Back to Basics: The Psychoanalytic Conceptualization of Motivation

Reconsideration of motivation, a fundamental concept in psychoanalytic theory, engages us with basic assumptions and postulates of our field and draws us to the borders with neighboring scientific elaborations of the design, structure, and function of the mind. This paper presents a concept of motivation from a perspective in modern conflict theory and correlates this concept with current thinking in evolutionary biology. The challenges that this correlation raises for all psychoanalytic approaches to motivation are discussed. Natural selection has fundamentally organized motivation in accord with the principle of inclusive fitness. Adaptive motivations of self-interest achieved through social success are paramount. In mind sciences there is a growing appreciation of the innately modular mind with mounting evidence for domain and content-specific evolved psychological mechanisms, the modern term for instincts. In regard to motivation in modern conflict theory, evolved mechanisms and predispositions are innately linked to pleasure–unpleasure and include, importantly, motivations of self-interest. The pleasure–unpleasure principle regulates motivation throughout life. Early mother–child interactions are vital to the development and contextualization of motivation; however, these interactions themselves depend on mutually coadapted mechanisms that give vectors and impose constraints on every primary relationship. In evading innate contributions there is a danger of embarking on a new creationist paradigm.     

Einige Gedanken über Rationalisierung und Intellektualisierung

Within the framework of Freud??s defence concept the question is examined whether rationalization and intellectualization should be regarded as separate mechanisms of defence. It is argued that both of them represent a specific handling of substitutive formations produced by other mechanisms of defence. Rationalization refers to the usage of substitutive formations as the reason for action. In the guise of these ego-syntonic and socially approved substitutive motives the original motives are hidden and appear encrypted in consciousness. Intellectualization names the handling of the outcome of a process in which instinctual wishes are isolated from their accompanying feelings and by virtue of further mechanisms of defence, these wishes are transferred in highly abstract substitutive formations where they also represent themselves in a mystified manner.     

Repression and substitutive formation: the relationship between Freud's concepts reconsidered

This paper examines Freud's concept of repression and the relationship between repression and substitutive formation as it presents itself in Freud's writings. The author shows that Freud gives at least four different meanings to the term "repression": Freud uses it interchangeably with defense, as a consciously intended forgetting, as a specific unconscious mechanism of defense, and to describe the consequence of defense mechanisms leading to substitutive formations. The inconsistencies in this relationship are discussed and clarified, and Freud's economic and linguistic attempts at founding repression are subjected to critique; the need of a primal repression as a necessary condition for repression proper is pointed out. In developing Freud's linguistic foundation of repression further, the author presents defense as a semantic displacement. Ideas are excluded from the realm of the concepts that belong to them historically. These presentations become unconscious, that is, repressed, in that they can no longer be identified as "cases" of these conceptual internal contents. At the same time they are displaced into the extensions of concepts whose internal contents do not belong to them originally. It is by virtue of the internal contents of these concepts that the displaced elements as substitutive formations once again attain consciousness, albeit a false one. The author suggests dismissing repression as a specific defense mechanism of its own; to reversing Freud's thesis that repression, as a rule, creates a substitutive formation into its opposite; and recognizing that the mechanisms used to build substitutes, as a rule, create repression.     

Christer Sjödin interviews Jan Stensson

Abstract

The author examines different definitions and applications of the terms “psychic energy” and “libido.” With regard to the “psychic energy” terminology, he shows that its application and usage relate in particular to the perspective of Brenner and not to Freud's definition. He argues that Freud uses the term “psychic energy” as a synonym for “libido,” and not “libido” as a synonym for “psychic energy.” It is demonstrated that in Freud's view, up until 1914, “libido” relates to manifestations of bodily sexual tensions, and subsequently this term applies to the manifestations of sexual energy in the psychic field. The author rejects this change in terminology and also challenges Freud's attempt to use dynamic-economic considerations as an explanatory device for epistemological reasons. Freud's concept of energy is inconsistent with the meaning of energy as defined in the physical sciences, and whereas the metapsychological topographical, dynamic, and structural viewpoints have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords unique access, this is not true of the economic viewpoint. It is claimed that bodily tensions only exist in the representational world in the form of affects, so that, in the author's opinion, the economic viewpoint should be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure adduced by Freud, this viewpoint focuses on the relationships between affects and the different elements of the representational world, thereby serving as the subject of metapsychological investigation.     

