitted to consideration, a very different situation obtains. It is here argued that parapsychology only makes sense within a dualist metaphysic.     

MUSIC OF THE “FOLKS‐NESHOME”

In their task of creating a style of “Jewish” national art music based on ethnographic research, many of the composers affiliated with the St. Petersburg Society for Jewish Folk Music wrote arrangements of traditional ethnic songs and dances for small chamber ensembles. These works, generally no longer than the duration of a traditional folk melody, and written with the aim of evoking Jewish village folk culture, occupy a genre that I call the “rural miniature”. This genre was popular in Eastern and Central Europe during this period, and was most commonly composed and performed by musicians who conducted ethnographic fieldwork themselves or studied the findings of other ethnographers of music. The rural miniature was a critical art music genre in the development of state and diaspora musical nationalism. Works in the genre assumed a standard role in the chamber music and solo repertoire during the first four decades of the twentieth century. As the genre’s early proponents moved away from their homes and settled throughout the diaspora, however, the continued survival of rural Jewish life appeared increasingly imperilled by urbanization, emigration, and anti‐Semitism. A discussion of Joseph Achron’s “Hebrew Melody” will demonstrate that, with this cultural migration, the ethnographic component of the rural miniature came gradually to be superseded by the aesthetic elements of propaganda and nostalgia, as the genre was appropriated for fictional idealizations of traditional life in the Eastern European shtetl ¹ 1. David Assaf defines the shtetl as “a physical enclave represented by hundreds of small and midsized towns in Eastern Europe whose Jewish character was in clear evidence”. Assaf, Journey to a Nineteenth‐Century Shtetl, 20. View all notes and expressions of a Zionist longing for the biblical Jewish homeland.     

Cybernetics and mind‐body problems 1

It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as ‘Can machines think?’, ‘Could robots have feelings?’ might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind‐body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are mistaken. It is then claimed, although not argued in detail, that the following three approaches to the first set of questions are mistaken: (1) machines (and robots) obviously cannot think, feel, create, etc., since they do only what they are programmed to do; (2) on the basis of ah analysis of the meaning of the words ‘machine’ ('robot’, ‘think’, ‘feel’, etc.) we can see that in principle it would be impossible for machines (or robots) to think, feel, create, etc.; (3) machines (and robots) obviously can (or could) think, feel, etc., since they do certain things which, if we were to do them, would require thought, feeling, etc. It is argued that, once it is seen why approach (2) is mistaken, it becomes desirable to decline ‘in principle’ approaches to the first set of questions and to favor ‘piecemeal investigations’ where attention is centered upon what is actually taking place in machine technology, the development of new programming techniques, etc. Some suggestions are made concerning the relevance of current computer simulation studies to traditional mind‐body questions. A new set of questions is proposed as a substitute for the first set of questions. It is hoped that attempts to answer these may provide us with new and detailed portraits of the mind‐body relationship.     

Indian muftis and the non‐Muslims

Muslims like to emphasize that Islam represents primarily a way of life and not a system of belief with elaborate doctrines. This statement is justified by the discussions of Indian jurisconsults about the attitudes to be taken towards non‐Muslims. It is true that they occasionally engage in a polemic concerning theological issues, but the main concern is directed towards practical problems the ordinary believer is faced with in his relations with non‐Muslims. Consequently, most fatwas in this context deal with day‐to‐day worries. The trouble caused by Hindus is the allurement of their exuberant festivals and imaginative rituals, whereas questions raised in regard to the British stem from uneasy feelings roused by the strangeness of European culture and its fashions.     

Incommensurable paradigms and psycho‐metaphysical explanation

The concept of ‘psycho‐metaphysical explanation’ is explained in terms of the philosophy of the German idealist J. G. Fichte, who uses this mode of explanation to account for the fact that the dispute between Idealism and Realism is one which cannot be resolved by means of rational argument. This paper presents a similar account of the contemporary dispute between competing paradigms of persons, i.e. between materialist and non‐reductivist theories. Some practical and frightening implications are illustrated by showing how this paradigmatic dispute is at the basis of much contemporary debate concerning the purpose of post‐secondary education. Since it is argued that the interrelated disputes in question are ones which cannot be resolved by straightforward rational argument the paper concludes by resorting to such non‐rational literary devices as satire, irony and metaphor.     

