The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire

One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections.     

忧乐圆融：儒家忧乐思想的核心特质

儒家肯定感性忧乐的自然合理性,但是认为感性忧乐有待于外,陷溺于感性忧乐,容易使人流于以物役心的异化状态。儒家忧乐思想的根本形态是德性忧乐,德性忧乐的根据是本心自足之德性。儒家以德性之忧作为德行修养的内在心理动力,德性之乐是在德性彰明过程中本心情感的自然涌现,可以统摄和超越感性忧乐,实现忧乐圆融。     

幸福是什么

幸福概念深刻而复杂,我们可以在且个层次上把握幸福概念。首先,幸福是人生重大的快乐;进一步说,是人生重大需要和欲望得到满足的心理体验,是人生重大目的得到实现的心理体验;最终是达到生存和发展的某种完满的心理体验。     

Motivation for reward as a function of required effort: Dissociating the ‘liking’ from the ‘wanting’ system in humans

Recent studies investigating the neurobiology of reward motivation in animals have begun to deconstruct reward into separable neural systems involving the ‘liking’ of a reward (hedonic enjoyment of consumption) versus the ‘wanting’ of a reward (incentive salience to obtain reward). To date, however, it is unclear whether these systems are also separable in humans. We examined this question by manipulating the effort (clicking on a moving square) required for participants to obtain a reward (humorous versus non-humorous cartoon). Overall, as the required effort to view a humorous cartoon increased, participants were less likely to choose this reward. Moreover, individual differences in cartoon preference predicted cartoon choice at low levels of required effort, but not at high levels of required effort. These findings suggest that manipulating effort may be a valid method for dissociating the ‘liking’ from ‘wanting’ components of reward motivation in humans.

Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean Instrumentalism and the Normative Authority of Desire

This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explores some broadly Humean versions of instrumentalism that are among the most plausible contenders to represent instrumentalism as a contemporary naturalistic position. It first offers a taxonomy of reasons for action and, in that light, formulates a plausible version of instrumentalism. It then raises difficulties for the view, some of them concerning the nature of desire. It also develops an epistemologically significant comparison of desires with beliefs. Given the magnitude of the difficulties, it outlines an alternative account of practical reason.     

Pleasurable emotions,age, and life satisfaction

The self-reported experiences of five distinct pleasurable emotions (tranquility, contentment, interest, cheerfulness, and vigor), as well as the relation between pleasurable emotions and life satisfaction, were examined in a sample of 173 pairs of younger and older adults (mean ages of 18.9 and 74.4?years, respectively). Older individuals reported significantly higher levels of cheerfulness and contentment than did younger individuals. The relation between pleasurable emotions and life satisfaction was significantly moderated by age. Specifically, life satisfaction was more strongly associated with tranquility among older individuals than among younger individuals (with a similar, albeit weaker, trend for contentment).     

The phenomenology of virtue

What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous—that is, for most of us, not very much.     

Do you find exercise pleasant or unpleasant? The Affective Exercise Experiences (AFFEXX) questionnaire

Suggestions that affective experiences may influence exercise motivation have commonly appeared since the dawn of exercise psychology. However, a measure that captures the nature, the antecedents, and the motivational implications of such experiences has been lacking. We developed the Affective Exercise Experiences (AFFEXX) questionnaire to assess the constructs within a conceptual model, according to which core affective exercise experiences (pleasure-displeasure, energy-tiredness, calmness-tension) are influenced by six antecedent appraisals and, in turn, shape attraction or antipathy towards exercise. We report results from three studies (N = 1799) evaluating internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and factorial, convergent, discriminant, construct, and criterion validity. We show that attraction-antipathy correlates with vigorous (0.55) and moderate-to-vigorous (0.48) self-reported physical activity, and accounts for 11–12% and 6–7% of additional variance, respectively, beyond variance explained by self-efficacy and behavioral intention. Affective exercise experiences warrant further study as possible contributors to motivation. The AFFEXX is available from this link: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/EF76R.     

Some thoughts about psychoanalysis and cinema

Abstract

This article approaches the pleasures of the cinema through a discussion of the conditions of cinema going and the place of the cinema in twentieth-century culture. It links them to the history of cinema and to the debates about art and psychoanalysis. It introduces the centrality of parallels between the cinema and dreaming and the importance of sexuality for the cinema. It suggests that discussion about the psychic mechanisms elicited by film going is a productive way of thinking about the cinema.