Variations on the concept of traumatism: Traumatism,traumatic, trauma1

In this paper, the author outlines Freud's fundamental hypotheses concerning the concept of traumatism, then goes on to differentiate three notions (French being a particularly apposite language for such a venture): ‘traumatism’, ‘traumatic’ (in a substantive sense) and ‘trauma’. These three terms correspond to the three turning points in Freud's theory with respect to the concept of traumatism (1895‐97, 1920, 1938). The author evokes also the developments that are due to Ferenczi, particularly in his later writings (1928‐33), where he defi ned and discussed the question of ‘trauma’ in contemporary clinical practice; the author goes on to explore the different variations on this theme as regards mental functioning. He then defi nes, from a metapsychological point of view, the differences between ‘traumatisms’ that have been ‘worked over by secondary processes’, organised and governed by the pleasure‐unpleasure principle (‘traumatism’) and ‘early’ or ‘primary traumatisms’, which interfere with the process of binding the instinctual drives (‘trauma’); states of mind infl uenced by a traumatic imprint (‘traumatic’) are looked upon as belonging to both categories of the above mentioned traumatisms. The author illustrates his hypotheses with a clinical example.     

FREUD'S LETTERS TO FLIESS: FROM SEDUCTION TO SEXUAL BIOLOGY, FROM PSYCHOPATHOLOGY TO A CLINICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The author describes the development of Freud's theory of neurosis from 1892 onwards, starting with his distinction between the actual neuroses and the psychoneuroses and his discovery of a specific, sexual aetiology for both, until which point it remained limited to pathology. The problem of the aetiology of perversion, however, confronted him with a paradox within the theory of seduction: how can an infantile sexual pleasure produce unpleasure when it is remembered at the time of puberty? This problem could not be solved within the framework of the seduction theory because the asexuality of childhood was essential to this theory. For an answer Freud had to turn to biology. He considered that the transformation of an infantile pleasure into unpleasure presupposed an organic repression of non‐genital sexual pleasure. This hypothesis of organic repression radically changed the anthropological claim of Freud's theory. As long as he was looking for a specific aetiology of neurosis and perversion, Freud's theory remained restricted to pathology. However, when he introduced infantile sexuality and its organic repression as universal organic processes, the strict distinction between normality and pathology could not be maintained. The author concludes that by turning to sexual biology, Freud transformed psychopathology into a clinical anthropology.     

Abwehr, Verdrängung und Ersatzbildung

The author investigates the relationship of defence, repression and substitutive formation as it presents itself in Freud’s writings. He shows that Freud gives at least four different meanings to the term “repression”: Freud uses it interchangeably with defence, as a consciously intended forgetting, as a specific unconscious mechanism of defence and to describe the consequence of defence mechanisms leading to substitutive formations. The inconsistencies in this relationship are discussed and clarified and Freud’s economic and linguistic attempts to justify repression are subjected to critique as well as the need of a primal repression as a necessary condition for repression proper. In developing Freud’s linguistic justification of repression further, the author presents defence as a semantic displacement. Ideas are excluded from the realm of the concepts which belong to them historically. These presentations become unconscious, i.e. repressed, in that they can no longer be identified as “cases” of these conceptual internal contents. At the same time they are displaced into the extensions of concepts whose internal contents do not belong to them originally. It is by virtue of the internal contents of these concepts that the displaced elements as substitutive formations once again attain consciousness, albeit a false one. It is suggested that repression as a specific defence mechanism of its own should be dismissed, to reverse Freud’s thesis that repression as a rule creates a substitutive formation into its opposite and to understand that the mechanisms used to build substitutes as a rule create repression.     