II. Eisenberg and self‐obligations

Terms for the pitch of tones, such as ‘high‐low’ do not describe pitch and can interfere with our apprehending such data for what they are in their sensuous uniqueness. Very different alternatives such as ‘narrow‐broad’ or French aigu‐grave serve equally well. In listening to music the first requisite is the apprehension of ‘uncategorized’ tones, the words for them serving only as a way of marking the fact of their differences. This must lead us to reaffirm what was said by Gorgias about what language can and cannot do in respect of such data.     

Merleau‐Ponty and the Phenomenological Reduction

It is commonly believed that Merleau‐Ponty rejected Husserl's phenomenological reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau‐Ponty rejected what he saw as the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. Contrary to a number of Merleau‐Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the epoché, and Merleau‐Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau‐Ponty's liberal use of the results of empirical psychology signifies a rejection of the epoché. A proper understanding of his views on the relation between phenomenology and psychology is that, at least in Merleau‐Ponty's eyes, the methods of phenomenology and the empirical sciences are largely similar. I conclude that we have every reason to think that Merleau‐Ponty accepted Husserl's demand that the phenomenologist place the world in brackets.     

The creative thinking,environmental frustration,and self‐concept of left‐ and right‐handers

Abstract:

Left‐ (n = 12) and right‐handed (n = 12) college students were compared on creative thinking, environmental frustration, and self‐concept. It was hypothesized that because left‐handers regularly encounter equipment designed for right hand use, these individuals must use creative thinking to successfully interact with the environment. Results indicated that on the Environmental Frustration Questionnaire, left‐handers indicated significantly greater frustration with two of the six categories of objects, namely household tools (p < .005) and classroom desks (p < .005). On the Verbal and Figural Forms of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking, lefthanders scored significantly higher on the figural elaboration measure (p < .05). Finally, the hypothesis that handedness plays a larger role in the self‐concept of left‐handers than right‐handers was confirmed. Left‐handers were significantly more likely than right‐handers to mention their handedness when asked to describe themselves (p < .05).     

Perceived localizations and eye movements with action‐generated and computer‐generated vanishing points of moving stimuli

When observers localize the vanishing point of a moving target, localizations are reliably displaced beyond the final position, in the direction the stimulus was travelling just prior to its offset. We examined modulations of this phenomenon through eye movements and action control over the vanishing point. In Experiment 1 with pursuit eye movements, localization errors were in movement direction, but less pronounced when the vanishing point was self‐determined by a key press of the observer. In contrast, in Experiment 2 with fixation instruction, localization errors were opposite movement direction and independent from action control. This pattern of results points at the role of eye movements, which were gathered in Experiment 3. That experiment showed that the eyes lagged behind the target at the point in time, when it vanished from the screen, but that the eyes continued to drift on the targets' virtual trajectory. It is suggested that the perceived target position resulted from the spatial lag of the eyes and of the persisting retinal image during the drift.     

Parent‐infant‐psychotherapy and psychoanalytic treatment: contradiction or mutual inspiration?

Psychoanalysis and parent‐infant‐psychotherapy are compared. Although parent‐infant‐psychotherapy developed from psychoanalysis, it appears at first glance not to be “analytic” with its aim of dealing quickly with the symptoms presented and also with its different setting. The author shows that an analytic approach in understanding the multi‐facetted net of relationships between family members and the infant in its “phantasmic interaction” and a consideration of the implication for analysis of the empirical research carried out in conjunction with parent‐infant‐therapy can lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas. One example of this is research into the correlation between attachment patterns and the processing of conflicts. Furthermore a dialogue between these two disciplines can remind psychoanalysts that a critical discussion of the external circumstances of their methods does not immediately call into question their fundamental approach to therapy: the work in transference on relationship fantasies.