„Fort-da — die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies — ins Leben“

The paper attempts to explore the choreography of this text which is central to psychoanalytic thinking and clinical practice. Especially the “Fort-da”-game of his grandson Ernst, in addition to the observation of traumatized people, lead Freud to question the assumptions of drive theory. How can the intrapsychic repetition of trauma and the pain of separation, in essence the repetition compulsion, be compatible with the pleasure principle? Freud’s considerations lead him to the assumption that there is a form of psychic functioning which pre-dates the pleasure principle, is independent from it and seems to have developed even prior to the intention of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure — a state of “beyond the pleasure principle”. Thus the question arises how this can be compatible with drive theory which is centered around the pleasure principle. What is the meaning of Freud’s words when he speaks about a time which pre-dates the pleasure principle and where the difference between wish and wish fulfilment and (drive)conflicts, which characterize our life, do not yet exist? Freud’s reconsideration and correction of drive theory and the introduction of the death drive seem to us an epistemological circle in his reasoning and the assumption of the death drive to be unnecessary. The introduction of the death drive seems rather to have arisen from an inner conflict between drive theory and a narcissism which is not drive-determined and which is reflected in the repetition compulsion. It seems that Freud is not aware of or does not explicitly mention the perspective of a non-drive-determinated narcissism, although we find such a point of view in other Freudian texts. Bela Grunberger’s theory of narcissism enables one to reread this text with a new perspective which has important consequences for psychoanalytic practice. For example, the question as to what it is that enables the patient to get through the painful process of psychoanalysis appears in a new light. In addition we gain new insight and a re-evaluation concerning the meaning and use of a transference interpretation. A clinical case attempts to illustrate this perspective.     

The Activities of The Scandinavian Societies

Freud's concept of the death instinct has given rise to many different interpretations which have often been contradictory. It is in fact already possible to discern two diametrically opposite meanings of this concept in Freud's work from 1920—Beyond the Pleasure Principle—in which he first introduced the concept of the death instinct. In this paper, it is argued that both these meanings are relevant in describing psychical life, although only one of these meanings actually qualifies for the concept “death instinct”. Beyond the Pleasure Principle was written in order to try to understand some everyday, as well as clinical phenomena which could not be explained by the so-called pleasure principle. Freud postulated something beyond the pleasure principle, which initially seemed to have to do with binding energy. I will preserve this idea and attempt to develop it within the context of a phenomenological analysis of time. The temporalization of the subject involves a very basic affirmation of existence, in that the subject experiences something constant, something that can be said to possess the quality of a gestalt. I propose that that which is beyond the pleasure principle—this binding of energy—should be understood as the opposite of the idea of a primordial death instinct striving towards death. In this case, that which is beyond the pleasure principle reflects an original affirmation of existence, which could be said to correspond to Freud's first meaning of the death instinct. The second meaning—for which the name “death instinct” seems to be applicable—concerns the discharge of energy, which from a temporal point of view shows itself as a tendency to dissolution. The concept of the death instinct in its various meanings is discussed in connection with phenomenological reflections on time, which is a different approach from Freud's attempt to ground the death instinct in biology.     

The Symbolic Object

Abstract

The term “symbolic object” is introduced as a way to understand the moments between analyst and patient where “something” new and dynamic emerges within the dyadic relationship. The symbolic object is the bridge between the idealized, all-good object and symbolization proper. The intrapsychic atmosphere between self and object representations is in a relatively non-conflicted state during this process. By reformulating the Nirvana principle and the principle of constancy as ways in which the organism economically strives for the most organized and homoeostatic state possible, the infant or adult can be seen to be searching for the position of lowest unpleasure possible. This is the optimum balance between the libidinal and aggressive forces in the self and object representational field. These moments of “truce” between often highly conflicted phantasies usher in a more refined use of projective identification as a form of intrapsychic/interpersonal communication. This is a particular atmosphere from which both parties, within the projective/introjective, back-and-forth dyadic world, can begin to co-create and rediscover assorted amalgams of self and object functioning. This newly awakened psychic entity is the symbolic object. This outgrowth of something fresh to the dyadic orbit is a mutative moment that propels the relationship into a different direction. Within the pairing of minds, a novel and mutual understanding is produced. Both parties share this new symbolic object and each is shaped by it.     

Some notes on Freud's concept of conversion

Abstract

The author investigates conversion, the process by which psychic contents are transformed into bodily symptoms. The author concludes that this process cannot be explained by libido theory or by assuming the existence of a psychic energy. He argues that although Freud was convinced that “the leap from a mental process to a somatic innervation … can never be fully comprehensible to us,” this process is, nonetheless, comprehensible in terms of Freud's own conceptualisation. To understand this process, one must take the characteristics of the primary process to which the “replacement of external by psychical reality” belongs as radical as his thesis of a hallucinatory wish fulfilment. This thesis includes not only the hallucinatory satisfaction of instinctual wishes, but also the hallucinatory satisfaction of the desire to avoid unpleasure, which is understood as a process by which the internal conditions of this affect are displaced from the presentational world into perceptions via conversion.     

How Change Happens: Controlling Images,Mutuality, and Power

SUMMARY

Change is inevitable but it can go in a positive direction toward growth or in a negative direction. Extending Patricia Hill Collins' concept of controlling images (2000), we can see how these images interact with relational images and strategies of disconnection to obstruct growth on both the societal and the personal level. In therapy, change is defined as movement-in-relationship toward better connection; and increased connection leads to growth. Several aspects of therapy that lead to deeper and wider connection are explored, especially increasing the patient's power. Prior versions of parts of this article were presented at the Jean Baker Miller Summer Training Institutes in 2001 and 2002 and at the 2002 Learning from Women Conference sponsored by the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute and the Harvard Medical School/Cambridge Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts.

As therapists, we're “in the business” of change–change for the better. That's our goal. Another word for change for the better is growth. Change is the essence of life. It is most obvious in children but it is a necessity through all of life. Change will occur inevitably but it can go in a positive or a negative direction. Further, I believe change toward growth creates pleasure. We feel most alive and zestful when we are engaged in this expanding activity.     

Sentience and Moral Standing

Abstract

This article deals with the concept of sentience, and more specifically with the argument from sentience as it is used by utilitarians in the abortion debate and in the advocacy of animal rights. It is argued that sentience is more than feeling pleasure and pain (with emphasis on pain), and that pain is an inborn protection required to fit into the world rather than the substance of evil.     

BECOMING A PETER PAN: OMNIPOTENCE,DEPENDENCY AND THE FERENCZIAN CHILD

The aim of this paper is to provide a short history of the changes in Ferenczi’s concept of early childhood, during the two decade period, 1913–1932. Initially, Ferenczi mainly emphasized children’s feelings of omnipotence, which enable them to perceive themselves as strong, independent and capable human beings. By the mid-1920s, however, he felt that his earlier work did not give a good account of what comes after the stage of omnipotence, and that it did not adequately describe the difficulties in the transition from pleasure to reality principles. However, in his Clinical Diary, Ferenczi became fully aware of how fragile and insecure children are, and therefore how dangerous—yet necessary—it is for them to abandon the “stage of omnipotence” and to gain a “sense of reality”. For Ferenczi, traumatized children are children who had not been loved in their early childhood, and therefore could not develop the capacity to make the journey from pleasure principle to that of reality. It will be suggested that a paradigmatic example for this kind of child is Peter Pan.     

Judgments of happiness during trail running: Pleasure,engagement, and meaning

ObjectivesIt has been theorized that happiness is derived from three major, unique sets of life experience: pleasure, engagement, and meaning. The present study examined the mental processes by which individuals combined five information cues (relatedness, autonomy, competence, mental vitality and physical vitality) when judging the degree of happiness felt by a trail runner during a run.Design/methodThe participants (104 adult male athletes; M_age = 32.70; SD = 10.86) rated pleasure, engagement, and meaning in 32 scenarios built from combinations of these cues.ResultsThe results of multivariate and univariate analyses of variance indicated that all five cues had a positive effect on judgments of pleasure, engagement, and meaning. The participants used three different information integration rules, depending on the pathway to happiness being probed.ConclusionsThe information integration and the integration rules highlighted the different contributions of pleasure, engagement, and meaning in cognitive building of happiness.     

The death instinct and the mental dimension beyond the pleasure principle in the works of Spielrein and Freud

In ‘Destruction as Cause of Come‐into‐being’, Spielrein argues for the need of postulating the existence of a death instinct in mental functioning. The idea that she thus anticipated the concept of death instinct Freud introduced in 1920 is often found in psychoanalytic literature. But the specific meaning of Spielrein's hypothesis is seldom discussed, as well as the extent to which she anticipated Freud's concept. In fact, there are important differences between their views. Besides, a closer analysis of Spielrein's text reveals other ideas that come close to fundamental aspects of Freud's theories from 1920 onwards, particularly the assumption of a more primordial mental functioning than the one regulated by the pleasure principle. But also here there are important differences between the views sustained by both authors. With this in view, the objective of this paper is firstly to discuss some hypotheses formulated by Spielrein in her 1912 work in order to elucidate her concept of death instinct as well as her hypothesis of the existence of a more primitive mental functioning than the one governed by the pleasure principle. Next, the question of the possible similarities and differences with regard to Freud's concepts is also addressed.     

Between a suffering body and a body in a state of need: Aulagnier’s theory of discourses on the body applied to primitive mental states

ABSTRACT

In her theory of discourses on the body, Aulagnier makes the comparison of the concept of ‘a suffering body’ and the concept of ‘a body in a state of need’. The last type is what she thinks is often found in addiction, anorexia and in borderline states, conditions marked by a radical negativity. On the other hand, ‘a suffering body’ is a concept that indicates a relation and two bodies, mother’s and child’s, that communicate. Suffering and infantile sexuality is a first attempt to accept separation by weaving a net of fantasy over the abyss of lack and separation. If pleasure and suffering are lacking as representations, the sensory reactions may exist physiologically but without psychical existence. The concepts of ‘a suffering body’ and 'a body in a state of need' will enable us to think about important structural differences between neurotic-, borderline- and psychotic conditions. As a foundation for her concepts lies a metapsychological elaborations of three kinds of processes for representation: the primal-, the primary- and the secondary process.     

Deprivation and the See-saw of Death

Abstract

Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus’s argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against the deprivation account and argue that this response to Epicurus’s argument is successful once it has been sufficiently clarified.     

On Hannah Arendt: The Worldly In-Between of Human Beings and its Ethical Consequences

Abstract

In this paper, I show how a concept of ethics can be derived from Hannah Arendt’s theory of action in The Human Condition, which contains from her call for action. When she looks at the ‘political actor’, as well as at the concept of ‘political situation’, her ethical claim is first of all the need to take initiative, to act. Hence, ‘political situations’ as she defines them are discussed as common responsibilities. But common responsibility is rooted in the in-between of human beings, rather than in individual human nature and is determined by Arendt’s principle of humanity. Therefore, at the centre of an implicit Arendtian ethics stands the world and the in-between of human beings.     

Symbolization

Abstract

The starting point of this article is that the concept of “vitality affects” is, on the one hand, very important, but, on the other, not precisely defined. The concept and its development are traced in the writings of Daniel Stern, the person who introduced the concept into practice. Three periods of Stern's conceptual development are differentiated here, and an attempt is made to summarize them as certain basic types. By this means, it is shown that vitality affects are defined in relation to most areas of developmental psychology (the neuropsychological, the bodily, the conscious, and the interactional), and that the concept is thereby extended to so many areas that it tends toward disintegration. As final remarks, those qualities of the concept that we find most constructive, especially if one desires to approach the area empirically, are highlighted.